波斯纳法律经济学的影响和变革意义

波斯纳法律经济学坚持效益应当被看作是法律的基本价值,其法律的效益价值理论和经济分析方法是法学研究理论领域和方法论上的重大突破.在世界经济全球化的背景下,经济分析法学对于当今研究市场经济条件下的法治,对于建立和健全符合市场经济内在规律的法律体系,具有重要的借鉴意义.     

Legal Positivism and Legal Disagreements

This paper deals with the possibility of faultless disagreement in law. It does this by looking to other spheres in which faultless disagreement appears to be possible, mainly in matters of taste and ethics. Three possible accounts are explored: the realist account, the relativist account, and the expressivist account. The paper tries to show that in the case of legal disagreements, there is a place for an approach that can take into account our intuitions in the sense that legal disagreements are genuine and at times faultless.     

法律实证主义的问题意识

法律实证主义作为西方法哲学史上与自然法学派相对立的思想流派.始终饱受误解和质疑.法律实证主义的"问题意识"是深入领会其良苦用心和精神实质的关键.自然法学派与法律实证主义的法律观都具有批判与保守、灵活与随意、确定与僵化的两面性.法律实证主义以"形式正义"取代"实质正义",以"合法性"诠释"正当性",是对自然法的绝对性、抽象性、不确定性等形而上学固有缺陷深刻认识的结果,反映了法律实证主义深刻的问题意识.因之,法律实证主义在实践上具有更稳健、妥切、现实的品格.法律实证主义以特殊的方式理解和处理了正当性观念,它与自然法学派的关系与其说是本体论上的对立,不如说是认识论和方法论上的发展、补充和超越,由此二者才能共同支撑和维护西方法治文明的大厦.     

Positivism and Plural Legal Systems

This paper considers whether the positivist account of law is useful in guiding states in how they should deal with religious or customary legal orders followed by minority groups within their jurisdiction. It argues, first, that such orders can be said to exist despite the prevalence of disagreement about the grounds of law. It then argues, contrary to views advanced by Scott Shapiro and Joseph Raz, that there are good reasons for perceiving that the resolution of legal disputes by reference to moral principle involves the application of pre‐existing law. However, the paper concludes by arguing that the Social Thesis has an important role in supplying the basis upon which the application of law can be deemed to be legitimate, and that this has relevance to the way states might respond to minority legal orders.     

Legal Positivism and the Nature of Legal Obligation

Law and Philosophy -     

Beyond Inclusive Legal Positivism*

In this essay, I characterize the original intervention that became Inclusive Legal Positivism, defend it against a range of powerful objections, explain its contribution to jurisprudence, and display its limitations and its modest jurisprudential significance. I also show how in its original formulations ILP depends on three notions that are either mistaken or inessential to law: the separability thesis, the rule of recognition, and the idea of criteria of legality. The first is false and is in event inessential to legal positivism. The second is inessential to legal positivism. The third is likely inessential to law. I then characterize the central claim of ILP in a way that relies on none of these: ILP is the claim that necessarily social facts determine the determinants of legal content. I show that ILP so conceived leaves the central debates in law largely untouched. I suggest how the most fundamental of these—the question of the normativity of law—at least can be usefully addressed. The essay closes by suggesting that even though one can distinguish the social from the normative dimensions of law, a theory of the nature of law is necessarily an account of the relationship between the two: It is a theory either of the difference that certain distinctive social facts make in normative space, or it is an account of the distinctive normative difference that law makes, and the social and other facts that are necessary to explain that difference. One can distinguish between but one cannot separate the social from the normative aspects of legality.     

Legal Positivism and Deontic Detachment

I consider a puzzle that arises when the logical principle known as “deontic detachment” is applied to the law. It is not possible to accept the principle of deontic detachment in a legal setting while also accepting that the so‐called “social facts thesis” applies to all legal propositions. According to the social facts thesis, the existence and content of law is determined by the attitudes or practices of legal officials. Abandoning deontic detachment is not an appropriate solution to the problem—the puzzle can be recreated with other plausible closure principles. The problem can be solved by restricting the social facts thesis to legal rules, rather than applying it to all legal propositions. Properly construed the social facts thesis does not apply to facts about what legally ought to be the case.     

法律实证主义散论

法律实证主义是20世纪西方三大主要法学流派之一。同时，它还是一个难以精确界定的学术派剐，“法律命令说”不过是法律实证主义的伪标志。法律实证主义的意旨是：通过概念分析，从而使得法学成为一门自足的科学。法律实证主义思想在清末民初时传入我国，但并没有真正地扎下根来。法律实证主义对于当下中国的法学发展、法治建设以及司法实践有着重要的启示意义。     

论法律事实

法律与事实在法学上是两个既有区别又有联系的概念.其区别表现为它们分别概括了不同的事物,它们的联系在于法律事实既是事实的一种,同时也属于法律现象.按<现代汉语词典>的解释,事实是指事情的真实情况,从这种解释的倾向性看,它侧重强调了事情的真实存在.而从较为公认的观点看,法律主要是指国家制定或认可的行为规则.所以,法律与事实明显属于两种不同的事物.在法学研究中,事实问题和法律问题必须加以区分.事实问题是指涉及与调查有关的过去某时间、某人、某事的存在状况或事实状态等.