Democracies: Forms, performance, and constitutional engineering

Abstract. The conventional wisdom concerning the choice between majoritarian electoral systems and proportional representation (PR) – and, more broadly, between majoritarian and consensus forms of democracy – is that there is a trade-off: PR and consensus democracy provide more accurate representation and better minority representation, but majoritarianism provides more effective government. A comparative analysis of 18 older and well-established democracies, most of which are European democracies, shows that PR and consensus democracy indeed give superior political representation, but that majoritarian systems do not perform better in maintaining public order and managing the economy, and hence that the over-all performance of consensus democracy is superior. This conclusion should also be tested among the growing number of slightly newer non-European democracies, which are already old enough to have proved their viability and can be studied over an extended period of time. If its validity is confirmed – and the evidence so far is very promising – it can have great practical significance for the future of democracy in the world.     

Explaining national environmental performance: approaches,evidence, and implications

Since environmental problems rose to prominence in the last third of the twentieth century, they have been a major area of policy for national governments. A large body of research has explored the explanations for different levels of environmental policy performance among countries. This article begins with a discussion of approaches to measuring national performance before reviewing and assessing four categories of explanations in the literature, which may be summarized in four questions: (1) What are the relationships between economic growth and environmental protection? (2) Do democratic regimes have advantages over more authoritarian ones in adopting effective policies and reducing harm? (3) Do such institutional characteristics as pluralism or neo-corporatism and federalism affect a nation’s ability to deal with environmental problems? (4) Are there institutional or societal capacities or relationships within or among nations that may explain policy success? By adopting a broad perspective on the literature on national environmental performance, the article is able to explore and compare the principal findings of these categories of research and assess the relationships among them.     

Political characteristics, institutional procedures and fiscal performance: Panel data analyses of Norwegian local governments, 1991–1998

Abstract.  Budgeting can be understood as a common resource pool problem where spending agencies have incentives to encourage excessive levels of current spending and reduce budget surplus or create budget deficits. The political leadership is assumed to have an important role in keeping fiscal control and resisting the high-demanders' pressure for increased spending. Three factors of relevance for their success are investigated: political characteristics (political colour and political strength, the strength of relevant interest groups) and two institutional characteristics – committee structure and budgeting procedures. The analyses are based on panel data from up to 434 Norwegian municipalities in the period from 1991 to 1998. The results support the hypothesis that strong political leadership improves fiscal performance. The effect of interest groups is to a high degree community-specific. However, an increased share of elderly reduces fiscal surplus. Differences in budgetary procedures do not seem to affect fiscal performance. A strong committee structure seems, on the other hand, to result in better fiscal performance than a weaker one.     

Stress and performance: Investigating relationship between occupational stress,career satisfaction,and job performance of police employees

The purpose of this research is to explore the impact of occupational stress on job performance of police employees. We theorized and tested the role of career satisfaction in the relationship between occupational stress and job performance as an underlying psychological mechanism. Primary data have been collected from 271 police employees working at AJ&K Pakistan. Results of this research study have shown that occupational stress is negatively related to career satisfaction, in‐role performance, and extra‐role performance of police employees. Moreover, career satisfaction mediates the relationships between occupational stress and in‐role and extra‐role performance of police employees. This research study has called researchers' and policy makers' attention towards an important issue of occupational stress in the police profession. The research will play an important role in compelling the top management, authorities, policy makers, and government officials of police to ponder over the issues of occupational stress aimed at enhancing the job performance including in‐role and extra‐role performance of police employees.     

The price of personalizing politics: Political distrust and economic performance in Latin America, 1996–2006

While research has provided evidence that culture and institutional performance shape individual level trust in political institutions, scholars have neglected to adequately estimate the effect of political institutions and macroeconomic conditions on trust. Using data from the World Value Surveys for eleven Latin American cases, we test if countries with “partyizing” electoral systems - those with rules that encourage voters to hold the party, not individuals, accountable for government performance - experience lower levels of distrust in political parties and the legislature in times of poor economic conditions than those countries with “personalizing” electoral rules. Our analysis shows that the macro political and economic context largely conditions the impact of culture and institutional performance on political trust.     

Macroeconomic performance,political trust and the Great Recession: A multilevel analysis of the effects of within‐country fluctuations in macroeconomic performance on political trust in 15 EU countries, 1999–2011

Recent cross‐national comparative studies have found no effect of countries’ macroeconomic performances on trust in national political institutions, once political explanations (most notably corruption) are taken into account. Although political trust is not determined by the comparison of national economic performance to other countries, it is argued in this article that it is affected by comparisons to their own past performance. In a multilevel, fixed effects analysis of Eurobarometer data (21 waves in 15 European Union Member States between 1999 and 2011) the extent to which within‐country variations in economic performance affect political trust longitudinally is tested. Three major conclusions are reached. First, within‐country, longitudinal changes in performance (growth, deficits, unemployment and inflation) affect political trust. Second, the impact of macroeconomic performance is stronger among the lower educated. Third, even in times of economic duress, budgetary deficits tend to undermine political trust.     

Practical assessment of project performance: the ‘potential impact’ approach*

This article sets out an approach to assessing project performance, using ‘potential impact’ of the project. Its purpose is to assist project design and evaluation. In project design, potential impacts of alternative activities on the project objective are compared, in order to select activities with the greatest impact. In project evaluation, potential and actual impacts of a project are compared. Additional benefits of the approach are that it indicates ‘value for money’ of development assistance invested in projects, and easier tracing of reasons for underachievement in projects to weaknesses in their design or management. Limitations are that it relies on informed judgement of the planners or evaluators and the categories for rating performance may unavoidably be broad. It complements the logical framework approach by providing a practical design and evaluation tool. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Strategy,market orientation and performance: the political context

This paper investigates the fit between the strategic posture of a political party and its political market orientation, and analyses the impact of this fit on party performance. For this purpose, a configuration theory logic is applied to the context of the political market; in particular, we develop strategic profiles (i.e. strategic postures and political market orientation) of four Belgian political parties represented in the Flemish Parliament. By comparing the strategic profiles derived from a questionnaire administered to 3148 party members with those of ‘theoretically ideal’ profiles, we uncover the ‘strategic misfit’ (or ‘misalignment’) for each party and then relate this misfit to party performance. Results indicate that there is a strong, negative relationship between the misalignment of actual and perceived strategic profiles on the one hand and performance on the other. However, the ‘ideal profiles’ differ with the strategic posture of a party. Thus, our findings show that it is not so much the strategic posture itself that will determine superior performance, but it is the strategic posture that the party aligns with implementing a particular political market orientation that is the most important factor. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Challenges for donor agency country‐level performance assessment: a review

This review of country‐level performance assessment in donor agencies is primarily based upon the experiences documented by bilateral donors to developing countries. The review suggests that four emerging themes can be identified in the literature on country‐level performance review: ownership, decentralisation and leadership, accountability and learning and complexity. The review considers the implementation of ‘results‐based’ approaches used by a number of international agencies and examines their relationship with ‘evidence‐based’ approaches. A key challenge, in the development of performance assessment, is bringing in a stronger evidence‐based approach into the planning and evaluation of donor country‐level programmes. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Multilevel governance and organizational performance: Investigating the political‐bureaucratic labyrinth

Research on governance has extensively explored the complex interactions of governmental, nongovernmental, and for‐profit entities in the execution of public policy. It has consistently failed, however, to model empirically the joint effects of political and bureaucratic actors in governance systems. To address this issue, a theory of multilevel governance built upon the foundation of representative bureaucracy was developed and tested. Results from an analysis of Texas school districts suggest that Latinos at all levels of the governance system, political and managerial, influence representation at other levels. Findings also indicate that Latinos at each level of governance have positive effects, directly and indirectly, on outcomes for Latino students. The influence of both political and managerial actors at times extends beyond the immediately adjoining level; the effects of such actors cascade through the governance system. The results show that a priority for systematic research should be the identification of approaches and settings for examining the multilevel aspect of governance. © 2004 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Economic performance of 'weak' governments and their interaction with central banks and labour: Deficits, economic growth, unemployment and inflation, 1961–1998

Abstract.   Comparative political economists have conventionally claimed that the strength and stability of governments affect policy making and performance, and that what they call 'weak governments'– multiparty, minority and short-lived governments – show poorer economic performance. This article tests this and related hypotheses on deficits, economic growth, unemployment and inflation by examining data from 17 OECD countries. I find that there is generally little evidence to indicate that so-called 'weak governments', when considered independently, produce poorer performance than strong ones. However, the effects of different government types are partly contingent on central bank independence and labour organization. When central banks are independent, coalition governments exhibit better inflation and economic growth performance than one-party governments, but the opposite happens when central banks are dependent. I attempt an explanation for these relationships. I also find that independent central banks, under certain conditions, lead to lower growth and higher inflation. Thus, some of the benefits of central bank independence are context-specific, depending on other political-economic factors.     

Public enterprise reform: Managerial autonomy,accountability and performance contracts

The underlying assumption in this paper is that autonomy and accountability are both fundamental prerequisites for the effective functioning of state-owned enterprises. The paper first examines the traditional, dichotomous approach to the autonomy-accountability conundrum. This approach posits the relationship as process oriented, pervasive, quantitative and based on a priori controls. A more recent view of control and accountability as a posteriori, qualitative, strategic, results-oriented and non-zero sum is then briefly analysed. The paper presents a review of the theory and practice of performance contracts (PC) as tools to implement the latter approach. Three basic models of PCs—Senegal's contrat plan, Pakistan's signalling system and India's memorandum of understanding—have been analysed, comparing the negotiating process, major players, substantive elements and results. The contrat plan is more of a legal document, at least in formal terms, than the other two. None of the three models, however, provides any sanctions in case of a violation of the contract by the governments. Although the Indian and Pakistani PCs appeared to be more successful than the Senegalese contracts, the relationship between financial performance and performance contracts remains far from conclusive. In all the three countries, the contracts have failed to provide a single window through which government-enterprise interface can be effectively managed. Thus the problem of multiple principals and single agents remains unresolved.