Trust in government and welfare regimes: Attitudes to redistribution and financial cheating in the USA and Norway

Abstract. Claims have been made that national institutions influence public preferences, as well as structuring patterns of social division. This article analyses attitudes to redistribution and financial cheating in Norway and the USA. On the aggregate level the results show that there are striking differences between the two countries regarding attitudes to redistribution and confidence in the state, while similar attitude patterns are found regarding cheating with taxes and benefits. Results endorse arguments emphasising that the design and scope of welfare state policies shape and determine their own legitimacy. There is less support for political trust arguments, which emphasise that the efficacy of political decision–making institutions promotes beliefs about trust in the state and views on government responsibilities. Similarly, arguments proposing that advanced welfare statism has undesirable effects on civic morality, such as cheating on taxes and benefits, are not supported empirically. Finally, while conflicts over redistribution are similarly structured in the USA and Norway, divisions over financial cheating are less clear–cut and vary cross–nationally.     

Divided by the Market,Divided by the State: Distribution,Redistribution and Welfare Attitudes in 47 Countries

This article examines the impact of income inequality and welfare state context on the extent to which the rich and poor share similar attitudes towards redistribution. It asks whether and how differences in attitudes, particularly those between income groups, are shaped by inequality and redistributive efforts. Based on a multi‐level analysis of individual survey data across 47 countries at three points in time, the article shows that such an interaction of individual characteristics and the macro‐context indeed matters considerably. While material self‐interest, unsurprisingly, explains part of the individual differences, the analysis also shows, for the first time, that both high inequality and strongly redistributive policies divide public opinion along the lines of socioeconomic position. Put differently, while market inequality may be associated with less cohesive attitudes, a highly redistributive welfare state does not seem to foster agreement among the public, either. These findings have important policy implications for advanced welfare states, including a renewed emphasis on ‘predistribution’ (i.e., policies that influence the primary distribution of income) in order to avoid the scenario of intensified redistributive conflicts.     

Well-Being in the Welfare State: Level Not Higher, Distribution Not More Equitable

The terms well-being and welfare are Often bracketed together, especially well-being and state welfare. The level of well-being is believed to be higher in welfare states, and its distribution more equitable. This theory is tested here in a comparative study of 41 nations from 1980 to 1990. The size of state welfare is measured by social security expenditures. The well-being of citizens is measured in terms of the degree to which they lead healthy and happy lives. Contrary to expectation, there appears to be no link between the size of the welfare state and the level of well-being within it. In countries with generous social security schemes, people are not healthier or happier than in equally affluent countries where the state is less open-handed. Increases or reductions in social security expenditure are not related to a rise or fall in the level of health and happiness either. There also appears to be no connection between the size of state welfare and equality in well-being among citizens of the state. In countries where social security expenditure is high, the dispersion of health and happiness is not smaller than in equally prosperous countries with less social insurance spending. Again, increases and reductions in social security expenditure are not linked with equality in health and happiness among citizens. This counterintuitive result raises five questions: (1) Is this really true? (2) If so, what could explain this lack of effect? (3) Why is it so difficult to believe this result? (4) How should this information affect social policy? (5) What can we learn from further research?     

Issue compensation and right‐wing government social spending

It is well‐established that prolonged left‐wing incumbency has a positive long‐term effect on welfare effort in terms of high levels of social spending and reduced levels of economic inequality and poverty. Prolonged left‐wing incumbency also influences the institutional set‐up of welfare states, in particular generating strong support for existing arrangements in countries with large welfare states. The issue ownership literature furthermore shows that the public comes to distrust right‐wing parties as defenders of the welfare state. In countries that have a tradition of left‐wing incumbency it is particularly important for right‐wing governments to compensate for the distrust of the public because of the popularity of the welfare state and strong vested interests. While right‐wing governments on average are negatively associated with social spending, there is a strong positive association between right‐wing government and social spending in traditionally left‐wing countries. It is even the case that right‐wing governments in these countries spend more on social welfare than left‐wing governments. This indicates that right‐wing governments are forced to compensate for the lack of public trust by being even more generous than the left.     

The rise of the modern welfare state, ideology, institutions and income security: analysis and evidence

In the 25-year period between 1960 and 1985, there was a great expansion of welfare state programs throughout the West. The fraction of GDP accounted for by social expenditures doubled in much of Europe and grew by 40–50% in many other OECD nations. After 1985, growth in social insurance programs slowed relative to other parts of the economy. This paper explores the extent to which institutions and ideological shifts may have accounted for the period of rapid growth, for differences in the extent of that growth, and for the subsequent reduction in the growth rates of social insurance programs.     

Social security: a program and policy history

Many of the federal and state programs that provide income security to U.S. families have their roots in the Social Security Act (the Act) of 1935. This Act provided for unemployment insurance, old-age insurance, and means-tested welfare programs. The Great Depression was clearly a catalyst for the Social Security Act of 1935, and some of its provisions--notably the means-tested programs--were intended to offer immediate relief to families. However, the old-age insurance program-the precursor to today's Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance, or Social Security, program-was not designed specifically to deal with the economic crisis of that era. Indeed, monthly benefit payments, under the original Act, were not scheduled to begin until 1942. In addition, from the beginning, the Social Security program has embodied social insurance principles that were widely discussed even before the onset of the Great Depression. The first four decades of the Social Security program were, in general, ones of expansion. In fact, the program was expanded even before it became truly operational. In 1939, amendments added child, spouse, and survivor benefits to the retirement benefits authorized by the 1935 Act. Those amendments also allowed for monthly benefits to begin in 1940. Although the program was not changed substantially during the war years and the initial postwar period, the 1950s were a transformational decade in the program's history: benefit amounts were increased substantially, coverage under the program became close to universal, and a new disability insurance benefit was offered. The 1960s witnessed additional growth in Social Security, but the most important development in social insurance occurred in health insurance, with the creation of the Medicare program in 1965. Legislative actions in the 1970s had profound effects on the Social Security program and, indeed, set the stage for many of today's reform debates. Large benefit increases, a new benefit formula that was erroneously generous, and other changes in the early 1970s created a situation in which annual program costs, as a share of gross domestic product, increased during a 12-year period from about 3 percent to 5 percent. In 1977, amendments to the Act corrected the flawed benefit formula and made other changes in the financing of the system to shore up the program. Thus, the 1970s represent a watershed in the program's history-program growth gave way to increasing concerns about the program's finances. Those concerns were reflected in the amendments to the Act in 1983, which were the last major changes to the program. These amendments, based largely on recommendations from a commission chaired by Alan Greenspan, adjusted benefits and taxes to address pressing near-term financing problems faced by the system. Although the Greenspan Commission focused to a large extent on short-range issues, the resulting reforms have generated large surpluses in the program and the buildup of a substantial trust fund. However, the looming retirement of the baby boomers and several other demographic factors will, according to projections, result in the exhaustion of the trust fund by 2042.     

Health insurance in a democracy: Why is it public and why are premiums income related?

Many democracies have public health insurance systems which combine redistribution from the rich to the poor and from the healthy to the sick. This paper shows that such systems can be in the interest of the poor and the rich from a constitutional perspective. Necessary conditions are that insurance markets are incomplete and that income inequality is neither too low nor too high. Then even the rich can prefer a public health insurance system financed by income-dependent contributions compared to a system financed by a flat fee or a private health insurance system.     

Moral consensus in a secularising society: The Irish divorce referendum of 1986

The research reported here constitutes a part of a major project on democratic transition in Southern Europe. The article seeks to bring Southern Europe within the ambit of comparative welfare state analysis by (1) developing time‐series models of social insurance growth in Greece, Portugal and Spain and (2) for the first time, incorporating these nations’ social insurance experience into a model of social security development for the advanced nations. The time‐series analysis centres on the formative interaction of democratic transition with socio‐economic, demographic and policy influences. The cross‐national analysis points to the crucial role of both democratisation processes and cultural differences; as well as the standard repertoire of explanations in this field of research.     

The compensation hypothesis goes east: FDI and welfare state demand in postcommunist countries

While existing research provides evidence that globalisation sparks citizen demand for the welfare state in wealthy Western democracies, less is known about how globalisation affects public demand for welfare elsewhere. This study explores the link between globalisation and welfare preferences in postcommunist countries by examining workers at multinational corporations (MNCs). These workers have previously been found to have lower levels of job security, even in Western Europe. Additionally, in the postcommunist context, MNC employment also frequently offers better opportunities than other available jobs. This combination of risk and benefit creates higher demand for social insurance (such as unemployment insurance) because MNC workers have both higher job insecurity and higher costs of job loss (if the benefits of MNC employment make it difficult to find an equally good job). Original survey data from Ukraine shows that MNC workers experience greater insecurity and are paid more than other workers. They also express preferences for more expansive welfare programmes, prioritising those related to labour market insurance. This pattern of MNC workers’ experience and preferences is confirmed in cross-national survey data from 30 peripheral economies, demonstrating that the compensation hypothesis has wider application than previously shown.     

Sectoral reallocation, distributional coalitions and the welfare state as determinants of economic growth rates in industrialized democracies

Abstract. This paper investigates three propositions about economic growth. It rejects the proposition that differences in the size of the agricultural sector or in opportunities to reallocate resources from this sector to other sectors of the economy significantly contribute to the explanation of differential growth rates among industrialized democracies. It supports Olson's proposition that long lasting democracies suffer from an accumulation of distributional coalitions whose rent-seeking activities retard economic growth. It also supports the proposition that the welfare state contributes to economic decline. Technically, this paper applies cross-sectional and pooled regression analyses of growth rates on employment in agriculture as a percentage of civilian employment, age of democracy, and social security transfers as a percentage of GDP. Data refer to the 1960–82 period and 19 nations.     

Institutional competitiveness in the global economy: Denmark,the United States,and the varieties of capitalism

Despite high taxes, a large welfare state, and much economic regulation, Denmark competes successfully against other advanced capitalist economies. Denmark’s success is based in large part on its institutional competitiveness – its capacity to achieve socioeconomic success as a result of the competitive advantages that firms derive from operating within a particular set of institutions. The institutional basis for successfully coordinating labor markets and vocational training programs are examined for Denmark and the US – two countries that were very different institutionally but very successful in the 1990s and in the 2000s. We show that there is no one best way to achieve success in today’s global economy, except with respect to social inequality; that the mechanisms underlying institutional competitiveness are more complex than often recognized; that institutional hybrids can be as successful as purer political economic cases; and that high taxes and state spending can enhance socioeconomic performance. As such, this paper challenges both neoliberalism and the varieties of capitalism school of comparative political economy.     

HEALTH CARE POLICY IN THE GERMAN SOCIAL INSURANCE STATE: From Solidarity to Privatization?

Statutory health insurance is a centerpiece of the German welfare state, which considers itself to be a “social insurance state.” At the same time, due to a large volume of interpersonal redistributions that occur in health insurance, it is the most ambitious branch of the country's social insurance system. The stability of the health scheme thus depends on a “culture of solidarity” to maintain the legitimacy of these redistributions. This article analyzes recent changes in the legislative framework of the statutory health insurance. It asks whether these changes which predominantly aim to contain employers’ nonwage labor costs by making the insured bear a larger share of total health care spending, are possibly weakening the moral infrastructure of the welfare state. To this end, findings from qualitative interviews with insured persons are evaluated in view of recently approved and currently proposed legislative changes to the health scheme. The analytical focus is the question whether the two equity principles of this scheme, delivering health care according to medical need and financing it according to the “ability‐to‐pay,” are becoming endangered.     

Institutional conditions for the integration of immigrants in welfare states: A comparison of the literature on Germany,France, Great Britain,and the Netherlands

Abstract. In this paper we analyse the literature on a particular aspect of immigrant integration in Western European welfare states: the extent to which this can be explained by conditions set by institutions, social rights and rights of residence. Our focus is on health care, old age insurance, housing and vocational training, and on the circumstances under which migrants have access to benefits from the general systems of social security. In particular, the assignment of a legal position by the rights of residence plays an essential role. The various legal groups have access to social benefits depending on their status of residence. The institutional framework of each welfare states is also relevant to the access that people have to social benefits. In the countries analysed, Germany, France, Great Britain, and the Netherlands, the individual security systems are organised according to different political concepts, each of them allowing immigrants access to their benefits to a different degree. On the whole, the degree and kind of governmental regulations seem to be crucially important for the integration of immigrants into the welfare state.     

Sozialpolitik im Finanzföderalismus – Hartz IV als Antwort auf die Krise der Kommunalfinanzen

In the literature on welfare state reforms, continental welfare states like Germany have been considered to be resistant to reform. However, recently scholars started to argue that new reform coalitions and policy learning have led to a major restructuring of the German welfare state. In this article we introduce a third argument into the debate and claim that the recent reforms can only be understood by taking into account the specific structure of welfare state financing in Germany. Focusing on the reform of unemployment benefits we show that the crisis of the widespread cost-shifting practice between the federal budget, the social insurance and local authority budgets contributed to fiscal problems which could ultimately only be resolved by engaging in a fundamental restructuring of the financing architecture of welfare provisions for the long-term unemployed.     

The Effects of Mandated Health Insurance Benefits for Autism on Out‐of‐Pocket Costs and Access to Treatment

As of 2014, 37 states have passed mandates requiring many private health insurance policies to cover diagnostic and treatment services for autism spectrum disorders (ASDs). We explore whether ASD mandates are associated with out‐of‐pocket costs, financial burden, and cost or insurance‐related problems with access to treatment among privately insured children with special health care needs (CSHCNs). We use difference‐in‐difference and difference‐in‐difference‐in‐difference approaches, comparing pre–post mandate changes in outcomes among CSHCN who have ASD versus CSHCN other than ASD. Data come from the 2005 to 2006 and the 2009 to 2010 waves of the National Survey of CSHCN. Based on the model used, our findings show no statistically significant association between state ASD mandates and caregivers’ reports about financial burden, access to care, and unmet need for services. However, we do find some evidence that ASD mandates may have beneficial effects in states in which greater percentages of privately insured individuals are subject to the mandates. We caution that we do not study the characteristics of ASD mandates in detail, and most ASD mandates have gone into effect very recently during our study period.     

The effects of state policy design features on take-up and crowd-out rates for the State Children's Health Insurance Program.

We evaluate the effects of state policy design features on SCHIP take-up rates and on the degree to which SCHIP benefits crowd out private benefits. The results indicate overall program take-up rates of approximately 10 percent. However, there is considerable heterogeneity across states, suggesting a potential role of inter-state variation in policy design. We find that several design mechanisms have significant and substantial positive effects on take-up. For example, eliminating asset tests, offering continuous coverage, simplifying the application and renewal processes, and extending benefits to parents all have sizable and positive effects on take-up rates. Mandatory waiting periods, on the other hand, consistently reduce take-up rates. In all, inter-state differences in outreach and anti-crowd-out efforts explain roughly one-quarter of the cross-state variation in take-up rates. Concerning the crowding out of private health insurance benefits, we find that between one-quarter and one-third of the increase in public health insurance coverage for SCHIP-eligible children is offset by a decline in private health coverage. We find little evidence that the policy-induced variation in take-up is associated with a significant degree of crowd out, and no evidence that the negative effect on private coverage caused by state policy choices is any greater than the overall crowding-out effect. This suggests that states are not augmenting take-up rates by enrolling children that are relatively more likely to have private health insurance benefits.     

Umbau des Sozialstaates? Österreich und Deutschland im Vergleich

In comparative analysis of welfare states, there is a consensus that mature welfare state systems have been confronted, for some considerable time, with substantial pressure towards re-structuring and that, as a result, they actually have undertaken several and varied modifications. This articles aims at exploring and analysing these developments in Austria and Germany from a comparative point of view. The analysis concentrates on two vital fields of social policy: old-age insurance and unemployment insurance. Especially in respect of the development of social policy and regarding important characteristics of the two welfare state systems, both countries traditionally show a large degree of resemblance to each other. Many similarities remained to exist during the phase of growing pressures on the welfare state, whereas at the same time it is evident that differences between the two countries increased. The respective actual developments will be interpreted in the light of corresponding theories of comparative welfare state research and classified as gradual and structural changes.     

Tax Competition and Income Redistribution: An Empirical Analysis for Switzerland

Tax competition is supposed to lead to thecollapse of the welfare state because, first, it willbecome difficult for a single jurisdiction to levy aredistribution tax upon the rich and mobile, andsecond, such a policy, if undertaken in onejurisdiction, will attract poor individuals from otherjurisdictions and erode internal redistributionpolicies. In this paper, the impact of personal incometaxes and transfers on residence decisions oftaxpayers is analyzed with Swiss subfederal data. Therelationship of tax competition and the erosion of theSwiss welfare state is tested with aggregate data onincome redistribution.     

Americanising Brexit Britain's Welfare State?

Will the British welfare state revert to an Americanisation trajectory or retain features of the European model after April 2019? After a period of historically prolonged austerity and substantial working age welfare reform, with the UK facing yet another renegotiation of the social contract in a post‐Brexit world, the question of whether there remains space for an alternative to the ‘American’ model is of crucial importance. We argue that there has been a blurring of differences across the American and European welfare states in terms of working age benefits, as most countries have adopted aspects of work‐based conditionality reforms, which attach the receipt of benefits to the active pursuit of work and, to varying extents, the underlying politics of US welfare reform, where there are large coalitions supportive of more punitive policies towards low‐income adults and minorities. These trends are taking place against the backdrop of a second major shift: increasing restrictions on benefits for immigrants. This double narrowing of the welfare state, making benefits conditional for citizens and excluding those who are not citizens, seemingly sets the agenda for a more restrictive post‐Brexit welfare state. The experience of the last two decades suggests, however, that the adoption of the American model has not been wholesale; steering a middle path between punitive conditional American benefits and more traditionally generous universal benefits is on the agenda across advanced welfare states.     

The effect of child support on welfare exits and re‐entries

Much of the literature on welfare dynamics has focused on the effects of recipient characteristics and state‐level characteristics such as welfare benefits and economic conditions; there has been very little analysis on the effects of child support. This paper, using the 1979‐1996 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, examines whether child support affects the likelihood of leaving and re‐entering welfare. The results indicate that strong child support enforcement is important in helping young mothers exit and stay off welfare. Women with $1000 child support payments in the previous year were 18 percent more likely to exit welfare and 12 percent less likely to re‐enter welfare. Compared with women in states that pursued child support least vigorously, women in states that had passed extensive child support enforcement legislation and that spent more money on child support enforcement were 79 percent more likely to exit welfare and about 60 percent less likely to re‐enter welfare. © 2002 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.