Scope conditions of economic voting: The Danish exception?

In country after country, economic voting analysts have found that voters react sociotropically rather than egotropically. However, in a series of papers Nannestad and Paldam have found the exact opposite result for Danish voters – a result which challenges the scope conditions of economic voting. Changing only a few minor aspects of Nannestad and Paldam’s design, including the introduction of a standard sociotropic item in their models, though, reproduces the standard result: strong sociotropic and weak egotropic effects. The challenging results thus seem to be methodological artefacts; a finding that strengthens confidence in the generalizability of the basic mechanism of economic voting. Voters are not necessarily altruists, however. Sociotropic voting may be driven by both egoistic and altruistic considerations.     

What are the current preoccupations of economic voting research?

The papers in this volume remind us of the enormous amount of research that has been conducted to date on the economic voting thesis. The sheer volume of findings reported in this theme issue alone is impressive and richly diverse. But what are the core preoccupations that presently fuel this line of investigation? The contributors to this volume include several of the major players in the field. This provides a convenient opportunity to take a snapshot of where the current priorities lie. In all, we see at least two main trajectories, both of which appear to be well on their way to delivering a variety of informative insights.     

Who's European? Scotland and England Compared

In the Brexit referendum in 2016, Scotland voted 62 per cent Remain, and England 53 per cent Leave. This article explores whether this came about because more people in Scotland considered themselves ‘strongly European’ compared with people in England. Analysis of Scottish and British Social Attitudes survey data for 2017 shows that people in Scotland are significantly more inclined to say they are ‘strongly European’ (45 per cent) than in England (34 per cent), a finding that holds true across the spectrum of socio‐demographic and political variables. Nevertheless, the key predictors of being strongly European are similar in both countries: having liberal values, high levels of education, political party support, as well as being British, while in Scotland supporting the Scottish National Party and being in favour of independence are important. ‘Being European’ has taken on different meanings in Scotland and England as the aftermath of the Brexit referendum works its way through the political process.     

Punishing without rewards? A comprehensive examination of the asymmetry in economic voting

It has been controversial whether incumbents are punished more for a bad economy than they are rewarded for a good economy due to mixed results from previous studies on one or handful number of countries. This paper makes an empirical contribution to this lingering question by conducting extensive tests on whether this asymmetry hypothesis is a cross-nationally generalizable phenomenon using all currently available modules of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems survey from 122 elections in 42 representative democracies between 1996 and 2016, as well as macro-economic indicators and individual-level economic perception. In general, this paper finds little support for the asymmetry hypothesis; although the evidence of such asymmetric economic voting is found in some subpopulations using certain economic indicators, these conditional effects are largely inconsistent, suggesting that it is still safe to assume a linear relationship between economic conditions and support for the incumbent.     

Increased economic salience or blurring of responsibility? Economic voting during the Great Recession

There is a puzzle which emerged following the Eurozone crisis: whereas the salience of the economy suggests an increase in economic voting, the realization that economic policies have become Europeanised may blur the responsibility of national governments, thus decreasing economic perceptions' weight on electoral choices. Do these mechanisms exclude each other? Do they refer to different groups of the electorate? We first examine the longitudinal trends of economic voting from 2002 to 2015 in three bailed out countries, namely Ireland, Portugal and Spain, to see if the economy's salience during the Great Recession increased the relevance of the economic perceptions in these countries. Secondly, making use of a unique media dataset of the last 16 years we test whether exposure to major mainstream newspapers that focus on the EU mitigates economic voting. On average, economic voting increased following the crisis. However, individuals who are more informed about the EU tend to use economic voting to a lesser extent, given they are more aware of the national government's limited room for manoeuvre.     

Drivers of political parties’ voting behaviour in European economic governance: the ultimate decline of the economic cleavage?

The article examines the factors that determined the attitude of parliamentary parties towards eurozone anti-crisis measures. Using a statistical logit model, it demonstrates that, while all governing parties supported such measures, opposition parties were divided. The support of the former is explicable in terms of international obligations. The positions of opposition parties reflected their attitude towards European integration: Eurosceptic parties tended to oppose anti-crisis measures. Furthermore, whereas negative votes were less likely in countries marked by higher levels of popular trust in government and satisfaction with the problem-solving capacity of the EU, the likelihood of no votes increased as a function of the level of trust in national parliaments. The policy preferences of opposition parties, measured on the economic left–right scale, did not provide significant explanatory potential; nor did an additional test measuring the impact of extreme left?right positions.     

Red Europe versus no Europe? The impact of attitudes towards the EU and the economic crisis on radical-left voting

The 2014 European Parliament election saw a relatively large increase in the size of radical-left parties (RLPs), particularly in Western Europe. This article aims to provide new ways of thinking about the dynamics of radical-left voting by analysing the changing role of attitudes towards the European Union in explaining support for RLPs at European Parliament elections during the Great Recession. It is argued that the Europeanisation of economic issues during the financial crisis, together with the particular kind of Euroscepticism advocated by these parties, have enabled them to successfully attract a heterogeneous pool of voters. Using the 2009 and 2014 European Election Studies, it is shown that the effect of negative opinions about the EU on support for RLPs increased significantly during the crisis. In addition, support for RLPs also increased among voters with positive views of the EU who were nevertheless highly dissatisfied with the economic situation.     

Agenda trees and sincere voting: a response to Schwartz

Schwartz (Public Choice 136:353–377, 2008) has identified a controversy within the voting theory literature pertaining to the representation of agenda structures and the consequent definition of sincere voting. This note responds to Schwartz’s remarks by arguing that the kind of agenda tree he uses does not adequately represent some common parliamentary agendas, and that consequently his definition of sincere voting cannot always be applied.     

Comment on Tollison’s contributions to economic history and the history of economic thought

Abstract Robert Tollison has furthered our understanding of mercantilism and other pivotal episodes in economic history considerably and also has applied the methods of positive economics to study the development of economic thought more generally. This article traces Tollison’s intellectual interest in those topics to his liberal arts education as an undergraduate at Wofford College and supplies commentary on Ekelund and Hébert’s valuable survey of his contributions to those areas of the literature.     

Is approval voting an ‘unmitigated evil’?: A response to Brams,Fishburn, and Merrill

Brams, Fishburn, and Merrill (1988) contend that the indeterminacy of approval voting (AV), introduced in our paper (1988), is not a vice, but a surpassing virtue of AV. They do not compare the negative versus the positive features of AV, so their assertion remains a conjecture. Our response emphasizes the need to determine the costs of AV and to evaluate them against any merits. Moreover, by correcting and answering BFM's comments, the argument against AV becomes much stronger. This is because we show that AV's region of indeterminacy is quite large; it includes most profiles. Some of the consequences of this instability are that the AV outcome can negate the voter's true wishes, that the AV outcome can be volatile even to minor fluctuations of voter's decisions, and that AV is one of the most susceptible systems to manipulation by small groups of voters (for example, small, maverick groups could determine the AV outcome). Under specific circumstances, AV may be appropriate. To identify these situations we propose the more accurate name of the "Unsophisticated Voter System."     

Political brand experience and voting intention: Is there a relation?

The current study reveals that Indian voters' political brand experiences positively influence their engagement and trust in a political party. Voters' addiction to political parties mediates the relationship between their party engagement and voting intentions. Thus, political marketers should increase voters' party brand addiction for proper conversion of party engagement in the ballot box. Although voters' political brand trust directly influences their voting intentions, interestingly, their political brand addictions indirectly influence the relationship between brand trust and voting intentions. The findings advocate that political marketers should ensure positive political party experiences to ensure voters' engagement with the party. Positive party experiences increase voters' trust in the party further. Another critical input for political marketers is the role of political brand addiction, which the study findings corroborate. Political brand addiction develops a set of loyal voters for a party and guarantees those voters' support for the party.     

A perfect match? The impact of statement selection on voting advice applications' ability to match voters and parties

This study examines how statement selection systematically affects the output of voting advice applications (VAAs). Does the statement selection influence how often voters are matched with parties that ‘should be’ close to them? Our benchmark is a classic account of issue voting, the proximity left–right model. We analyze the Belgian VAA Do the Vote Test and find that the output resembles the left–right model. When more left–right statements are included, more left-wing voters get the advice to vote for left-wing parties and the same is true on the right, while simultaneously advantaging parties with more extreme positions on this dimension. We also analyze issue saliency and find that parties are disadvantaged when more statements about salient issues are included. These findings imply tough choices for VAA builders.     

Do the IMF and the World Bank influence voting in?the?UN General Assembly?

Using panel data for 188 countries over the 1970–2008 period, this paper analyzes empirically the influence of the IMF and the World Bank on voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. Countries receiving adjustment projects and larger non-concessional loans from the World Bank vote more frequently in line with the average G7 country. The same is true for countries obtaining non-concessional IMF programs. Regarding voting coincidence with the United States, World Bank non-concessional loans have a significant impact, while IMF loans do not. This overall pattern of results is robust to the choice of control variables and method of estimation.     

Which voting rule is most likely to choose the “best” candidate?

One criterion for evaluating voting rules is the frequency with which they select the best candidate. Using a spatial model of voting that is capable of simulating data with the same statistical structure as data from actual elections, we simulate elections for which we can define the best candidate. We use these simulated data to investigate the frequencies with which 14 voting rules chose this candidate as their winner. We find that the Black rule tends to perform better than the other rules, especially in elections with few voters. The Bucklin rule, the plurality rule, and the anti-plurality rule tend to perform worse than the other 11 rules, especially in elections with many voters.     

Expressing or fuelling discontent? The relationship between populist voting and political discontent

Many studies have found that political discontent and populist voting are positively related. Yet, an important shortcoming of these studies is that they interpret the correlation between these two phenomena as evidence that existing feelings of political discontent contribute to the support for populist parties. We argue that there is also a causal effect in the opposite direction: Populist parties fuel political discontent by exposing their supporters to a populist message in which they criticize the elite. Our study links individual level data on political discontent of voters to the populist message of the party they intend to vote for, employing various operationalizations of populism. Based on a 6-wave panel study from the Netherlands (2008–2013), we conclude that political discontent is both cause and consequence of the rise of populist parties. Our findings imply that the effect of political discontent on populist voting has been overestimated in many previous studies.     

Organizational Pathology Compared to What? Impacts of Job Characteristics and Career Trajectory on Perceptions of Organizational Red Tape

Early studies of organizational red tape emphasized that worker perceptions of organizational rules and procedures are dependent on workers’ frames of reference. However, most prior studies do not account sufficiently for how and why these reference points vary across employees, even if they work within the same or similar organizational contexts. While the effects of contemporaneous employee attitudes on perceptions of red tape have been considered in prior analyses, how do perceptions of organizational rules and procedures as red tape relate to workers’ prior career trajectories and occupational contexts? Variable norms and expectations across organizations as well as across the public and private sectors may produce different attitudes toward rules and procedures. Of equal import, current occupational characteristics are relatively unexamined in studies of worker perceptions of red tape. Using a survey of state level public managers, this paper examines how employees’ perceptions of red tape are mediated by their prior career trajectories and experiences, as well as by their occupational context. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.     

Black pioneers—do their moves to the suburbs increase economic opportunity for mothers and children?

Abstract

This paper examines whether housing vouchers help poor people improve their education and employment. The Gautreaux program uses housing certificates and counseling to help poor people move to white suburbs and to black urban areas. The people who move to suburbs face different opportunities and challenges than those moving within the city, so it is not certain which group will have better employment and education. We find that compared with city movers, the adult suburban movers have greatly improved employment, even after controls, but they have no different pay or hours worked. Among children, suburban movers are more likely than city movers to be (1) in school, (2) in college‐track programs, (3) in four‐year colleges, (4) in jobs, (5) in better‐paying jobs, and (6) in jobs with benefits. Just by moving people and without providing additional services, this program has uncovered capabilities of these low‐income people that were not evident in the city. Policy implications of this program are considered herein.     

Political regime change, economic liberalization and?growth accelerations

We examine whether the type of political regime, regime changes, and economic liberalization are related to economic growth accelerations. Our results show that growth accelerations are preceded by economic liberalizations. We also find that growth accelerations are less likely to happen the longer a political regime??be it a democracy or an autocracy??has been in place, while (a move toward) more democracy according to the Polity IV dataset reduces the likelihood of growth accelerations.