Clientelism and polarized voting: empirical evidence

One must take country-specific institutional features into account when analyzing former communist countries’ transformation process to new political institutions. We do so for post-communist Albania, where the regional and cultural polarization that has existed for centuries has evolved to clientelism in the new democracy. We show how clientelistic parties give rise to very particular voting patterns. These reveal major differences across regions not only in party choice but also in voters’ responses to government policies. These responses depend on the party in government and on the region concerned. This is in sharp contrast with results obtained when applying the same model to a large number of more advanced democracies with similar electoral institutions. A proper evaluation of democratization in Albania thus requires looking beyond the formal institutions governing elections and taking clientelism and its effect on voter behavior into account.     

Rent seeking and hidden in-kind resource distortion: Some empirical evidence

We wish to thank John Jackson, Robert Hebert, Gordon Tullock and an anonymous referee for helpful comments on earlier draft of the paper.     

Variation in central bank independence across countries: Some provisional empirical evidence

In this paper seven hypotheses to explain variation in central bank independence across countries are tested. The predictions based upon the theory that delegation of authority by politicians to the central bank is used as a commitment device are not supported: central bank independence is not higher the larger the employment motivated inflationary bias, the higher political instability or the larger the government debt. Central bank independence is positively related to historical inflation experience and negatively with political instability. We do only find limited support for the view that countries with a universal banking system and countries whose central banks do not regulate financial institutions have more independent central banks.     

Decentralization and development: Theory and evidence from Bangladesh

There is a view that decentralization brings tangible benefits to the developing world, increasing material welfare and reducing the alienation of traditional societies when faced with centralized and modernizing bureaucracies. In theory, this is plausible, but in practice decentralization seldom lives up to its promises. Only strong states are in a position to cede a realistic range of powers. ‘Successful’ decentralization often takes place in conscious opposition to the state, and for that reason it is likely to be short-lived. This paper draws on the past history and more recent experience of decentralization in Bangladesh, to conclude that the reform of local government structures has not in practice been of benefit to rural areas, the villages and the rural poor. The delivery of basic needs has not improved, nor has there been any significant increase in popular participation. The conclusion emphasizes the need to view decentralization in its social and political context. Proper account needs to be taken of the interests that dominate the political process in a highly stratified society such as Bangladesh.     

Another look at anti-scalping laws: Theory and evidence

This paper investigates the impact of anti-scalping laws on the face value of tickets in professional football and baseball. Previous theoretical models have suggested that scalpers might cause an increase in prices at the ticket window because they represent an increase in demand. This paper provides a model in which ticket scalping has an ambiguous impact on ticket window prices, making the actual impact an empirical question. Empirical analysis suggest that in cities with anti-scalping laws average per-game season ticket prices are approximately $2 greater in baseball and $10 greater in football. Anti-scalping laws actually increase team revenues, as the laws have no adverse effect on attendance. Thus, event promoters might have sufficient pecuniary incentive to tacitly or explicitly support anti-scalping legislation.     

Parties and institutions: empirical evidence on veto players and the growth of government

Does the effective number of veto players in a political system explain the rate of government growth? Panel data analyses are conducted in order to test several measures of veto players against each other, and these results are compared with similar analyses of government fractionalization. The analyses indicate that veto players and especially government fractionalization exert a constraining effect on changes in the size of government, but also that the effect is not consistent over time: neither veto players in general nor fractionalization of government in particular exerted any constraining effect during the decades of rapid government growth due to welfare state creation and expansion in the 1960s and 1970s. The strength of government fractionalization vis-a-vis the veto player measures in explaining changes in the size of government suggest that the constellation of partisan veto players within coalition governments matters, while the effect of institutional veto players remains uncertain.     

Pivotal power brokers: Theory and evidence on political fundraising

This study examines the campaign fundraising success of Senate incumbents that have a unique, pivotal status (legislatively) in the Senate with regards to parliamentary procedures (e.g., the filibuster). Regression estimates place the fundraising advantage, in favor of certain pivotal moderates over all other Senators, at about $2.12 million (in real terms) in total contribution per 2-yr election cycle. Pivotal status is even more significant in explaining variations in PAC contribution in the U.S. Senate, given that individuals who make contributions are not likely to be as interested as PACs in ‘buying policy.’ The results also suggest that Krehbiel’s Pivotal Politics (Krehbiel, K. (1988). Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. lawmaking. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago press.) construct warrants modification, given that it offers prediction about policy outcomes and gridlock intervals without fully incorporating interest group politics of the ‘vote-buying’ or ‘policy-buying’ variety.     

Theory and evidence of municipal borrowing in Chile

Although Chilean municipalities are not permitted to borrow, they do so through arrears and leasing contracts. A formal model of municipal indebtedness is estimated, based on a sample of 345 municipalities with yearly data from 2004 to 2007. Variables that are positively and significantly related to borrowing through arrears are: mayors closely tied to the ruling central government coalition; politically diverse municipal councils; years close to elections; and deeper municipal involvement in education. While leasing contracts appear to be insensitive to political factors, they are positively and significantly related to municipal staff managerial skills and municipal revenues per capita.     

The effect of rent-seeking on family income levels: Some suggestive empirical evidence

The comments of Jason Shogren, Pat Gaynor and Gordon Tullock on an earlier version of this paper are gratefully acknowledged, as is the typing assistance provided by Deborah Culler. I am responsible for any errors or omissions.     

An empirical study of the consolidation of local public health services in Connecticut

This study contributes to the literature by empirically examining the decision of Connecticut communities to consolidate the delivery of public health services. As theory suggests, the prospect of scale economies is found empirically to increase the likelihood that a community consolidates public health services. In addition, differences across communities are found to inhibit the consolidation of public health services. Overall, the results imply that financial incentives may be necessary to encourage more regional districts because localities may underestimate the true minimum efficient scale for public health services and because heterogeneity among jurisdictions impedes regional cooperation.     

Bureaucratic choice and nonoptimal provision of public goods: Theory and evidence

Local governments' allocation decisions are modeled in the context of a slack maximizing bureaucrat who produces public goods according to a production function that includes both provision and the constituents' socio-economic characteristics. To gain a better understanding of the determinants of slack, comparative statics and an empirical study of Illinois municipalities are conducted. The indirect output distance function provides efficiency scores upon which we regress several variables, representing socio-economic characteristics, costs and competition measures. We find that slack or inefficient behavior is associated with richer communities, lower education levels and a lack of competition for residents among municipalities.     

Ownership,empowerment, and productivity: Some empirical evidence on the causes and consequences of employee discretion

Abstract This paper uses a sample of professional engineers employed in the public and private sector to investigate the effect of sector employment, indicators of task complexity, organization size, number of rules, importance, and attentiveness and agreement among various principals (customers or clients, peers, mid‐ and top‐level management, and politicians) on both employee discretion and a subjective measure of employee productivity. The results show that disagreement among important and attentive proximate principals (mid‐level managers) expands discretion, but disagreement among important and attentive distant principals (top executives and politicians) reduces discretion. Sector has no direct or indirect effect on discretion. When customers or clients and peers are important and attentive principals, discretion increases, and so does productivity. Monitoring by mid‐level management has no effect on productivity. Because disagreement among distant principals is greater in the public sector, devolution of authority alone is unlikely to increase public sector productivity. © 2000 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Multi-organisational implementation: A challenge for empirical research and modelling

Abstract The tentative evidence which has emerged from multi–organisational implementation processing has had little impact on explanatory theoretical frameworks. The literature uses 'top–down' and 'bottom–up' models as if they were totally discrete ways of examining the institutionalisation of an implementation process. However, actual processes tend to fall somewhere between these two extremes. In this paper, I consider why this might be the case and suggest that there are ways of solving the theoretical dilemmas which prevent a comprehensive analysis of implementation processing. Using evidence from a recently completed case study of the implementation of environmental health–care in Finland, I suggest that the evidence of an interplay between the mandated implementors and others, be they public or private agents, may be an indication of an effective method of coping with these issues.     

Measuring individuals' priorities for national goals: A methodology and empirical example

This study suggests a methodology for measuring individuals' priorities for national goals on an interval scale and multivariate procedures for interpreting such scale values. The scaling procedure used is a paired comparison paradigm developed by Bechtel. This scaling procedure is outlined and a test-retest procedure developed by Bechtel is discussed. Multivariate analysis of variance, discriminant analysis, and cluster analytic procedures are then outlined for gaining policy insights from the scale value data. Finally, the above methodology is applied to an empirical example carried out in 1970 concerning national priorities for eight possible national goals. Extensions of the technique and further areas of application are proposed.