Economic self-interest and the vote: Evidence and meaning

The issue of personal economic self-interest — people responding politically to changes in their financial well-being — has been a central focus in the economic voting literature. In a recent article, Kramer (1983) contended that people may be acting in a personally self-interested manner despite findings to the contrary from survey research analyses. In another article, Sears and Lau (1983) argued that findings of economic self-interest from survey data may be artifactual and that self-interested behavior may be even weaker than previously thought. In this paper I review the literature on economic self-interest and attempt to determine to what extent people do act on the basis of their financial well-being and under what conditions this is most likely.     

Condemning corruption while condoning inefficiency: an experimental investigation into voting behavior

This article reports results from an economic experiment that investigates the extent to which voters punish corruption and waste in elections. While both are responsible for reductions in voters’ welfare, they are not necessarily perceived as equally immoral. The empirical literature in political agency has not yet dealt with these two dimensions of voters’ choice calculus. Our results suggest that morality and norms are indeed crucial for a superior voting equilibrium in systems with heterogeneous politicians: while corruption always is punished, self-interest alone—in the absence of norms—leads to the acceptance and perpetuation of waste and social losses.     

Identities, Interests, and Imports

There is increasing attention to the mass public in the politics of trade debate, yet we still know little about how Americans formulate opinion on trade. Scholars are puzzled by the ineffectiveness of traditional dispositional beliefs to account for trade policy judgment, while an emerging economic self-interest perspective contends that opinion on trade is based on material concerns. This article demonstrates how symbolic predispositions provide critical information shortcuts for Americans on trade in which the relationship between trade policy and economic self-interest may be unclear. Symbolic politics theory explains how citizens can rely on accessible symbolic predispositions, including conceptions of national identity, in an unfamiliar and evolving trade policy environment often subject to multiple and conflicting cues, limited political information, and changing economic circumstances.     

Self‐interest or Ideology? The Attitude of Norwegian Medical Specialists towards Private Welfare Services

A striking common characteristic in many Western countries at the turn of the millennium is the debate on the role of private actors in public health care systems. Following the long line of Norwegian political scientists paying attention to attitudes towards privatization, this article uses data from 2005 on medical specialists to investigate their preferences for private welfare services, and to uncover the relative role of political ideology and self-interest in affecting their attitudes. So far, few attempts have been made to test in depth the impact of ideology and self-interest as alternative explanations of the attitudes of a professional group toward a policy issue that is important to its interests. The analysis documents the fact that both public and private specialists display scepticism towards leaving welfare services in the hands of private actors. The empirical model for the multivariate analysis builds on the large body of literature on political attitudes, and incorporates variables that are derived from economic and psychological theories in order to test the impact of ideology and subjective self-interest (emphasis on high salary for job satisfaction) and objective self-interest (private economy). In addition, the model also controls for a vector of individual characteristics and professional background. For the group of full-time public specialists, both subjective and objective self-interest, together with ideology, turns out to be the major determinants of view on private welfare services. The attitudes of the private specialists are, on the other hand, not at all affected by self-interest – only by ideology.     

Interrogating the Political Economy of Age

This article considers the argument by Tim Vlandas, in this issue, that an ageing electorate may undermine democracies’ ability to make the right economic choices. Vlandas suggests that the emergence of gerontocratic politics may give rise to ‘gerontonomia’: an economy run for the old, at the expense of younger generations and of future prosperity. However, evidence from the UK suggests a more mixed picture. Age-based voting patterns have been consequential around single issues, not least the 2016 Brexit referendum. However, voters’ interests in broad economic policy models are not easily reducible to age dynamics, and intergenerational politics are filtered through a set of normative and affective considerations beyond straightforward self-interest. Moreover, since the rational interests of different age groups do not speak for themselves, cueing by political elites is potentially significant and may be contributing to older voters’ relative tolerance of a poor economic record.     

Fact or artifact revisited: Survey instrument effects and pocketbook politics

Sears and Lau (1983) presented evidence that apparent self-interest effects can be, and have been, generated in political surveys by question order artifacts. This evidence was based in part on a tabulation of published reports of self-interest effects in the NES series, specifically on the political effects of personal financial situation. From another analysis of the NES data, Lewis-Beck (1985) concluded, to the contrary, that personal finances have in fact had a consistent effect on voting preferences, without significant contamination from such artifacts. We here argue that his analysis inappropriately defines the conditions for possible contamination. We first lay out a theory of when such contamination effects might occur. We then repeat our analysis, taking into consideration both his observations and our own reappraisal of our procedures. We obtain results consistent with our original position, although the results are confounded by different types of questions appearing disproportionately in contaminated and uncontaminated conditions. However, the 1984 election appears to be a special case, in which self-interest effects were strong and relatively uncontaminated. We then report a split ballot experiment that is not confounded by item content, and find results consistent with our original position. However this methodological debate may be resolved, on the larger question of whether people's economic self-interest has major political implications, the evidence seems clear. In cases not contaminated by item order, which we would take to be the most appropriate test of self-interest effects, personal finances have on the average had only a small effect on political responses.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1989 annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago. Address all correspondence before June 30 to Richard R. Lau, Department of Social and Decision Sciences, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213; after July 1 address correspondence to Richard R. Lau, Department of Political Science, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08903.     

The (ir)relevance of unemployment for labour market policy attitudes and welfare state attitudes

Typically, associations between being unemployed and policy attitudes are explained with reference to economic self-interest considerations of the unemployed. Preferences for labour market policies (LMP) and egalitarian preferences are the prime example and the focus of this study. Its aim is to challenge this causal self-interest argument: self-interest consistent associations of unemployment with policy preferences are neither necessarily driven by self-interest nor necessarily causal. To that end, this article first confronts the self-interest argument with a broader perspective on attitudes. Given that predispositions (e.g., value orientations) are stable and influence more specific policy attitudes, it is at least questionable whether people change their policy attitudes simply because they get laid off. Second, the article derives a non-causal argument behind associations between unemployment and policy attitudes, arguing that these might be spurious associations driven by individuals’ socioeconomic background. After all, the entire socioeconomic background of a person is simultaneously related to both the risk of getting unemployed (‘selection into unemployment’) and distinct political socialisation experiences from early childhood onwards. Third, this article uses methods inspired by a counterfactual account on causality to test the non-causal claims. Analyses are carried out using the fourth wave of the European Social Survey and applying entropy balancing to control for selection bias. In only two of the 31 analysed countries do unemployment effects on egalitarian orientations remain significant after controlling for selection bias. The same holds for effects on active LMP attitudes with the exception of six countries. Attitudes towards passive LMP are to some degree an exception since effects remain in a third of the countries. Robustness checks and Bayes factor replications showing evidence for the absence of unemployment effects support the general impression from these initial analyses. After discussing this article's results and limitations, its broader implications are considered. On the one hand, the article offers a new perspective on the conceptualisation and measurement of unemployment risk. On the other hand, its theoretical argument, as well as its treatment of the resulting selection bias, can be broadly applied. Thus, this article can contribute to many other research questions regarding the (ir)relevance of individual life events for political attitudes and political behaviour.     

Patience as the rational foundation of sociotropic voting

Economic voting is one of the most important mechanisms on explaining voting behavior and on establishing the democratic accountability. However, people tend to use perceived national economic condition on evaluating the incumbent, which is known as sociotropic voting, instead of their pocketbook. Previous studies suggest both altruism and self-interested future expectation may help explain this seemingly irrational behavior, but empirical works have not yet found convincing evidence to prove or disprove the self-interested motivation. This article suggests that patience makes people discount less on the potential future influence of the current national economic change; if self-interest drives sociotropic voting, patient voters would be more sociotropic. Consistent with the hypothesis, individual-level data from 2014 Comparative Congressional Election Survey shows that patient voters rely more on the perceived national economic change to evaluate the incumbent and make vote choice. Limited evidence of the linkage between impatience and pocketbook voting among non-partisans, and on the country-level is also provided.     

Development Ballot Measures, Interest Group Endorsements, and the Political Geography of Growth Preferences

In response to rapid population and economic growth, many communities have turned to voter initiatives to resolve their land use disputes. We find that despite strong public concern about growth, voters often support measures that allow or encourage new development. We consider the sources of this support by analyzing patterns of voting on a range of prodevelopment ballot initiatives. These initiatives provide a valuable opportunity to understand how economic self-interest, geography, interest group endorsements, and public goods affect citizen support for development policies. We find that interest group endorsements significantly increase public support for new development. These endorsements help voters evaluate the personal impact of complex development proposals and allow voters to behave in ways that reflect a high degree of sophistication .     

Conceptualizing Politics: Strategic or Communicative Action?

Following the "behavioral revolution" in the social sciences, analyzing political behavior as strategic action has become a dominant paradigm in political science. However, many political processes become incomprehensible from a purely strategic angle. Only a concept of politics as communicative action can explain how people reach mutual agreements on factual and normative matters. Some analysts seem to assume that whenever actors take a position in a debate that coincides with their own interest, the employed arguments must be understood as a strategic device to promote this self-interest But this explanation in most cases seems too simplistic and, from a communicative perspective, beside the point. In an open debate it will still be the rational weight of the arguments that matters, not the eventual strategic interests of the participants. Rational communication is a precondition for civilized conflict resolution as well as for the stability and durability of the political order.
Max Weber provided us with a typology of goal-oriented behavior which included, along with the rational self-interest variety, which he called Zweckrationalität , or instrumental behavior, Wertrationalität , or absolute value-oriented behavior, traditional or habitual behavior, and impulsive behavior. From this perspective we can see what a small part of the reality we, as social scientists, want to explain is captured by the rational choice model (Almond 1991, 49).     

The Poverty of Participation: Self-Interest, Student Loans, and Student Activism

Political scientists maintain that self-interest should motivate political participation; however, empirical verification of the self-interest motive for participating is rare. Self-interested activism among the less-affluent is shown to be even more uncommon. Results of the present study suggest that when lower-income college students have resources and increased self-interest motives to act, not only do they choose to participate, they do so at higher levels than their more affluent peers. Utilizing policy-motivated activism (defined as voting, contributing, and contacting officials) with respect to student loans, the analysis suggests that the probability of contacting increases among student borrowers as their income decreases. Results suggest that lower-income borrowers are more likely to participate out of concern for the program than their higher-income counterparts, and self-interest explains the behavior.     

An economic analysis of voting in Sweden

Using data from the Swedish Election Studies between 1985 and 1994 supplemented with time series on inflation and unemployment, I compare the impact of macro- and microeconomic variables on the individual vote. The principal finding is that macroeconomic variables influence the vote a bit more than microeconomic variables do. In consequence, both self-interest and public interest appear to be important explanations of economic voting in Sweden. Macroeconomic variables have, however, been much more influential in determining election outcomes. Since previous studies of economic voting have used cross-sectional data only, it is also worth noting that panel estimates indicate a much greater impact of macroeconomic variables on the individual vote than cross-sectional estimates do.     

Modeling Other-Regarding Preferences and an Experimental Test

Behavior inconsistent with self-interest has beenobserved in many contexts. We argue thatmodels designed to cope with theseanomalies are inadequate to deal with avariety of social values. Our extension ofthe Fehr & Schmidt `inequity aversion'model is applied to results from dictatorexperiments in which the money to bedivided is generated by the efforts ofpaired individuals in either one or tworooms. This production leads to sharingbehavior qualitatively different from thatfound in other dictator experiments. Thepattern of sharing can be explained byentitlements, equity, and the credibilityof the experiment.     

Self-Interest,Symbolic Politics,and Public Attitudes Toward Gun Control

Numerous studies have found that immediate and tangible self-interest has a minimal influence on public attitudes toward many policy issues. We examine public attitudes toward gun control in order to determine whether gun owners exhibit distinctive policy preferences. Our results indicate that self-interest strongly influences public preferences on gun control and that banning handguns evokes stronger self-interest effects than banning assault weapons or imposing a waiting period on purchases of firearms. We conclude by discussing why gun control evokes self-interested calculations among gun owners, the implications of our findings for self-interest theory, and suggestions for further lines of research.     

“Public goods”: An exercise in calibration

This paper considers a measure of the “publicness” of goods and services implicit in responses that individuals make when asked about public sector spending. At the limit, all consumers consume equal amounts of a public good. Thus any differences between an individual's self-interest preferences and public-interest preferences cannot be based on differential provision, but only on differences in the individual's public- and self-interest utility functions. If we rule out the latter, self-interest and public-interest preferences for a pure public good are identical. Using sample survey data it is possible to calibrate the public good content of different public goods.     

Program evaluation and the commissioning entity

The present decade has witnessed a shift from planning to emphasis on program performance and accountability. However, program evaluation must contend with many different policy preferences articulated by groups and institutions involved with social programs. In particular, the entity commissioning an evaluation expects some policy dmileage from the undertaking. Evaluation intended as an aid to decisionmaking cannot afford to separate the program under study from its organizational and political context.Federal categorical social programs like Head Start fill many needs for many groups. Evaluation preoccupied with experimental rigor often underestimates the need to adapt to political and administrative realities. At the other extreme, excessive accommodation to program ideology and organizational self-interest undermines the credibility of the evaluative process.Its limitations notwithstanding, program evaluation does yield informed policy alternatives. It invites rational public discussion of social programs and adds substance to the process of political bargaining.     

Selfish and Cooperative Voting: Can the Majority Restrain Themselves?

At every scale from small committees to national elections, voters face tradeoffs between self-interest and the common good. We report three experiments in which participants vote for policies with real payoffs at stake. We manipulate self-interest by randomly assigning participants to two groups in society with different policy payoffs. Participants in the majority group are confronted by a simple choice between a policy that is better for themselves or a policy that is best for society. Overall, we find a clear effect of self-interest: Participants are more likely to choose the policy that earns them more money, compared to participants in the other group, even when the policy is detrimental to the common good. Simultaneously, we observe considerable levels of cooperative voting among participants in the majority, ranging from 47% to 79% across different payoff regimes. Finally, participants were not more cooperative when voting compared to when they chose between the same policies with a lottery or leader institution, departing from the hypothesis that voting institutions promote cooperative motives. We discuss implications for multiple literatures about voting behavior.

     

The Epistemological Foundations of Public Choice Theory

The new political economy - public choice - has contributed considerably to a long-awaited inter-marriage between political science and economics. The economic approach to the interpretation of the public sector - politics as well as administration - has resulted in a number of interestingly relevant models. At the same time modelling political behaviour on the basis of the economic man perspective gives rise to puzzling difficulties creating much controversy. The article attempts to establish in principle the ethically neutral and scientifically objective nature of the public choice approach. It elaborates on the crucial concept of self-interest in the public choice behaviour assumptions in order to show that the criticism from the public interest adherents may be countered.     

Parenthood and social policy preferences: A gender and time sensitive examination

Attitudes towards social spending and the welfare state have been characterised by one of the longest standing and widest gender gaps. Past research suggests that parenthood deepens this divide further. Yet, the exact relationship between parenthood and support for social policies – and the gendered nature of this process – has been difficult to establish because it can vary across welfare policy areas and the age of the children, which past studies, relying on cross-sectional data, has found difficult to unravel. Using panel data from the Swiss Household Panel, we examine individual level changes in fathers’ and mothers’ views towards specific welfare state policies. We find that individuals’ support for social spending fluctuates at different stages of parenthood, and that mothers’ demands differ from fathers’ in relation to care related but not in terms of educational spending. This implies that parents are not a homogeneous group that parties could target with uniform electoral pledges. As a result, building widespread electoral support for expanding a broad range of social investment policies is likely to be challenging in a context where, first and foremost, self-interest appears to drive (or depress) individuals’ support for specific welfare state policies.     

Terrorism: The relevance of the rational choice model

Terrorism in general, and suicidal terrorism in particular, is popularly seen as “irrational,” but many economists and political scientists argue otherwise. This paper distinguishes three different senses of irrationality: unresponsiveness to incentives, deviation from narrow self-interest, and failure of rational expectations. It concludes that an intermediate position on the rationality of terrorism is appropriate. The typical terrorist sympathizer deviates only slightly from homo economicus. But active terrorists arguably stray from narrow self-interest and rational expectations, and suicidal terrorists probably violate both. Deterrence remains a viable anti-terrorism strategy, but deviations from rational expectations increase the potential of persuasion and appeasement.