委托代理关系与国有企业改革

企业所有权与经营权的分离，产生了企业的委托代理关系。由于委托代理关系本身存在着难以克服的问题，可能发生代理人追求自己的利益而损害委托人利益的事情。因此，认真分析委托代理关系存在的问题，建立有效的企业治理机制，防止不良事件的发生，降低代理成本，实现所有...     

政府治理与公司治理中委托代理问题比较及其启示

新公共管理改革主张公共管理借鉴工商企业管理理论与技术方法,用企业家精神重塑政府。这种借鉴是在对公共管理与企业管理之异同进行深入分析基础上的创造性借鉴。众所周知,缓解委托代理问题是公司治理与政府治理的核心问题。政府治理与公司治理中委托代理问题比较:有过之而无不及。而我国政府委托代理问题更加严重,即没有实事求是地认识我国政府治理中存在的委托代理问题;封建思想根深蒂固,影响深远;监督体系整体上还比较低效等。缓解政府委托代理问题应当着重把握完善政府多元化指标体系的绩效衡量;减少政府的委托代理层次;加强政府信息公开;将重点置于监督上,而非激励;打破政府垄断,引入竞争机制。     

公司控制权市场的微观和宏观经济功能初探

公司所有权和控制权分离的实质是一种委托代理关系的建立 ,由于委托人与代理人追求目标本来就不尽相融 ,再加上信息不对称和道德风险、逆向选择等原因加剧了委托代理问题。为了降低委托代理问题产生的负效应 ,在公司长期发展过程中 ,公司控制权市场应运而生 ,这种内外部控制机制的结合体对委托代理问题的缓和及抑制具有相当重要的微观和宏观经济功能     

代理理论、管家理论与公司治理分析框架的重构

代理理论和管家理论在截然相反的经理人行为假设基础上分别提出了控制和信任两类完全不同的公司治理策略,但理论分析和公司治理实践都表明,单一的控制治理或信任治理并不能有效地解决复杂的公司治理问题.本文借鉴功能导向的组织结构设计思想,提出了功能导向的公司治理分析框架,较好地融合了代理理论和管家理论的对立关系,重新定位了公司治理的目标,为今后的公司治理研究提供了新的思路和方向.     

公司治理与构建内部会计控制制度

建立现代企业制度,完善公司治理结构是现阶段深化企业改革的核心。而建立健全内部会计控制制度是强化公司治理的必然要求和重要组成部分。委托代理理论是公司治理与内部会计控制制度的共同基础。公司治理与内部会计控制制度有着紧密的联系,要实现公司目标,应从公司治理结构入手建立健全内部会计控制制度。     

代理治理模式：一种统治类型的讨论--以基层政府治理体系为分析单位

代理治理模式揭示基层政府治理的性质,指出基层政府治理体系的核心元素是政治治理而不是科层治理,是党政统合体系与威权治理结构的多重因素作用结果。代理治理模式有三个基本特征：代理治理是政治职能与行政职能的统合体系;代理治理与社会是一种统治关系;代理治理是一种多中心权威治理结构。代理治理模式的权力来源在国家,不在基层社会,向上级政府（国家）负责,与基层社会没有授权关系。代理治理模式的现代转型,应从基层政府的政治职能与行政职能的分离着手,以民主法治原则来建构基层政府的权力结构和治理体系,在行政职能上建构政府治理的公共本质,在政治职能上建构基层治理的社会授权关系。     

关于国有企业代理问题的思考

国有企业改革的核心是按照“产权清晰、权责明确、政企分开、管理科学”的原则,全面建立现代企业制度。这其中,最主要的环节是建立完善的国有企业法人治理结构。目前,国有企业存在的代理问题(内部人控制),致使法人治理结构难以起到应有的作用。深化国企改革,解决代理问题,已是进一步完善法人治理结构的紧迫任务。一、代理问题有关概念及由来公司治理结构(ＣｏｒｐｏｒａｔｅＧｏｖｅｒｎａｎｃｅ)是通行于西方发达国家的一个经营管理概念,涉及的是公司治理的方式,重点是股东与管理部门的关系。公司治理结构由股东大会、董事会和由高层经理人…     

委托-代理理论视野下地方政府公共服务责任问题探析

委托—代理理论是近年来由契约经济学发展起来的分支理论,该理论对契约中委托人与代理人的博弈关系做出了更为精深细致的解读。鉴于代议制民主的特点,委托—代理理论亦可移用于地方公共事务治理领域内地方社会与地方政府的委托—代理关系的分析中,对地方政府公共服务责任的生成与其部分缺损问题的探究具有借鉴意义。     

有限合伙制私募股权基金公司治理的法律机制构建——基于中小投资者利益保护的视角

有限合伙制私募股权基金同公司一样存在着"委托-代理"问题,为此,必须构建公司治理的法律机制,以降低其代理风险及成本。构建有限合伙制私募股权基金公司治理法律机制,决策机制是最重要的一环;在决策执行方面,应以有限合伙人与普通合伙人为共同执行主体;在监督方面,应构建内外监督并重的机制。     

企业契约与公司治理

新制度经济学提出的企业契约理论,为我们认识和研究企业开辟了广阔的天地,但企业契约到底是什么,一直是理论界关注的重点问题之一,同时该理论的局限性却常常被人们所"忽视"。周其仁提出了企业契约的观点。根据企业契约的内容,可将其分为企业治理契约与管理契约。基于企业契约理论及建立在其上的委托代理理论的局限性,公司治理不仅要解决"代理问题",更要解决"企业家问题",进而改进公司治理。     

Continuity and Change in Executive Leadership: Insights from the Perspectives of State Administrators

Executive leadership in state government is examined at two levels, both from the perspectives of the heads of state administrative agencies responding to mail question surveys in 1994, 1998, and 2004. At one level, the status and strength of the governor in controlling and leading the executive branch are assessed. At the second (agency) level, state executives (and their agencies) are assessed on four criteria that are connected, directly or indirectly, with the aims of the Winter Commission: leadership, responsiveness, reforms (at the agency level), and performance (through contracting). State administration generally reflects a balance between continuity and change, with more of the former at the gubernatorial (and legislative) level, and more of the latter at the state agency level.     

Steering Agencies with Short-Term Authorizations

After World War II, the U.S. Congress began a process of engaging in what David Rosenbloom refers to as Congress-centered public administration. In this article, the author argues that the use of short-term authorizations by Congress facilitates congressional oversight and co-management of public programs. Using data from three case studies, the author shows that Congress is able to systematically, on a regularized basis, shape the overall goals, structures, and decision rules that govern agency activities. It can also promote research and analysis that will inform the reauthorization of a program by funding studies and requiring specific reports to be produced. The agencies are, in turn, able to implement the new legislative requirements over a given timeframe—typically four to six years—and do so in an environment that is relatively free from other congressional changes to the legislation underlying the program in question. During this time, the agency and Congress are able to determine what works and what does not work and to formulate changes that should be considered in the next reauthorization legislation.     

Maximizing social equity as a pillar of public administration: An examination of cannabis dispensary licensing in Pennsylvania

Public administration upholds four pillars of an administrative practice: economy, efficiency, effectiveness, and social equity. The question arises, however, how do administrators balance effectiveness and social equity when implementing policy? Can the values contributing to administrative decisions be measured? This study leverages the expansion of medical cannabis programs in the states to interrogate these questions. The awarding of dispensary licenses in Pennsylvania affords the ability to determine the effect of social equity scoring on license award decisions, relative to criteria that represent the other pillars. The results show that safety and business acumen were the most important determining factors in the awarding of licenses, both effectiveness concerns. Social equity does not emerge as a significant determinant until the second round of licensing. This study then discusses the future of social equity provisions for cannabis policy, as well as what the findings mean for social equity in public administration.     

What Makes an Agency Independent?

The responsiveness of government agencies to elected officials is a central question in democratic governance. A key source of variation in responsiveness is agency structure. Yet scholars often view agencies as falling into broad structural categories (e.g., cabinet departments or independent commissions) or fixate on some features of design (e.g., “for cause” protections). I develop new estimates of structural independence based on new data on 50 different structural features of 321 federal agencies in the federal executive establishment. Using a Bayesian latent variable model, I estimate independence on two dimensions: limits on the appointment of key agency decision makers and limits on political review of agency policy. I illustrate the value of this new measure by using it to examine how structure affects political influence and how agency independence can vary over time.     

Presidents and Patronage

To what extent do presidents select appointees based upon campaign experience and connections? The answer to this question has important implications for our understanding of presidential management and political leadership. This article presents a theory explaining where presidents place different types of appointees and why, focusing on differences in ideology, competence, and non‐policy patronage benefits among potential appointees. We develop a formal model and test its implications with new data on 1,307 persons appointed in the first six months of the Obama administration. The empirical results broadly support the theory, suggesting that President Obama was more likely to place appointees selected for non‐policy patronage reasons in agencies off his agenda, in agencies that shared his policy views, and where appointees are least able to affect agency performance. We conclude that patronage continues to play an important role in American politics, with important consequences for campaigns, presidential politics, and governance.     

Effects of Administrators' Aspirations,Political Principals' Priorities,and Interest Groups' Influence on State Agency Budget Requests

This article addresses a long‐standing question in public budgeting: What factors influence bureau/agency budget request decisions? Empirical results confirm the complexity of variables that explain different levels of budget requests by over 1,000 state administrative agencies. The expected significant influence of administrator (agency head) aspirations was clearly present. But other important sources enter into the decision of agencies to satisfy rather than maximize. These include the strategic roles, activities, and priorities of governors, legislatures, and interest groups. These political principals' influence operates to constrain, discipline, or even augment agency budget requests.     

Performance measures in tax administration: Chile as a case study

The article proposes a set of tax administration performance measures and contrasts them with measures actually used by the Chilean tax administration agency. The goals assumed for the tax administration agency (TA) are to maximize tax revenue collection and provide quality services to taxpayers. Ideal performance measures (PMs) would measure the deviation of actual outcome from a best‐practice standard, given the value of all variables affecting organisation performance that are outside management control. The key challenge is to build and calculate these best‐practice outcomes. In Chile the PM in use, for the first goal, is the ratio of actual to potential tax revenue collection. This PM does adjust revenue collection for variations in the tax structure and rate, but it fails to control other variables that affect performance such as the TA budget and per capita income. The PM in use, for the second goal, is taxpayer satisfaction measured through sample surveys. This seems the appropriate PM, as quality of taxpayer services depends directly on the TA efforts to improve them. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

WHAT DO CHIEF ADMINISTRATORS DO? FINDINGS FROM VICTORIA

Abstract: This study explores the views of Victorian Chief Administrators (CAs) about their jobs. CAs report that the environment of administration has changed in three broad areas: greater public expectations, a breakdown of the politics-administration dichotomy and difficulties reconciling managerial accountability with limited managerial autonomy. In response, CAs describe a distinctive pattern of concerns — with the "what", "why" and "how" of agency operation. First, they attempt to shape the "what" or the ends and values their agency creates. Second, they act to enhance the "why" or their agency's legitimacy and the support it attracts from constituencies. Third, CAs are concerned with "how" to mobilise organisational resources, particularly by moulding culture towards the agency values they identify. These findings suggest that CAs have devised understandings of their responsibilities which conform more to theoretical conceptions of leadership than either administration or management. The research points to the emergence of a distinctive type of administrative leadership.     

Socializer or Signal?, How Agency Accreditation Affects Organizational Culture

Agency accreditation has grown steadily as a management strategy in recent decades. Accreditation is meant to help professionalize public administration work by requiring an agency to adopt policies and practices that are sanctioned by an external organization. Advocates claim that accreditation facilitates the diffusion of best practices and builds a culture of professionalism in an agency. Accreditation clearly leads agencies to adopt formal policies. This article identifies two ways in which accreditation might affect organizational culture: (1) by socializing employees, and (2) by signaling the agency’s priorities to employees. Analyzing attitudinal data from officers in six American police departments, this study finds no association between accreditation and officers’ own values, but finds that accreditation is strongly correlated with officers’ perceptions of their agencies’ priorities.