The Italian budgetary process: Political and institutional constraints

The Italian budgetary process requires constant interaction between executive and legislature. As a result budgetary policy is a reflection of Italian legislative activity in general. Time‐consuming negotiations and compromises are required between a wide range of political interests. Coherent and consistent economic policy‐making is, in these circumstances, difficult to achieve.     

Legislative Capacity and Credit Risk

Legislatures differ in their institutional capacity to draft and enact policy. While strong legislatures can increase the congruence of policy outcomes to the electorate's preferences, they can also inject uncertainty into markets with their ability to alter the political economic landscape. We argue that this uncertainty will manifest in a state's ability to borrow and hypothesize a negative relationship between legislative capacity and creditworthiness. Using ratings of general obligation bonds issued by the American states over nearly two decades and data on the institutional capacity of state legislative assemblies, we find support for the claim that having a legislature that is better equipped to affect policy change increases credit risk evaluations. The results we present broaden our understanding of the importance of legislative institutions, the determinants of credit risk, and the economic implications of democratic responsiveness.     

Executive capacity to control legislatures and presidential choice of cabinet ministers in East Asian democracies

How do presidents in new democracies choose cabinet ministers to accomplish their policy goals? Contrary to existing studies explaining the partisan composition of the cabinet with institutional characteristics, such as formal authority, we argue that the broader political context surrounding the president's ability to control the legislature can affect cabinet partisanship. By analyzing original data on cabinet formation in all presidential systems in East Asia since democratization, we find that when presidents are more likely to be dominant in executive–legislative relations, they have less concern about legislative support and more leeway to focus on policy performance by appointing nonpartisan cabinet members. This analysis suggests that understanding cabinet partisanship requires a view of cabinet appointments as a trade‐off between securing legislative support and managing policy performance, and the scope of this compromise depends on the strength of the president vis‐à‐vis the legislature.     

Mobilizing Interests: Group Participation and Competition in Direct Democracy Elections

We examine group mobilization in direct democracy elections by assessing the conditions under which interests will actively support or oppose ballot measures. Motivating our analysis is that the decision to mobilize is driven by the costs and benefits of group participation, a calculus shaped by issue characteristics, state political institutions, and the electoral context. Using data from initiative and referendum measures appearing on statewide ballots from 2003 to 2008, we find that ballot measures involving social and tax issues are likely to produce competition among groups and increase the overall number of groups involved. In addition, we find that group competition and levels of mobilization increased in response to how difficult it would be for the legislature to undo the change brought about from passage of a ballot measure. Lastly, group competition and levels of mobilization increased for ballot measures appearing in nonpresidential election years and for ballot measures featuring a close election. Taken together, our results suggest that groups engage strategically in direct democracy elections to pursue a mix of policy and political goals.     

FEDERAL POLICY IN LOCAL CONTEXT: The Influence of Local State-Societal Relations on Endangered Species Act Implementation

Current debates regarding the degree to which centralization or decentralization of environmental bureaucracies promotes more effective management of natural resources suggest the need for employing new methodologies to empirical analysis, in a variety of political and ecological settings. In this paper, recent state synergy scholarship is adopted to an analysis of the impact of state‐societal relations on the implementation of the U.S. Endangered Species Act in the coastal redwoods region of California. This study suggests that certain state‐societal relations at the peripheries of bureaucratic state systems pose potential sources of both state autonomy and capacity. Effective utilization of such sources may be hampered, however, by policy actions that reflect national‐level political pressure, leading to management decisions that are not necessarily designed to improve either the ecological or social welfare of the region. In conclusion, the author argues that decentralization may be beneficial to bureaucratic effectiveness, however such efforts will be contingent on the ability of states to develop dense connecting networks with social actors that can contribute to policy goals.     

Representation beyond people: Lobbying access of umbrella associations to legislatures and the media

Lobbying access to policy discussions determines how political interests are voiced and potentially exert influence. This article addresses whether access to the national legislature and the media favors umbrella organizations, which represent interests of their member groups. It theorizes that the role of umbrellas goes beyond signaling a large individual membership or constituency of people, but that umbrellas are distinct in transmitting interests from other organizations. This function is expected to be valuable in exchanges with legislators who seek efficiency, input legitimacy, and policy implementation, but less valuable in the media arena. Using a new data set on lobbying by 286 groups on 12 issues in the United Kingdom and Germany, the article serves support for this theory: Umbrellas enjoy higher legislative access, but lower media access than groups without member organizations, irrespective of their individual membership or claimed constituency. The findings have implications for how we understand and study political representation.     

From Safety Net To Trampoline: Labor Market Activation in the Netherlands and Denmark

In recent years Denmark and the Netherlands have made dramatic shifts from passive to active labor market policies. Though often portrayed as a necessary response to high levels of structural unemployment, such changes are more than a mere technical adjustment of welfare programs to a changing economic climate. They represent new ideas about the goals of public policy and the social rights of citizenship. This article surveys the politics of labor market policies in the two countries to demonstrate that the recent activation programs reflect a departure from the ideas and goals of the postwar welfare state.     

Ideological extremism and electoral design. Multimember versus single member districts

Relying on a formal theoretical model, Gary Cox demonstrates that single member districts induce candidates toward policy positions at their constituency median while multimember districts encourage dispersion. We test this theoretical implication in the context of the Arizona state legislature, in which each legislative district chooses one senator and two representatives in single member and multimember contests respectively. To do so, we generate W-NOMINATE estimates of scores based on roll-call data from the Arizona state legislature that are comparable across chambers (Senate and House). Our results are substantially less supportive of the formal theory than are those of prior studies.     

AGENDA-SETTING BY STATE LEGISLATIVE BLACK CAUCUSES: POLICY PRIORITIES AND FACTORS OF SUCCESS

As their representation in legislative chambers has increased, black state legislators have organized into caucuses to maximize their policy influence. These caucuses act as policy entrepreneurs in initiating and advancing minority policy goals. The North Carolina Legislative Black Caucus is il- lustrative of an emerging force in half the states in moving minority policy issues from the systemic to the formal legislative agenda. Using the 1987 North Carolina Legislative Black Caucus as the research setting, supple- mented with selective data on other state caucuses, this article offers insights into the types of policy initiatives state legislative black caucuses advance. Also, situational and political factors that may foster successful agenda-setting are explored.     

论行政立法与公众的利益表达

随着社会发展的需要,行政立法在世界范围内已成为一种普通现象,但任何形式的法律其存在的目前是为人民谋更大的福利。分析和研究国内外的立法理论与实践可以看出,公众在行政立法过程的利益表达既存在理论基础也具有规范性的依据。然而在行政立法过程中的公众利益表达机制设计必须解决三个前提性的问题,即利益表达的主体的确定、利益外化的承载体和有效的表达方式。     

Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Policy Discretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise

We investigate how aspects of "civil service" systems of personnel management interact with bureaucratic discretion to create expert bureaucracies populated by policy-motivated agents. We construct a dynamic model in which bureaucrats may invest in (relationship-specific) policy expertise and may or may not be interested in policy choices per se. The legislature makes sequentially rational grants of discretion, which serve as incentives for expertise investment and continued service only for policy-motivated bureaucrats. Bureaucratic policy preferences and the legislature's agency problem vis-à-vis bureaucracies develop endogenously in the model. Bureaucratic expertise can be supported in equilibrium only at a cost of its politicization; "neutral competence" is inconsistent with strategic incentives of bureaucrats. We identify several conditions that support the development of an expert bureaucracy in equilibrium, including security of job tenure and control over policy issues for policy-motivated bureaucrats.     

Taking on the World: The International Activities of American State Legislatures

State legislatures in the United States engage in a substantialamount of international activity. In the 2001-2002 legislativesessions, some 886 bills and resolutions with significant internationalimplications were introduced. Approximately 306 of these wereadopted. This level of international activity has increasedsubstantially since 1991, and the substantive focus has changedover time. In addition, about half of all state legislaturesreceived at least one foreign delegation and sent at least onedelegation of members abroad in the last session. As in mostareas of state policy, there is considerable interstate variationin legislatures' international activities. Some states had virtuallyno international legislative activity, whereas others were veryactive. The principal factors explaining this variation werethe degree of state involvement in the international economy,as measured by the level of state exports, and party controlof the legislature.     

Legislators,organizations and ties: Understanding interest group recognition in the European Parliament

What explains Members of European Parliament's (MEPs’) decisions to recognize some interest groups as relevant policy actors? Addressing this question is fundamental for understanding the role of political elites in shaping patterns of interest representation and interest groups’ role in legislative decision making. Building on theories of legislative behaviour and informational theories of legislative lobbying, we argue that MEPs give recognition to those organizations that are instrumental for achieving key political goals: re-election, career-progression and policy influence. The pursuit of these goals generates different patterns of MEP recognition of interest groups. We contribute to the literature in three ways. Conceptually, we propose interest group recognition as a key concept for understanding interactions and links between legislative and non-legislative actors. We illustrate the high conceptual relevance of recognition for interest groups research while noting its conspicuous neglect in the literature. We address this gap and place the concept central stage in understanding legislators’ attention to and behaviour towards interest organizations. Theoretically, we build on a classic framework explaining legislators’ behaviour and refine it through the lenses of informational theories of legislative lobbying. We argue and show that legislators recognize organizations that enhance electoral prospects in their home Member States, and that legislator–group ideological proximity and an interest group's prominence in a specific policy field affect MEPs’ decisions to recognize some organizations as relevant actors. Our argument acknowledges the importance of the broader context in which MEPs operate and pays attention to how they react to and interact with it. Empirically, we propose an original and innovative research design to identify and measure recognition with the help of social media data. Our measurement strategy constitutes a significant improvement insofar that it reduces the challenges of measurement bias usually associated with self-reported data generated through interviews, surveys, or the textual analysis of newspaper articles and official documents. Our research design allows using fine-grained measures of key dependent and explanatory variables and offers the very first analysis of MEP interest group recognition that holds across decision-making events and policy areas. We test our argument on a new dataset with 4 million observations recording the recognition of more than 7,000 organizations by 80 per cent of MEPs serving in EP8. We find that MEPs are more likely to recognize organizations from their Member State, particularly under flexible- and open-list electoral institutions. MEPs are also more likely to recognize organizations that share their ideological affinities and are prominent actors in policy areas legislators specialize in.     

全球化与行政管理制度变迁

政府转型是国际政治和国内政治互动过程中的重要问题,而政府在面对国际制度挑战中处于核心角色,形成和国际制度相适应的协调制度是政府转型的主要特征.通过大量的实证材料和个案分析,在对国际制度、公共政策协调和发展型政府理论进行理论综述的基础上,阐述了国际制度下的政府转型现象.这种现象指的是在发展型政府国家,国际制度为国内政策制定引入了全球化因素,并促使国家内部建立与国际制度联系的对口协调部门或制度.这些都有利于国际制度进一步塑造国内决策环境.伴随着国际制度的发展,发展中国家决策过程日益专业化和多元化,政府转型成为全球化时代中的一个显著特点.主要采用文献分析和实证研究相结合的方法,在实证研究中采用文本分析和深度访谈的方法.发现,国际制度会通过议事日程和规则的变化、新的配套协调决策机构的建立等来影响部门利益的表达、部门与跨部门的知识(信息)的建构、以及各部门对最后决策形成的意见、建议、交换,并导致新的国内制度的产生.     

Tax earmarking, party politics and gubernatorial veto: theory and evidence from US states

This paper provides a theory of earmarking based on the relative power of a legislature and executive. The politically powerful use earmarking as a means of resolving uncertainty and insulating preferred policy from the reach of future government. Tax revenue will be earmarked more often when political power is unified under one party or when a party has the legislative majority needed to overturn a gubernatorial veto. An empirical test of the theoretical predictions are conducted using a panel of data for US states. A state with a legislature controlled by a single party with a large enough majority to overturn a gubernatorial veto will earmark 5% more of its tax revenue than other states and a state with a unified government will earmark 6.5% more. Together these explain 18.5% of the observed decrease in the percentage of state tax revenues earmarked from 1954 to 1997.     

Negotiating climate legislation: Policy path dependence and coalition stabilization

This article investigates the nature of policy path dependence through analysis of climate policy formation in the United States. In 2008 the US Congress attempted to pass the Lieberman–Warner bill, a comprehensive climate and energy package that would have capped greenhouse emissions and established a nationwide cap and trade program. In the same year, California successfully enacted the Global Warming Solutions Act. This article explores the circumstances of both cases and raises the question of why legislation at the state level was successful and took such a divergent form from legislation at the federal level. The divergence of these cases is used to highlight the nature of coalition formation and policy path dependence in the legislative process. Explanations of policy tend to gravitate toward either the generalizability of game theoretic approaches or the empirical depth of case studies. This article suggests a combined approach that uses case studies to analyze the positions and motivations of actors and to then model policy development over time. The approach examines policy through the formation and negotiation of policy coalitions. Drawing on the Advocacy Coalition Framework and omnibus analysis, the approach expands these coalition theories first by analysing legislative development at the interface of legislators and constituent interest groups, and second by adding temporal dimension to the analysis. The findings suggest that policy is path dependent in that it is negotiated between coalitions that in turn create stability in the policy process and insulate policy fields from external shocks. Policy path dependence suggests that theory alone is insufficient to predict policy outcomes; policy results depend strongly on prior policy efforts, historically and socially contingent coalitions, and the resulting framing of policy possibilities.     

Education Reform California Style

Education reform was a major issue in California during the1983 legislative session. As a legislative issue, it was resolvedin July when Governor George Deukmejian signed into law an educationreform bill that increased spending by $800 million and madea number of important changes in the state's education code.The differences between the 1982 and 1983 legislative sessionswere stark. In 1982, an election year, despite intense pressureby the education lobby, the state legislature refused to grantnew monies to education. Yet in 1983 the reverse was the case.Now this turnabout came to pass is a case of state politics;national events had little impact on either the direction orthe nature of reforms enacted.     

The Political Economy of Gender: Explaining Cross-National Variation in the Gender Division of Labor and the Gender Voting Gap

Mainstream political economy has tended to treat the family as a unit when examining the distributional consequences of labor market institutions and of public policy. In a world with high divorce rates, we argue that this simplification is more likely to obscure than to instruct. We find that labor market opportunities for women, which vary systematically with the position of countries in the international division of labor and with the structure of the welfare state, affect women's bargaining power within the family and as a result, can explain much of the cross country variation in the gender division of labor as well as the gender gap in political preferences.