Information sharing,secrecy and trust among law enforcement and secret service institutions in the European Union

Abstract

Transnational information sharing among security agencies in the European Union and beyond has grown considerably more important over the past decades. Centralised databases and numerous formal and informal networks now facilitate cooperation and information sharing. However, sharing intelligence may not only conflict with the protection of fundamental rights (data protection/privacy; presumption of innocence), but also with the organisational culture of institutions that are built upon secrecy. Police agencies often keep knowledge about individual cases and their strategies secret as long as possible. Intelligence services build their work and strategies upon secrecy even more. This paper analyses the variations of secrecy that can be observed for police agencies and secret services, and the relationship between information sharing among security agencies, secrecy, trust, transparency and accountability. In a normative perspective, the paper explores answers to the questions of how secret the work of security agencies should be in democratic rule of law systems and how accountability can be improved without making these institutions work less effectively.     

Can decision transparency increase citizen trust in regulatory agencies? Evidence from a representative survey experiment

Decision transparency is often proposed as a way to maintain or even increase citizen trust, yet this assumption is still untested in the context of regulatory agencies. We test the effect of transparency of a typical decision tradeoff in regulatory enforcement: granting forbearance or imposing a sanction. We employed a representative survey experiment (n = 1,546) in which we test the effect of transparency in general (providing information about a decision or not) and the effect of specific types of transparency (process or rationale transparency). We do this for agencies supervising financial markets, education, and health care. We find that overall decision transparency significantly increases citizen trust in only two of the three agencies. Rationale transparency has a more pronounced positive effect only for the Education Inspectorate. We conclude that the overall effect of decision transparency is positive but that the nature of the regulatory domain may weaken or strengthen this effect.     

Regulatory Agencies—The Challenges of Balancing Agency Autonomy and Political Control

In this article we focus on the dynamic interplay between increase in autonomy of regulatory agencies and political control of those agencies. The general research issues are the weak empirical foundations of regulatory reforms, the complex trade‐off between political control and agency autonomy, the dual process of deregulation and reregulation, the problems of role‐specialization and coordination, and the questions of “smart practice” in regulatory policy and practice. The theoretical basis is agency theories and a broad institutional approach that blend national political strategies, historical‐cultural context, and external pressures to understand regulatory agencies and regulatory reform. This approach is contrasted with a practitioner model of agencies. Empirically the article is based on regulatory reform in Norway, giving a brief introduction to the reform and agency context followed by an analysis of the radical regulatory reform policy introduced recently by the current Norwegian government. We illustrate how regulatory reforms and agencies work in practice by focusing on two specific cases on homeland security and telecommunications.     

Partisan Improprieties: Ministerial Control and Australia's Security Agencies, 1962–72

Partisan behaviour and abuses by intelligence and security agencies have often been attributed to the fact that agencies have become ‘out of control’ or ‘rogue elephants’. But a detailed empirical study of the politicization of the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) over ten years shows that the agency was not ‘out of control’ but very much under the control of its minister. The partisan use of security information arose from directives issued through the ‘democratic’ control exercised by a government. On the basis of this study, prevention of abuses by tighter governmental control is unlikely to work. A combination of government control, autonomy of the agency and independent scrutiny by an inspector-general is more likely to succeed.     

Implementing PBB: Conflicting Views of Success

A modern budget reform, performance‐based budgeting (PBB) emphasizes the measurement of government performance by agencies and public servants. In this article we define PBB as requiring strategic planning regarding agency mission, goals and objectives, and a process that requests quantifiable data that provide meaningful information about program outcomes. Performance‐based budgeting requirements are now pervasive in the states. Of forty‐seven states with PBB requirements, thirty‐one have legislated the process to be conducted, while sixteen have initiated the reform through budget guidelines or instructions.¹What remains unknown, yet of vital interest to state administrators, their staff, legislators, and citizens, regards implementation status of PBB systems. How many states are utilizing a PBB process as prescribed by law or administrative directive? And if PBB has been implemented, has it been successful regarding improvement of agency effectiveness and decision making about spending? Perhaps most importantly, has PBB influenced appropriation decisions?. This research is based on responses to a mail survey of executive and legislative budgeters regarding the PBB system established in their state. Results discussed in this article consider budgeters’ response about PBB implementation status and effectiveness as conducted. We find that there are differing perceptions across the branches of government regarding both the extent of PBB implementation as well as its success. Results show that states with better‐known PBB systems have not necessarily realized greater success in terms of effectiveness from this budget reform than states with less popularly known systems, at least as perceived by the budgeters included in this article.     

Policymaking with Multiple Agencies

Authority over related policy issues is often dispersed among multiple government agencies. In this article, I study when Congress should delegate to multiple agencies, and how shared regulatory space complicates agency decision making. To do so, I develop a formal model of decentralized policymaking with two agencies that incorporates information acquisition and information sharing, delineating situations where legislators should and should not prefer multiple agencies. Greater divergence between the agencies' ideal points distorts information sharing and policy choices, but it may increase the amount of information acquisition. Congress achieves better policy outcomes by delegating authority to both agencies if the agencies have strong policy disagreements. If the agencies have similar policy preferences, however, then Congress may want to consolidate authority within one agency because this approach mitigates free-riding and takes advantage of returns to scale.     

Effects of Administrators' Aspirations,Political Principals' Priorities,and Interest Groups' Influence on State Agency Budget Requests

This article addresses a long‐standing question in public budgeting: What factors influence bureau/agency budget request decisions? Empirical results confirm the complexity of variables that explain different levels of budget requests by over 1,000 state administrative agencies. The expected significant influence of administrator (agency head) aspirations was clearly present. But other important sources enter into the decision of agencies to satisfy rather than maximize. These include the strategic roles, activities, and priorities of governors, legislatures, and interest groups. These political principals' influence operates to constrain, discipline, or even augment agency budget requests.     

Performance Budgeting: The Perspective of State Agencies

Although performance‐based budgeting requirements are pervasive, what remains a challenge is how to gain the support from all stakeholders in the budget process that are essential to the integration of performance information with budgeting. This study examines the perspective and role of state agencies on performance budgeting. The finding indicates that for agencies to conduct performance‐informed budgeting, the focus needs to be on elevating managerial capacity to use performance information, and improving measurement quality. Moreover, it is crucial to recognize that performance budgeting is a collaborative process in which each participant plays a valuable role.     

Does agency competition improve the quality of policy analysis? Evidence from OMB and CBO fiscal projections

Public management scholars often claim that agency competition provides an effective institutional check on monopoly authority, and hence, leads to improvement of administrative performance in public sector agencies. This logic was central for creating the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in 1975 to challenge the policy information provided by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). We challenge this conventional wisdom by demonstrating that CBO has failed to enhance the quality of U.S. fiscal policy analysis on its own terms; nor has it spurred improvements in OMB's performance. Our empirical results indicate that the quality of OMB's fiscal projections has often deteriorated since the establishment of CBO as a rival bureau. We also show that both public and private information is being shared by these agencies to produce a similar caliber of task outputs. The broader implications of our study indicate that although politicians face incentives to employ agency competition in governmental settings, this type of bureaucratic strategy does not necessarily enhance the quality of administrative performance. © 2006 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management     

Merit, Management, and Neutral Competence: Lessons from the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, FY 1988–FY 1997

Despite the centrality of merit principles to governance in the United States over the past century, scant empirical research examines linkages between institutions, and outcomes in the implementation of merit system protections. We argue that the fate of merit principles depends, at a minimum, on two influences that may compete with neutral competence. The first is partisan responsiveness by counter bureaucracies charged with holding agencies accountable to merit principles. The second influence is the sacrifice of merit in the interest of managerial rerogatives at the agency level. This exploratory study assesses both of these influences within the federal government. Our data consist of personal interviews, analyses of U.S. Merit System Protection Board (MSPB) processes, case loads, and decisions between fiscal years 1988 and 1997, and a brief case study of the Justice Department. We find that the MSPB is largely the neutral and competent agency that Congress intended to create when it enacted the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. Less positively, our analysis also reveals that federal agencies vary in how well their personnel actions fare with the MSPB. This finding is especially germane to reinventing-government reforms that decentralize personnel management to agencies or to line operators within agencies.     

Structure and Process: Examining the Interaction between Bureaucratic Organization and Analytical Requirements

Attempts by politicians to control bureaucratic decisions include both structural (how is the agency making the decision organized?) and procedural (what rules must they follow when making the decision?). But how do these two modes of influence interact? This article examines the interaction between bureaucratic structure and one procedural control, the requirement that agencies conduct an analysis of their decisions prior to their issuance. I look at this interaction in the context of two types of analysis, cost‐benefit analysis and environmental impact assessment. I interview 16 individuals in each field and draw from their experiences of conducting and reviewing more than a thousand analyses. The conduct of analysis is affected by where analysts are placed in agencies. In particular, independence of analysts has a trade‐off. The more independent analysts are, the more likely they can challenge preferred decisions in their agency. But independent analysts are brought into decisions later and their independence may limit their long‐term impacts on agency culture. Despite this trade‐off, analysts expressed a clear preference for independence. The interaction between different controls of bureaucratic behavior is a potentially fruitful line for further research.     

Police Performance As Symbolic Politics? Public Recognition and the Value of Awards

Abstract

What constitutes “good” performance in a law enforcement agency, who decides, and how does public recognition of that performance change how an agency performs? This study uses a quasi-experimental design and propensity-score matching model to assess the impact of a law enforcement agency’s status as a finalist for the annual Cisco/International Chiefs of Police Association (IACP) Community Policing Award on performance in future years, as measured by crime clearance rates. It is found that after comparing the treated group (finalist agencies) with the untreated group (non-finalist nearest-neighbor agencies), there is no meaningful difference in crime clearance rates. This unexpected finding establishes that the public recognition of finalist status by the Department of Justice, which promotes finalist agencies as exemplars of best practices in community policing, does not impact the subsequent performance of those agencies. Additionally, the results of the model suggest that the impact of symbolic politics and social construction on the award finalist selection process and the choice by DOJ to promote the practices of those agencies should be explored. Questions are also raised as to the utility of crime clearance rates as a performance measure, and future avenues for research in each area are proposed.     

Boosting or Hindering Aid Effectiveness? An Assessment of Systems for Measuring Donor Agency Results

Amid rising criticism of aid effectiveness coupled with tight budgets in many donor countries at a time of economic crisis, donor agencies are under pressure to deliver value for money and to demonstrate development results. In response to these pressures, more and more donor agencies are adopting standard indicators, which allow for results to be aggregated across interventions and countries, in order to report agency‐wide results. This article analyses the reporting practices of eleven bilateral and multilateral donor agencies and assesses the implications of agency‐wide results measurement systems for aid effectiveness. The analysis shows that the data on aggregate results provided by donor agencies is only of limited informational value and does not provide an adequate basis for holding donor agencies to account. Moreover, reporting on agency‐wide results may have a number of adverse effects. Given the various limitations and risks identified in this article, I suggest that donor agencies should explore complementary options or alternatives to standard indicators in order to meet their reporting requirements. Donor agencies are advised to invest more in rigorous impact evaluations and to raise the transparency of individual interventions. © 2016 The Authors. Public Administration and Development published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.     

Who Participates in Collective Petitions in Rural China?

This article examines the question of why the risks posed by collective petitioning in China deter some villagers from participating but not others. Based on the statistical analysis of an original dataset and an ethnographic study of one case, this article finds that higher household income is the only significant factor that increases a villager??s probability to participate in collective petitions. Economic security empowers a peasant??s political participation. Contrary to the existing literature, being a demobilized soldier does not significantly increase a villager??s probability to participate in collective petitions. The implication of this finding is that petitioning as a form of ??managed participation?? in Chinese politics may face more and more challenges if the average Chinese household income continues to grow.     

Counter-Terrorism,Security and Intelligence in the EU: Governance Challenges for Collection,Exchange and Analysis

In this article we seek to address the emerging role of the European Union (EU) as a security and intelligence actor from the perspective of counter-terrorism. Intelligence as a process and product has been strongly promoted by the EU as a useful and necessary tool in the fight against terrorism, radicalization, organized crime and public order problems. A range of agencies has been established that collect, analyze and operationalize intelligence in view of strategically defined security threats. Examples are Europol and Frontex. This article makes an inventory of their roles and competences in the field of intelligence and looks at the list of instruments that encourage the sharing of intelligence between different law enforcement and security agencies. Moreover, it is argued in this article that as intelligence becomes more hybrid and as the EU only holds light powers of oversight on ownership and integrity of data, considerable governance challenges lurk around the corner. As ‘intelligence’ is usually a complex and sensitive product, it often travels outside formal bureaucratic channels, which undermines accountability and transparency of where, how and for what purpose the intelligence was gathered.     

Transparency and mistrust: Who or what should be made transparent?

It is increasingly recognized in public administration that the relationship between trust and transparency is not straightforward. Recently, right‐wing populists have risen to power, rejecting transparency requirements based on documents while claiming that they “hide nothing.” Clearly, existing scholarly conceptualizations are insufficient for understanding how transparency operates as a value in real‐world political contestation. An analysis of state‐ and national‐level politics in Nigeria reveals that, while always retaining a core informational component, there are multiple competing conceptions of transparency. Popular demands for transparency express a belief that not only should data be made transparent, but also the social networks in which politicians are embedded. “Transparency in people” can clash with more traditional, technocratic transparency practices centered on data. By rethinking who or what should be made transparent—data, things, or people—this article offers fresh theoretical insights on the complex politics of transparency and trust.     

DISPUTING AND REGULATORY POLICY: THE EXAMPLE OF A STATE PUBLIC UTILITY AGENCY

The literature on policy making has largely ignored the formulation and implementation of policy when governmental agencies process citizen disputes. In this essay we provide an initial exploration of the dimensions of agency policy making and policy implementation during dispute processing. Using a case study of dispute processing by a state public utilities regulatory agency, it appears that dispute processing contributes to evolutionary policy formulation and implementation by providing a context for the incremental adjustment and legitimation of continuing policies, by sponsoring negotiations leading to the serial adaption of existing policies to new circumstances, and by screening disputes and sharpening the issues in disputes so they are amenable to policy development through agency adjudicatory procedures. The findings of the case study suggest that processing of citizen complaints flowing into the "bottom" of an agency is potentially as important as the politics of the rule making and licensing procedural contexts in the conduct of regulatory policy.     

Political Learning from Rare Events: Poisson Inference, Fiscal Constraints, and the Lifetime of Bureaus

David E. Lewis Woodrow Wilson School and Department of Politics, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544 e-mail: delewis{at}princeton.edu How do political actors learn about their environment when the"data" provided by political processes are characterized byrare events and highly discontinuous variation? In such learningenvironments, what can theory predict about how learning actorswill take costly actions that are difficult to reverse (e.g.,eliminating programs, approving a risky new product, revisinga security policy, firing or recalling an appointed or electedofficial)? We develop a formal model for this problem and applyit to the termination of bureaucratic agencies. The conventionalwisdom that "the older a bureau is, the less likely it is todie" (Downs 1967, Inside Bureaucracy) persists but has neverbeen properly tested. This paper offers a learning-based stochasticoptimization model of agency termination that offers two counterintuitivepredictions. First, politicians terminate agencies only afterlearning about them, so the hazard of agencies should be nonmonotonic,contradicting Downs's prediction. Second, if terminating agenciesis costly, agencies are least likely to be terminated when politiciansare fiscally constrained or when the deficit is high. We assessthe model by developing a battery of tests for the shape ofthe hazard function and estimate these and other duration modelsusing data on U.S. federal government agencies created between1946 and 1997. Results show that the hazard rate of agency terminationis strongly nonmonotonic and that agencies are less likely tobe terminated under high deficits and divided government. Forthe first 50 years of the agency duration distribution, themodal termination hazard occurs at five years after agenciesare enabled. Methodologically, our approach ties the functionalform of a hazard model tightly to theory and presents an applied"agenda" for testing the shape of an empirical hazard function.With extensions, our model and empirical framework are applicableto a range of political phenomena.     

Opening the Black Box of Administrative Reform: A Strategic-Relational Analysis of Agency Responses to Termination Threats

ABSTRACT

How do public agencies respond when reform proposals threaten downsizing, reduction in functions, or termination? Agency survival during administrative reform is conventionally explained by structural characteristics, informed by the hardwiring thesis derived from the politics of the U.S. federal government. Parliamentary systems provide greater opportunity for agency reform, but there is little evidence of how agencies respond to such proposals or how proposals are altered prior to decision. We consider agencies as active participants in the reform processes, using strategic-relational theory to analyse their strategizing. The article employs detailed empirical evidence on 12 agencies subject to reform by the UK government between 2010 and 2013. We identify three archetypical defence strategies—technical expert, network node, and marginal adaptor—and argue that coding agency strategies alongside structural analysis can help better explain reform outcomes.     

When do autonomous banking regulators promote stability?

Can autonomous banking regulatory agencies reduce the odds that a country will suffer a crippling banking crisis? We investigate the impact that agencies charged with banking regulation and prudential supervision can have on financial stability in the banking sector. We argue that the potential benefits of autonomy are hard to realise because banking regulators face incentives to shirk in their mandate to secure banking stability. These incentives are strongest in political systems with high numbers of veto players, where the autonomy of a banking agency is difficult to undo even if the agency is derelict in promoting banking sector stability. We test an implication of this argument, namely, that the probability of bank crisis onset should diminish with the level of autonomy of the banking agency, but only in polities with low numbers of veto points. We base our analysis of this conditional hypothesis on an original dataset of 79 countries observed between 1971 and 2009 that captures the degree of autonomy of banking agencies from political principals. Our findings confirm that the impact of banking agency autonomy on the risk of bank crisis onset is conditional on the political structure in which the agency is embedded.