Clarity of responsibility and economic evaluations

Convincing scholarly evidence shows the economy directs the mass public's support for parties and leaders. But the extent of economic voting depends on a country's “clarity of responsibility.” According to several scholars, political clarity is important because it determines whether people link national economic performance to the parties in government. This study explores a potential second role, which involves how clarity moderates the strength of partisan-motivated reasoning. Clarity of responsibility makes the economy more or less central to party politics. It could therefore moderate people's motivation to rationalize economic facts in a biased direction. Using cross-national survey data, this study tests this possibility by examining economic disagreement between people who support a party in government and those who support the opposition. Results from a Bayesian multilevel regression show that partisan disagreement varies systematically with clarity of responsibility. This finding raises new questions about cross-national differences in economic voting.     

Local economies and national economic evaluations

Underlying the phenomena of economic voting are voters’ perceptions of economic conditions. But from where do these evaluations originate? This work examines the effects of three types of factors influential to the formation of national economic evaluations: predispositions (such as age, gender, income, partisanship), information and attentiveness, and objective local economic conditions (local unemployment rates). Our findings fit with earlier work, broadly confirming the influential role each set of factors plays in shaping national economic perceptions. We then extend the literature - demonstrating that the impact of the local economic environment is conditional on attention to media, political information and education. Using a combined dataset of the 2006 Canadian Election Studies with neighbourhood level economic indicators drawn from Canadian Census data (2006), our findings show that, in developing perceptions of the national economy, more attentive, more informed and more educated individuals are less influenced by local economic conditions than their less attentive, less informed and less educated counterparts. These findings contribute to our understanding of how local economic conditions influence the formation of national economic evaluations.     

Public evaluations of the presidential nomination process

The evaluation of presidential nomination reforms has been the topic of elite discussion and debate, with little attention paid to popular evaluations. Public attitudes toward a number of reforms to the presidential nomination process were evaluated through survey data collected in 1988. The evaluations included campaign costs, debates, the influence of consultants, and the role of the media. The analysis suggests that there is a relatively high level of popular satisfaction with these dimensions of the current system. Popular concern about the nomination process is focused in two areas—the roles of money and the media. There is a strong suggestion that the movement toward regionalization of the calendar was responsive to partisan concerns in different regions of the country.     

On evaluating success in complex policy mixes: the case of renewable energy support schemes

The aim of this paper is to propose the main elements of a theoretical and methodological framework for the assessment of the success of complex policy mixes, to highlight the conflicts between individual instruments and other elements within those mixes and to propose policy recommendations in order to mitigate them. Some criteria are defined, and different levels of analysis are considered. The challenges in evaluating policy packages are illustrated with the case of the coexistence between renewable energy support and emissions trading schemes. It is shown that policy mixes inherently lead to interactions between the different instruments, either in the form of conflicts or synergies. Conflicts are horizontal (i.e., between different types of instruments) and/or vertical (i.e., between different administrative levels). It is suggested that mitigating those conflicts could require administrative coordination. Relevant coordination could take place between different administrative levels and relate to different instruments or different design elements within similar instruments. However, given the trade-offs between different criteria, the role of coordination is necessarily limited.     

The dynamics of interest group evaluations of Congress

We apply a dynamic spatial model to interest group ratings of the members of Congress over the period 1959–1981. Spatial distances between an interest group and the members of Congress are assumed to be monotonic with the ratings. Our pooled cross-sectional time-series data set consists of 203,387 ratings by 59 interest groups. We restrict the spatial coordinates of the interest groups and members of Congress to be polynomial functions of time. Two significant dimensions are recovered: the first dimension, which accounts for approximately 75% of the variance, represents liberal-conservative positions on economic issues; the second dimension, which accounts for approximately an additional 5% of the variance, represents liberal-conservative positions on social issues. Nearly all the interest groups and most members of Congress are ideologically consistent. They are either liberal on both dimensions or conservative on both.     

Governmental failures in evaluating programs

Consider a government that adopts a program, sees a noisy signal about its success, and decides whether to continue the program. Suppose further that the success of a program is greater if people think it will be continued. This paper considers outcomes when government cannot commit. We find that welfare can be higher when information is poor, that government should at times commit to continuing a program it believes had failed, and that a government which fears losing power may acquire either too much or too little information.     

Toward more valid evaluations of training programs serving the disadvantaged

The author challenges the widespread assumption that the wage effects of federal training programs are reliable and unbiased estimates of productivity effects and social benefits. Evidence is presented that the reputations of government training programs are unreliable and that employers stigmatize those eligible for Targeted Jobs Tax Credit and Comprehensive Employment and Training Act on-the-job training contracts. Graduates of classroom training programs which are known to be funded by the Job Training Partnership Act are likely to be similarly stigmatized. TJTC eligibles are seriously underpaid by employers and job training partnership act graduates may experience a similar fate. Consequently, the true effect of JTPA on the productivity of disadvantaged workers may be considerably larger than its effect on wages. The author describes alternative methods of obtaining estimates of productivity effects of training programs.     

Electoral rules,corruption, inequality and evaluations of democracy

Features of electoral systems have been found to have positive effects on evaluations of democracy. This article proposes that there are larger social forces that must be accounted for in such analyses. Using European Social Survey measures of democratic expectations and the ‘satisfaction with democracy’ item, this study tests for effects of electoral rules on perceptions of democracy. It is found that multipartyism/proportionality and preferential ballot structure appear to correspond with positive evaluations of elections and parties, and with greater satisfaction with how democracy is functioning. However, these relationships dissipate when corruption and income inequality are accounted for. This suggests substantial limits to the capacity of electoral reforms to enhance democratic legitimacy. It also suggests that studies of mass perceptions of democratic performance may over‐estimate effects of electoral rules if country‐level corruption and income inequality are not accounted for.     

Can evaluations influence programs? The case of compensatory education

Evaluators have often had trouble providing analyses that are of practical use to policymakers. A major reason for this is that evaluators characteristically pay little attention to variables that are politically relevant. The National Institute of Education's evaluation of Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education act, used extensively by Congress in 1977–1978, provides a clear example of how attention to political concerns can pay off for evaluators in increased utilization of their products.     

Political polarization in retrospective economic evaluations during recessions and recoveries

Retrospective economic evaluations are politically biased: across a broad range of democratic countries, supporters of the party that controls the executive provide evaluations that are systematically more positive than those of the rest of the electorate; similarly, ideological distance from the ruling party predicts more negative evaluations. Yet, during economic downturns, citizens of different ideological persuasions and partisan affiliations tend to agree that the state of the economy is dire. During recoveries, on the other hand, evaluations are polarized along partisan and ideological lines. Due to the psychological phenomenon of negativity bias, retrospective evaluations respond to economic downturns more strongly than to recoveries. As a consequence, the extent of polarization in public opinion varies dramatically between good and bad economic times.     

A precise method for evaluating election schemes

A previously published paper evaluated election schemes under a wide variety of election circumstances. This paper improves upon the previous work by refining the measures used to rate the election schemes and increasing the statistical significance of those ratings. With these modifications, we can now draw some new conclusions:

1. In general circumstances, the Borda System outperforms the Copeland System which outperforms Approval which outperforms Majority Rule.
2. The Maximin Rule — strongly supported by Rawls's — turns out to be a reasonable election rule if the number of election alternatives is large relative to the number of voters.
3. With two exceptions, all our election systems performed quite well given a society with highly correlated utilities.
4. Given a polarized society, a serial dictatorship was better than every other election system except Borda.

Perhaps even more importantly, we now have the possibility of conducting some cost/benefit analyses of different proposals for electoral changes.     

Popular evaluations of election quality in Africa: Evidence from Nigeria

Despite the important consequences of citizens' election quality perceptions on political behavior and political attitudes, very little is known about how citizens formulate their perceptions of election quality. In this paper, I assess the correlates of citizens' perceptions of election quality. I suggest that the performance of election-related institutions is an important correlate of citizens' election quality perceptions. However, citizens' experience with electoral irregularities, and partisan affiliation also matter. I test these hypotheses in the context of the 2007 Nigerian general elections using survey data from Afrobarometer and International Foundation for Electoral Systems. The findings provide robust support for the hypotheses. Most importantly, the results indicate that the performance of electoral management bodies is associated with citizens' assessment of election quality in Africa and that citizens demand electoral management bodies with impartiality and professionalism.     

European elections and the pre-electoral period: Media use and campaign evaluations

Abstract: This article addresses the problems of the campaign period of the 1989 Euro-elections: frequency of following the campaign, media use, preferences for various channels of communication (conversations, encounters with party workers, political meetings, mailed material, posters, advertisements, press, TV, radio). It demonstrates that, even if important national variations can be found, common socio-economic and political stratifications are at work, across borders, on the continent.
The variables of sex, occupation and political affiliations clearly play a role which frequently is transnational, and sometimes more active than the variable of nation. It is also true that, compared to the 1979 campaign, the 1989 one is marked by a problem of significant alignments: the last campaign tends to be less sexist, less 'socially privileged' and less biased to right wing voters than the first one. But these alignments take place among weak figures of interest and participation.     

The influence of levels of information on the use of prospective evaluations

Recent work on voting behavior suggests that both retrospective and prospective evaluations are important components of vote choice. To test the generalizability of the prospective model, (1) the same model of voting behavior is applied to groups of differing cognitive abilities, (2) a comparison of the extent to which each group extrapolates from the past to the future is made, and (3) the frequency with which people of each group respond don't know is examined. The evidence presented supports the hypothesis that the prospective model is generalizable across segments of the population. Alternatively, since there are relatively few differences across categories, one might view this paper as a collection of negative findings.     

Evaluation's serendipity: A new approach in evaluating training impact

Evaluating training impact is most productive when carried out by means of in-country interviews. But such interviewing can be distorted by ‘evaluation hospitality’, and therefore needs to develop a flexible comprehensive ‘evaluation habit’. It has not been sufficiently recognized that evaluating impact not only helps develop a training course, but also has a therapeutic value for ex-trainees and is an effective form of follow-up. The evaluation process itself can intensify and increase the extent of training impact and therefore should be an integral part of any training package.     

What's looks got to do with it? Instructor appearance and student evaluations of teaching

Some studies suggest that instructors' looks are important determinants of their Student Evaluations of Teaching (SET) results. Yet the studies examining this proposition leave out many independent variables that have been found to be important determinants of SETs in the SET literature. This study adds in most such factors and finds that, controlling for these other factors, attractiveness has no effect in our data. We conclude that earlier findings indicating that instructor appearance is important are likely due to omitted variable bias. © 2005 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management