拉美国家现代化与美洲国际秩序民主化——对美拉关系发展中三大标志性“峰会”的考察及思考

由美国主导的、已有120年历史的泛美联盟组织,由于其内存逻辑的矛盾而造成的美洲国际秩序民主化功能的缺失,未能为拉美国家现代化创造良好的外部条件,导致泛美联盟危机屡屡出现。2010年2月,墨西哥坎昆团结峰会决定组建无美的拉美和加勒比国家共同体,以推进拉美地区一体化,进而加速拉美国家现代化,这是一种明智的战略性选择。本文从拉美历史嬗变的视角,阐明经济全球化背景下的国家现代化不完全是单纯的国家工程,它需要有良好的国际环境和条件,要求与改革旧的游戏规则、推进国际秩序民主化相衔接。尽管这一过程可能十分复杂、曲折,但这一历史趋势不可避免,其前景是看好的。     

‘Unfortunate Arabia’: The United States,Great Britain and Yemen, 1955–63

As it emerged from a long, self‐imposed diplomatic isolation after 1955 and then plunged into revolution and civil war in 1962, Yemen confronted its Arab neighbours, the United States, and Great Britain with difficult political challenges. This study of Anglo‐American diplomacy concerning Yemen in the late 1950s and early 1960s reveals the very different British and American interests and priorities in Arabia at the height of the Cold War and underscores the different tactics employed by each nation in pursuit of its regional goals. It also points out the strikingly different attitudes of officials in Washington and London to the phenomenon of Arab nationalism. Further, it highlights the importance of stability in the southwestern corner of the Arabian Peninsula to US and British strategies for ensuring the uninterrupted flow of Persian Gulf petroleum to the West. Finally, this examination of events in southwest Arabia demonstrates how traditional rivalries and animosities in the region shaped the conditions under which the United States and Britain attempted to pursue their interests there.     

'Unfortunate Arabia': The United States, Great Britain and Yemen, 1955-63

As it emerged from a long, self-imposed diplomatic isolation after 1955 and then plunged into revolution and civil war in 1962, Yemen confronted its Arab neighbours, the United States, and Great Britain with difficult political challenges. This study of Anglo-American diplomacy concerning Yemen in the late 1950s and early 1960s reveals the very different British and American interests and priorities in Arabia at the height of the Cold War and underscores the different tactics employed by each nation in pursuit of its regional goals. It also points out the strikingly different attitudes of officials in Washington and London to the phenomenon of Arab nationalism. Further, it highlights the importance of stability in the southwestern corner of the Arabian Peninsula to US and British strategies for ensuring the uninterrupted flow of Persian Gulf petroleum to the West. Finally, this examination of events in southwest Arabia demonstrates how traditional rivalries and animosities in the region shaped the conditions under which the United States and Britain attempted to pursue their interests there.     

Progressive Era Diplomat: Lloyd C. Griscom and Trade Expansion

The Progressive Era, from the late 1890s to the entry of the United States into World War One, was marked by a professional commitment to global trade expansion on the part of the State Department and the McKinley, Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson administrations. Philosophically, the United States embraced the belief that a liberal, democratic, free-enterprise political and economic system would advance human progress on every continent, and that global free trade would remove many causes of war and conflict. Such a policy position attracted young and talented foreign service officers to serve in the American diplomatic corps. One young man was Lloyd C. Griscom, heir to one of the great American shipping fortunes. Griscom's career as a diplomat in Turkey, Persia, Japan, Brazil, and Italy between 1899 and 1909 revealed much about American political and economic interests during a period when the United States emerged as a major power.     

Progressive Era Diplomat: Lloyd C. Griscom and Trade Expansion

The Progressive Era, from the late 1890s to the entry of the United States into World War One, was marked by a professional commitment to global trade expansion on the part of the State Department and the McKinley, Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson administrations. Philosophically, the United States embraced the belief that a liberal, democratic, free-enterprise political and economic system would advance human progress on every continent, and that global free trade would remove many causes of war and conflict. Such a policy position attracted young and talented foreign service officers to serve in the American diplomatic corps. One young man was Lloyd C. Griscom, heir to one of the great American shipping fortunes. Griscom's career as a diplomat in Turkey, Persia, Japan, Brazil, and Italy between 1899 and 1909 revealed much about American political and economic interests during a period when the United States emerged as a major power.     

Steadfast Yet Reluctant Allies: Japan and the United Kingdom in the Vietnam War

During the Vietnam War there were high expectations from the Johnson and Nixon Administrations for Japan and Britain to provide practical and political support for American military and strategic objectives in Indochina. The leader of Japan's conservative Liberal Democratic Party, Sato Eisaku, and the British Labour Party's Harold Wilson, balanced political support for the United States with significant public pressure at home to eschew any entanglement in the highly unpopular conflict. As junior allies of the United States both Sato and Wilson did not want to see the United States fail in Vietnam or the communist sphere expand in Southeast Asia. Both leaders accrued significant foreign policy advantages as a result of politically and publicly supporting American actions in Vietnam. But to placate domestic electorates that clearly felt uncomfortable over their governments providing explicit, albeit non-military, support to the United States in Vietnam, Sato and Wilson expended substantial prime ministerial diplomacy in attempting to play a mediatory role in the conflict. Each was highly successful in balancing domestic and American demands, whilst maintaining their security partnerships with the United States.     

‘The Privileged Friendship’: Reassessing the Central Intelligence Agency Operation at Zaire’s Kamina Airbase

ABSTRACT

From 1986 to 1991, the United States Central Intelligence Agency funnelled arms to the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola through Zaire’s Kamina Airbase. Recently declassified documents cast new light on the ways that facilitating this operation and protecting its covert status provided invaluable bargaining leverage for Zaire’s president, Mobutu Sese Seko, who demanded political and economic concessions from Washington. As a rare Cold War precedent for the types of covert, temporary basing agreements that the United States is now establishing throughout Africa, the Kamina case thus warrants a substantive reappraisal.     

战后日本国家战略演进及岸田内阁战略走向

二战后日本不得不放弃武力扩张的国家战略,但伴随形势变化,日本不同当政者的治国方略则不相同。围绕是维护宪法、优先发展经济、重视国际协调,还是修改宪法、增强军事力量、成为政治军事大国等,存在两种不同国家战略倾向。其背后则是两种不同的历史观。战后,日本在《日本国宪法》下走和平发展道路,经济、科技取得令世界瞩目的成就,但外交则受制于美国而缺乏自主性。日本成为经济大国后,开始借助美国,努力成为亚洲领导国家和联合国常任理事国,而非所谓摆脱美国的"正常国家"。21世纪以来,安倍晋三的国家战略目标是对内推动修宪,使日本成为"能战国家";对外构筑"自由开放的印太",制衡中国。菅义伟内阁继承了安倍的国家战略。岸田文雄执政后在延续同一国家战略的同时,会展现何种特色,值得关注。     

Diplomacy of Estrangement: The Dealings of the United States with Pakistan before 9/11

Diplomatic correspondence between Washington and the American Embassy in Islamabad published by the National Security Archive shows that during the last 35 years of the twentieth century American diplomacy toward Pakistan faced a mutually de-escalating relationship. Pakistan wanted American economic and military assistance as well as support in its conflicts with India. The United States was ready to aid Pakistan, but only so far as Islamabad respected American demands. These focused on containing Soviet influence in the region and, more recently, fighting al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The United States also asked Pakistan to refrain from manufacturing nuclear weapons. To enforce this policy, successive American administrations showered Pakistan with sanctions. These sanctions were lifted again and again, because they undercut American diplomatic influence with the Pakistani government. Washington did not intend to support Pakistan in its conflicts with India. Pakistan let down the United States by not using its leverage over the Taliban to capture Osama Bin Laden. Mistrust resulting from this roller coaster relationship should have warned American diplomats not to take Pakistan's support in the war in Afghanistan against al-Qaeda and the Taliban for granted.     

War Makes the State,but Not as It Pleases: Homeland Security and American Anti-Statism

The shock of war is thought to be closely associated with the growth of the state, in the United States and elsewhere. Yet each proposal to significantly expand state power in the United States since September 11 has been resisted, restrained, or even rejected outright. This outcome—theoretically unexpected and contrary to conventional wisdom—is the result of enduring aspects of America's domestic political structure: the separation of powers at the federal level between three co-equal and overlapping branches, the relative ease with which interest groups access the policy-making process, and the intensity with which executive-branch bureaucracies guard their organizational turf. These persistent aspects of u.s. political life, designed by the nation's founders to impede the concentration of state power, have substantially shaped the means by which contemporary guardians of the American state pursue “homeland security.” War does make the state, but not as it pleases. Theoretical approaches to state building should recognize that domestic political institutions mediate between the international shock of war and domestic state building.     

Choosing Sides in the Horn of Africa: Wikileaks,the Ethiopia Imperative,and American Responses to Post-9/11 Regional Conflicts

The United States has faced at times the policy dilemma of seeing conflict erupt between two countries with which it maintains friendly diplomatic relations. The bureaucratic biases of relevant agencies can play an important role in determining whether to choose sides or remain neutral in these conflicts. In the early 1960s the Africa Bureau adopted a pro-Ethiopia bias that shaped American policy in the Horn of Africa. With the insights provided by the 2010 Wikileaks cables, this analysis explores how the “Ethiopia imperative” affected three inter-related American policy decisions in the Horn of Africa in the early twenty-first century: the decision to support Ethiopia despite its refusal to abide by a legally binding decision that favoured Eritrea following the 1998–2000 Eritrea–Ethiopia border war; to give Ethiopia what amounted to a “blank cheque” to invade Somalia in December 2006 and overthrow the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC); and to confront and isolate Eritrea diplomatically for waging proxy war against Ethiopia in Somalia.     

America's freedom to act in the Caspian Area

After the break up of the Soviet Union the conflict over energy resources in the Caspian area has flared up again. The United States has entered the stage, but the only remaining superpower finds it hard to forward its security policy interests and interests in the economic sphere in the area. The creation of a US‐dominated hegemony in the area would be beneficial for the United States, but the policy of containment of Iran and Russia, and US policy towards Azerbaijan seriously limits this possibility. Thus it is not possible to secure American influence in the Caspian area. In the long term this leaves the area open to Russia and Iran, or new actors such as China and the EU, unless the United States is willing to soften its policy vis‐à‐vis Iran and/or Azerbaijan in order to create the needed hegemony, and in this way achieve economic and political influence in the former Soviet republics.     

A ‘visionary hope’ frustrated: J.M. Keynes and the origins of the postwar international monetary order

During the 1930s and 1940s Keynes developed the vision of a world in which every country would be able to pursue its own New Deal. He believed in the Second World War that Anglo‐American partnership would provide the foundations of this benevolent new order. But his enterprise was frustrated by Washington's insistence on economic orthodoxy. It was an outcome which left Keynes pessimistic about the prospects for international economic cooperation. However the prejudices of Keynes's first biographer, Roy Harrod, in combination with the political exigencies of the early cold war period, obscured the extent of his disillusionment.     

The Offshore Balancing Thesis Reconsidered: Realism,the Balance of Power in Europe,and America's Decision for War in 1917

According to John Mearsheimer, the United States entered the First World War because the Wilson administration believed the Triple Entente was on the verge of defeat. As a result, he claims, the Americans entered the war to prevent Germany from becoming a regional hegemon in Europe. A careful and targeted examination of the relevant primary sources, however, demonstrates that Washington was largely unaware of the plight of the Allied powers in the spring of 1917; therefore, the argument that the United States was acting as an offshore balancer at this time is unconvincing. This article shows that unit-level factors and statecraft can play a larger role in international relations than structural realist theory allows and makes an empirical contribution to the World War I literature by demonstrating that balance of power considerations were not a major factor in the Wilson administration's decision for war.     

How the United Nations Beat Hitler and Prepared the Peace

The United Nations was born in 1942, defeated the Axis Powers led by Germany, Italy and Japan and created today's UN system. This reality has been lost in modern scholarship. We are taught that the Allied countries, mainly America and Britain, with the Soviet Union won the war and that the United Nations was created in 1945. In this way, the achievement of victory can be set in opposition to the United Nations and to multilateralism in general. But it should not be possible to separate victory in the war from the modern United Nations and its priorities, for these were the priorities set by the United Nations at war. America, Britain and the Soviet Union led a large coalition of states organised as the United Nations and this term was used routinely in military orders, in the instruments of surrender signed by the enemy and in political and social life. Bretton Woods and San Francisco were United Nations conferences, and interim United Nations organisations preceded the Charter. Understanding the wartime United Nations reframes our understanding of the second half of the last century and of our own. From UNESCO to the World Bank the primary purpose of the international system is conflict prevention and its wartime architects bequeathed us this system as a realist necessity vital in times of trial, not as a liberal accessory to be discarded when the going gets rough.     

A Weary Hercules: The United States and the Fertile Crescent in a Post-Caliphate Era

Since the 9/11 attacks, the United States has tended to engage in regime change missions with a short-term and improvisational approach that focuses on removing adversaries from the battlefield rather than achieving consolidated political gains. Today, Washington may repeat the same mistake by prioritizing the military destruction of ISIS, rather than creating a tolerable political order. The policy challenges are particularly acute because, like a weary Hercules, Washington is confronted with endless labor, but limited capability. The answer is to pursue a long-term strategic approach that aligns the ends and means of war, seeks ugly stability rather than illusory goals, accepts that nation-building in some form is inevitable, and wins the narrative war.This article is part of a special project conducted by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, titled: “After the Caliphate: Reassessing the Jihadi Threat and Stabilizing the Fertile Crescent,” which includes a book, a thematic issue of Orbis: FPRI's Journal of World Affairs (Summer 2018), and a series of podcasts. Each element of the project can be found here: https://www.fpri.org/research/after-the-caliphate-project/.     

Stuxnet and the Limits of Cyber Warfare

American foreign policy analysts have generally viewed World War II as the most important of the six wars the country fought in the twentieth century. By entering this war, so the argument goes, the United States prevented the gravest geopolitical threat to its security—German and Japanese hegemonies in Eurasia—from materializing. Careful reexamination of the best case for U.S. entry into World War II, made by Nicholas Spykman in 1942, demonstrates that the traditional view is misplaced: the United States could have remained secure over the long term had it not entered the war and had it allowed Germany and Japan to win. Its standard of living and its way of life, however, would most likely have suffered. Avoidance of those two outcomes was the real reason to have entered the war. The implications of this analysis for balance of power theory and current American grand strategy are spelled out.     

国际环境对东南亚威权政治的影响

冷战期间,东南亚国家处在冷战的全球国际大环境之下的“热战”地区国际小环境之中。两种制度之间的争夺、美苏中三大国之间的角逐对东南亚国家推行威权政治起到了一定的推动作用。由于实行威权政治的东南亚各国的国情不同,国际环境对它们的作用方式和影响效果也不尽相同。本文试对新加坡、印度尼西亚和菲律宾三国的情况进行初步的分析。     

大国安全与地区发展的悖论?——基于冷战早期美拉关系的考察

为了遏制共产主义的发展,战后初期美国积极在西半球编织反共防务安全体系。与此相比,美国对拉美国家的经济援助需求消极怠慢,对它们所面临的经济发展问题视而不见,采取了“贸易而非援助”的经济政策,激化了美拉矛盾。20世纪五六十年代,一些拉美国家实行了国有化和土改等民族主义改革,并同苏联加强贸易往来,反美反独裁的游击运动风起云涌。在美国看来,这与其在西半球的经济安全和反共战略相悖。为了化解危机,美国一方面以反共和集体安全为名,对“敌对”政权进行军事干预,另一方面也在不断调整自身政策,加大对拉美国家的经济援助力度。不论怎样,谋求和巩固在西半球的霸主地位始终是美国制定拉美政策的根本目的,安全和稳定是其维护的主要利益。在理论上,只有拉美国家的深层经济发展问题得到有效解决,才能消除不稳定的隐患,所以,美国国家安全与拉美地区发展是并行不悖的。但在现实中,由于拉美国家的既得利益集团与美国关系密切,美国不可能切实推进拉美国家的经济改革,同时美国又常以安全防务政策化解由经济发展引发的拉美问题,这种立场上的偏差注定了美国提出的经济改革方案的“无效性”,而仅仅是一种权宜之计。     

Pamphlets of the Committee on Public Information and the Construction of an American National Identity during World War One: An Event-Frame Analysis

In 1917, the United States was far from a cohesive entity. Using the events surrounding World War One as a natural laboratory to trace the construction of a unified American identity, this article adds to the debate on the political sociology of identity frames and nationalism. Using an event-frame - model to analyze the discourse reflected in pamphlets disseminated by the Wilson administration, I demonstrate how identity frames evolved and increasingly relied on enemy images to strengthen the in-group coherence of American citizens. Thus, paying attention to the political dynamics of frame evolution is crucial in understanding the emergence of salient identities.