Motivating Management: Corporate Compliance in Environmental Protection*

Based on interviews with facility managers in the electroplating and chemical industries, this study examines regulated firms’ perceptions of how various instrumental, normative, and social factors motivated their firms’ environmental actions. We found that “implicit general deterrence” (the overall effect of sustained inspection and enforcement activity) was far more important than either specific or general deterrence, and that deterrence in any form was of far greater concern to small and medium‐sized enterprises than it was to large ones. Most reputation‐sensitive firms in the environmentally sensitive chemical industry chose to go substantially beyond compliance for reasons that related to risk management and to the perceived need to protect their social license to operate. Almost half our respondents also provided normative explanations for why they complied. Overall, we conclude that there are various, often interwoven, strands that must be taken into account in understanding what motivates corporate environmental behavior, and how they play out depends very much on the size and sophistication of companies themselves and on the characteristics of the industry sector within which they are located.     

Neoclassical Difficulties: Tort Deterrence for Latent Injuries*

Economists often claim that the tort system leads firms to provide consumers and workers with the socially optimal level of safety. Moreover, in the case of work-related hazards, employers are alleged to have another source of incentives to take precautions. If wages are sensitive to job-related risks, employers should spend money to reduce such risks when, by doing so, they can save more in wage costs than the costs of the precautions taken. Whatever their merits in other settings, in the case of latent injuries such as workplace exposure to asbestos neither tort nor market are likely to provide an optimal level of safety; indeed, they have failed to do so in the examples we discuss. We find that the introduction of a long delay between the exposure to a hazard and the onset of symptoms introduces a variety of empirical complications that overwhelm the assumptions on which the neoclassical model rests. Our conclusion is thus that comparisons between tort and alternative systems of deterrence/compensation should start from an empirical assessment of how the tort system actually works (and doesn't work), rather than beginning with misleading theoretical claims about the system's optimality.     

The Dynamic of Corporate Self-Regulation: ISO 14001, Environmental Commitment, and Organizational Citizenship Behavior

This article examines the institutional impact of environmental management systems (EMSs), focusing on ISO 14001. It develops a pluralistic framework for thinking about the dynamic of corporate self-regulation that we term the polyphonic model. It argues that the adoption of ISO 14001 can move the firm into a new equilibrium trajectory, which enmeshes together environmental and economic goals and reflects greater sensitivity to ecological concerns. There is a positive reciprocal cycle between the pro-environmental structural changes induced by ISO 14001 and the employees' attitudes toward the firm and the environment. In order to examine ISO 14001 institutional impact, we conducted a series of interviews with managers and administered questionnaires to employees in 24 Israeli firms with and without certification. The findings indicate that the perceived environmental commitment of certified firms was higher than that of noncertified firms and was higher among employees that perceived the EMS as more highly integrated in the firm. Perceptions of the standard's integration were also found to be positively correlated with personal environmental commitment. The results also indicate that the increase in the firm's environmental commitment was positively associated with employees' organizational citizenship behavior within certified firms. Further indications of the pro-environmental dynamic induced by ISO 14001 were found in the in-depth interviews.     

Deterrence and avoidance

This paper explores the effects of public enforcement, in general, and punishment, in particular, on crime levels if offenders can engage in avoidance activities. Avoidance reduces the probability or magnitude of punishment. In general, offenders can reduce their expected punishment either by substituting legal activities for criminal activities (the deterrence effect) or by increasing avoidance activities. This paper shows that increasing the direct costs of crime – by either increasing punishment or enforcement efforts – does not necessarily deter criminal activity and may actually trigger increased crime if avoidance is possible. Furthermore, this paper shows that increasing the opportunity costs of crime (e.g. by subsidizing legal alternatives or through educational and vocational programs) reduces both crime and avoidance and thus, in this respect, is advantageous. The conditions for these outcomes are identified, the economic mechanisms are explained, and an underlying intuitive approach for these results is proposed.     

Competing Normative Frameworks and the Limits of Deterrence Theory: Comments on Baker and Griffith's Ensuring Corporate Misconduct

This essay reviews the contributions to deterrence theory that Tom Baker and Sean Griffith make in Ensuring Corporate Misconduct (2010) and argues that their work highlights the limits of deterrence theory for shaping corporate conduct. Baker and Griffith extend the deterrence framework to account for the mediating effect of third‐party institutions, like insurers, on deterrence calculations, and they suggest how corporate governance decisions, such as what type of insurance coverage to purchase, encode signals about corporations' compliance motivations and capacity. Although these insights might prove useful for enhancing the efficacy of deterrence regimes aimed at white‐collar crime and other types of corporate misconduct, they suggest the difficulty of shaping corporate conduct that is influenced not only by the norms embodied in securities law, but also by the alternative normative system of shareholder value maximization. I discuss the failure of deterrence theory to address adequately noncompliant behavior that springs not solely from material self‐interest, but from adherence to an alternative set of norms, and I explore the possibility of viewing corporate compliance as a norm‐change project.     

What Is Corporate Crime? It Is Not Illegal Corporate Behavior

Corporate misconduct is of increasing concern to society - and researchers. Despite this increased research focus, little is known about the factors that lead to such wrongdoing, the consequences of such behavior, and consequently of meaningful remedies and deterrence measures. A large factor in this information problem is the ambiguity surrounding the definition and use of the terms "corporate crime" and "illegal corporate behavior." Researchers use them interchangeably despite the fact they are two different phenomena. This article reviews some of the definitions and uses of these terms, and points out the confusion which results. It then discusses major differences between illegal corporate behavior and corporate crime, and the positive implications of treating them separately.     

Deterrence and arrest ratios

In the limited research on the origins of sanction threat perceptions, researchers have focused on either the effects of actively engaging in crime or the effects of formal sanctioning but rarely on both (i.e., the arrest ratio or the number of arrests relative to the number of crimes committed). This article extends this line of research by using a sample of Colorado inmates and measures arrest ratios and sanction perceptions for eight different crime types. Analyses reveal that the offenders report both significant experiential and arrest ratio effects. Theoretical and policy implications, limitations, and directions for future research are outlined.     

Auto Theft and Restrictive Deterrence

Although researchers have examined the attributes that make offenders more or less responsive to sanction threats, far less attention has centered on the manner in which responsiveness can lead to less detectible crime, or perhaps even more overall crime. Restrictive deterrence is the concept that explains this paradox. We explore it here using qualitative interviews with 35 active auto thieves. Findings suggest that auto thieves' restrictively deterrent decision-making strategies fell into three broad categories: discretionary target selection, normalcy illusions, and defiance. Discussion focuses on the data's conceptual implications for restrictive deterrence and offender decision-making.     

从一般预防理论看《中华人民共和国食品安全法(草案)》

法律应当具有一般预防的目的,即通过法律惩罚的威胁以及惩罚的实现,公众应当掌握法律的禁止性规定并避免违反这些规定。法律一般预防目的的实现与法律的明确性和精确性、制度设计的有效性以及责任和惩罚的合理性密切相关。《中华人民共和国食品安全法(草案)》在明确性和精确性、制度设计有效性以及惩罚力度等方面存在诸多欠缺。《草案》应增设食品安全国家标准,完善监管体制以及各项具体制度,提高法律惩罚力度、降低起刑点,从而提高本法的威慑和预防效果。其中,降低起刑点是实现本法一般预防目的的关键和今后立法应当努力的方向。     

Deterrence and the tipping effect

Previous research has focused on certaintyznty of punishment as one. factor. upon which any dzterrent effect of punishment might be contingent and Auggested that it must reach a critical tipping level before the deterrent effect becomes evident. Using data on index crimes and clearance. rates for. Virginia cities and counties, bupport was found for both the. deterrent effect and the exlstenee of a tipping level. Attention was directed towand a more precise specification of the form of the tipping effect, suggesting that there is a single critical tipping level and that it occurs at a relatively low level of certainty of punihment.     

Focused Deterrence Strategies and Crime Control

Research Summary

Focused deterrence strategies are increasingly being applied to prevent and control gang and group‐involved violence, overt drug markets, and individual repeat offenders. Our updated examination of the effects of focused deterrence strategies on crime followed the systematic review protocols and conventions of the Campbell Collaboration. Twenty‐four quasi‐experimental evaluations were identified in this systematic review. The results of our meta‐analysis demonstrate that focused deterrence strategies are associated with an overall statistically significant, moderate crime reduction effect. Nevertheless, program effect sizes varied by program type and were smaller for evaluations with more rigorous research designs.

Policy Implications

The available empirical evidence suggests these strategies generate noteworthy crime reduction impacts and should be part of a broader portfolio of crime reduction strategies available to policy makers and practitioners. Investments still need to be made, however, to strengthen the overall rigor of program evaluations and improve our understanding of key program activities associated with observed crime reduction impacts.     

Regulation and In-Company Environmental Management in the Netherlands*

This paper addresses the relationship between preventive systems of social control and regulation of the behavior of public bodies and private organizations. Illustrated with material on new developments in self-regulation concerning environmental management in companies in the Netherlands, the author argues that a combination of stimulated (or “regulated”) self-regulation and stringent enforcement policies is feasible and should lead to company compliance with environmental regulation. The article discusses the assertion that to reduce the social distance between government and individual citizen, between regulator and regulated, a mixture of policy instruments is needed, ergo: by involving societal groups of interested people in policy formation and self-regulation, enhancing the creation of normative systems (involvement “by association”) on the one hand and the availability of adequate law enforcement procedures on the other, corporations, through responsive government regulation, could promote an adequate and successful preventive system of social control.     

The UN and Corporate Environmental Responsibility: Between International Regulation and Partnerships

This article analyses the successive attempts of the United Nations to ensure the responsible conduct of transnational corporations, and of business in general, with reference to the protection of the environment. The article will concentrate mainly on the UN draft Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations, the 'partnership with business' approach of the Global Compact and the human-rights-based approach of the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with regards to Human Rights. After considering recent developments at the UN Commission on Human Rights, the article evaluates the continued efforts, diverse strategies and multi-faceted institutional role of the UN in keeping the issue of corporate environmental responsibility on the international agenda and in trying to identify the international environmental standards directly applicable to business entities.     

Deterrence and Individual Differences Among Convicted Offenders

Conflicting evidence exists on how criminal propensity moderates deterrent effects, and there is little empirical evidence on this issue from relatively experienced offenders. This study tested how variation in criminal propensity (operationalized as “low self-control”) moderates deterrent effects in a sample of convicted offenders in New Jersey’s Intensive Supervision Program in 1989 and 1990. Offenders’ perceptions of the risks and consequences from violating ISP were associated with whether they successfully completed ISP. Moreover, lower self-control did not diminish, and if anything, enhanced these deterrent effects.