Dynamic Attenuation: Terrorism,Transnational Crime and the Role of the US Army Special Forces

This article analyses the ability of the US Army Special Forces to combat illicit networks (criminal and terrorist) through ‘dynamic attenuation’. It is argued that a process of dynamic attenuation, where network ties and not the actors in the network are targeted, should replace the current US strategy of ‘killing or capturing’ criminal agents threatening US interests. By dynamically attenuating (not destroying) the ties between and among criminal actors and criminal organisations, the US can effectively reduce the capability of criminal organisations to operate and achieve their missions (profit and/or terror). This argument is substantiated by assessing the environments where criminal networks thrive, the characteristics of criminal networks, the utility of targeting networks instead of individual actors, and through a comparison of criminal organisations' and US Army Special Forces' strengths and weaknesses. This article concludes with implications and recommendations for US policy in the fight against criminal organisations.     

Terrorism and mental illness: is there a relationship?

This article examines the connections between mental illness and terrorism. Most social scientists have discounted a causal relationship between mental illness and terrorism. This is not necessarily always the case within terrorism studies, the media, or political circles where the psychology of terrorism is often expressed in the language of mentalisms, and theories of pathologisation continue to exist. This article reaffirms the view that apart from certain pathological cases, there is no causal connection between an individual's mental disorder and engagement in terrorist activity. The individual terrorist's motivations can be explained by other factors, including behavioural psychology. However, there may be a connection between an individual engaging in terrorist activity and developing a mental disorder[s]. Certain stressors that occur because of terrorist activity may result in psychological disturbance in terrorist individuals. These factors may partially explain terrorist group instability and should be taken into account when detaining and interrogating terrorist suspects.     

Anatomy of a dark network: the case of the Turkish Ergenekon terrorist organization

Dark networks refer to organizations that are covert and illegal in nature. Terrorist networks, organized crime groups, arms smugglers, and conspiracy organizations can all be classified as dark networks. This paper analyzes Turkey??s Ergenekon Terrorist Organization (ETO) which is a political conspiracy network that has played a significant role in the terrorist activities within the country in the last few decades. It has features of organized crime enterprises, terrorist organizations, and Gladio type clandestine armies, but it exceeds the scope of these three. This study examines the structure of the ETO using network analysis tools and court documents as the data source. Findings indicate that the network has a concentrated structure which consists of a core and periphery group of actors. The core group has a strong connectedness with each other while the density of the relationship gets lower in the periphery group. Peripheral actors are separated into subgroups which are necessary for operational purposes and also prevalent in the literature of dark networks. An efficiency-security tradeoff, which is also widely discussed in the literature, does not take place in the ETO network because the political and legal conditions of the country allow members of the network to act comfortably as opposed to being under the threat of counter-terrorism or law enforcement efforts.     

Networks, terrorists and criminals: the implications for community policing

This paper addresses both the connections between criminals and terrorists and the potential overlap and meshing of their networks and considers the implications of these intersections for counterterrorism policies and actions. It concludes with a focus on the community and community policing’s role in the disengagement of terrorists from terrorist organizations. While addressing the intersections between terrorists and criminals and the actions they commit, it explores important distinctions between terrorism and criminality, and the implications these distinctions imply for confronting terrorism and criminality within communities and their effect on successful counter terrorism policies and actions.     

Estimation of bullet striation similarity using neural networks

A new method that searches for similar striation patterns using neural networks is described. Neural networks have been developed based on the human brain, which is good at pattern recognition. Therefore, neural networks would be expected to be effective in identifying striated toolmarks on bullets. The neural networks used in this study deal with binary signals derived from striation images. This signal plays a significant role in identification, because this signal is the key to the individually of the striations. The neural network searches a database for similar striations by means of these binary signals. The neural network used here is a multilayer network consisting of 96 neurons in the input layer, 15 neurons in the middle, and one neuron in the output layer. Two signals are inputted into the network and a score is estimated based on the similarity of these signals. For this purpose, the network is assigned to a previous learning. To initially test the validity of the procedure, the network identifies artificial patterns that are randomly produced on a personal computer. The results were acceptable and showed robustness for the deformation of patterns. Moreover, with ten unidentified bullets and ten database bullets, the network consistently was able to select the correct pair.     

Digital evidence from peer-to-peer networks

In this paper we examine the legal aspects of the forensic investigation of peer-to-peer networks. Organisations may encounter instances where employees have used peer-to-peer software for a variety of types of computer misuse including the dissemination of copyrighted materials or indecent images, or instances where peer-to-peer software has been involved in the transmission of malware for malicious or criminal purposes. In this paper we examine the process of the forensic investigation of peer-to-peer networks, and the issues relating to obtaining digital evidence from such peer-to-peer networks.     

Extracting Concealed Information from Groups*

Abstract: Lie detection procedures are typically aimed at determining guilt or innocence of a single suspect. Serious security threats, however, often involve groups, such as terrorist networks or criminal organizations. In this report, we describe a variant of the skin conductance‐based Concealed Information Test (CIT) that allows for the extraction of critical information from such groups. Twelve participants were given information about an upcoming (mock) terrorist attack, with specific instructions not to reveal this information to anyone. Next, each subject was subjected to a CIT, with questions pertaining to the details of the attack. Results showed that for every question, the average skin conductance response to the correct answer option differed significantly (p < 0.05) from those to all other options. These results show that the information about the upcoming attack could be extracted from the group of terror suspects as a whole.     

Commodities and Terrorist Financing: Focus on Diamonds

Commodities, trade, and natural resources have long been part of the political economy of conflict, as soldiers and militants usually employ accessible means and methods to raise funds unless there is a clash with honestly held religious or ideological positions. Reports about the role of commodities in the financing of terrorist groups cover many areas of legal and illicit trade, foremost among these diamonds. A brief background to the diamond industry, with particular attention to vulnerabilities and their exploitation in conflict areas, provides the necessary context for two case studies about al-Qaeda (AQ) and Hezbollah. These utilize primary and secondary data to explore the linkages between diamonds and these particular groups. We found conflicting and weak evidence as well as vague language to describe interfaces between terrorist groups and the diamonds trade. We conclude that while there is cause for concern that this industry can be used to support terrorist activity, deeper factual grounding, meaningful context, and a more nuanced understanding of the diamond industry are necessary to fully inform policy makers and law enforcement about the connections between terrorist finance and the commodities trade.Research on which this paper is based was sponsored by a National Institute of Justice (NIJ) grant for a study of "Terrorist Finance and the Nexus with Transnational Organized Crime: Commodities Trade and the Social Organization of al Qaeda Groups," grant no. 2003-DT-CX-0001. We would like to thank Christian Dietrich and an anonymous peer reviewer for their very constructive comments.     

Patterns of precursor behaviors in the life span of a U.S. environmental terrorist group

Research Summary
This article discusses the paucity of data available for assessing the "life span" of a terrorist group. It introduces a new methodology that allows researchers to examine when terrorist groups perform their preincident activities. The findings suggest that differences exist in the temporal patterns of terrorist groups: environmental terrorist groups engage in a relatively short planning cycle compared with right-wing and international terrorists. The article concludes by examining a case study on "the Family," which is a unique environmental terrorist group that conducted activities over a relatively long period of time. This group provides an interesting contrast to other environmental terrorists. Despite significant organizational differences, their patterns of preparatory conduct were highly similar.
Policy Implications
The findings suggest that (1) temporal and spatial data about preincident terrorist activity can be collected from unclassified and open sources and (2) law-enforcement agencies that are investigating environmental groups have relatively little time to observe and infiltrate their individual cells (compared with right-wing and international terrorists). Finally, the data suggest that environmental terrorists—at least so far—have engaged in attacks that are less deadly than the comparison groups.     

Business incubators and the networks of technology-based firms

This paper looks to broaden understanding about the networks of firms located in Business Incubators (BIs). To achieve this objective, a framework for understanding the networks of incubator firms was constructed. We argue that networks at incubators can be seen in two dimensions. In the first dimension, we define incubator firm networking activities in terms of resource type, i.e. tangible and intangible resources. In the second dimension, we define networks of incubator firms as external and internal. Internal networks refer to the relationship among tenants while external networks refer to the firm’s relationship with other institutions such as a university and/or research centre. Networks of firms located at the Daresbury Science and Innovation Campus in the United Kingdom were investigated using a tenant survey. Findings show that incubator firms develop more networks to access intangible resources than tangible resources. The analysis explored and compared types of networks for highly innovative firms and medium to low innovative firms and found differences in their networking activity. With regards to policy recommendations, this study shows network support for incubator firms can be improved. It also shows that those concerned with developing BI policy need to recognize and appreciate that not all incubator firms have the same needs. This should be taken into account when developing network support.     

A Preliminary Report of Psychiatric Diagnoses in a Scottish County Sample of Persons of National Security Concern

Increasing anecdotal, empirical, and research evidence indicates mental disorder history is one of the several factors associated with increased risk of involvement in lone-actor terrorist activities. Currently, few studies have been conducted on the mental disorder histories of individuals assessed as at risk of involvement in terrorist activities (Meloy, J Threat Assess Manag 2019;6:93). This pilot study describes demographic, psychiatric, and criminal characteristics of a sample of Scottish individuals identified by the Prevent element of the U.K. national counterterrorism strategy, and outcome data after follow-up at 2 years. Twenty-three individuals were referred to Prevent as posing a national security risk from a county in Scotland. Their records were studied for psychiatric and criminal histories. Nine (39%) had previous psychiatric contact, all were “lone actors”, and none were embedded with organized terrorist groups. The most common diagnoses were substance use disorder, personality disorder, depression, and psychotic disorder. The sample displayed factors associated with increased risk of violence including previous offending, early behavioral difficulties, school problems, substance misuse, cluster B personality disordered traits. After 2 years, 44% of the mentally disordered group had re-offended. The offense types were generally similar to those prior to the individual being involved with the Prevent counter terrorism program. Only one of the mentally disordered group committed a further national security offense. In this sample, mental disorder history is overrepresented in individuals who come to the attention of the U.K. Prevent counter terrorism strategy. Further empirical studies with additional power are required to develop the empirical evidence base in this under-researched area.     

Privacy and social networks

This article discusses the complex relationship between social networks and the EU Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC). After a concise introduction to the general privacy impact of social networks, it discusses how the Directive applies to users and operators of social networks and social network applications. Particular attention is drawn to the scope of the Directive (including the “household” exception), the obligations imposed on data controllers, the interpretation of the Directive by Working Party 29, as well as the difficulties that are encountered when applying the aging Directive to the technological reality of today’s social networks.     

Cross-Classified Multilevel Models: An Application to the Criminal Case Processing of Indicted Terrorists

This study provides an application of cross-classified multilevel models to the study of early case processing outcomes for suspected terrorists in U.S. federal district courts. Because suspected terrorists are simultaneously nested within terrorist organizations and criminal court environments, they are characterized by overlapping data hierarchies that involve cross-nested ecological contexts. Cross-classified models provide a useful but underutilized approach for analyzing such data. Using the American Terrorism Study (ATS), this research examines case dismissals, trial adjudications and criminal convictions for a sample of 574 terrorist suspects. Findings indicate that diverse factors affect case processing outcomes, including legal factors such as the number of counts, number of co-defendants, and statute of indictment, extralegal factors such as the ethnicity of the offender, and incident characteristics such as the type of terrorism target. Case processing outcomes also vary significantly across both terrorist groups and criminal courts and are partially explained by select group and court characteristics including the type of terrorist organization and the terrorism trial rate of the court. Results are discussed vis-à-vis contemporary research on terrorism punishments and future directions are suggested for additional applications of cross-classified models in criminological research.     

Leadership protection in drug-trafficking networks

Effective leadership is a crucial component in organisational success. This also applies to criminal networks that have the added challenge of operating in a high-risk hostile environment. While criminal networks commonly employ communicative and structural practices meant to buffer leadership from exogenous threats, there has been little empirical examination as to their effectiveness. In this article, we review the research literature on the various approaches that profit-oriented illicit networks employ to protect their leaders. We then present sociometric and qualitative data from a previously unexamined drug-trafficking network (the Prada cocaine-trafficking network) as a case study on leadership protection tactics employed by illicit entrepreneurial networks. Results of our analysis are discussed in the conclusion, along with study limitations and areas for future research.     

恐怖主义犯罪的界定

恐怖主义犯罪的界定应当立足于犯罪学的角度 ,而不应限于刑法学或者政治学的范围 ;恐怖主义犯罪的目的具有层次性和多样性的特征 ,而不应锁定为纯粹的政治性目的 ;恐怖主义犯罪是有组织犯罪的一种表现形式 ,个人不能成为恐怖主义犯罪的主体 ;恐怖主义犯罪的手段不限于传统的暴力范围 ,而是日益呈现出高科技化的发展趋势 ;恐怖主义犯罪的袭击目标是特定的 ,但受害对象却具有广泛和不确定的特征。恐怖主义犯罪与恐怖犯罪、政治犯罪与黑社会性质犯罪等相近概念之间的界限有必要加以明确。     

A Comparison of Ideologically-Motivated Homicides from the New Extremist Crime Database and Homicides from the Supplementary Homicide Reports Using Multiple Imputation by Chained Equations to Handle Missing Values

This study took advantage of the new open-source Extremist Crime Database (ECDB) to overcome obstacles to studying domestic far-right terrorism from a criminological perspective. In the past, exclusive definitions and inclusion criteria have limited available data on violent crimes committed by domestic far-right terrorists, and official data on violent crimes fail to capture offenders’ links to domestic far-right terrorism and ideological motivation (e.g., anti-government, anti-abortion, anti-religion). Therefore, little is known about the nature of far-right terrorist violence and how such violence is similar to and different from routine or more common forms of violence. Focusing on homicides, this study addressed why and how open-source terrorism data and official crime data can be comparatively analyzed. In doing so, we also demonstrate the utility of synthesizing terrorism and official crime data sources. Data on 108 far-right terrorist homicides were taken from the ECDB. Data on 540 common homicides (five comparison homicides for each far-right terrorist homicide) were randomly sampled from the 2000 Supplementary Homicide Reports. Using multiple imputation by chained equations and logistic regression, we imputed missing values and estimated models to compare the two homicide types on 12 different victim, offender, and event characteristics. Relative to common homicides, we found that far-right terrorist homicides were significantly more likely to have white offenders, multiple victims, multiple offenders, and to occur between strangers, and they were significantly less likely to have white victims, to be carried out with a firearm, and to occur in cities with more than 100,000 residents.     

Terrorism Risk Forecasting by Ideology

The purpose of the present study is to produce foresights on terrorism. For the first time in the literature, we test the predictive validity of risk terrain modeling to forecast terrorism. Because the relevant literature suggests that target selection and the places where terrorist attacks occur are related to a group’s strategies, we also investigate whether and how violent terrorist acts vary with respect to their surroundings in the same jurisdiction when the ideology is the point of comparison. Separatist and leftist terrorist groups committed 1152 violent terrorist acts between 2008 and 2012 in Istanbul, Turkey. Our analysis begins with a comparison of targets and risk factors by the ideology of the perpetrators for 857 separatist and 295 leftist terrorist incidents. After identifying high-risk locations, we test the predictive validity of risk terrain modeling. The study results showed that context and spatial influence—the risky areas of terrorism—vary by the nature of the ideology in the jurisdiction. Practical implications also are discussed.     

Network subversion: The contrasting effects of multiple networks on bribery in South Korea

This paper is based on the premise that corrupt uses of public, civic networks ostensibly built and legitimated for their altruistic purposes can be a source of network subversion and corruption. Open, public, civic networks of South Korea seem to be systemic and organizational facilitators of criminality instead of assumptions of criminality being related only to closed, criminal cultures or anomie. We test whether increasing participation in the major social networks of Korean civic life – networks based on geography (common ancestral hometown), family (extended kinship), and education (alumni) – are associated with increasing penchants for self-admitted criminal collusion, in this case, bribery. We argue that due to relational association or within-network favoritism the increase in multiple networks per individual generates increasing social capital of access, information, and trust which may be subverted toward some form of private criminal collusion.     

城市反恐重要目标安全防范试点与研究

“9·11”以来,国际恐怖活动与反恐斗争的较量已经持续了十余年,但以全球化为背景的恐怖主义威胁不仅没有消失,反而持续存在且更加突出.“三股势力”和由于各种原因导致的个体暴力恐怖威胁将成为今后相当长一段时间内影响我国安全与稳定的主要因素.借鉴国内外相关研究和城市反恐试点单位的成功做法,提出如下对策建议：一是建立党政领导,部门参与的反恐防范工作格局;二是加强防范恐怖犯罪公众教育,增强公众的防范意识;三是建立统一高效的情报信息工作机制;四是明确责任,建章立制,夯实基础;五是制定应对预案,通过演练予以巩固完善;六是强化检查考核,促进防范责任和措施落实.     

Government protection against terrorism and crime

A game theoretic model is developed where a government protects against a terrorist seeking terrorism and criminal objectives. A terrorist can recruit a benefactor providing funds by remaining ideologically pure, or may resort to crime. The model accounts for the players’ resources, unit costs of effort, unit benefit and valuations and contest intensities for terrorist and crime objectives. We determine and quantify how these factors and the government impact a terrorist’s terrorism and crime efforts and relative ideological orientation on a continuum from being highly ideological to being highly criminal. We also consider how the terrorist group is impacted by support of benefactor(s), the central authority’s ability to impose greater sanctions for terrorist activities compared to criminal actions and the ideological orientation of the group’s leadership. We discuss insights from the model and consider a few historical perspectives.