The Language of Practical Philosophy

Kant's criticism is based on the idea that all possible knowledge of facts is determined by the immanent structure of our apparatus of cognition, and that therefore we have no access to reality as it is per se (" Ding an sich "). In modern analytical philosophy some elements of this view survived, namely, the distinction between framework construction and actual data of experience, supposition or voluntary setting. The conditio humana is characterised by our capacity of acting. Acting is defined as behaviour determined and controlled by information processes. The structure of these processes defines the semantics and logical principles of practical philosophy. From this view follows the conception of value judgments, the logic of preferences, formal teleology, the analysis of utility and norm logic. The framework theories should be open in order to be able to express all possible theoretical views, namely, subjectivism as well as objectivism. The paper gives a concise account of the systems of practical thought (formal axiology, formal teleology, preference logic and norm logic) and their gnoseological problems.     

Conflicting Views on Practical Reason. Against Pseudo-Arguments in Practical Philosophy*

Abstract
The author distinguishes two concepts of practical reason: (a) practical reason as a source of practical principles, and (b) practical reason as the theory of thought operations connected with action. He proves that there is no practical recognition in the sense (a). We can deal with actions only on the basis of dichotomic semantics. Critical analyses of some theories of practical reason are presented (Kant, Lorenzen, Apel, Alexy). The critical part of the paper mainly concerns the discourse theory and its implications for practical philosophy and jurisprudence.     

The Theory of Legal Dynamics Reconsidered*

Abstract. The author criticizes Kelsen's distinction between static and dynamic systems of norms and his theory of legal dynamics. The author moreover presents the institutionalist conception of legal dynamics. Kelsen's concept of static systems is incompatible with normological scepticism: The deduction of rules from a basic principle depends on additional premises; even in static systems there is a kind of dynamics produced by actual facts. Kelsen's conception of legal dynamics is also incompatible with normological scepticism and with Kelsen's demand of purity of jurisprudence. In the institutionalist conception Iegal dynamics is rather conceived as an interplay of legal norms and facts. Empowering relations, the principle of co-validity, temporal limits of norms, derogation, legal validity and the basic norm are analysed accordingly. Appendices deal with Paulson's empowering theory of legal norm and Lippold's double-faced reconstruction of the legal order.     

拉兹的法哲学趣向——将法律实证主义导向实践哲学

约瑟夫.拉兹是法律实证主义后期的重要代表人物。在研究法律时,他除了继续保持实证主义传统、使用法律实证主义惯用的分析方法以外,还试图用新的方法来替代早期的分析法学家们广为使用的方法,并使用新的哲学理论来改造法律实证主义。他的法哲学思想表现出的一个重要趣向就是：将法律实证主义导向实践哲学。这一趣向贯穿于拉兹法哲学思想的方方面面,是理解拉兹法哲学思想的关键。     

凯尔森法学思想中的新康德主义探源

汉斯·凯尔森的法学理论与新康德主义哲学之间的内在关联已为学界所周知,但究竟是何种关联以及如何关联的,却并不清晰。作为德国二战前最重要的哲学思潮,新康德主义是凯尔森法学思想的灵感和基础所在。无论是马尔堡学派的先验认知理论,还是西南德学派的判断和效力学说,都为凯尔森所继受,并纳入到其法学理论大厦的建构当中。正是建立在这两个学派基础之上的凯尔森法学理论,为法学成为一门科学奠定了几乎所有重要的概念。这些新康德主义要素就此成为凯尔森法学乃至法哲学思想研究必要的对象。然而,凯尔森自己却几乎没有专门论述过新康德主义思想。通过调查,本文不仅揭示两者之间的关联,也试图间接为我国学者建构中国自身的法学理论提供某些有益的启示。     

悖论社会中的公共领域——评马长山《法治进程中的民间治理》

马长山先生所著《法治进程中的民间治理》一书,沿用公共领域和市民社会的理论逻辑,以理想类型的公共领域和市民社会作为社会坐标和价值标尺,同时借助具体翔实的实证材料为读者展示当代中国"看得见的市民社会",以此阐释民间社会组织与法治秩序的内在关系,揭示民间治理的法治诉求。然而,该书更多地从政治哲学的理论维度,对法治进程中的民间治理进行功能定位和价值探讨,没有很好地从现实经验出发利用社会理论分析民间治理内在的秩序生发机制,因此,移植而来的理论框架仍不能完全适应悖论社会的实践逻辑。     

Hart's Jurisprodence: Its relation to Philosophy

The essay concerns the way jurisprudence adapts to the challanges set by contemporary philosophy concentarting upon the case of Hart"s legal theory. Hart produced one paradigm of linking philosphical considerations to jurisprudential analyses. He seemed to believe that the investigation of legal phenomena must itself raise and answer the underlying philosophical questions (only occasionally relying on philosophical sources). Although Hart was well aware of the rising new philosophy of his time, he sought to elaborate an autonomus conceptual framework for philosophical jurisprudence. The essay often takes Wittgenstein as an example for elucaidating Hart"s relation to philosophy (although critizing those who believe that Hart"s is a key figure in the jurisprudential reception of Wittgenstein"s later philosophy). The essayjustifies Hart"s claim to gain theoretical autonomy but points to three mistakes in that prespect. (1) He sometimes misconcieved his philodophical sources owing to the fact that he refrained from analyzing them. (2) Hart justified some of his crucial claims by a combination of arguments that is not entirely consistent. (3) His standpoint often raised philosophical issues but sometimes failed to make an identifiable point upon them. The essay concludes that Hart was right in thinking that the time had come to reconsider the conditions of making theories about law but he couild not justify his assumption that the reconsideration would lead to certain kind of comprehensive theory of law.     

Does Ethical Theory Have a Future in Bioethics?

Although there has long been a successful and stable marriage between philosophical ethical theory and bioethics, the marriage has become shaky as bioethics has become a more interdisciplinary and practical field. A practical price is paid for theoretical generality in philosophy. It is often unclear whether and, if so, how theory is to be brought to bear on dilemmatic problems, public policy, moral controversies, and moral conflict. Three clearly philosophical problems are used to see how philosophers are doing in handling practical problems: Cultural Relativity, and Moral Universality, Moral Justification, and Conceptual Analysis. In each case it is argued that philosophers need to develop theories and methods more closely attuned to practice. The work of philosophers such as Ruth Macklin, Norman Daniels, and Gerald Dworkin is examined. In the writings of each there is major methological gap between philosophical theory (or method) and practical conclusions. The future of philosophical ethics in interdisciplinary bioethics may turn on whether such gaps can be closed. If not, bioethics may justifiably conclude that philosophy is of little value.     

On the Nature of Norms

This paper deals with the question of how norms are to be conceived of in order to understand their role as guidelines for human action within various normative orders, particularly in the context of law on the one hand and conventional morality on the other. After some brief remarks on the history of the term “norm,” the author outlines the most significant general features of actually existing social norms, including legal and conventional norms, from which he arrives at two basic requirements on an appropriate conception of such norms: the actuality and the normativity requirements. On this basis, he enters into a critical discussion of Kelsen's highly influential view of norms, arguing that this view is doomed to failure. In the last part of the paper, the author scrutinizes the more promising “practice theory of norms” by H.L.A. Hart, which, in his view, also suffers from some shortcomings, but may be modified in a way that leads to a conception of social norms providing us with a plausible explication of their actual existence and their normative force.     

法学方法论研究的语用学转向( 下)——法学方法论研究的语用模式及其新开展

随着哲学的语用学转向,哲学与法学的内在交融与互动,法哲学、法学方法论、法律语言学、法律逻辑的研究也随之发生了“语用学的转向”,这种转向的标志就是法律语用学和“规范语用学”的诞生与日新月异的发展,进而为我们理解和诠释法律的本质、类型、功能、适用机理、适用效力及其行动之有效性,提供了前所未有的分析方法、知识范式和建构模式,从而使法哲学、法学方法论（尤其是狭义的法律方法论）实现了——由事实世界向规范世界的转变,由主客二分到主体间性的行为互动,由面向单向度的工具理性转向实践理性,再由面向单一主体的实践理性转向多主体之间的沟通理性,由静态的逻辑分析转向动态的语境分析或情境构作,由困固于语形、语义分析转向以法律言语行为主体及其相关语境为出发点的语用建构和实践.     

黑格尔的历史法学思想

对于黑格尔法哲学这样一个异常庞杂的体系,学界一般认为其大体属于理性主义范畴.然而,正如黑格尔自己所言,欲准确把握其法哲学,就必须将其放在黑格尔逻辑学的背景中进行;在这个前提下,从辨证逻辑角度讲,当我们认识到黑格尔法哲学中的理性主义成分时实际上就意味着其中也必定含有经验主义的成分.欲全面而深入地研究黑格尔法权哲学,就必须对相关的经验主义成分予以充分地关注.     

原初状态的由来及其内在困境——浅论《正义论》的逻辑基点

罗尔斯以其《正义论》而奠定了他在当代政治哲学界的地位。据说,他扭转了政治哲学的方向,从新回到了近代的契约论传统,并使之上升到更高的抽象水平而提出了他的“作为公平的正义”的理论。他整个理论的逻辑起点是“原初状态”,那么通过分析“原初状态”构建及其内在的困境我们可以透视其整个理论的说服力。     

蔡元培“通性说”溯源

蔡元培关于世界本原的思想,既传承了中国道家的"道器说"和宋明以后的"物心说",更糅合了德国古典哲学家康德的"二元世界说"和叔本华的"意志论",并在此基础上提出寻找世界统一本性的"通性"说."通性说"表达了蔡元培为达到理想的大同世界所作的哲学思考和心路历程,成为影响和决定其一生的思想基础.     

Information and Human Liberty

Abstract. Political and juristic enquiry must be conceived of as an action theoretical approach. On the basis of his formal and finalistic action theory as well as his neo-institutionalist view, the author sketches the role of information in modern democracy. He holds the view that democratic institutions are always in danger of being misused. The complex role of mass media, party propaganda and the detrimental effects of state propaganda are analyzed. The author deals with some general features of information processes in the realm of political practice: Information has to be considered in relation to action; the message by itself does not show whether the information is true; there are two forms of reception of information, active and passive reception. Information processes have a deep influence on personal as well as on political liberty. The intrusion of marketing-methods of propaganda in political practice is a great danger for democratic life, particularly if realized by the state or central institutions. It can destroy intellectual freedom, which is a prerequisite of discursive democracy. Democracy and human liberty can flourish only in an open society.     

分析学还是解释学——法律论证之知识属性辨析

论证理论主要源于分析学,这一点一般为大多数学者所接受。鉴于解释学与分析哲学在哲学上大体分属两种不同的思维传统,因此,解释学与论证理论之关系便值得探讨。法律论证理论固然来源于分析学的传统,但如果没有解释学知识的支持,它也是不可能的。可以说,没有解释的论证是空洞的,没有论证的解释是盲目的。二者均致力于型构具有实践理性品格的法学知识。     

凯尔逊的“纯粹法”理论研究

本文主要是介绍和评述凯尔逊的“纯粹法”理论。首先,作者解释了“纯”的含义,以及凯尔逊提出“纯粹法”理论的目的。其次,对凯尔逊关于法律的概念、法律规范的形式结构、法律规则的体系等重要思想进行了介绍。再次,对凯尔逊思想中的公理化的倾向进行了分析,总结了凯尔逊的命令性规范的逻辑的思想。最后,对凯尔逊的思想进行了简短的评述。