Desert,Bell Motion,and Fairness

In this critical review, I address two themes from Shelly Kagan’s path-breaking The Geometry of Desert. First I explain the so-called “bell motion” of desert mountains—a notion reflecting that, ceteris paribus, as people get more virtuous it becomes more important not to give them too little of whatever they deserve than not to give them too much. Having argued that Kagan’s defense of it is unsatisfactory, I offer two objections to the existence of the bell motion. Second, I take up an unrelated issue—the relation between comparative and non-comparative desert. I argue that, given a certain disaggregationist view of comparative desert, it is possible that comparative desert is not satisfied, even if non-comparative desert is perfectly so. Unlike my objections to the bell motion, this possibility adds further complexity to an already complex Kaganian account of desert.     

Social Justice in Love Relationships: Recent Developments

In all societies, people are concerned with justice. “What’s fair is fair!” “She deserves better.” “It’s just not right.” “He can’t get away with that!” “It’s illegal.” “It’s unethical!” “It’s immoral” are fairly common laments. In the 11th century, St. Anselm of Canterbury (Anselem of Canterbury: The major works, 1998) argued that the will possesses two competing inclinations: an affection for what is to a person’s own advantage and an affection for justice; the first inclination is stronger, but the second matters, too. Equity theory, too, posits that in personal relationships, two concerns stand out: firstly, how rewarding are people’s societal, family, and work relationships? Secondly, how fair and equitable are those relationships? According to equity theory, people feel most comfortable when they are getting exactly what they deserve from their relationships—no more and certainly no less. In this article, we will begin by describing the classic equity paradigm and the supporting research. We will then recount the great debate that arose in the wake of the assertion that even in close, loving, intimate relationships, fairness matters. We will end by describing what scientists have learned in the past 35 years about the competing claims of altruism, reward, and fairness in love relationships.     

Misleading by Example: The Effects of a Manager’s Unfair Customer Treatment on Service Employee Performance and Perceived Managerial Trustworthiness

We explore service worker reactions to a supervisor’s fair treatment of customers (i.e., customer-directed fairness), utilizing the group-value model of fairness to formulate two distinct predictions: (1) a status cuing effect, in which employees internalize social cues from the supervisor’s behavior to determine the social value of customers, and adapting their own customer-oriented behaviors to reflect the supervisor’s cue, and (2) a character indictment effect, in which employees use customer-directed fairness to assess the trustworthiness of the supervisor’s character. Results from experimental and field data provide evidence for these dual effects and show how each ultimately affects the employee’s in-role and extra-role customer service behavior. Implications are discussed with regard to the group-value model of fairness, alternative theories of fairness, and practical applications.     

Self-Awareness and Mental Perception

The purpose of this paper is to clarify Prajñākaragupta’s view of mental perception (mānasapratyak?a), with special emphasis on the relationship between mental perception and self-awareness. Dignāga, in his PS 1.6ab, says: “mental [perception] (mānasa) is [of two kinds:] a cognition of an [external] object and awareness of one’s own mental states such as passion.” According to his commentator Jinendrabuddhi, a cognition of an external object and awareness of an internal object such as passion are here equally called ‘mental perception’ in that neither depends on any of the five external sense organs. Dharmakīrti, on the other hand, considers mental perception to be a cognition which arises after sensory perception, and does not call self-awareness ‘mental perception’. According to Prajñākaragupta, mental perception is the cognition which determines an object as ‘this’ (idam iti jñānam). Unlike Dharmakīrti, he holds that the mental perception follows not only after the sensory perception of an external object, but also after the awareness of an internal object. The self-awareness which Dignāga calls ‘mental perception’ is for Prajñākaragupta the cognition which determines as ‘this’ an internal object, or an object which consists in a cognition; it is to be differentiated from the cognition which cognizes cognition itself, that is, self-awareness in its original sense.     

An Acquittal for Epistemicism

Scott Soames argues that consideration of the practice of legal judgement gives us good reason to favor the partial-definition/context-sensitive theory of vagueness against epistemicism. Despite the fact that the value of power-delegation through vagueness is evidenced in practice, Soames says, epistemicism cannot account for it theoretically, while the partial-definition/context-sensitive theory is capable of it. In this paper, I examine the two possible arguments against epistemicism that can be extracted from Soames’s account: (1) an argument based on unknown obligations, and (2) an argument based on power-delegation through vagueness. The first argument tries to convince us that, as based on epistemicism, the law has already decided the borderline cases, so that judges have obligatory decisions even in such cases: therefore epistemicism is inconsistent with the discretion of judges in borderline cases. I show that even if we sympathize with Soames’s intuitions concerning the legal practice, the argument he offers is not conclusive since it is either invalid, unsound, or paradoxical. The second argument holds that only the gaps which the partial-definition/context-sensitive theory predicts give judges the possibility of lawmaking in borderline cases. However, by categorizing the vague laws as imperfect laws, the judges can claim the right of lawmaking without any need to refer to gaps in the law. By neutralizing these arguments, I argue that epistemicism is able to explain the phenomena just as well as the partial-definition/context-sensitive theory.     

On the Argument of Infinite Regress in Proving Self-awareness

In PV 3.440ab and 473cd–474ab, Dharmakīrti raises the argument of infinite regress (anavasthiti) twice. The argument originates from the same argument stated by Dignāga in his Pramā?asamuccaya 1.12ab1, in which the fault of infinite regress is called ani??hā. In Pramā?asamuccayav?tti 1.12b2, Dignāga presents another type of argument of infinite regress (anavasthā) driven by memory, which is elucidated by Dharmakīrtian commentators. The arguments were criticized by Kumārila Bha??a and Bha??a Jayanta and even more intensively so by two modern scholars, Jonardon Ganeri and Birgit Kellner. In this paper, I first examine the source of the arguments—Pramā?asamuccayav?tti 1.12 and its translation, based on which I provide my interpretation of the two models of arguments of infinite regress. I then offer my response, according to Dharmakīrti and his commentators, to Ganeri’s and Kellner’s critiques. By doing so, I attempt to identify the essence of these arguments is and find out to what extent one can defend the infinite regress argument in Dignāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s theory.     

The Positionless Middle Way: Weak Philosophical Deflationism in Madhyamaka

In this paper, I explore the connections between meta-ontological and meta-philosophical issues in two of Nāgārjuna’s primary works, the Mūlamadhyamakārikā and the Vigrahavyāvartanī. I argue for an interpretative framework that places Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka as a meta- and ultimately non-philosophical evaluation of philosophy. The paper’s primary argument is that an interpretative framework which makes explicit the meta-ontological and meta-philosophical links in Nāgārjuna’s thought is both viable and informative. Following Nāgārjuna, I start my analysis by looking at the positions that exist within the ontological debate and show that the Mādhyamika should be understood as an ontological deflationist who aims to discredit ontological questions altogether. I argue, however, that the Mādhyamika does not wish to engage in meta-ontological debates either and that Nāgārjuna’s ontological deflationist arguments necessarily lead to a position of philosophical deflationism: the rejection of all philosophical and meta-philosophical debates. Further on, I provide a sketch of denegation, the language operator in Madhyamaka that allows Nāgārjuna to make seemingly philosophical claims while not having the commitments that traditional philosophical claims do. I conclude with a defense of my interpretation of Madhyamaka as weak philosophical deflationism compared to other deflationist construals, an explicit discussion of the ways in which my understanding differs from contemporary western interpretations that prima facie resemble weak philosophical deflationism, and an identification of weak philosophical deflationism with dequitism, a variant of quetism.     

Rehabilitating Retributivism

This review essay of Victor Tadros’s new book, “The Ends of Harm: The Moral Foundations of Criminal Law,” responds to Tadros’s energetic and sophisticated attacks on retributivist justifications for criminal punishment. I argue, in a nutshell, that those attacks fail. In defending retributivism, however, I also sketch original views on two questions that retributivism must address but that many or most retributivists have skated past. First, what do wrongdoers deserve – to suffer? to be punished? something else? Second, what does it mean for them to deserve it? That is, what is the normative force or significance of valid desert claims, either with respect to retributivist desert in particular or with respect to all forms of desert? Because the answers that this essay offers are preliminary, the essay also serves as a partial blueprint for further work by criminal law theorists with retributivist sympathies.     

Victimization and Poly-Victimization in Adolescent Outpatients from Mental Health Centers: A Case-Control Study

The aims of the present study were to establish interpersonal victimization rates in a clinical sample and to analyze this sample’s risk of victimization relative to the general population. The sample was composed of 472 adolescents (12–17 years of age): 118 outpatients from public mental health centers and 354 students who were matched by age and sex. Following previous studies, this research defined poly-victimization as four or more victimization types occurring during the previous year. The clinical group was more likely to report sexual victimization (OR = 9.540), conventional crime (OR = 3.120), caregiver victimization (OR = 3.469), witnessing and indirect victimization (OR = 3.466), electronic victimization (OR = 2.809), and poly-victimization (OR = 4.319) compared with the control group. Clinical samples present an increased risk of interpersonal poly-victimization compared with the general population. The influence of poly-victimization on mental health should be considered in the evaluation and treatment of adolescent outpatients.     

Growing up Sexist: Challenges to Rawlsian Stability

John Rawls pinpoints stability as the driving force behind many of the changes to justice as fairness from A Theory of Justice to Political Liberalism. Current debates about Rawlsian stability have centered on the possibility of maintaining one’s allegiance to the principles of justice while largely ignoring how citizens acquire a sense of justice. However, evaluating the account of stability in political liberalism requires attention to the impact of reasonable pluralism on both of these issues. I will argue that the first question of Rawlsian stability – how a child acquires a sense of justice – remains unanswered in Political Liberalism. This fact has been overlooked by Rawls, his defenders, and his critics. The failure to attend to the ways reasonable pluralism undermines Rawls’s own story about a child’s moral development ultimately threatens Rawls’s account of stability in political liberalism – or so I will argue. Despite all of the changes Rawls makes to justice as fairness in order to resolve the stability challenge, Political Liberalism fails to deliver the robust stability Rawls seeks.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Designing the New American University</Emphasis> by Michael Crow and William Dabars: a primer for technology transfer academics,agencies, and administrators

You should read this book if you identify with one or more of the following groups. The first group is the academic readership of The Journal of Technology Transfer, mostly organizational economists and policy analysts, who should read the book because it presents some compelling ideas for research and theory. The second audience is the journal’s policy making readership concerned with return-on-investment from universities, who should view the institutional design process touted by the authors with skepticism. The third audience is comprised of university administrators, who might be inspired by the book to reevaluate what they’re doing structurally at their own institutions.     

Kamalaśīla on Doubt as the Cause of the Activity of Reading

As Funayama has shown, Dharmakīrti’s successors had an animated discussion on the nature and function of the initial statement (ādivākya) of scientific treatises in terms of its effectiveness and requisites. Arca?a (8th c.) in his comments on the initial statement of the Hetubindu considers that the initial statement, which contains the purpose (prayojana) of the treatise, is useless in prompting people to undertake the activity (prav?tti) of reading the treatise because judicious people are supposed to undertake action only due to certainty (ni?caya) which never arises from something that is not a pramā?a. For Arca?a, the initial statement is set forth only to dispel the objection of an opponent who criticizes the treatise for not having a purpose. Kamala?īla (8th c.) criticizes Arca?a on this point; for him the initial statement is effective to prompt people to undertake the reading of the treatise because people act also on the basis of doubt (sa??aya), which arises from the initial statement that is not a pramā?a but an abhyupāya for action. This paper attempts to consider how such doubt can cause reading by examining the debate in the Tattvasa?grahapañjikā and related texts. As Kamala?īla presupposes, when people act due to doubt, they may attain the desired purpose by chance but cannot escape the risks of not attaining an desired purpose and also of attaining an undesired purpose. Taking these risks into consideration, it is reasonable for Granoff to take up Kamala?īla’s position as an example of the maxim of kākatālīya in the introduction of her paper in the present volume. However, the probability for the readers of the Tattvasa?graha to achieve easy comprehension of tattva as a result of reading a full treatise, which they undertake due to doubt out of the initial statement, is higher than that for a crow being suddenly killed by a falling palm-fruit. According to Kamala?īla, the risk of not attaining the desired purpose does not prevent people from reading because such fear equally occurs in activities based on certainty. Furthermore, there is no risk of attaining an undesired purpose from the treatise because authors are supposed to undertake action only for the sake of others. Therefore, doubt which arises from an abhyupāya can make people undertake action.     

On Self-Awareness in the Sautrāntika Epistemology

This paper aims to examine the role of self-awareness (svasa?vedana) for the Sautrāntika epistemological tenet known as the doctrine that cognition has a form (sākārajñānavāda). According to this theory, we perceive external objects indirectly through the mental forms that these objects throw into our minds, and this cognitive act is interpreted as self-awareness. However, if one were to interpret the cognitive act such that the subjective mental form (grāhakākāra/svābhāsa) grasps the objective mental form, the position of the subjective mental form becomes problematic—it becomes superfluous, as can be demonstrated with reference to Dignāga’s explanation of the Sautrāntika’s pramā?a-pramā?aphala argument. As a result, self-awareness itself becomes precarious. In connection with this problem, an argument on the relationship between self-awareness and the yogic perception of other minds given by Dharmakīrti leads us to discover that self-awareness is important for establishing subjectivity, in order to avoid another person’s access to one’s own mental states. Through examining Pramā?avārttika 3.448–459, this paper tries to find a way to interpret the svābhāsa-factor without relating to its object-factor (grāhyākāra), and to shed new light on the problem of subjectivity in the Sautrāntika epistemology.     

Of Normal Human Sympathies and Clear Consciences: Comments on Hyman Gross’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Crime and Punishment: A Concise Moral Critique</Emphasis>

Contemporary criminal justice systems are extraordinarily unfair. Focusing on Hyman Gross’s Crimes and Punishment: A Concise Moral Critique, however, I identify ways in which scholarly criticisms of these criminal justice systems tend to miss their target. In particular, I argue against the assumption that in order to criticize these criminal justice systems we need to cast doubt on the very practice of blaming people and on the notion of desert, or that we need to reject wholesale retributive rationales for punishment. Quite the contrary: an important reason why contemporary criminal justice systems are unfair is that they punish many people undeservedly.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Mokṣa</Emphasis> and <Emphasis Type="Italic">Dharma</Emphasis> in the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Mokṣadharma</Emphasis>

This essay asks what the terms mok?a and dharma mean in the anomalous and apparently Mahābhārata-coined compound mok?adharma, which provides the title for the ?āntiparvan’s third and most philosophical anthology; and it further asks what that title itself means. Its route to answering those questions is to look at the last four units of the Mok?adharmaparvan and their three topics—the story of ?uka, the Nārāya?īya, and a gleaner’s subtale—as marking an “artful curvature” that shapes the outcome of King Yudhi??hira’s philosophical inquiries of Bhī?ma into a ”return” to this world to take up the topic of the fourth anthology, a King’s generous giving, in the Anu?āsanaparvan’s Dānadharmaparvan. Usages of the term mok?a in the narratives in these units are considered in the light of The Laws of Manu’s usage of mok?a to define the “renunciatory asceticism of a wandering mendicant” after the fulfillment of one’s debts (Olivelle et al., in Life of the Buddha by A?vagho?a, 2008). Usages of mok?adharma are discussed in conjunction with its overlapping term niv?ittidharma. With the term dharma itself, it is a matter of finding the best contextual translation. A pitch is made that these four units, and particularly the Nārāya?īya, should no longer be thought of as “late” additions.     

Stealing more is better? An economic analysis of Islamic law of theft

This study is the first attempt (in the field of Law and Economics) to apply economic analysis to shari’a or Islamic criminal law, in particular, that aspect of the law pertaining to theft. Shari’a imposes two main punishments for theft; hadd, a fixed penalty of amputation of the offender’s right hand under certain conditions and ta’zir, a discretionary punishment, less severe than hadd. From the viewpoint of marginal deterrence and multiplier principles, lesser crimes with low social harm are punished more severely with hadd whereas crimes with high social harm are punished with ta’zir. Moreover, as the probability of detection and sanction is less in those crimes of high social harm, criminals would have more incentive to commit them. Consequently, if Islamic criminal law is to be applied in its current form, crimes of high social cost are likely to become more frequent.     

The Horizons of the Constitution: <Emphasis Type="Italic">Politeia</Emphasis>, the Political Regime and the Good

How do we think about the word politeia when this involves a reaching back to the past? The response, pursued in this paper, is that in the classical understanding of politeia there is a significant connection between the question of the ‘good’ and the constitution; a connection which has become occluded or obscured by modern constitutional thought. In support of this understanding of politeia it must be acknowledged that what is meant, in this paper, by ‘good’ is very different from that conventionally found in contemporary constitutional, legal or political theory. In an effort to disclose how politeia unravels this novel sense of ‘the good’ the paper will closely consider the philosophical work of Hans-Georg Gadamer on Plato. The paper claims that this largely neglected work is of importance to contemporary constitutional philosophy, particularly in so far as it focuses, as in this paper, on classical traditions or origins within constitutional thought.     

Interpreting the Political Theory in the Practice of Human Rights

In this discussion of The Heart of Human Rights, I support Allen Buchanan’s pursuit of a theory-in-practice methodology for interpreting the foundations and meaning of international legal human rights from within the practice. Following my use of that methodology, I recharacterize the theory of rights revealed by this methodology as political not moral. I clarify the import of this interpretation of international legal human rights for two problems that trouble Buchanan: (1) whether the scope of ‘basic equal status’ is a global or an ‘intrasocial’ standard and (2) whether there is a ‘proliferation’ of rights that risks undermining the legitimacy of international legal human rights. I argue that the scope of basic equal status is global and that the practice of making what he calls ‘new’ rights claims is part of the practice of human rights.