The congressional veto: Shifting the balance of administrative control

During the past decade, hundreds of provisions have been enacted by Congress giving that body some form of control over the projects and regulations of federal agencies. Pressures for more far-reaching measures of this sort, including a proposal to vest Congress with a veto of all regulations promulagated by federal agencies, have intensified debate on both the constitutional merits and administrative wisdom of the congressional veto process. These measures are exerting considerable effect, delaying the decisions of the agencies, reshaping the regulatory process, and increasing the direct congressional role in setting administrative agendas and substantive policies. The result is a transfer of administrative power to the more than 200 standing committees and subcommittees of the Congress-and, significantly, to their staffs. This transfer has served to impede the executive chain of command, to diminish the role of independent regulatory agencies as experts in their respective fields, to devalue judicial review of agency action, and to reduce the accountability of the affected agencies.     

Post-Foreclosure Conveyance of Occupied Homes and Preferential Sales to Nonprofits: Rationales,Policies, and Underlying Conflicts

This article explores the reasons why the conveyance of foreclosed homes with occupants makes sense, and why nonprofits should be given preferential treatment as purchasers, as well as the relevant policies and practices of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Federal Housing Administration (HUD/FHA) and the Federal Housing Finance Agency and the Government-Sponsored Enterprises (FHFA/GSEs). It also presents recommendations for revising current policies, and suggestions for further research. These issues also raise underlying questions about how the federal agencies view their public purpose roles and the implications for possible increased long-term public costs to shelter low-income households displaced because of foreclosure of their homes. Although HUD/FHA’s guidelines allow for conveyance of foreclosed homes with occupants, the evidence—interviews with key stakeholders in Boston and data obtained from HUD through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request—reveal that the guidelines are largely irrelevant in practice. Although there has been a change in an FHFA policy that could soften the GSEs’ practice of no occupants at conveyance, it is not yet clear whether this will result in former owners and tenants being allowed to remain in their homes following foreclosure. Concerning preferential sales to nonprofits, whereas positive new policies have been issued by both the FHFA and HUD, the extent of implementation is not known. Finally, it appears that HUD/FHA and the FHFA/GSEs view foreclosed homes more as financial assets, whose value they seek to maximize, rather than as dwellings for financially strained households that, if evicted, may need additional housing subsidies and as part of a strategy to preemptively stabilize neighborhoods.     

The Paradox of Implementing the Government Performance and Results Act: Top-Down Direction for Bottom-Up Implementation

Research on the implementation of the Government Performance and Results Act generally has not considered how the strategic plan, annual performance plan, and annual performance report are produced and used. Are the documents good decision and management tools, as the act intends, or are agencies internalizing them to meet the unique needs of their organization? Interviews with representatives of 14 cabinet‐level federal agencies suggest that implementation of the act is not standardized. Instead, it is influenced by the unique challenges that agencies face. Further, there is a relationship between the implementation challenges and the overall use of the documents.     

Budgetary Incentives for Retail Activities at Military Bases

The Department of Defense (DoD) operates an extensive system of retail activities at military bases for active duty, retired, and reserve personnel and their families. DoD stores employ 96,000 civilian workers and sell $14 billion of goods and services annually at below-market prices. DoD resists efforts to reduce its role in retail activities, arguing that even within the United States stores with below-market prices are a cost-effective alternative to higher cash compensation for military personnel. This article examines the budgetary incentives that make inefficient, government-operated stores attractive to DoD and describes options that would change those incentives. Because most of DoD's retail stores are controlled by nonappropriated fund instrumentalities of the federal government, reforming those incentives could require changes in the treatment of these poorly understood federal entities.     

Hybrid Organizations and the Alignment of Interests: The Case of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

This article explores the political influence of government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). Using Congress's overhaul of the regulatory infrastructure for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as a case study, the article presents two principal findings: (1) The characteristics that distinguish government-sponsored enterprises from traditional government agencies and private companies endow Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac with unique political resources; and (2) the alignment of interest groups around Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is subject to strategic manipulation by the GSEs. A triangular model of this alignment is proposed and employed to analyze the legislative outcome. The case has implications for students of organizational theory as well as policy makers considering the use of GSEs or other hybrid organizations.     

Why do “teeth” need “voice”? The case of anti‐corruption agencies in three Australian states

Interactions between horizontal accountability agencies (e.g., anti‐corruption agencies [ACAs]) and social accountability actors (e.g., journalists, civil society activists, and complainants/whistleblowers) are recognized as important to horizontal agencies’ performance, but the reason(s) is not clear. This study therefore explores why horizontal accountability agencies need social accountability actors in performing their functions. The study analyses data from 30 key stakeholders in Australia, including ACAs staff members, social accountability actors, and other observers to report on the specific support roles social actors play to ACAs’ activities and operations. Through the conceptual lens of social accountability, evidence show that social actors play four key types of support roles to ACAs’ activities and operations: activate ACAs’ investigations; “amplify” ACAs’ operations; guard ACAs’ activities and operations; and defend ACAs’ independence and powers. These findings support the need for interactions and, also, affirm the potential for research into how these support roles can better be provided for effective anti‐corruption outcomes. The research is of value to public accountability agencies in Australia, and internationally.     

The challenge ahead: the state agenda for the coming years

The mid-1990s promise to be extremely challenging years as state leaders and institutions struggle to bring accountability and predictability back into their political systems. Faced with continuing budgets troubles, increasing demands for services and a shift of responsibility from the federal to the state level, the American states will be hard pressed to satisfy constituent needs or improve state services. However, the tough times may result in long-term improvement in state government, as administrators streamline agencies, legislators trim inefficient or redundant programs and state leaders generally seek new and cost effective solutions to social and economic problems.     

Innovation Inducement Prizes: Connecting Research to Policy

Innovation inducement prizes have been used for centuries. In the United States, a recent federal policy change—the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010—clarified and simplified a path by which all federal agencies can offer innovation inducement prizes, thus intensifying interest in how government agencies can most effectively design and apply such prizes. This paper aims to review and synthesize the academic literature on innovation inducement prizes, to clarify what has been learned that is relevant to current policy discussions, and to highlight unresolved questions that would be fruitful areas for future academic research and policy experimentation. Relative to the existing literature, this paper aims to bridge two gaps. First, I synthesize the academic literature in this area with an eye toward drawing lessons for the types of innovation inducement prizes under consideration by federal agencies under the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act. Second, I discuss the problem of how to evaluate the success or failure of innovation inducement prizes, arguing that careful empirical evaluations of innovation inducement prizes are needed in order to provide guidance to federal agencies (and others) on how to most effectively apply and design innovation inducement prizes.     

Business "Not" as Usual: The National Incident Management System, Federalism, and Leadership

Federal, state, and local governments did not work well together to provide an effective response to Hurricane Katrina. Some of this failure can be attributed to the power struggle between the federal and state governments. The National Incident Management System (NIMS) was designed to foster collaboration among governments and their departments and agencies. However, this system largely failed. To overcome this failure, many have proposed centralizing disaster response in the federal government. Centralized control would damage the basic federal structure of our government as the national government appeals to the ever-present dangers of terrorism and natural disaster to gain permanent primacy in the relationship. The current federal system actually can work better than centralization if leadership and organizational transformation are stressed. The National Incident Management System has many elements in place that can make the federal system of disaster response work if the proper stress on organizational transformation and leadership is applied.

If we ignore the systemic issues and simply replace people or re-assign responsibilities, we may simply fail again in the not too distant future with a different cast of characters.
John R. Harrald, director of the Institute for Crisis, Disaster, and Risk Management,
       George Washington University
U.S. House Committee on Government Reform hearing, September 15, 2005

     

Intergovernmental Relationships and the Federal Performance Movement

Although implementation of the federal Government Performanceand Results Act (GPRA) has provided the framework for the federalperformance effort, other efforts have been undertaken withinfederal agencies to balance the two often conflicting imperatives:to provide states with flexibility and yet maintain a commitmentto performance outcomes that acknowledges the expectations ofthose who fund and authorize programs. This analysis seeks todevelop a typology to examine the ways that the federal governmenthas attempted to bridge the goals of funders with the demandsof those who implement programs. This article highlights sixdifferent approaches that have been taken recently within federalagencies: performance partnerships, incentives, negotiated measures,building performance goals into legislation, establishment ofstandards, and waivers.     

在分散与统一之间——美国食品安全监管事权划分探析

美国食品安全事权划分,在形式上呈现分散特征,联邦层面有十多个机构参与食品监管事务,州、地方、部落、领地有3000多个独立的监管机构来保障本地食品安全,这种分散特征主要是由美国的宪政体制、权力结构的分散性和政策输出的不确定性造成的。但在实际运行过程中,各监管机构之间通过正式的和非正式的协调活动,彼此之间分享了权力,共享了食品安全监管标准,达到了一定的统一性。我国食品安全事权划分可在明晰监管机构间的责任、保持事权划分稳定性以培养专业能力、建立倒金字塔式的监管任务结构方面借鉴美国的经验。     

Levels of Value Integration in Federal Agencies' Mission and Value Statements: Is Open Government a Performance Target of U.S. Federal Agencies?

The Barack Obama administration advanced open government initiatives to make federal administration more open, accountable, and responsive to citizens. Yet a question remains whether federal administrators took notice. This article examines changes in the extent to which U.S. federal agencies have integrated the three core principles of open government—transparency, public participation, and collaboration—into their performance planning. By analyzing 337 annual performance plans of 24 major federal agencies from fiscal years 2001 to 2016, the authors found that, overall, the level of integration of open government into performance planning has been trending higher since the early 2000s. During the Obama presidency, integration initially rose sharply but later declined. Findings also show that agencies' stated core values regarding open government are not consistently integrated into their performance plans. The implications of these findings for incorporating democratic‐constitutional values into holistic performance management are considered.     

Comments on “Are the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) justified?”

In “Are the Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) Justified?” the authors conclude that the benefits delivered by the GSEs (as structured prior to conservatorship) are minimal and do not exceed their costs. While many of the arguments made in the article have merit and raise serious questions about the structure of the GSEs prior to 2008, the article overlooks several important benefits and costs. More significantly, no one is arguing for a return of the GSEs as they were structured prior to conservatorship. Rather than debate the merits of a model that has already been rejected by policymakers, we argue that the far more important question is what the housing finance market should look like in the future.     

Reducing Government Involvement in a Market: Lessons from the Privatization of Sallie Mae

Government intervention shapes institutions and markets; even when government seeks to reduce its involvement, it must protect against resulting market distortions. Government provided substantial benefits to Sallie Mae as a government‐sponsored enterprise (GSE). Giving up GSE status allowed Sallie Mae to expand the scope of its financial services beyond restrictions of its GSE charter. Benefits of GSE status led to scale economies and low cost structure that now propel the company's dominance and growth as a non‐GSE. Lessons from Sallie Mae apply to removal of GSE status from other GSEs and to restructuring and deregulation in other economic sectors.     

Information sharing,secrecy and trust among law enforcement and secret service institutions in the European Union

Abstract

Transnational information sharing among security agencies in the European Union and beyond has grown considerably more important over the past decades. Centralised databases and numerous formal and informal networks now facilitate cooperation and information sharing. However, sharing intelligence may not only conflict with the protection of fundamental rights (data protection/privacy; presumption of innocence), but also with the organisational culture of institutions that are built upon secrecy. Police agencies often keep knowledge about individual cases and their strategies secret as long as possible. Intelligence services build their work and strategies upon secrecy even more. This paper analyses the variations of secrecy that can be observed for police agencies and secret services, and the relationship between information sharing among security agencies, secrecy, trust, transparency and accountability. In a normative perspective, the paper explores answers to the questions of how secret the work of security agencies should be in democratic rule of law systems and how accountability can be improved without making these institutions work less effectively.     

Monomaniacs or Schizophrenics?: Responsible Governance and the EU's Independent Agencies

This paper examines the creation of independent agencies within the EU, such as the European Environment Agency (EEA) and the European Central Bank (ECB). Majone and others have argued the case for European regulatory agencies. Such agencies can provide for continuity, expertise, accountability and effective authority – in short, an institutionalisation of responsibility . Against this optimism, I argue that a dilemma of institutional design naturally arises from the agencies' situation in the EU. On the one side, we risk creating powerful agencies that institutionalise monomania – that is, agencies that single-mindedly and all-too-effectively pursue narrow agendas, inadequately checked by other bodies. On the other, we are also likely to encounter relatively impotent agencies which institutionalise schizophrenia – that is, agencies that must scout around for audience and support, and hence are unable to act effectively.     

The Challenges of Contracting and Accountability Across the Federal System: From Ambulances to Space Shuttles

This article focuses on two questions related lo governmentcontracting and accountability. How are key components of contractingsimilar or different for city, state, and federal governmentsin the United States? To what extent do the three levels ofgovernment share the widely recognized challenges of contractdesign and contract management? To address these questions,we compared and contrasted six contracting cases, two each forlocal, state, and the federal governments. We found that forall governments in the U.S. federal system, the public managementfunctions of contracting are remarkably similar, and that contractmanagement and the achievement of accountability are "weak links"in the contracting process. Our findings do not support thehypothesis that contract management is more effective in localgovernment relative to state and federal governments.     

Stewardship of quality of care in health systems: Core functions,common pitfalls,and potential solutions

National Ministries of Health in low‐ and middle‐income countries (LMICs) have a key role to play as stewards of the quality agenda in their health systems. This paper uses a previously developed six‐point framework for stewardship (strategy formulation, intersectoral collaboration, governance and accountability, health system design, policy and regulation, and intelligence generation) and identifies specific examples of activities in LMICs in each of these domains, pitfalls to avoid, and possible solutions to these pitfalls. Many LMICs now have quality strategies with clear vision statements. There are good examples of quality agencies and donor collaboration councils to coordinate activities across different sectors. There are multiple options for accountability, including public reporting, community accountability structures, results‐based payment, accreditation, and inspection. To improve health system design, available tools include decision support tools, task‐shifting models, supply chain management, and programs to train quality improvement staff. Policy options include legislation on disclosure of adverse events, and regulations to ensure skills of health care providers. Lastly, health information tools include patient registries, facility surveys, hospital discharge abstracts, standardized population and patient surveys, and dedicated agencies for reporting on quality. Policy‐makers can use this article to identify options for driving the quality agenda and address anticipated implementation barriers.     

Nonmission–Based Values in Results–Oriented Public Management: The Case of Freedom of Information

Since the 1940s, Congress and the federal courts have sought to make U.S. federal administration more responsive to democratic–constitutional values, including representation, participation, transparency, and individual rights. As manifested in the National Performance Review, the New Public Management emphasis on results may reduce attention to these values, which for most agencies are not intrinsically mission–based. Freedom of information illustrates the problem of protecting nonmission–based, democratic–constitutional values in results–oriented public management. Agencies' annual performance plans under the Government Performance and Results Act overwhelmingly ignore freedom of information, even though it is a legal requirement and performance measures for it are readily available. This study concludes that focusing on results may weaken commitment to democratic–constitutional values by default. It suggests that using a balanced scorecard approach in performance plans could enhance attention to freedom of information and other democratic–constitutional values.