The crimes of the homeless or the crime of homelessness? On the dialectics of criminalization,decriminalization, and victimization

This paper is a limited attempt to synthesize the older and newer trends in radical criminology — to integrate the issues of criminalization, decriminalization, and victimization. The object of our endeavor is homelessness and how society responds to it. In the paper, we first examine the dialectics of criminalization, homelessness, and economic crisis in relation to some of the general trends in the developing political economy of welfare capitalism. Second, we argue that criminologists should support and focus on effort to criminalize the condition of homelessness and, at the same time, to decriminalize most of the acts of survival of the homeless. In pursuing this end, we urge criminologists to respond by doing things with rather than for or to the homeless. Ultimately, we hope this paper contributes to the ideological and practical struggle for achieving stable institutional methods for satisfying basic human needs.     

Rectification of the Register – Prospective or Retrospective?

In Gold Harp v MacLeod the Court of Appeal considered paragraph 8 of Schedule 4 of the Land Registration Act 2002 and interpreted this provision to mean that the priority between mistakenly de‐registered interests and registered interests can be altered following rectification. The court can give the de‐registered interest the priority which it ‘would have had’ but for the mistake. In other words, it allows for retrospective rectification. This case note concludes that this is the correct interpretation of paragraph 8 and of the words ‘for the future’. However, it argues that the current range of options available to the court in terms of rectification are producing uncertainty, and that a better approach may be to rely on the priority provisions in sections 28 and 29.     

Wisdom or Indifference? The Principles of Representative Government in the Eyes of the French Voters

This contribution attempts to assess qualitatively the current views of ordinary French citizens about political representation in general and their MPs in particular. In contrast to the Tocquevillian idea of an unequivocal egalitarian claim rising from the people, the results of the present study support the view that citizens tend to adopt both democratic and aristocratic principles in their perceptions of political representation. General support for the electoral procedure captures such ambiguity as elections are not only legitimate on democratic grounds (the egalitarian civic participation) but also on aristocratic grounds (the selection of the best). This study follows an original method involving analysis of discussions from 11 focus groups within French constituencies in 2010–11. The results of an experimental design comparing various kinds of elected position (parents' representatives, workers' representatives, MPs and the President of the Republic) are presented and discussed.     

The EU or France? The CSDP Mission in Mali the Consistency of the EU Africa policy

The EU’s role in the recent Mali crisis offers a good opportunity to assess the consistency of the EU’s Africa [Africa as used here refers to Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)—the region of the EU’s most extensive external policy] policy in the post-Lisbon era. Against the background of the EU’s external policy objectives with special reference to SSA, this Article will particularly offer a comprehensive overview of the legal and policy dynamics of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). This will be discussed especially with reference to how they relate to (in)consistency in implementation as illustrated in the EU’s role in the recent Mali crisis. Although the EU initially made a decision to deploy an EU Training Mission to Mali, the EU did not activate the peacekeeping dimension of the CSDP as required at an advanced stage of the crisis. Instead, this gap was filled by France’s unilateral military intervention in Mali. The EU’s inertia in this regard raises the question of the consistency of its external policy instruments and policy objectives towards the region. Without excluding other possible contributing factors, the analysis submits that the ‘partial’ activation of the CSDP in Mali is mainly attributable to the constitutional specificity of the CSDP especially its lack of permanent and planning conduct structures. In any event, it is argued that these do not render the EU’s role in Mali less inconsistent both in the light of the relevant EU external policy instruments and objectives towards SSA in general, and in the light of the CSDP objectives in particular. In general, the Article uses Mali as a case study to illustrate the extent and therefore the limits of the consistency of the EU’s CSDP and its overall policy towards SSA especially post-Lisbon. Whilst acknowledging the current limits of the law in this context, the Article nevertheless argues that the dire implications of inconsistency for the effectiveness of the EU’s policies and for the credibility of the Union make a search for practical, if not legal solutions, a political imperative. This is necessary especially if the EU wants to protect or indeed rebuild its credibility as an international actor in general, and as an effective partner for crisis management in SSA, in particular [The EU’s credibility in much of the African Caribbean and Pacific states, especially SSA is reportedly already at an all-time low (Mackie J et al. in Policy Manag Insights ECDPM 2, 2010)].     

The First Member State Rebellion? The European Court of Justice and the Negotiations of the ‘Luxembourg Protocol’ of 1971

This article delves into the history of the negotiations of the ‘Luxembourg protocol’ of 1971, which conferred jurisdiction upon the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for the interpretation of the 1968 Brussels convention. The protocol provided a preliminary ruling procedure that had undergone restrictive modifications in comparison with the European Economic Community (EEC) treaty's original (Article 177). Some have, therefore, interpreted the outcome of the negotiations as a sign that the mechanism was being criticised in national administrations. This article will, for the first time, bring to the surface archival evidence to explain why the protocol contained an altered version of Article 177 EEC. Furthermore, it will reveal that the governments' experts' intention to limit the procedure in the protocol caused serious concern inside the ECJ, of which some members consequently repeatedly urged national decision‐makers to opt for formulas identical with Article 177 EEC.     

Judicial Interpretation or Judicial Activism? The Legacy of Rationalism in the Studies of the European Court of Justice

During the last two decades, law as a factor in European integration has attracted great scientific interest. Numerous studies and theoretical analyses have been published that have undertaken the task of examining and explaining the role of law in the progress of integration. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) in particular, as Europe's judiciary body, draws much attention in this context. However, the inflexible, mechanistic and universalistic notion of rationality that these works employ leads to serious misinterpretations and unjustified criticism regarding the role the ECJ takes in the course of integration. Within the frameworks of contemporary approaches, the Court is perceived as just one more political player among other actors and institutions, able to shape the EU in the pursuit of its own rational interests. By outlining the theoretical concept of context rationality, this article shows that the logics of law and judicial lawmaking are based on a non‐trivial and non‐political rationality and cannot be understood appropriately without paying attention to the context of European law.     

The importance of ethics in the law curriculum: essential or incidental?

Recently, the debate as to whether ethics should be a compulsory requirement of a law degree was refuelled when the English and Welsh Legal Education Training Review (LETR) recommended that professional ethics should be primarily addressed in vocational Legal Services and Education Training programmes and that learning outcomes in the academic curriculum should include reference to morality and the law, the values supporting the legal system and their connection to the role of lawyers. This debate is also occurring in other jurisdictions. In Australia the debate is focused on the proposal that ethics be removed as a compulsory subject in the law degree. This proposal has raised a concern that law students will be denied the opportunity to develop as ethically competent lawyers. This paper argues for the continuation of ethics as a core component of a law degree and evidences the model used for the teaching of ethics in the law degree at the University of Technology Sydney in support of our argument. The background to the model is examined to highlight the significance of student feedback and ongoing curriculum review, including the alignment of parallel pedagogical factors. This model serves as an example of not only why ethics should be core to a law degree but, in order to provide graduates who are ethical and reflective practitioners, why ethics should be pervasively taught throughout the degree and supported by an introductory and capstone presence.     

Is It the What or the How? The Roles of High‐Policing Tactics and Procedural Justice in Predicting Perceptions of Hostile Treatment: The Case of Security Checks at Ben‐Gurion Airport,Israel

What affects perceptions of hostile treatment by police, characterized by feelings such as humiliation and intimidation? Is it what the police do to the citizen, or is it about how they do it? The important effects of procedural justice are well documented in the policing literature. Yet, it is not clear how high‐policing tactics, coupled with procedural justice, affect one's sense of hostile treatment: is it the case that what the police do does not matter as long as they follow the principles of procedural justice, or do some invasive or unpleasant tactics produce negative emotions regardless of the amount of procedural justice displayed by the officer? In the present study we examine this question in the context of security checks at Ben‐Gurion Airport, Israel. Using a survey of 1,970 passengers, we find that the behavioral elements of procedural justice are an important antidote, mitigating the negative effects of four “extra” screening measures on the perceived hostility of the checks. At the same time, two security measures retain an independent and significant effect. We discuss the implications of our findings and hypothesize about the characteristics of policing practices that are less sensitive to procedural justice.     

The crime of the century? The case for the Holocaust

With the twentieth century now ended the Holocaust is surelya leading contender for the title of ``The Crime of the Century.'Although a massive literature exists on the Holocaust, very littleof this literature has been produced by criminologists. Somereasons for this relative neglect are identified and a case ismade for the claim that criminology can contribute to anunderstanding of the Holocaust and that the Holocaust cancontribute to the development of a more profound criminology. Thispaper draws upon an integrative criminological approach toconstruct a framework for understanding the Holocaust. This multi-disciplinary framework links philosophical, sociolegal,sociological, behavioral and criminological dimensions todiscriminate between unique and non-unique aspects of the Holocaustas a case of genocide and as crime. The paper closes with someobservations on the relevance of the Holocaust for challengesconfronting a twenty-first century criminology.     

The internet and the state: Instrument of social control or subversive tecnology?

Conclusion Technological progress always contains within it the ironic dialectic of liberation and domination. The computer-based information highway is no exception. As a consequence, our own view is that the computer revolution contains the potential for both over-control and subversion of control. Science and technology are not neutral. They are social constructs that exist only within a context of choices of development and application. Therefore, it is not the technology that constrains, or oppresses, or liberates. Rather, the emancipatory potential of this new technology lies in the degree to which those who use it can disseminate it and maintain it as a relatively low-cost communication tool. To date, many of those involved in expanding the Internet frontier have generally been suspicious of and resistant to government intrusion into the Net. While it is often easier to simply dismiss such suspicion as the ranting of conspiracy theorists, history has taught us that such a na?ve faith in the benevolence of the government is unwise. Our intention here has not been to provide a definitive conclusion about the past, present, or future state of technological progress; instead we hope that our discussion will spark further critical analysis of technology and related topics.     

May,Should, or Do,Administrative Judges Participate in the Management of the Public Sphere in the Rule of Law?

The article concerns the actual impact of courts controlling the activity of public administration on the direction of its activities and the content of issued decisions. In particular, it concerns sovereign individual decisions that affect the sphere of civil rights and freedoms. The aim of the article is to seek an answer to the question of whether independent judges actually participate in the process of management in the public sphere, which is characterised by elements of politics and (regardless of the answer to this question) whether such participation is allowed or (even) necessary in modern rule of law states. The main argument is that regardless of whether the courts controlling the administration have reformatory or exclusive cassation powers, they influence the decision-making process in the public sphere. At the same time, such influence not only does not violate the fundamental values of the rule of law, but is even sometimes necessary. This does not mean that courts should interfere in the management processes in the public sphere in every case.