Referendums in the Third World

Since the early 1960s many Third World countries have been attracted to referendums, with the earliest being held in Uruguay in 1917, Iraq in 1921 and Chile in 1925. Butler and Ranney(1978) identified referendums in Third World nations up to 1978, yet analysis of the political process and patterns of these referendums is lacking in the political science literature. It is the purpose of this paper to identify some of the patterns and processes common to African, Asian, Latin American and Middle Eastern referendums. The paper will examine briefly the Western democratic referendums, excluding the experience of Switzerland and Australia where referendums are an integral part of the constitutional and political process. Secondly, the general and regional Third World patterns will be examined. Thirdly, referendums in nine countries will be described; lastly, the paper will conclude with the identification of the common patterns and processes of Third World referendums. In this paper we are concerned with post- independence national level referendums; although, many referendums have been conducted on a subnational level and prior to independence.     

Referendums on Membership and European Integration 1972–2015

There are many myths about referendums. The most common one is that voters are inherently sceptical and tend to vote no when given the opportunity. This article analyses some of the commonly held ‘truths’ about referendums on EU matters. Based on a statistical analysis of all forty‐three EU‐related referendums since 1972, it shows that governments tend to lose referendums if they have been in office for a long time, that emotive words on the ballot paper are correlated with a high yes vote and that a high turnout is correlated with a vote against European integration, but campaign spending is inconsequential. Based solely on statistical evidence from the previous forty‐three referendums, the opponents of EU membership will win the Brexit referendum.     

Agenda control in EU referendum campaigns: The power of the anti‐EU side

European Union (EU) referendums provide unique opportunities to study voters’ attitudes toward a distant level of governance. Scholars have long tried to understand whether EU referendum results reflect domestic (dis‐)satisfaction with the incumbent governments or actual attitudes toward the Union. Finding evidence supporting both domestic and European factors, the recent focus has thus turned to referendum campaigns. Recent studies emphasise the importance of the information provided to voters during these campaigns in order to analyse how domestic or European issues become salient in the minds of voters. These studies nonetheless overlook the asymmetrical political advantage in such campaigns. The broader literature on referendums and public opinion suggest that in a referendum, the ‘No’ side typically has the advantage since it can boost the public's fears by linking the proposal to unpopular issues. This article explores whether this dynamic applies to EU treaty ratification referendums. Does the anti‐EU treaty campaign have more advantage than the pro‐EU treaty campaign in these referendums? Campaign strategies in 11 EU treaty ratification referendums are analysed, providing a clear juxtaposition between pro‐treaty (‘Yes’) and anti‐treaty (‘No’) campaigns. Based on 140 interviews with campaigners in 11 referendums, a series of indicators on political setting and campaign characteristics, as well as an in‐depth case study of the 2012 Irish Fiscal Compact referendum, it is found that the anti‐treaty side indeed holds the advantage if it engages the debate. Nonetheless, the findings also show that this advantage is not unconditional. The underlying mechanism rests on the multidimensionality of the issue. The extent to which the referendum debate includes a large variety of ‘No’ campaign arguments correlates strongly with the campaigners’ perceived advantage/disadvantage, and the referendum results. When the ‘No’ side's arguments are limited (either through a single‐issue treaty or guarantees from the EU), this provides the ‘Yes’ side with a ‘cleaner’ agenda with which to work. Importantly, the detailed data demonstrate that the availability of arguments is important for the ‘Yes’ side as well. They tend to have the most advantage when they can tap into the economic costs of an anti‐EU vote. This analysis has implications for other kinds of EU referendums such as Brexit, non‐EU referendums such as independence referendums, and the future of European integration.     

Moving Away from the Ideal: The Rational Use of Referendums in the Baltic States

Most theories on the use of referendum focus on its democratic virtues. With this point of reference the article analyses the causes of variation in the use of referendums in Latvia and Lithuania since independence. It shows that the referendum has been part of a rational strategy of political parties. Differences in the degree of polarization within the party systems created different incentive structures. As a result, parties in Latvia followed the defensive decision–controlling strategy, trying to prevent decisions made by the opposition from being carried out, while in Lithuania the parties sought to get their own proposals adopted through the decision–promoting strategy. The results reported in this article do not represent a universal explanation for the use of referendum as it is acknowledged that significant differences do exist between transition countries and consolidated democracies, but they do constitute a first step in new theory building.     

(Re‐)join the party! The effects of direct democracy on party membership in Europe

It has been argued that political parties are in decline. While they used to be responsible for connecting citizens to the state by translating their preferences into policies, they have increasingly become part of the state, acting as governors instead. While this perspective emphasises parties’ representative function, it is less clear what their role is in a more direct democratic context. Parties may gain support due to such context, but they may also be seen increasingly redundant in a situation where citizens can co‐decide directly. Focusing on party membership, this study tests these rival expectations on a panel of 16 West European democracies over the period 1980–2008 and finds that parties tend to have higher levels of party membership in a direct democratic context. The usage of referendums, however, does not contribute to this effect.     

‘You Can't Always Get What You Want’: The effects of winning and losing in a referendum on citizens' referendum support

In Western democracies, many citizens support the use of referendums. However, as referendums create satisfying outcomes for citizens with majority views, they could generate ambivalent feelings among voters for the minority option. Little is known about the effects of winning or losing a referendum for citizens' referendum support. This article analyses multiple-wave survey data from five referendums in Bavaria (Germany), Finland and the Netherlands. The findings show that losers' referendum support decreases in nearly all cases, but there is very limited evidence for an increase of winners' referendum support. Nevertheless, the results clearly indicate a winner-loser gap, suggesting that referendums have relatively more positive effects for winners' than for losers' referendum support. As such, this article extends previous findings of the non-stability of referendum support. As the legitimacy of democratic institutions depends upon losers' consent, these findings have important implications for the democratic potential of referendums.     

Referendums in Western Europe – A Wave of Direct Democracy?

The aim of this article is to analyze the explanations for the increased number of referendums in Western European states. Bogdanor has explained this by the unfreezing of political alignments and institutions. After classifying referendums in 18 Western European states, it will be observed that especially the number of referendums introduced by citizens has increased wherever they are constitutionally provided, that is, in Italy and in Switzerland. Referendums in these two countries contribute most of the overall increase in the number of referendums in Western Europe. Moreover, the number of referendums concerning European integration have increased, also in states that do not have the referendum as an integral part of their political system. When it comes to the unfreezing of institutions, it must be pointed out that after the 1970s there have been no constitutional reforms which would have significantly increased the use of referendums.     

Independent central banks, regime type, and fiscal performance: the case of post-communist countries

This article analyzes the effect of central bank independence on fiscal deficits. Previous literature finds a negative relationship between bank independence and deficits in OECD countries. No such relationship is found for developing countries. We argue that independent and conservative central bankers prefer budget discipline due to the long run connection between deficits and inflation and can enforce their preference through interest rate hikes and refusal to lend to the government. The claim, however, is that the legislated independent status of the central bank is cheap talk in the absence of democratic institutions. We test empirically the conditional effect of central bank independence on a sample of 23 democratic and undemocratic post-communist countries from 1990 to 2002. Results show that independent central banks restrain budget deficits only in democracies. Also, democracies that have not granted independence to their central banks have the worst fiscal discipline.     

Democratic accountability and central bank independence: Historical and contemporary,national and European perspectives

Recently there has been a general move towards greater central bank independence in Europe. Countries such as Belgium, Britain, France and Spain have all increased the autonomy of their respective central banks. In this context, some people have argued that the prospects for democratic, representative government have been weakened. In these countries, democratically elected governments can no longer control the process of monetary policy making. By constructing an index of central banks’ independence, this article shows that the recent moves towards central bank independence in Britain and France have not challenged the basic foundations of indirect political accountability. However, it also shows that the proposed institutional architecture of the European Central Bank is a departure from the norms of political accountability and that, in this case, there is a distinct ‘democratic deficit’ which needs to be addressed.     

Do populist values or civic values drive support for referendums in Europe?

Representative democracy gives voters the right to influence who governs but its influence on policy making is only indirect. Free and fair referendums give voters the right to decide a policy directly. Elected representatives usually oppose referendums as redundant at best and as undermining their authority at worst. Democratic theorists tend to take electing representatives as normal and as normatively superior. The nominal association of popular decision making and populism has strengthened this negative view. Public opinion surveys show substantial support for holding referendums on important issues. Two major theories offer contrasting explanations for popular support for referendums; they reflect populist values or a commitment to the civic value of participation. This innovative paper tests an integrated model of both theories by the empirical analysis of a 17-country European survey. There is substantial support for all three civic hypotheses: referendum endorsement is positively influenced by attitudes towards participation, democratic ideals and whether elected representatives are perceived as responsive. By contrast, there is no support for populist hypotheses that the socioeconomically weak and excluded favour referendums and minimal support for the effect of extreme ideologies. The conclusion shows that most criticisms of referendums also apply to policy making by elected representatives. While referendums have limits on their use, there is a democratic argument for holding such ballots on major issues to see whether or not a majority of voters endorse the choice of their nominal representatives.     

The Rise of ‘Politically Obligatory' Referendums: The 2005 French Referendum in Comparative Perspective

This article compares the use of the referendum in France by the President of the Republic with its use at the initiative of governments in other democracies. It strengthens the current view of a specificity of French referendums, consisting in their power-reinforcing use by the president, and relates it to the personal initiative and the French institutional culture. But French referendums have had other functions as well, like ensuring the adoption of legislation or increasing its legitimacy. Moreover, the use of the referendum for a variety of political ends is a dominant feature of government-initiated referendums in all countries. A straightforward relation between the type of initiative and the type of use of the referendum cannot however be drawn, just as between the initiative, or the use, and the democratic quality of the referendum. The final section focuses on the ‘politically obligatory’ referendum: from being a political resource in the hands of governments, government-initiated referendums are increasingly forced upon them. Two different reasons – appropriateness and pressures – have been found to be conducive to such a political obligation. The decision by the French president to hold a referendum on the EC Constitutional Treaty, which is closely analysed, provides a clear example of a politically obligatory referendum, in contrast to the traditional entrepreneurial use of the referendum by the president. Some decisions by other governments to submit the treaty to the people can also be interpreted in this way.     

Ethnic politics and public sector management in Trinidad and Guyana

Representativeness and diversity in public institutions are among the principles of good and democratic governance, but a commitment to achieving ‘balance’ is far easier said than done, particularly in the context of small, ethnically divided societies in which political mobilization is based on ethnic identity. Trinidad and Guyana are two such societies in which political power was held for a long time by a dominant ethnic group and has recently been transferred to the former ‘out group’. Specifically, politics in both territories was dominated by parties that are identified with the urban African populations, whereas the main opposition parties drew their electoral support almost exclusively from rural Indian groups. In both cases the Indian ‘out group’ accused the African ‘in group’ of favouring members of the latter group—and, conversely, of discriminating against the Indians—in the allocation of resources which are in the gift of the state. Also in both countries, democratic elections have resulted in regime changes after three decades of near one‐party rule. The issue of employment in the public service has become critical as the two groups battle for scarce resources, and the public service is described as a ‘theatre of inter‐ethnic drama’. The article takes the view that managing ethnic and cultural diversity is tantamount to managing unproductive tensions that threaten to undermine confidence and morale among public officials. This impacts negatively on their levels of job satisfaction, the quality of the work environment and, ultimately, on performance and output. It breeds suspicion among co‐workers and has the potential to degenerate into ethnic strife that can cripple the public sector and affect the overall goal of national development. The article examines existing legal/constitutional and institutional provisions for conflict management and resolution, but ultimately suggests the need for well‐conceived confidence‐building measures such as public scrutiny of the personnel function and the reintroduction of ethnicity as a category on official government personnel records. The main theoretical conclusion is that while equality of opportunity must be guaranteed, the notion of a representative bureaucracy has many practical limitations that make it unworkable in Trinidad and Guyana. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Emotions and voting behavior in self-determination referendums: the case of New Caledonia in 2018

In this article we examine the impact of emotions in an independence referendum. New Caledonia – a French Pacific territory with 270,000 inhabitants – held a self-determination referendum in November 2018, in which 56% of the voters opted to remain a part of France. We conducted a post-referendum survey with 1496 respondents that included a specific battery to measure emotions as well as control variables. We find that experiencing anger with the national status of the territory increases the probability of voting for independence, while experiencing pride reduces it. These results remain after controlling for partisan, ethnic and national identification, expected effects of independence as well as sociodemographic factors. Moreover, emotions and identity interact and increase the effect of (the lack of) national identification. Beyond the effects of the traditional control variables, the results suggest that knowledge about voting behavior in independence referendums is transferable to decolonization in Pacific Islands.     

Democratic Deficit or the Europeanisation of Secession? Explaining the Devolution Referendums in Scotland

This article deals with the variation in the demand for self-government in Scotland – as measured by the vote in the two referendums – between 1979, when devolution was rejected, and 1997, when devolution was endorsed. The existing literature mainly deals with each of the two referendums in isolation and does not offer an explicitly comparative analysis of them. However, implicit comparisons contained in analyses of the 1997 referendum tend to identify as the main cause of the variation the 'democratic deficit' created by Conservative rule between 1979 and 1997, which was consistently rejected in Scotland. I take issue with this explanation on theoretical and empirical grounds and advances an alternative account grounded in an explicit comparison of the two referendums. Based on a rationalist approach, the analysis presented here identifies three key elements in the voting dynamics at the two points in time – a gap between support for self-government and the actual vote in the referendum; an interaction effect between attitudes to devolution and to independence; and the role of the European context in shaping perceptions of independence. I argue that significant change in these three variables (rather than a 'democratic deficit') appear to have been the most important determinants of the different results of the two referendums.     

The limits of autocracy promotion: The case of Russia in the ‘near abroad’

In recent years, observers have raised concerns about threats to democracy posed by external support for authoritarianism coming from regional powers such as Russia, China and Venezuela. This article assesses the efficacy of autocracy promotion through a close examination of Russian efforts to shape regime outcomes in the former Soviet Union. It finds that while Russian actions have periodically promoted instability and secessionist conflict, there is little evidence that such intervention has made post‐Soviet countries less democratic than they would have been otherwise. First, the Russian government has been inconsistent in its support for autocracy – supporting opposition and greater pluralism in countries where anti‐Russian governments are in power, and incumbent autocrats in cases where pro‐Russian politicians dominate. At the same time, the Russian government's narrow concentration on its own economic and geopolitical interests has significantly limited the country's influence, fostering a strong counter‐reaction in countries with strong anti‐Russian national identities. Finally, Russia's impact on democracy in the region has been restricted by the fact that post‐Soviet countries already have weak democratic prerequisites. This analysis suggests that, despite increasingly aggressive foreign policies by autocratic regional powers, autocracy promotion does not present a particularly serious threat to democracy in the world today.     

Inside versus outside lobbying: How the institutional framework shapes the lobbying behaviour of interest groups

Different types of interest groups use different lobbying strategies. This article presents an investigation of this already well‐established hypothesis once more, but additionally proposes that the institutional framework of the country in which interest groups operate also influences their lobbying behaviour. More specifically, it is shown that groups working in the interest of the public are better integrated into the policy‐making process when direct democratic instruments, such as referendums, occur regularly (as in Switzerland) than when referendums are the exception (Germany). The article demonstrates that Swiss cause groups – often also referred to as ‘public interest groups’ in the literature – use a more balanced mixture of insider and outsider strategies than their German peers, but also that this moderating effect cannot be found for specific interest groups, such as industry groups or unions.     

Voting on Electoral Reform: A Comparative Perspective on the Alternative Vote Referendum in the United Kingdom

Referendums on electoral systems are relatively rare. In most countries changes to the electoral system are enacted through the legislatures. The British referendum in May 2011 is thus one of the rare examples. In this article it is shown that the apparently idiosyncratic factors in the referendum were consistent with general trends identified in other referendums. While the media focused on the harshness of the campaign, the referendum also resulted in surprising coalitions between long‐term foes, thus suggesting that the referendum contributed to cross‐party cooperation rarely seen in a majoritarian system like that of Great Britain.     

Norway: Madisonianism Reborn

This article discusses citizen control in Norwegian parliamentary democracy, and specifically the changes that have recently taken place. Around 1960 Norway had reached a constitutional form that, apart from the consequences of proportional representation, looked much like a Westminster system. From that point on, however, Norwegian democracy has generally moved away from this model. A series of minority governments has given rise to parliamentary reassertion. The Norwegian party system has fragmented, and the individual parties have atrophied as mass membership organizations. A wave of corporatism and later a heightened assertiveness on the part of the judiciary have helped to contain parliamentary power. Two critical European Union membership referendums in 1972 and 1994 have firmly established the role of direct democracy in critical political decisions. And despite the results of these two popular consultations, international constraints have become ever more significant. Compared with most others in Europe, however, Norway is a relatively unconstrained polity. There are few important ways in which the citizenry is partitioned into multiple democratic principals, and the country is a reasonable fit to the parliamentary ideal type of an unfettered hierarchy controlled by the median voter. At the same time, the trend is unmistakably one towards greater policy‐making complexity and increasing constraints on policy makers. Norway's reluctant but seemingly inevitable incorporation into a larger Europe is the greatest and most decisive of these constraints, but it is not the only one. Judicial institutions are likely to play an increasingly important political role, and direct democracy perhaps likewise. And although central bank independence has met with greater scepticism than in most other European countries, it is not likely to be reversed. All in all, it seems that Norwegian parliamentary governance is becoming at least a little more Madisonian and a little less Westminsterian.     

A problem-based approach to understanding public support for referendums

A prominent explanation of widespread popular support for referendums is dissatisfaction with the functioning of representative democracy. In this article, the aim is to gain a better understanding of how dissatisfaction affects support for referendums. Drawing on previous research, it is argued here that citizens follow a problem-based approach in their support for referendums, in that referendums are considered a suitable solution to address some specific problems in a political system but not all. Survey data from the 2012 European Social Survey (29 countries; N = 37,070) is used to show that citizens’ expectations towards and evaluations of representatives relate to support for referendums. In particular, dissatisfaction with the ability of governments to listen to their citizens is associated with higher support for referendums. In contrast, citizens dissatisfied with the government's ability to lead are less supportive of referendums. Furthermore, the relationship between dissatisfaction with governments’ ability to listen varies across countries depending on the level of experience with decision making via referendum. In countries where referendums are used more often, the expectation of referendums being able to solve the problem of unresponsive government is weaker. This study offers important insights into the different ways in which preferences and evaluations of representative practices relate to popular support for referendums.