A Lost Opportunity: A Reappraisal of the Kennedy Administration's China Policy in 1963

This article explores US policy towards China under President Kennedy. It focuses on 1963, when it is argued a major reappraisal took place under the auspices of State Department Officers Averell Harriman, Roger Hilsman and James Thomson. It concludes that a twin-track approach was developed which gave the President a greater degree of flexibility in his dealing with the PRC and laid the basis for the policy to be followed in a second term Kennedy administration. It also suggests that a close relationship existed between the Kennedy State Department and a group of policy academics that enabled this evaluation of China policy to take place.     

The Meaning of Intuition for the Negotiation Process and Outcome

Intuition is a useful tool for negotiators, as negotiations are often highly complex endeavors in which people make holistic judgments with incomplete information and no time for deliberation. Therefore, one might expect that intuition greatly influences negotiations and their outcomes and that negotiators would use intuition to their advantage. However, there is almost no systematic research into the meaning of intuition for negotiation. In this conceptual paper, drawing on five interviews of experienced negotiators, we apply general research on intuition to the specific case of negotiation and find that negotiators use intuition specifically for attribution and social interaction. We distinguish different intuition attitudes; identify preparation, time, and negotiation stages as relevant drivers for the use of intuition in negotiation; clarify the distinction between intuition and routine; and shine new light on the concept of domain-specific knowledge.     

The Illusion of Transparency in Negotiations

The authors examined whether negotiators are prone to an illusion of transparency, or the belief that their private thoughts and feelings are more discernible to their negotiation partners than they actually are. In Study One, negotiators who were trying to conceal their preferences thought that their preferences had leaked out more than they actually did. In Study Two, experienced negotiators who were trying to convey information about some of their preferences overestimated their partners' ability to discern them. The results of Study Three rule out the possibility that the findings are simply the result of the curse of knowledge, or the projection of one's own knowledge onto others. Discussion explores how the illusion of transparency might impede negotiators' success.     

The Kennedy Administration and the Battle over Foreign Aid: The Untold Story of the Clay Committee

President John Kennedy made foreign aid a key component of his Cold War strategy, introducing it with much fanfare in 1961. He increased funding for aid projects and created several agencies aimed at modernising the under-developed world. A year later, aid was under pressure from elements in Congress that doubted both its value and accomplishments. In late 1962, Kennedy commissioned General Lucius Clay to assemble a committee to review the aims and management of America’s foreign aid programme. Reflecting the president’s desire to ensure optimal value and neutralise opponents, it also indicated Administration belief that the rhetoric of modernisation had overshadowed the relationship between aid and national security. Never intending Clay to assemble a mere rubber stamp Committee, Kennedy specifically tasked the members with investigating aid’s role in supporting the “Free World.” The effort failed. Scholars traditionally assume that it did so because Clay opposed Kennedy’s programme; however, he was supportive of the president’s efforts. Instead, its demise came at the hands of an unusual Congressional coalition that enthusiastically cut the president’s budget.     

Toward a Theory of Negotiation Precedent

It is remarkable that precedents and their use have not been well explored within the negotiation literature. In this article, I examine the sparse knowledge of precedents and offer a preliminary framework for understanding the role of precedents in negotiation, including how negotiators establish and apply them. Precedents can either evolve randomly or be created with strategic intent. Understanding precedents generally involves examining how negotiators build, adopt, avoid, and reject them. In this review of the existing literature, I identify twelve concepts and paradigms that are particularly relevant to our understanding of negotiation precedents. I also establish a research agenda and identify three methods for further developing our knowledge of precedents: applying path dependence theory from the field of international relations to a negotiation context; conducting experimental research in a laboratory setting involving subjects engaged in negotiation exercises that contain opportunities to apply precedents; and conducting field research with a focus on case methodology grounded in negotiation linkage theory and theories of negotiation dynamics. Finally, in this article, I formulate a two‐part framework on building and applying precedents, and offer managerial guidance for the negotiation practitioner. Precedents serve as a strategic technique and provide a source of power at that point in a negotiation when decisions are made.     

俄罗斯加入WTO的进程及相关性问题研究

俄罗斯为争取加入WTO进行了长期不懈的努力。尤其是普京执政以来 ,为尽早加入WTO ,俄政府做了大量工作 ,但受国内外因素的制约 ,其在加入WTO的许多关键的问题上与谈判对方还存在着诸多矛盾和分歧 ,使它至今仍处于加入WTO的艰难阶段。俄加入WTO的道路遥远而漫长。     

Prospect Theory and the Cuban Missile Crisis

This article tests the predictions of expected-utility and prospect theories against the most important dimensions of the Cuban missile crisis. Largely through use of the most recently released information on the crisis from the American and Soviet governments, I attempt to ascertain the anticipated benefits, costs, and probabilities of success associated with each of the major policy choices that the key leaders in both superpowers perceived before each of the major decisions throughout the crisis was made. Using this information and the logic of extensive-form game-theoretic models of choice, I construct a baseline for expected-utility theory that helps us to understand when prospect or expected-utility theory provides the better explanation for a particular decision. Prospect theory predicts that when individuals perceive themselves to be experiencing losses at the time they make a decision, and when their probability estimates associated with their principal policy options are in the moderate to high range, they will tend to make excessively risky, non–value maximizing choices. I find that the evidence for the Cuban missile crisis supports this prediction for the most important decisions made by both Khrushchev and Kennedy.     

Negotiating with Your Nemesis

The assumption that negotiators can and should eradicate emotions from negotiating is unrealistic. Instead, effective negotiators know how to handle emotional outbursts including how to respond when the other negotiator evokes their nemesis. A nemesis is the hidden part of ourselves that we project onto others who push our hot buttons. When emotions are intense, understanding the possibility that you may be giving or receiving a projection can help you sidestep escalatory behavior. This article explores the concept of the nemesis and offers practical steps for confronting it as well as responding to others' emotions at the negotiating table.     

Buyer and Seller Differences in Business‐to‐Business Negotiations

The purpose of this article is twofold: first, to examine the differences between buyers' and sellers' use of negotiation tactics in face‐to‐face business‐to‐business (B2B) negotiations and second, to explore how negotiators' professed negotiation styles influence buyers' and sellers' use of tactics. The methodology is a multiple case study analysis of eighteen negotiators representing twelve companies in six real‐life buyer–seller negotiations in B2B settings analyzed using qualitative research methods, including both comparative analysis and frequency analysis. We found some difference between buyers' and sellers' use of negotiation tactics, which suggests this question deserves further empirical study. Buyers' and sellers' use of specific tactics differs according to which overall strategy the negotiators chose, and sellers generally use a greater number of negotiation tactics than buyers. The findings challenge previous findings that suggest that B2B negotiations are collaborative and that negotiators communicate in a collaborative manner. The findings also increase our understanding of buyers' and sellers' variable use of tactics in the course of everyday practice as well as the interplay between negotiation tactics and strategies.     

JFK's ambassadors and the cold war

The importance of sound representation abroad was plain to President J.F. Kennedy. This survey of Kennedy's diplomats is selective, confined to the three most telling cases in the Cold War drama: Moscow, New Delhi, London. The countries corresponding with these capitals shaped America's world, as chief rival, preeminent neutral and pluckiest ally. Ambassadors in distinctive posts do not constitute the whole of JFK's foreign policy, but this account do shed light on significant achievements, thereby challenging those critics who have attributed every manner of blunder to Kennedy. His diplomatic record may not have been as brilliant as court historians suggested. Yet, to JFK's credit, the practical effect of his ambassadors in three major countries was to advance US security and prestige.     

The Effect of Negotiation Practices on the Relationship between Suppliers and Customers

This article examines the effects of negotiation practices, such as coercion and contract formality, on how suppliers and customers perceived the resulting business relationship. We conducted a purchasing negotiation simulation with students in a classroom setting in which participants competed for resources in a mock supply-chain context. The participants were surveyed at key stages of the ongoing negotiation in order to measure their behaviors as a customer–supplier relationship developed. The data were used to test several hypotheses developed from the marketing and purchasing literature. The hypotheses were analyzed using structural equation modeling.
Results demonstrated that the use of coercive techniques by negotiators during negotiation had a negative effect on satisfaction. In addition, the findings showed that, as expected, negotiators entering a negotiation with a cooperative orientation would tend to avoid the use of coercive practices during negotiation. The cooperative orientation also exhibited an unexpected positive effect on the formalization of the design of the contract between the parties. This study contributes to the current knowledge base focusing on the creation of agreements between companies and will, we hope, encourage the integration of suppliers and customers in an operating context within a supply-chain setting.     

Managing the Goal-Setting Paradox: How to Get Better Results from High Goals and Be Happy

Many negotiation teachers share the same tip early on: negotiators who set higher goals "do better." It turns out that one of the most empirically supported "truths" about negotiation comes with a big "but." Negotiators who set higher goals are likely to feel worse. In other words, negotiators who set optimistic goals are likely to obtain better objective outcomes but worse subjective outcomes.
We call this empirical finding the "goal-setting paradox." This article considers sources of and explanations for the goal-setting paradox and suggests how negotiators and negotiation teachers may better manage this paradox through mindfulness and other techniques.     

Limiting America's Engagement: Roger Hilsman's Vietnam War, 1961–1963

This article examines the role of Roger Hilsman, an important State Department official in the Kennedy administration, in the formulation of American policy towards the Vietnam War between 1961 and 1963. Hilsman was one of the leading opponents of a conventional military escalation of the war in Vietnam, frequently clashing with the Pentagon and the American military establishment in order to limit United States' engagement. Hilsman was convinced that “victory” in Vietnam was possible if the United States adopted a counterinsurgency approach to the conflict. This perception was forged by his experiences as a guerrilla fighter in World War II. Perceived to be one of the main architects of the coup against President Diem in 1963, and vilified by elements in the United States military, he was removed from office by President Johnson early in 1964.     

JFK's ambassadors and the cold war

The importance of sound representation abroad was plain to President J.F. Kennedy. This survey of Kennedy's diplomats is selective, confined to the three most telling cases in the Cold War drama: Moscow, New Delhi, London. The countries corresponding with these capitals shaped America's world, as chief rival, preeminent neutral and pluckiest ally. Ambassadors in distinctive posts do not constitute the whole of JFK's foreign policy, but this account do shed light on significant achievements, thereby challenging those critics who have attributed every manner of blunder to Kennedy. His diplomatic record may not have been as brilliant as court historians suggested. Yet, to JFK's credit, the practical effect of his ambassadors in three major countries was to advance US security and prestige.     

中俄关系进入新的历史发展时期

2009年,中俄关系在两国建交60周年之际进入新的历史发展时期。胡锦涛主席成功对俄罗斯国事访问并出席中俄建交60周年庆祝大会。继而两国元首又在联合国气候峰会和G20峰会等国际会议期间频频会晤,商讨加速推进两国各领域合作大计。随后普京总理成功访华,两国政府和企业签署数十项合作协议及合同,使两国政经关系实现重大突破,各领域合作空前发展。     

With Feeling: How Emotions Shape Negotiation

Recognition of the role played by emotions in negotiation is growing. This article synthesizes current research around four broad themes: moves and exchanges, information processing, social interaction, and context. The authors' review reveals that much of the research on this topic has focused on two key emotions, anger and happiness. More recently, negotiators have turned to other emotions such as guilt and disappointment, demonstrating that not all negative emotions have the same consequences, or activate the same regions of the brain. Focusing on social interaction, the authors note that negotiators may influence each others' emotions: whether negotiators converge to anger or happiness has different consequences for agreement. Researchers have broadened their examination of emotion by considering how external factors such as power, the number of negotiators, culture, and gender influence the impact of emotional expression. The authors also consider the function and impact of expressing authentic emotions, or choosing to use emotions strategically to gain an advantage — an issue that raises important ethical questions for negotiators. The article concludes with some practical implications of the research.     

Supplemental Joint Brainstorming: Navigating Past the Perils of Traditional Bargaining

Though decision makers in many domains use bargaining as their primary approach to negotiation, it has limited efficacy in multi-issue, nonquantifiable transactions. Nevertheless, many negotiators use back-and-forth bargaining rather than other approaches. The author explicates reasons for this choice and describes supplemental joint brainstorming, an innovative strategy to supplement the institutionally-entrenched bargaining approach to negotiation with interest-based negotiation.     

Perceptions of Time and Their Impact on Negotiations in the Arabic-Speaking Islamic World

This article examines how perceptions of time affect Arabic-speaking Islamic negotiators and how their attitudes about time, and their corresponding behaviors, may differ from those of their Western counterparts. We begin by identifying cultural differences in the conceptualization of time and then comment on the role of time in negotiations, discussing how time influences bargaining, trust, and negotiation tactics. In the section on tactics, we discuss stall-and-delay tactics, the use of the past as an objective standard, and limits on negotiating the future. Our purpose is to encourage negotiators from the West to be knowledgeable about the way they, as well as negotiators from Arabic-speaking Islamic cultures, conceive of and use time in negotiations. We believe that understanding that the very concept of time is often quite different in these two cultures is an important step in facilitating negotiations that cross these cultural boundaries.     

Culture and Negotiation: The Pedagogical Dispute Regarding Cross-Cultural Simulations

This article examines one especially challenging aspect of active-learning international studies courses—the use of cross-cultural simulations. What is the significance of culture for negotiation? What difficulties might cross-cultural negotiations pose, and how might negotiators work with cultural differences to achieve successful outcomes? Is it possible to model the effects of cultures on negotiators in a classroom role-play? What are the advantages to using cross-cultural simulations, and what difficulties do they entail? How might an instructor make best use of materials that focus on cultural issues and their effect on negotiation? When teaching students of different cultures by active-learning methods, what ought an instructor to bear in mind? What cross-cultural simulations are available, and what readings might be assigned to accompany them?