Political transition and civil society: The cases of Kenya and Zambia

Studies of regime change that focus on the “high politics” of transition tend to overlook the importance of civil society in democratization and liberalization. This article explores the role that organizations and institutions in society play as agents of political change. Elements of civil society influence both the processes and outcomes of political transitions. Case studies of Kenya and Zambia indicate that associational arenas representing civil society made important contributions in liberalizing and democratizing authoritarian regimes. Beyond this, contrasting the two cases highlights the factors that influenced their efficacy as agents of political transition. Differences are found in the character of the civil societies in the two countries. These differences help to account for the extent of Zambia’s transition when compared to Kenya. Peter VonDoepp is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of Florida. From 1992 to 1995 he held a Foreign Language/Area Studies Fellowship at Florida’s African Studies Center. He is currently conducting research in Malawi on the role of religious institutions in political change. Until 1997     

Greek-Cypriot teachers’ perceptions of religious education and its contribution to peace: perspectives of (in)compatibility in a divided society

This paper explores the ways in which a group of primary school teachers in Cyprus interprets religious education and its contribution to peace. In particular, this phenomenological exploratory study: first, examines how teachers perceive religious education and whether this conceptualization is considered to be (in)compatible with peace in the context of a conflict-affected society; and, second, shows some of the tensions that exist in the aims of religious education between the desire to encourage mutual understanding and exposure to religious pluralism, on the one hand, and the political demands for entrenching ethnic cleavages, on the other. Although these tensions are largely contextual, they nevertheless raise two important issues that are worthwhile to consider for religious education and peace in conflict-affected societies: first, the ‘naturalization’ of religion and religious instruction, on the one hand, vs. the recognition that some models of religious instruction (i.e. confessional teaching) might actually limit the space within which teachers can make contributions to peace, on the other; and, second, the tension between the different models of religious education within a conflict-affected society and particularly which model would strategically and politically serve best the purposes of peace in the short- and long-term.     

The muslim slavs of Bosnia and Herzegovina (with reference to the Sandzak of Novi Pazar): Islam as national identity

Using results from a 2010 survey conducted in the Republic of Buryatia, this paper compares the responses of Russians and Buryats on questions of religious practice and belief, as well as the role of religion and religious organizations in the political sphere of contemporary Russia. Buryats more commonly identify with a religion and more frequently attend religious services in comparison to Russians living in the republic. There is greater consonance between the two groups on the public role of religion, with both Russians and Buryats generally supportive of the recent extension of religious education into schools and the creation of national holidays for all traditional religions, among other issues.     

Post-Islamism and fields of contention after the Arab Spring: feminism,Salafism and the revolutionary youth

In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, conflicts in Egypt and Tunisia over the authority to rule and the role of religion in society raised questions about these societies’ capacity for reconciling differences. In retrospect, the conflicts also raise questions about the theoretical tools used to analyse regional developments. In particular, the ‘post-Islamism’ thesis has significantly changed the debates on ‘Islam and democracy’ by bringing to light the changing opportunity structures, and changed goals, of Islamist movements. However, this paper argues that the theory underestimates differences within post-Islamist societies. Drawing on field theory, the paper shows how the actual content of post-Islamism is contingent on political struggle. It focuses on three fields whose political roles have been underestimated or misrepresented by post-Islamist theorists: Islamic feminism, Salafist-jihadism and the revolutionary youth. Their respective forms of capital – sources of legitimacy and social recognition – give important clues for understanding the stakes of the conflicts after the Arab Spring.     

Religion,identity and politics in Tanzania

In Samuel Huntington's world of hostile civilisations, Tanzania would fall into the category of a torn country, a battle ground for the forces of African, Western and Islamic meta-cultures to expand their influence. On the surface, this might seem the case. Tanzania is an impoverished country where the benefits of economic liberalisation have reached only a narrow stratum and the fruits of political liberalisation are yet to be seen, placing severe strain on national social cohesion. There is certainly a possibility that pent up economic and political frustrations could be channelled into religious extremist movements. However, religion has not served as a primary fault-line for sustained political violence and conflict, although there are signs that this might be changing. In this paper we argue that uncovering and analysing these relationships elucidates how cross-cutting cleavages complicate the mobilisation of individuals and organised groups based on identity, not only in Tanzania, but in other societies as well.     

Faith in an Interdependent World

The resurgence of political Islam and the endurance of broad religious belief in the most modern of societies—America—has created a crisis of faith among secularists. If modernity no longer implies a secular outlook, and secularism, by definition, cannot generate any values beyond an indifferent tolerance of all belief, what role will religion play in the 21st century? In an interesting confluence of reflection, Jürgen Habermas, one of Europe's leading secular liberal thinkers, argues that secular citizens must be open to religious influence, especially since the very identity of Western culture is rooted in Judeo‐Christian values. In his political afterlife, Tony Blair has converted to Catholicism and established a Faith Foundation to press for religious literacy because “you can't understand the modern world unless you understand the importance of religious faith.” Similarly, when Pope Benedict XVI visited secular France in September, President Nicholas Sarkozy scandalized the lay establishment by saying, like Habermas, that “rejecting a dialogue with religion would be a cultural and intellectual error.” He called for “a positive secularism that debates, respects and includes, not a secularism that rejects.” Despite the flurry of controversy over a recent spate of books extolling the virtues of atheism in the wake of Islamist terrorism, the more interesting issue by far is the emergence of post‐secular modernity.     

Organizing Civil Society in Russia and China: A Comparative Approach

Despite their authoritarian tendencies, the current regimes in Russia and China have both actively promoted stronger civil societies. This article explores this apparent paradox for insights both into the meaning of civil society and into the nature of governance in these two regimes. It argues that the social organizations that make up civil society both inhabit and construct a public sphere where individuals assist in their own governance. Recognizing that administered societies cannot compete in a globalizing economy, these regimes look to social organizations to perform functions previously left to the state, but at the same time use similar repertoires of regulation, revenue control, and repression to ensure such organizations do not transgress acceptable boundaries. Still, different notions of state–society relations in the two countries have led to different patterns of social organizations in the two countries. In Russia, a sharp distinction between state and society has contributed to a government strategy that seeks to dominate the public sphere leaving little room for autonomous civic action. In China, by contrast, deeply embedded institutionalized accounts see state and society as overlapping spheres of activity, creating pyramid-like structures encompassing both state-based and more autonomous organizations, and allowing more room for negotiation between the two.     

Notes on Post‐Secular Society

The resurgence of political Islam and the endurance of broad religious belief in the most modern of societies—America—has created a crisis of faith among secularists. If modernity no longer implies a secular outlook, and secularism, by definition, cannot generate any values beyond an indifferent tolerance of all belief, what role will religion play in the 21st century? In an interesting confluence of reflection, Jürgen Habermas, one of Europe's leading secular liberal thinkers, argues that secular citizens must be open to religious influence, especially since the very identity of Western culture is rooted in Judeo‐Christian values. In his political afterlife, Tony Blair has converted to Catholicism and established a Faith Foundation to press for religious literacy because “you can't understand the modern world unless you understand the importance of religious faith.” Similarly, when Pope Benedict XVI visited secular France in September, President Nicholas Sarkozy scandalized the lay establishment by saying, like Habermas, that “rejecting a dialogue with religion would be a cultural and intellectual error.” He called for “a positive secularism that debates, respects and includes, not a secularism that rejects.” Despite the flurry of controversy over a recent spate of books extolling the virtues of atheism in the wake of Islamist terrorism, the more interesting issue by far is the emergence of post‐secular modernity.     

God and the Political Planet

The resurgence of political Islam and the endurance of broad religious belief in the most modern of societies—America—has created a crisis of faith among secularists. If modernity no longer implies a secular outlook, and secularism, by definition, cannot generate any values beyond an indifferent tolerance of all belief, what role will religion play in the 21st century? In an interesting confluence of reflection, Jürgen Habermas, one of Europe's leading secular liberal thinkers, argues that secular citizens must be open to religious influence, especially since the very identity of Western culture is rooted in Judeo‐Christian values. In his political afterlife, Tony Blair has converted to Catholicism and established a Faith Foundation to press for religious literacy because “you can't understand the modern world unless you understand the importance of religious faith.” Similarly, when Pope Benedict XVI visited secular France in September, President Nicholas Sarkozy scandalized the lay establishment by saying, like Habermas, that “rejecting a dialogue with religion would be a cultural and intellectual error.” He called for “a positive secularism that debates, respects and includes, not a secularism that rejects.” Despite the flurry of controversy over a recent spate of books extolling the virtues of atheism in the wake of Islamist terrorism, the more interesting issue by far is the emergence of post‐secular modernity.     

Problems of corruption and distrust in political and administrative institutions in Slovenia

Corruption is perceived in all societies as a social pathology that causes great material and moral damage and is a threat to the society's continual development. Especially in countries with a freshly consolidated democracy, as Slovenia, the phenomena of corruption must be treated with all due attention. This article emphasises that corruption in Slovenia is publicly perceived as one of the most important and even increasing problems in society. We are also analysing one of the crucial side effects of the corruption, resulting itself in ever deeper public distrust to most significant political and administrative institutions.     

"Global Civil Society" and the Political Depoliticization of Global Governance

Activists, officials, and academics alike have often linked observations about an emerging global civil society to an incipient democratization of world politics. Global civil society is assumed to bring public scrutiny and "bottom-up" politics to international decision making "from outside" formal political institutions. Based on an analysis of uses of the concept of global civil society in 1990s global governance discourse (especially related to the major UN world conferences), this paper argues that the presumed democratization of world politics is better understood in terms of a double movement: on the one hand, "global civil society" depoliticizes global governance through the promotion of "human security" and "social development"; on the other hand, the emerging international public sphere (in the UN context) operates as a subsystem of world politics rather than opposing the system from outside. Practices of depoliticization are thus part of the political logic of (neo-)liberal global governance. The argument draws on Luhmann's systems theory and Foucault's analysis of governmentality.     

Republicanism in Mediated Society. A Comparative Analysis on Public and Private Evaluation Guided by the Theory of Symbolic Society

Philosophical and historical analyses of the relationship between the public and the private sphere suggest that contemporary men and women evaluate public affairs, politics and the state of society-at-large in the light of their private, particularistic concerns. That proposition is evaluated on the basis of the theory of symbolic society. This theory considers the process of detraditionalization as a shift in the mode of social control. From a situation in which the conduct of conduct is based on traditional roles, threat of scarcity and religious belief, societies shift to social control on the basis of, on the one hand a belief in an autonomous subject, on the other new socializing institutions like schools, mass media, advertising, consumption and therapy. When this theory is applied to the distinction between public and private sphere, three implications are drawn: (1) that the evaluation of the state of society and of personal life will be quite distinct; (2) that each of those evaluations is determined by different factors; and (3) that interpretative communities, created by similarities in the level of education and media use, have become more important for the evaluation of the state of society and less important for the evaluation of personal life. These hypotheses, which run counter the expectation that contemporary men and women evaluate public affairs in the light of their private concerns, are tested using multilevel analysis on comparative data of 18 countries (European Social Survey). The analysis shows how European modernization influences the structuring of evaluation of the private and public sphere in the sense predicted by the theory of symbolic society.     

Can Turkey's state–religion relationship serve as a role model for emerging Arab regimes? A critical assessment

One of the most pressing issues facing Arab societies, in view of the large-scale political transitions taking place in the Middle East, is the status of religion in the state. In this regard, Turkey, a Muslim democratic state, is often offered as a model to follow. The current piece demonstrates that despite the seeming appeal of the Turkish model, it is inadequate for Middle Eastern societies, in which religion plays a significant social role and is a core ingredient of individual and collective identity. This is because the foundations of the Turkish model were artificially imported from the Western experience, and forced from above onto the Turkish populace without much-needed contextual adjustment. This assertion is true not only for the original state-religion model in Turkey, but also for its modified present-day version, which bears to a large extent the burdens of the past. The article concludes by outlining some points that might serve emergent Arab democracies aiming to design a constructive and authentic model of religion and the state.     

Passive revolution in Brazil: struggles over hegemony,religion and development 1964–2007

This article examines transformations of the role of religion in Brazil, focused on two transitions within the national political economy. A Gramscian framework of analysis is used to investigate the shift from import substitution industrialisation to neoliberalism, and the varying role of religion within class struggles in each period. The central argument is that Brazil has moved from a period of ‘passive revolution’ to one of ‘hegemony’, and that the role of religion has changed significantly in this period. The article examines ideas, institutions and social forces, with particular attention to the Landless Workers Movement and its relationship with Liberation Theology.     

Social capital in civic and stressful societies

This article examines social capital with particular reference to societies where distrust of institutions has been the norm. The first section describes alternative relationships between individuals and institutions in civil and uncivil societies. The second makes clear the important distinction betweensocial network capital andorganizational capital. The former can be used to achieve freedom from the state; the latter implies a trustworthy state. The third section presents empirical survey data from the New Democracies Barometer in nine post-Communist societies; the data measure trust, scepticism and distrust in fifteen institutions. The following sections use multivariate analysis to account for differences in individual levels of trust, and discuss the implications for theories of civic democracy. Richard Rose received his doctorate from Oxford University. He is Director of the Centre for the Study of Public Policy at the University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, Scotland. William Mishler received his doctorate from Duke University. He has published extensively in the fields of methodology, legislative studies, and political economy.     

The Hijab and Work: Female Entrepreneurship in Response to Islamophobia

This article focuses on the emerging phenomenon of Muslim women’s entrepreneurial networks in France. It seeks to illustrate a causal relationship between a sociopolitical context where state secularism (laïcité) has been abusively interpreted as a blank check to enforce religious neutrality in France, which has therefore inadvertently encouraged these entrepreneurial networks. As such, this article positions these networks as form of empowerment to overcome the sense of humiliation, isolation, and exclusion produced by the current context of state secularism in France, rather than solely an illustration of an independent entrepreneurial spirit. The labor market appears as a field in which social and political practices regulating religious visibility have been enacted within a context of religious tensions in French society rising since the late 1980s (Baubérot 2000). This occurs between the pre-eminence of individual freedoms in secularism and the anticlerical tendencies that can be inferred from recent decisions made by French courts. Based on observations of participants in two women’s entrepreneurship networks made as part of my doctoral research on the impact of la nouvelle laïcité on the lives of Muslim women in France, this article also draws on qualitative interviews with over 30 Muslim women entrepreneurs and dozens of participants involved in professional network initiatives. Because these networks are rapidly evolving and relatively new, my fieldwork data addresses a significant gap in the literature concerning this particular aspect of the debate concerning laïcité. This study makes it possible to observe how in a key part of the private sector—that of entrepreneurial self-employment—the question of the place of religion and its expression in society is a consequence of a particularly French shift away from a common-sense duty of religious neutrality, the result of mounting layers of political debate over the hijab at schools, universities, and hospitals. The Baby Loup case legally confirms the gradual prohibition of public displays of religion outside of the public-sector work environment.     

Islam and power legitimation: instrumentalisation of religion in Central Asian States

How can Islam play multiple and contradictory roles as a source of violence and peace, and a marker of identity differences and national unity? This study argues that religion, as a system of beliefs, manifests itself through discourses, which not only render intelligibility to religious practices and beliefs but also serve as the instruments of social control and regulation. An infinite variety of organizational and ideological differences within Islam presents the possibility for instrumentalisation of religion by stakeholders interested in accomplishing distinctive political aims connected to political legitimation. The study offers an empirical analysis of instrumentalisation of Islam by governments of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and uses this evidence for developing a framework linking various discursive representations of religion to their political uses.     

Praying Under Restrictions: Islam,Identity and Social Change in Azerbaijan

This article examines a series of political changes that recently affected the levels of religiosity in Azerbaijan. Since 2009 the Azerbaijani leadership has adopted a set of laws and policy regulations designed to restrain Islamism and Islamic activism. In spite of heavy-handed state control and legal restrictions, there has been a visible increase of religiosity within Azerbaijani society, particularly amongst religious organisations and parties. The article aims to decode the underlying reasons behind the persistent upsurge of religiosity in Azerbaijan and further our understanding of the social–political implications of this trend. The article also argues that, since restrictions were imposed on religious expression in 2009, the revival of Islam in Azerbaijan has become much more visible while serving as an alternative avenue for the emergence of social movements within the country.     

Rebellion in Gojam Province,Ethiopia

This article explores how and why the church in South Africa became an important civil society space and actor at the height of the anti-apartheid struggle and yet its civil society role declined following the unbanning of the African National Congress (ANC) and the release of political prisoners such as Nelson Mandela. It does this by engaging in a discussion of the nature of the South African church as civil society, followed by a consideration of the church's role at various points during the democratic transition. Specifically, it explores the church as a “site of struggle” during the late stages of the anti-apartheid struggle, as engaging in mediation and negotiation during the democratic transition, and as returning to a predominantly religious organisation in the post-apartheid era. It concludes with a discussion of the reasons for and implications of the church's decreased role in public and political life following the transition from apartheid to non-racial democracy.     

Islam and Toleration: Studying the Ottoman Imperial Model

This article explores the relationship between religion and politics in the context of the recent debates on Islam and religious fundamentalism. I argue that too much attention is paid to the theological issues of Islam, and that we should rather focus on the historical conditions that tend to produce religious tolerance or intolerance. I use the Ottoman Empire as an example of a polity that succeeded in maintaining religious and ethnic toleration for the tremendous diversity it encountered within its frontiers. I analyze the specific relationship between the Ottoman state and Islam, the subordination of religion to the state, the dual role of religion as an institution and a system of beliefs as well as the intricacies of the millet system. I conclude that the particular relationship that was forged between religion and politics during the first four centuries of the empire promoted religious openness and toleration.