The legal status of abortion in the States if Roe v. Wade is overruled

This article explores the legal status of abortion in the States if the Supreme Court overrules Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), as modified by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Although an overruling decision eventually could have a significant effect on the legal status of abortion, the immediate impact of such a decision would be far more modest than most commentators on both sides of the issue believe. More than two-thirds of the States have expressly repealed their pre-Roe laws or have amended those laws to conform to the trimester scheme of Roe v. Wade, which allows abortions for any reason before viability and for virtually any reason after viability. Those laws would not be revived by the overruling of Roe. Only a few of those States have enacted post-Roe laws that would prohibit most abortions if Roe were overruled. Slightly less than one-third of the States have not expressly repealed their pre-Roe laws. Many of those laws would notbe effective to prohibit abortion if Roe were overruled either because they allow abortion on demand, for undefined reasons of health or for mental health reasons; because enforcement would be precluded on state constitutional grounds; or because the pre-Roe laws prohibiting abortion have been repealed by implication with the enactment of post-Roe laws regulating abortion. In sum, no more than eleven States, and very possibly as few as eight, would have laws on the books that would prohibit most abortions if Roe were overruled.     

Abortion on demand in a post-Wade context: must the state pay the bills?

The legal issues involved with the application of the United States Supreme Court decisions in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton (1973) are reveiwed, particularly the question of whether an indigent pregnant woman now has the right to abortion on demand at public expense. The 2 decisions, based on the Fourteenth Amendment, established that a woman, in consultation with her physician, must be free to choose to terminate her pregnancy, at least in the first trimester. State laws are permitted only to regulate abortion procedures in the second trimester and may only regulate or proscribe abortion itself after the fetus becomes viable. The Court did not rule that indigents had a corollary right to the implementation of abortion, and thus free abortions do not appear to be constitutionally required. However, depending on the type of Medicaid coverage in which the individual state is participating, the medically indigent may receive Medicaid benefits for abortions, at least in the first trimester. Since Medicaid is voluntary for the state, it could drop out of the program entirely or the Congress could specifically exclude abortions from Medicaid coverage. Both actions appear unlikely, however, and abortions for medical reasons clearly seem to fall under Medicaid's purpose. Consequently, despite the Wade and Bolton decisions, the right to abortion is limited by the ability of indigents to pay for it. In the light of the serious complications of illegal abortion, it is concluded that legislators should insure the availability of legal abortions. Such a move would not in itself encourage abortions but would properly extend the right to abortion to all citizens.     

COERCIVE AND NONCOERCIVE ABORTION DETERRENCE POLICIES: A Comparative State Analysis

The Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade ( 1973) limited the authority of states to prohibit abortions during the first two trimesters of pregnancy. Although they can no longer prohibit abortions, state legislatures have adopted a variety of coercive and noncoercive policies that might operate to alter the utilities associated with having or providing abortions. This article analyzes the relative impacts of these policies on two measures of abortion behavior: (1) state abortion rates in 1976 and (2) trends in states' abortion rates from 1973 to 1976. Multiple regression analysis reveals that neither coercive nor noncoercive policies are strongly related to these aggregate measures of abortion behavior .     

Legal abortion: the impending obsolescence of the trimester framework

Women who wish to terminate a pregnancy, and physicians willing to perform abortions, are subject to increasing harassment from groups which challenge the constitutional abortion right upheld by the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade. Their vulnerability, in fact, parallels the vulnerability of the abortion right. This Article analyzes the inherent weakness and impending obsolescence of the trimester framework established in Roe. Present medical evidence of maternal health risks and fetal viability demonstrates that the trimester framework is inconsistent with current medical knowledge, and will likely be rendered obsolete by developments in medical technology. The Article suggests that adoption of an alternative constitutional basis for legal abortion is necessary to preserve the abortion right, and explores the utility of two arguments grounded in the equal protection doctrine. Finally, it discusses means of preserving legal abortion within the confines of the trimester framework established in Roe v. Wade.     

Roe v. Wade and the lesson of the pre-Roe case law

The attempt is made in this discussion to demonstrate that the Supreme Court in deciding the Roe v. Wade case should not have decided an abortion case when it did and that the opinion was almost destined to be bad in that the Court could find no persuasive rationale in the pre-Roe cases for each of the points in its decision. In 1973 political forces were actively debating abortion. Abortions had been prohibited by most states, except to save a woman's life, since the 19th century. In the 5 years immediately preceding Roe, 13 states had revised their statutes to resemble the Model Penal Code's provisions, which permitted abortions if the pregnancy threatened the woman's life, if it would gravely impair her physical or mental health, if it resulted from rape or incest, or if the child would be born with grave physical or mental defects. 4 states had removed all restrictions on the permissible reasons for seeking an abortion before a pregnancy passed specified lengths. In short, in many states the political process had yet to decide on abortion, but Roe's rejection of Texas's statute voided almost every other state's statutes as well. Between 1970 and 1972, a flurry of constitutional challenges hit the courts. 3 years was hardly sufficient time for the judicial system to evolve sound analysis for such an emotionally charged issue as abortion. The Court could justifiably have allowed the dispute to simmer longer in the lower courts. There is some indication that a sounder case law might evolved if given time, but that was prevented by Roe. The Court could not find a rationale in 1973, but it decided anyway, suggesting a legislative rather than a judicial process.     

Criminal liability of physicians: an encroachment on the abortion right?

The Supreme Court in 1973 in Roe v. Wade established that decision of first trimester abortion is left to the physician, exercising his best medical judgment, in consultation with the patient. During this period the state may not regulate abortion determination since there is no compelling state interest; therefore a physician performing abortion will be precluded from civil or criminal liability. In second trimester abortion the state has a compelling interest in the health of the mother and may regulate the procedure to protect maternal health; although a previable fetus may be able to survive the abortion, Roe v. Danforth definitively places the woman's right to an abortion above the life of the fetus during the previable stage; therefore the state cannot seek to safeguard the life or health of the fetus during the abortion. Third trimester abortion implies a viable fetus; thus, a compelling state interest in the potential life arises and the state may regulate and proscribe abortion except when necessary for the life and health of the mother. The determination of when viability has been achieved is a matter of judgment resting with the physician who has the choice of techniques and operating procedures which may or may not be fatal to the unborn. It is a question of either termination of pregnancy or destruction of the fetus. In this last case the legal responsibility placed upon the physician is very serious, and involving a risk of civil and criminal liability. Uncertainties as to the boundaries of legal abortion and the threat of criminal liability can only result in a reluctance among physicians to perform second and third trimester abortions, which is against the fundamental right to abortion guaranteed by the Constitution. The Supreme Court will have to elaborate upon the scope of the abortion right, whether it encompasses fetal destruction or only termination of pregnancy, because it directly affects the extent and quality of maternal and fetal care that must be rendered by a physician. If only termination of pregnancy is included the Court must resolve whether the woman's health interests predominate, or whether the physician can be required to enhance fetal survival. Physicians have a right to know the full extent of legal ramifications and implications of legally induced abortion.     

Brief for 885 law professors in support of maintaining adherence to the Roe decision

This brief opposes the overturn of "Roe v. Wade" and resists weakening "Roe's central holding" that would allow states to overturn legal abortion. The brief was written for 885 law professors. "Roe" was not a "constitutional aberration," or "an exercise of raw, judicial power." Some members of the Supreme Court seem to think that the state has "an overriding interest" in protecting fetal life. Some Court members have questioned "Roe's" trimester framework. A person's decision to abort should be done privately. If women are not free to choose abortion, they will not have equality. There is an absence of "express rights of privacy and procreational freedom" in the Constitution. "Roe" was 1 instance of the Court's recognition of constitutional rights that are not named explicitly. Historical materials are drawn on to show the link between trends in society and the "judicial recognition of unenumerated rights." The most serious questions about "Roe" deal with its trimester framework. Justice Blackmun's majority opinion said that the 1st trimester of pregnancy was personal. "Roe" said that abortions created a medical risk at the beginning of the 2nd trimester. Therefore, the government was more interested in the health of the mother at that time. The state could then regulate abortion "in ways that are reasonable related to maternal health." The start of the 3rd trimester was when the fetus was viable. The right of a woman to end her pregnancy "offends powerful moral forces." Some of "Roe's" critics had their scientific facts wrong. Medical authorities think Justice O'Connor is mistaken when she says that "Roe" is "on a collision course with itself." The 23rd to 24th week of pregnancies where the fetal organs can "sustain life outside the womb." This has not changed since "Roe" was decided in 1973, nor is it likely to in the future. Some "amici" believe that the state can never have an interest in the fetus. The state can not have an interest in the fetus distinct from the woman who will give birth to it. During previability, restricting a woman's procreational rights would not be scientifically supportable. The state does have an interest in "upholding the value of human life." "Roe" is "within the mainstream" of constitutional jurisprudence and should be reaffirmed.     

Conforming to the rule of law: when person and human being finally mean the same thing in Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence

The Fourteenth Amendment was intended to protect people from discrimination and harm from other people. Racism is not the only thing people need protection from. As a constitutional principle, the Fourteenth Amendment is not confined to its historical origin and purpose, but is available now to protect all human beings, including all unborn human beings. The Supreme Court can define "person" to include all human beings, born and unborn. It simply chooses not to do so. Science, history and tradition establish that unborn humans are, from the time of conception, both persons and human beings, thus strongly supporting an interpretation that the unborn meet the definition of "person" under the Fourteenth Amendment. The legal test used to extend constitutional personhood to corporations, which are artificial "persons" under the law, is more than met by the unborn, demonstrating that the unborn deserve the status of constitutional personhood. There can be no "rule of law" if the Constitution continues to be interpreted to perpetuate a discriminatory legal system of separate and unequal for unborn human beings. Relying on the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court may overrule Roe v. Wade solely on the grounds of equal protection. Such a result would not return the matter of abortion to the states. The Fourteenth Amendment, properly interpreted, would thereafter prohibit abortion in every state.     

Brief for bioethicists for privacy as amicus curiae supporting appellees

Amicus, an ad hoc group of philosophers, theologians, attorneys, and physicians, believe that adults should consult their doctor when making personal decisions. The doctor-patient relationship would be protected under the Constitution. In "Griswold v. Connecticut," the Supreme Court said that a state law which forbid married couples from using contraceptives was unconstitutional; that the couples should have a right to privacy. In "Roe," the Supreme Court recognized that a patient and her doctor should have privacy. In "Doe v. Bolton," the Supreme Court found that the State of Georgia was violating the patients' and physician's freedom. In "Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth," the Supreme Court said that a general informed consent provision was alright because it did not take away the abortion decision. The post- Roe state laws were ways to control doctors and patients so that a particular philosophical view could be imposed. The major question in Webster is whether personal decisions should be made by doctors and patients or the state. Both parties must agree to the decision. Section 188.205 of the Missouri law was before the Court in Webster. This section makes it illegal for public funds to be used to encourage a woman to have an abortion that wasn't necessary to save her life. There are medical conditions for which abortion is reasonable - Tay-Sachs disease, for instance. The child usually dies by 3 years of age. Without genetic screening, many at-risk couples would abort all pregnancies. 95% of all prenatal screenings are negative. State medical treatment decisions are arbitrary and impersonal. Having control over important personal decisions is necessary for freedom.     

Back to the future of abortion law: Roe's rejection of America's history and traditions

In Roe v. Wade much of Justice Blackmun's judgment was devoted to the history of abortion in Anglo-American law. He concluded that a constitutional right to abortion was consistent with that history. In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 281 American historians signed an amicus brief which claimed that Roe was consistent with the nation's history and traditions. This article respectfully questions Justice Blackmun's conclusion and the historians' claim.     

Personhood,property rights,and the permissibility of abortion

The purpose of this paper is to argue that the tactic of granting a fetus the legal status of a person will not, contrary to the expectations of opponents of abortion, provide grounds for a general prohibition on abortions. I begin by examining two arguments, one moral (J. J. Thomson's ‘A Defense of Abortion’) and the other legal (D. Regan's ‘Rewriting Roe v. Wade’), which grant the assumption that a fetus is a person and yet argue to the conclusion that abortion is permissible. However, both Thomson and Regan rely on the so-called bad samaritan principle. This principle states that a person has a right to refuse to give aid. Their reliance on this principle creates problems, both in the moral and the legal contexts, since the bad samaritan principle is intended to apply to passive refusals to aid; abortion, however, does not look like any such passive denial of aid, and so it does not seem like the sort of action covered by the bad samaritan principle. In defense of the positions outlined by Thomson and Regan, I argue that the apparent asymmetry between abortion and the usual type of case covered by the bad samaritan principle is only apparent and not a genuine problem for their analyses. I conclude with a defense of the morality of the bad samaritan principle.     

Speech, privacy, and the power of the purse: lessons from the abortion "gag rule" case.

In Rust v. Sullivan, 59 U.S.L.W. 4451 (1991), the US Supreme Court ruled that neither the privacy interests of family planning clients nor the 1st Amendment interests of their counselors prevented the government from banning all discussion of abortions in federally funded family planning clinics. In doing so, the Court also reaffirmed its view that the state and federal legislatures have virtually unlimited discretion in limiting or conditioning social welfare programs, a view having even greater long-term implications for American health policy than the implications of Rust for the constitutional protection of abortion. Rust upheld the Department of Health and Human Services' 1988 directive prohibiting the use of any funds from Title X of the Public Health Service Act (authorizing family planning programs) in programs where abortion is a method of family planning. This means that a clinician may lawfully respond to a client's inquiry about abortion only with a denial that abortion is an option. Thus, while allowing women the constitutional protection to chose an abortion, the Court has allowed the legislature to freely use the power of the purse to discourage or prevent the choice of abortion. Rust's greatest impact may well be in its acceptance of the enormous power wielded by the government over funded activities, especially in health policy. Justice Rehnquist believes there is not constitutional right to health, welfare, or any other government benefit; the legislative branches of the government cannot be required by judicial interpretation of the Constitution to provide any particular benefit or service to anyone. Even when the government chooses to fund a particular benefit, it is free to condition that benefit with virtually no judicially enforceable limits on that discretion.     

Roe v. Wade and the history of abortion regulation

In "Roe," the Supreme Court found that the privacy right in the 14th amendment's view of "personal liberty" encompasses a woman's right to choose an abortion. The Court found that "abortion is a fundamental right." These conclusions are mistaken. The Court's analysis of "the history of abortion regulation" had a lot of errors and did not consider the state of technology in which abortion evolved. Sir Edward Coke, a 16th and 17th century jurist, said that abortion was a "great misprison." Quickening, the point at which a woman feels life, was used to determine fetal viability. State courts, therefore, viewed "abortion after quickening as common law crime." By the end of 1868, 30 to the then 37 states had passed laws restricting abortion. The Supreme Court said that the 19th century laws were passed to guard the mother's health "against the dangers of unsafe operation." In the 15 months before "Roe," 5 state courts said that their abortion laws were constitutional. They said that this was "intended to protect the lives of unborn children." Therefore, the Court's belief that "the state courts focused on the State's interest in protecting "the health of the mother" was unexplainable. The Court said that in many states the woman couldn't "be prosecuted for self-abortion." 17 states did "incriminate the woman's participation in her own abortion," but the Court did not note this. The Court's premise about the greater hazards of late abortions is mistaken. The states were concerned, in the late 19th century, about whether the attempted abortion caused the death of a child. The "right to an abortion" can only be seen as "fundamental" if it is "implicit" in the "ordered liberty" concept or "deeply rooted" in US tradition and history. "Roe" struck down the abortion laws of all 50 states and should be overturned.     

The fetus as a patient: emerging rights as a person?

Dramatic scientific breakthroughs in medical technology have revolutionized the physician's diagnostic prowess in the art of obstetrics. Scientific procedures now reveal previously undetectable secrets about the womb's tiny inhabitants. In the last few years, perinatologists have not only demonstrated the ability to discern fetal abnormalities of an extraordinary variety, but also have become increasingly successful in correcting many of these defects in utero. This article identifies the potential medicolegal conflicts that may arise as fetal surgery becomes an accepted medical practice. It begins by surveying the legal rights of unborn persons with a particular emphasis on the role of viability in determining those rights. The article will then examine the concept of viability as developed by the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade and later abortion decisions and concludes that the current judicial deference to the medical community in determining viability is adequate for balancing rights in the abortion context. However, conflicts among physicians and between the other and her unborn child that may arise in the fetal surgery context suggest that viability may be an adequate benchmark for resolving such conflicts. The article concludes with a recommendation to reform the current method of resolving the critical question of when a fetus becomes viable.     

Human Rights in an Era of Neoliberal Globalization: The Alien Tort Claims Act and Grassroots Mobilization in Doe v. Unocal

This article examines a widely publicized corporate accountability and human rights case filed by Burmese plaintiffs and human rights litigators in 1996 under the Alien Tort Claims Act in U.S. courts, Doe v. Unocal , in conjunction with the three main theoretical approaches to analyzing how law may matter for broader social change efforts: (1) legal realism, (2) Critical Legal Studies (CLS), and (3) legal mobilization. The article discusses interactions between Doe v. Unocal and grassroots Burmese human rights activism in the San Francisco Bay Area, including intersections with corporate accountability activism. It argues that a transnationally attuned legal mobilization framework, rather than legal realist or CLS approaches, is most appropriate to analyze the political opportunities and indirect effects of Doe v. Unocal and similar litigation in the context of neoliberal globalization. Further, this article argues that human rights discourse may serve as a common vocabulary and counterhegemonic resource for activists and litigators in cases such as Doe v. Unocal , contrary to overarching critiques of such discourse that emphasize only its hegemonic potentials in global governance regimes.     

Lochner redeemed: family privacy after Troxel and Carhart

At least since its 1992 decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Supreme Court has differentiated its review of abortion laws from its scrutiny of other intrusions on family privacy. Whereas abortion restrictions are reviewed under the middling "undue burden" standard, incursions on other family-related liberties, including marriage, kinship, and child rearing are said to be subject to the strict scrutiny ordinarily employed in the defense of fundamental rights. This Article contends that the Court's most recent decisions in this context give reason to reconsider both sides of that equation. Stenberg v. Carhart, striking down Nebraska's ban on "partial-birth" abortions, suggests that the Court's scrutiny in the abortion context will be more aggressive and rigid than most had supposed. At the same time, its decision in Troxel v. Granville, limiting states' authority to order grandparent visitation over the objects of a parent, suggest that there is more fluidity in the Court's review of other family liberties than is conventionally assumed. Together the cases signal a convergence in both sorts of family-privacy controversies toward a common standard of "reasonableness." That standard bears, for many, an uncomfortable association with the much-maligned "natural law-due process formula" of the Lochner era, but Professor Meyer argues that it is precisely the right approach in the context of family privacy. Although more rigid doctrinal formulae are sometimes preferred on the ground that they constrain judicial judgment, here they are undesirable precisely because they obscure the value judgments that are inevitably at the core of every family-privacy decision.     

Selective pregnancy reduction: medical attitudes, legal implications, and a viable alternative

"Selective pregnancy reduction" is a medical procedure used to reduce a multiple pregnancy, often a multiple pregnancy induced by in vitro fertilization or drug therapy. In such instances, healthy embryos are sacrificed in order to maximize the chances of survival of the remaining embryos or to allow the mother to choose the number of babies she wishes to deliver. Physicians appear to rely on Roe v. Wade in assuming the legality of the procedure, although such an assumption may be erroneous. Rather than continue to implant an excessive number of pre-embryos, the American Medical Association and the Association of Obstetrics and Gynecology should adopt guidelines similar to those established by the Voluntary Licensing Authority in London, which limit the number to be inserted to a maximum of three. Careful ultrasound monitoring could ensure that no more than three embryos implant when fertility drugs are used. Such practices would help physicians avoid the many moral, ethical, legal, and philosophical problems caused by selective pregnancy reduction.     

The Impact of State Laws Protecting Abortion Clinics and Reproductive Rights on Crimes Against Abortion Providers: Deterrence, Backlash, or Neither?

Since Roe v. Wade, most states have passed laws either restricting or further protecting reproductive rights. During a wave of anti-abortion violence in the early 1990s, several states also enacted legislation protecting abortion clinics, staff, and patients. One hypothesis drawn from the theoretical literature predicts that these laws provide a deterrent effect and thus fewer anti-abortion crimes in states that protect clinics and reproductive rights. An alternative hypothesis drawn from the literature expects a backlash effect from radical members of the movement and thus more crimes in states with protective legislation. We tested these competing hypotheses by taking advantage of unique data sets that gauge the strength of laws protecting clinics and reproductive rights and that provide self-report victimization data from clinics. Employing logistic regression and controlling for several potential covariates, we found null effects and thus no support for either hypothesis. The null findings were consistent across a number of different types of victimization. Our discussion contextualizes these results in terms of previous research on crimes against abortion providers, discusses alternative explanations for the null findings, and considers the implications for future policy development and research.     

Abortion laws in African Commonwealth countries

This paper provides an overview of the range of current (1981) abortion laws in the African Commonwealth countries, traces the origins of the laws to their colonial predecessors, and discusses legal reform that would positively provide for legal termination of pregnancy. The authors claim that the range of these laws demonstrates an evolution that leads from customary/common law (Lesotho and Swaziland) to basic law (Botswana, The Gambia, Malawi, Mauritius, Nigeria's Northern States and Seychelles) to developed law (Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria's Southern States, Sierra Leone, and Uganda), and, finally, to advanced law (Zambia and Zimbabwe). The authors call for treating abortion as an issue of health and welfare as opposed to one of crime and punishment. Since most of the basic law de jure is treated and administered as developed law de facto, the authors suggest decriminalizing abortion and propose ways in which to reform the law: clarifying existing law; liberalizing existing law to allow abortion based upon certain indications; limiting/removing women's criminal liability for seeking an abortion; allowing hindsight contraception; protecting providers treating women in good faith; publishing recommended fees for services to protect poor women; protecting providers who treat women with incomplete abortion; and punishing providers who fail to provide care to women in need, with the exception of those seeking protection under a conscience clause. The authors also suggest clarifying the means by which health services involving pregnancy termination may be delivered, including: clarification of the qualifications of practitioners who may treat women; specification of the facilities that may treat women, perhaps broken down by gestational duration of the pregnancy; specifying gestational limits during which the procedure can be performed; clarifying approval procedures and consents; and allowing for conscientious objections to performing the procedure.     

Rewriting Roe v. Wade

Presented in this essay are suggestions for rewriting Roe vs. Wade, the case that resulted in the establishment of a constitutional right to abortion. Essentially, the argument is 1 of equal protection. It is suggested that abortion be viewed as presenting a problem that might be termed "the law of samaritanism" -- the law regarding obligations imposed on certain individuals to provide assistance to others. In American law it is a deeply rooted principle that an individual is ordinarily not required to volunteer assistance to another individual who is in danger or in need of aid. The argument presented maintains that if a pregnant woman is required to carry the fetus to term and deliver it, then she is being compelled to be a Good Samaritan. It is argued further that if the generally limited scope of obligations of samaritanism under current law are considered, and the special nature of the burdens imposed on pregnant women by laws forbidding abortion are also considered, the obvious conclusion is that the equal protection clause forbids imposition of these burdens on pregnant women. The argument is developed in a lengthy form and calls for an extended discussion of the law of samaritanism. The uniqueness of the abortion case also creates problems as the equal protection argument is approached, and an approach to equal protection questions is sketched.