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I study a game where two agents bargain on an agreement to replace the status quo. For their agreement to come into effect, they need the approval of a third agent. The preferences of this third agent is private information, but there is communication among agents. I study this game in the context of international agreements to provide an explanation for involuntary ratification failures. I show that under certain assumptions, the informational deficiency is incurable due to incentives to misrepresent preferences, and that a parliament whose majority is more hawkish than their executive prefers the executive to be risk averse. 相似文献
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Niclas Berggren 《Public Choice》2012,152(3-4):313-321
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Geoffrey Brennan 《Public Choice》2012,152(3-4):351-358
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This paper critically reviews the extensive literature on retrospective voting in response to economic conditions. Each of the major types of analyses which have been performed — time-series analyses of national vote totals, presidential popularity, and cross-sectional analyses of individual survey responses — has raised several interesting and important questions. The answers that have been obtained, however, are only partial and limited, as each of these approaches entails serious problems of estimation and interpretation. Further progress in this area, we argue, requires explicit treatment of conceptual and statistical issues that have hindered previous research: the dynamic formulation of expectations and preferences, the incidence of policy (and nonpolicy) effects across the population, and notions of incumbency and political responsibility. 相似文献
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Roger D. Congleton 《Public Choice》2012,152(3-4):273-278
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This paper investigates empirically the influence of government ideology on social policy using German data. Examining the funding and the benefits of social security and public healthcare policy, my results suggest that policies implemented by governments dominated by left- and rightwing parties were similar over the 1951?C2007 period. Leftwing governments, however, spent more in the 1970s and rightwing governments did so after German Reunification in 1990. Since policy convergence encourages new parties to enter the political arena, and party platforms on social policy matters are likely to undergo further changes in light of demographic change, the observed pattern may thus be a transitory phenomenon. 相似文献
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Hartmut Kliemt 《Public Choice》1994,79(3-4):341-353
It is shown that the basic normative argument of thecalculus is moored to a collectivistic unanimity norm. As most scholars working in the field of public choice, including the authors of the seminalcalculus, would otherwise reject collectivistic normative premises, a re-interpretation of the status of the unanimity principle of thecalculus seems unavoidable. The paper argues that this can be done if the basic formation of a society is not characterized as starting from a given set of individuals but rather in terms of the formation of clubs. This amounts to the same thing as substituting universalistic ethical premises by particularistic ones which are more in line with standard economic methodology. 相似文献
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Sujai Shivakumar 《Public Choice》2012,152(3-4):339-344
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Costas Panagopoulos 《Political Behavior》2008,30(4):455-467
Compulsory voting laws have consistently been demonstrated to boost electoral participation. Despite the widespread presence
of compulsory voting and the significant impact these laws appear to have on voting behavior, surprisingly little effort has
been devoted to analyzing how mandatory voting alters the decision-making calculus of individual voters in these systems.
Moreover, studies that investigate the influence of compulsory voting laws on electoral participation generally treat these
policies monolithically, with scant attention to the nuances that differentiate mandatory voting laws across systems and to
their consequences for voting rates. Analyses that explicitly and empirically examine the effects of penalties and enforcement
are surprisingly rare. This study aims to fill that void by adapting rational choice models of participation in elections
for compulsory voting systems. I find that the level of penalties countries impose for non-compliance and the degree of penalty
enforcement impact turnout rates. Voters in mandatory voting systems abstain least when both the penalties and the likelihood
of enforcement are high, and abstain most when both meaningless.
相似文献
Costas PanagopoulosEmail: |
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Pierre Salmon 《Public Choice》2012,152(3-4):299-302
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DIETER STIERS RUTH DASSONNEVILLE MICHAEL S. LEWIS-BECK 《European Journal of Political Research》2020,59(3):646-668
Although the theory of retrospective voting receives wide support in the literature on voting behaviour, less agreement exists on voters’ time horizon when assessing the government's performance – that is, whether voters are myopic. Previous studies on voter myopia tend to focus on aggregate-level measures of the economy, or use an experimental approach. Using panel data, this article offers the first investigation into voter myopia that uses individual-level evaluations of government performance in a representative survey at several points during the electoral cycle. The study focuses on The Netherlands, but it also provide tests of the generalisability and robustness of the findings, and a replication in the American context. The results indicate that voter satisfaction early in the government's term adds to explaining incumbent voting. Thus, rather than the myopic voter, evidence is found of the abiding voter – steady at her or his post, evaluating government performance over a long length of time. 相似文献
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