Voters and roll call voting: The effect on congressional elections

The subject of this research is whether ideological preferences play a major role in explaining voters' refusal to reelect some members of the U.S. House of Representatives. If ideological control is important, one would expect to find a large difference between the voting record of a rejected incumbent and his or her replacement. In distinction, whenever voters must replace a congressman or congresswoman because that person had died in office or chose to run for higher office, the hypothesis of ideological tracking implies that the newly elected member of Congress will resemble his or her predecessor. The data confirm these hypotheses and show, as well, that ideological control exists within parties and not only between them; that the degree of voters' ideological control is as great over senior congressmen and congresswomen as over junior ones; and that voters' concern about ideology has increased over the last two decades.     

Are Preferences for Fiscal Discipline Endogenous

Differences in voters' fiscal preferencesare examined taking advantage of theexceptional Swiss institutional setting.Empirical evidence suggests thatpreferences are determined by strictlycultural patterns (cultural area measuredby language). Thus, fiscal preferences canbe considered as being largely exogenous.This implies that, except for specialcases, it is not possible to find simpleproxy variables for fiscal preferences. Anad hoc index of fiscal preferencesought to be built up when the introductionof this variable is required forcomprehensive explanatory models of fiscaldiscipline or for other related studies.     

Voter preferences and party loyalty under cumulative voting: Political behaviour after electoral reform in Bremen and Hamburg

Many electoral systems constrain voters to one or two votes at election time. Reformers often see this as a failing because voters' preferences are both broader and more varied than the number of choices allowed. New electoral systems therefore often permit more preferences to be expressed. In this paper we examine what happens when cumulative voting is introduced in two German states. Even when we allow for tactical considerations, we find that the principle of unconstrained choice is not widely embraced by voters, although in practice, too, many seem to have preferences for more than just one party. This finding has implications for arguments relating to electoral reform as well as how to conceive of party affiliations in multi-party systems.     

The Incumbent Electoral Defeat in the 2011 Spanish National Elections: The Effect of the Economic Crisis in an Ideological Polarized Party System

Abstract

This article examines the effect of the economic crisis on voting preferences in the 2011 Spanish national election. Specifically we demonstrate that Spanish voters' reactions to the economic crisis were not uniform and that their evaluations of the economic situation and final electoral decisions were conditioned by prior ideological preferences. Our findings have several important consequences for the economic voting model. First, in a more polarized party system how voters evaluate the economic performance of the incumbent is a better predictor of vote choice than evaluations of the economy as a whole. Second, this effect varies depending on where parties are located and competing ideologically. Finally, those effects are more conditional on voters' ideological predispositions than the effects of voters' evaluations of the situation of the economy.     

Expected utility or learned familiarity? The formation of voters' coalition preferences

In most modern parliamentary democracies, it is unlikely that single party governments will be formed, meaning that a voter's preferred party presumably has to share cabinet offices and negotiate policy compromises in a coalition government. This raises the question of how voters evaluate potential (coalition) governments, especially since recent studies have shown that coalition preferences influence voting behaviour. In this paper, we combine theories of voting behaviour, government formation and political learning to derive expectations regarding the factors that may impact voters' coalition preferences. We test our hypotheses by analysing survey data from the German federal and state levels. The results of a mixed logit regression analysis support our arguments: Voters' coalition preferences not only depend on the perceived policy distance between the positions of voters and the most distant party within combinations of parties, but also on predominant patterns of government formation.     

Individual level dynamics of PTV change across the electoral cycle

Propensity-to-vote (PTV) scores are ever more commonly used in electoral research as a measure of electoral utilities. Yet a growing literature employs them as dependent variable in the voting equation in place of the lower information granted by vote recall questions. However, this choice can be seen as problematic because of the very structure of election survey research. To the extent that voters' PTVs are measured in post-election surveys (as it is often the case) these are likely to result endogenously produced by actual voting behavior in the past election – thus partly undermining the validity of the PTV question which, ideally, should not be related to any specific election. In this paper, we try to disentangle the relationship between short-term political attitudes (leader evaluations, issue proximity, economic assessments) and voters' changing patterns of propensities to vote in both an electoral and a non-electoral context. The latter scenario serves as a means to rule out the potentially contaminating effect of voting choices on voters' PTVs. The data comes from two panel surveys of Italian voters conducted by ITANES in occasion of the 2006 general election, and in 2011 (that is, in a non-electoral year) respectively.     

Nobody seems to be fully representing me: Differential inter-attitudinal cohesion systems and their effects on satisfaction with the political system

A shared inter-attitudinal structure of political preferences is a key precondition for political parties' abilities to represent citizens' views and, consequently, for the system's capacity to fulfil its purpose satisfactorily. Nonetheless, the structure of attitudes' cohesion is not usually included in studies exploring the elements that affect citizens' satisfaction with the functioning of the system. This paper aims to explore this gap. It distinguishes between two ways in which voters' structure of attitudes might be different from that of elites: insufficient thinking around issues, and the use of different schemes of thinking around political objects. Results from the European Election Study show that the two logics co-exist in European Union societies. They also demonstrate that the latter is associated with voters' lower levels of satisfaction with the functioning of democracy, even after controlling for political engagement, distance to closest party and need to engage in trade-offs.     

The responsiveness of approval voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen

Saari and Van Newenhizen (1987) misinterpret their findings about the indeterminacy of voting systems: far from being a vice, indeterminacy is a virtue in allowing voters to be more responsive to, and robbing them of the incentive to misrepresent, their preferences. The responsiveness of approval voting, in particular, means that the cardinal utilities that voters have for candidates can be reflected in voters' strategy choices, which ultimately translate into better social choices. Empirical data from a recent election support these claims, showing, among other things, that the Borda system, a determinate voting system favored by Saari and Van Newenhizen, is highly vulnerable to manipulation by strategic voters.     

The effects of election polls in Mexico's 2018 presidential campaign

This research note presents the results of an experimental design to study the effects of poll releases in Mexico's 2018 presidential campaign. Our research design allows us to test the conditions in which polling information can alter voters' reported preferences. The results show that the exposure to polling results makes respondents more likely to identify themselves as undecided. We interpret this change as a sign of voters' willingness to form veridical attitudes. To support this interpretation, we show that the effect is stronger among citizens with the ability and motivation to elaborate on the polling information. The findings contribute to the debate about the consequences of publishing pre-election poll results that show a clear advantage for one of the candidates.     

On a Short Leash? Sub-National Party Positions between Regional Context and National Party Unity

Do sub-national parties reproduce the programmatic orientation of the party as a whole? Or are they able to adjust their programmatic orientation to their sub-national electorate? I seek to answer these questions based on the policy positions of German sub-national parties and survey data on voters' positions. Referring to these very similar parties – which all have to commit themselves to certain policy positions in the run-up to state elections – allows for a controlled analysis of sub-national parties' autonomy. The analyses reveal that the regional context does play a role; voters' preferences and the unemployment rate appear to influence the dynamics of party positions. However, the results also show that regional branches of the same party change their positions in a similar way and also seek not to distance themselves too far from the national party line. This indicates that German sub-national parties appear first and foremost to be regional party branches of national parties.     

Turnout Across Democracies

World democracies widely differ in legislative, executive, and legal institutions. Different institutional environments induce different mappings from electoral outcomes to the distribution of power. We explore how these mappings affect voters' participation in an election. We show that the effect of such institutional differences on turnout depends on the distribution of voters' preferences. We uncover a novel contest effect: Given the preferences distribution, turnout increases and then decreases when we move from a more proportional to a less proportional power‐sharing system; turnout is maximized for an intermediate degree of power sharing. Moreover, we generalize the competition effect, common to models of endogenous turnout: Given the institutional environment, turnout increases in the ex ante preferences evenness, and more so when the overall system has lower power sharing. These results are robust to a wide range of modeling approaches, including ethical voter models, voter mobilization models, and rational voter models.     

Probabilistic Voting and Equilibrium: An Impossibility Result

The introduction of voters' uncertainty alone is in no way sufficient to guarantee an equilibrium outcome of a voting process. What is needed in addition is the assumption that the voting probabilities depend strictly convex respectively concave of the utility losses caused by the proposed policies of the different parties. This assumption is, however, not compatible with an unrestricted policy space, and it has to be rejected for theoretical as well as empirical reasons. Thus, using models of probabilistic voting we still have to accept that cycles can arise and electoral outcomes are prone to manipulation via agenda setting.     

The Representative Roles of MPs: A Citizen Perspective

From the normative point of view, there is a general agreement that representatives should act in line with the interests of those being represented. The knowledge about citizens' preferences for representation is very limited, however. This study examines MP's representative roles from the perspective of the citizens. It utilises a task definition approach in the Finnish institutional setting, which substantially differs from the context of earlier investigations in terms of open‐list electoral systems with mandatory preferential voting. Based on the 2007 Finnish National Election Study (n = 1,422), voters' preferences concerning four different representational roles are analysed: as representatives pursuing the interests of their electoral district, party, individual voters or being independent actors. Next, voters' preferences are accounted for by the factors related to each type of representation: citizens' regional electoral context, party attachment and electoral supply, political engagement and political competence, respectively. The results show that citizens living in electoral districts located far away from the political centre or in constituencies where it is more difficult for small parties to win political representation are most prone to prefer regional representation. Similarly, voters who have closer ties with political parties prefer party‐centred representation while those who feel less politically efficient favour close ties with their MPs. Education in turn increases the support for a political representative to act independently from the electorate or the party.     

The more the better? Cumulative issue ownership and intra-campaign party switching

We contribute to the literature on short term changes in voters' party preferences (or intra-campaign party switching), by advancing a factor that has been neglected so far: Voters' perceptions about parties' issue competence. We develop a model of party switching that includes both classic predictors and issue ownership considerations. Moreover, in contrast to the usual single issue ownership conception focusing on the party deemed most competent to solve the most important problem, we argue that voters base their party choice on their perceptions of parties' competence on a variety of issues, i.e. on cumulative issue ownership. We test our model on panel data from the 2015 Swiss election study. The change in competence perceptions appears as a strong predictor of party switching: The higher the increase in the number of issues on which voters see a party as most competent during the campaign, the higher their likelihood to switch to that party.     

Voters' party preferences in multiparty systems and their coalitional and spatial implications: Germany after unification

How should party preferences of voters in a multiparty system be measured, compared and aggregated? We use city block metric of distances between the pairwise comparisons of the five German parties (1995 survey data for West and East Germany). Neither in West nor in East Germany, a party gains the absolute majority of voters' preferences. We derive coalition preferences from the party rankings; the governing coalition of CDU/CSU and FDP is not the winner, compared with other feasible coalitions of the German party system. But the party rankings of the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition leaners are more homogeneous than other groups of coalition leaners. In the second part of the article, we analyze the common structure of all consistent party rankings. Do voters apply the same criteria to evaluate the political parties? Although only a slight majority of individual rankings fit the often used ideological left-right scale, there does not exist a competing one-dimensional order of the parties that would capture more voters. The joint scale of individual party rankings is interpreted as the collective order which facilitates political orientation of voters. This collective order is more pronounced in West than in East Germany where individuals are almost as consistent in their party rankings but where the rankings fit the collective order less well than in West Germany.

     

Political brand experience and voting intention: Is there a relation?

The current study reveals that Indian voters' political brand experiences positively influence their engagement and trust in a political party. Voters' addiction to political parties mediates the relationship between their party engagement and voting intentions. Thus, political marketers should increase voters' party brand addiction for proper conversion of party engagement in the ballot box. Although voters' political brand trust directly influences their voting intentions, interestingly, their political brand addictions indirectly influence the relationship between brand trust and voting intentions. The findings advocate that political marketers should ensure positive political party experiences to ensure voters' engagement with the party. Positive party experiences increase voters' trust in the party further. Another critical input for political marketers is the role of political brand addiction, which the study findings corroborate. Political brand addiction develops a set of loyal voters for a party and guarantees those voters' support for the party.     

An Empirical Example of the Condorcet Paradox of Voting in a Large Electorate

Social choice theory suggests that the occurrence of cyclical collective preferences should be a widespread phenomenon, especially in large groups of decision-makers. However, empirical research has so far failed to produce evidence of the existence of many real-world examples of such, and none in large electorates. This paper demonstrates the existence of a real cyclical majority in a poll of Danish voters' preferred prime minister, using pair-wise comparisons. This result is compared with those of a similar poll, but by using different voting methods, each resulting in different choices. The example demonstrates the empirical reality of cyclical collective preferences and the importance of the choice of institutions.     

Inter-Party Competition,Intra-Party Competition,and Distributive Policy: A Model and Test Using New Deal Data

This paper presents a theoreticalmodel examining the influence of two stylized types ofvoters: ``loyal voters'' and ``swing voters''. The model showswhy both types of voters will influence thedistribution of benefits by a reelection-seekingincumbent, and it predicts how their influence willvary with the importance of the general electionrelative to that of the primary: closer competitionbetween parties in the general election, ceterisparibus, increases the influence of swing votersrelative to that of loyal voters. County-level dataon the allocation of money and jobs by New Deal reliefprograms confirm the model's predictions.