走向服务政府:洛克有限政府理论及其启示

随着国家治理现代化建设的推进,我国政府治理模式经历了管理型政府向服务型政府的转变.洛克有限政府理论在保护公民权利、实现政治国家与市民社会互动等方面具有积极的现实意义,但有限政府不一定等同于服务政府,在面对不同时期、不同国情下的市场失灵问题以及权衡德治与法治、自由与平等、作为与不作为等现实问题时,有限政府理论具有自身的局限性.而服务型政府必然是一个有限政府,洛克所提出的自然权利、社会契约以及权利让渡所构成的有限政府理论,对于新时代构建服务政府仍然有很强的借鉴意义.     

政府公共管理新理念及其在社会实践中的运用

随着我国改革开放的深入和社会主义市场经济体制建设的日益完善,传统公共行政的那种僵化的、等级森严的官僚制式的观念正在被新的政府公共管理理念所替代。本文透析了我国政府在进行行政管理改革的进程中所暴露出的一系列有关政府公共管理事务能力、国民素质、非政府组织、政府外交管理事务、政府行政改革滞后于经济改革等方面的问题。最后认为,当前我国应该采纳新的政府公共管理理论,重塑公共政策的价值起点,加快新一轮的政府体制和职能改革,早日使我们的政府变成真正的“统一、高效、公正、廉洁”的政府。     

The bigger the better? Evidence of the effect of government size on life satisfaction around the world

This paper empirically analyzes whether government size is conducive or detrimental to life satisfaction in a cross-section of 74 countries. We thus provide a test of the longstanding dispute between standard neoclassical economic theory and public choice theory. According to the neoclassical view, governments play unambiguously positive roles for individuals' quality of life, while the theory of public choice has been developed to understand why governments often choose excessive involvement in – and regulation of – the economy, thereby harming their citizens' quality of life. Our results show that life satisfaction decreases with higher government consumption. For low, middle income, and male people, this result is stronger when the government is leftwing, while government consumption appears to be less harmful for women when the government is perceived to be effective. Government capital formation and social spending have no significant impact on life satisfaction.     

Costs of taxation and the size of government

Existing theory on the form of government suggests that a parliamentary system promotes a larger size of government than does a presidential system. This paper extends the existing theory by allowing for distortionary taxation. A main result is that if taxation is sufficiently distortionary, the parliamentary system may promote a smaller size of government than the presidential system. The proposed mechanism appears consistent with several empirical patterns in the data that cannot be explained by other theories.     

论邓小平的政府职能理论

邓小平的政府职能理论，是我国理论界尚未系统开掘的理论宝藏。本在对政府职能的涵义及其相关问题进行界定和解析的基础上，从邓小平关于政府职能的相关论述中，比较系统和深入地分析、归纳了邓小平政府职能理论的主要内容，以期为邓小平理论的研究工作作出自己的贡献。     

公信力:文明政府的重要指标——兼谈政府如何赢得公信

近年来,许多案例表明政府公信力在下降。本文依据学术界有关信任的一般理论,讨论了政府公信力的内涵、意义和来源,简要分析了政府公信力流失的原因,指出重构政府公信力需要一场持久的诚实施政运动和政府再造工程。     

政务服务“好差评”制度：政策意蕴、理论阐释与路径建构

党的十八大以来,政务服务已成为建设服务型政府的新引擎。政务服务质量高不高、企业群众满意度如何衡量,长期以来缺乏制度化保障。公共管理学界已经认识到,构建科学合理的政务服务“好差评”制度已提上日程。基于政务服务助力推进政府治理现代化的宏大视角,本文探讨了现阶段我国政务服务“好差评”制度的政策意蕴,基于公共受托责任理论和新公共管理理论阐释了政务服务“好差评”与服务型政府的理念映射,并从价值取向、评价机制、评价内容、评价方法四个维度勾勒出了其建构路径。本文研究既丰富和发展了新公共管理运动的理论体系,亦有助于在实践中为加快我国服务型政府建设提供方法论借鉴。     

Punctuations and agendas: A new look at local government budget expenditures

Punctuated equilibrium theory (PET) is an agenda‐based theory that offers a theoretical foundation for large budget shifts. PET emphasizes that the static, incremental nature of agendas is occasionally interrupted by punctuations. These punctuations indicate shifts in priority among the agenda items, and with those agenda shifts come trade‐offs. This article expands the discussion of punctuated budgets to the level of local government by determining that local government expenditures have the characteristics espoused by the punctuated equilibrium theory. The article also determines the frequency of punctuations and the probability for future punctuations. The findings show that some budget functions and policy types are more prone to punctuations and, therefore, have a less stable agenda. The practical significance of extending PET to local government budgeting is the implication on planning, forecasting, and the agenda‐setting process. © 2003 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

A Critical Evaluation of Virtual Local Government in Australia

The vigorous debate surrounding local government amalgamation in Australia remains unresolved. In an attempt to break the current stalemate Percy Allan (2001) has proposed a model of 'virtual local government' that seeks to combine the service appropriateness and effectiveness purportedly associated with demographically small councils with the service efficiency of large municipalities. This paper attempts to place his model in the context of the literature on the theory of public sector policy reform. It then goes on to examine virtual local government in the light of new institutional economics, public choice theory and the characteristics of Australian local government.     

Veto player theory and reform making in Western Europe

Veto player theory generates predictions about governments’ capacity for policy change. Due to the difficulty of identifying significant laws needed to change the policy status quo, evidence about governments’ ability to change policy has been mostly provided for a limited number of reforms and single‐country studies. To evaluate the predictive power of veto player theory for policy making across time, policy areas and countries, a dataset was gathered that incorporates about 5,600 important government reform measures in the areas of social, labour, economic and taxation policy undertaken in 13 Western European countries from the mid‐1980s until the mid‐2000s. Veto player theory is applied in a combined model with other central theoretical expectations on policy change derived from political economy (crisis‐driven policy change) and partisan theory (ideology‐driven policy change). Robust support is found that governments introduce more reform measures when economic conditions are poor and when the government is positioned further away from the policy status quo. No empirical support is found for predictions of veto player theory in its pure form, where no differentiation between government types is made. However, the findings provide support for the veto player theory in the special case of minimal winning cabinets, where the support of all government parties is sufficient (in contrast to minority cabinets) and necessary (in contrast to oversized cabinets) for policy change. In particular, it is found that in minimal winning cabinets the ideological distance between the extreme government parties significantly decreases the government's ability to introduce reforms. These findings improve our understanding of reform making in parliamentary democracies and highlight important issues and open questions for future applications and tests of the veto player theory.     

治理结构、运行机制、与政府关系: 非营利组织有效性分析--浙江省义乌市玩具行业协会个案

非营利组织的治理结构、运行机制、与政府关系对于非营利组织的发展特别重要.行业协会是非营利组织的一种形态.通过分析浙江省义乌市玩具行业协会个案,运用制度变迁和合作博弈理论,剖析协会的治理结构、运行机制、与政府关系,探讨非营利组织的有效性.     

The Italian state: no longer Catholic,no longer Christian

The constant appearance of highly detailed studies of parties in the different West European countries creates the need for a theory which summarises their major findings and relates them to each other. Such a theory needs to be general in form, but existing formulations (for example, minimal‐winning criteria for government formation) are limited to one aspect of government and are theoretically inadequate. A general theory covering all major aspects of democratic party government (formation, distribution of ministries, reshuffles, policy formation and termination) is proposed and its fit with existing findings illustrated.     

ECONOMIC THEORY AND POLICY ANALYSIS: CONCEPTUAL GUIDELINES FOR PUBLIC POLICY-MAKERS

Abstract: Traditionally public policy analysis has been able to employ the conceptual framework offered by the theory of market failure in order to evaluate the efficiency of market outcomes. However, until fairly recently, no corresponding analytical structure existed which could facilitate the examination of the efficiency and equity characteristics of government or non-market outcomes. Quite apart from public choice theory, an embryonic normative theory of government failure has now been developed which can act as a conceptual analogue to the market failure paradigm. At present, three theories of government failure coexist in the literature: Wolf's theory of non-market failure; Le Grand's theory of government failure; and Vining and Weimer's theory of govern- ment production failure. These models form the basis for a more universal theory of government failure. Nevertheless, in its current state of development this seminal literature can still assist in rational public policy design subject to certain caveats. Foremost amongst these is the need for policy analysts to augment the efficiency and equity criteria with some additional broader normative measures, and the necessity for care to be taken in the use of allocative efficiency as a benchmark in non-market circumstances.     

Political Competition and State Government Size: Do Tighter Elections Produce Looser Budgets?

We test implications of politicalcompetition theory concerning government size, usingdata from U.S. states. We find that greaterpolitical competition in the race for governor actsas a check against bigger government. Evidence onthe effectiveness of legal limits on expendituresand/or revenues growth is mixed. The DemocraticParty is associated with bigger government, but onlywhen party representation in both the governor'shouse and the legislature is strong. The flypapereffect of grants is found to be strong. Our resultshave implications for models of fiscal illusion.     

政府有效性：理论涵义与现实途径

现代社会经济的发展与现代政府的有效性是内在关联的。本文讨论了政府有效性的理论涵义并分析了提高我国政府有效性的8个途径。     

企业政治行为对管制动态均衡的隐蔽性影响

随着现代管制理论和管制实践的不断发展,研究管制均衡的动态性变化和企业影响管制均衡的隐蔽性行为,对于提高政府管制政策的合理性有着十分重要的意义.因为这些隐蔽性行为处在合法性的边缘或是范围以内,在实践中也越来越多地被企业所运用.从管制过程中的三个利益相关者--消费者、企业和政府之间的现实关系、各自追求不同的目标和相互作用入手,运用Stigle-Peltzman的管制均衡模型研究了政府管制机制从初始设计到现实执行结果之间的演变轨迹,并在此基础上通过对该模型进一步的推理分析和案例研究得出结论,企业运用政治行为对管制动态均衡进行隐蔽性影响,使其向有利于自身的方向发生动态的偏离,从而获取超额利润的机制和作用方式.主要有:利用管制政策的相对静态性,通过隐蔽信息产生管制错位;削弱消费者的影响力,改变政府边际效用替代率.进一步阐述了管制错位和政府失灵的经济学机理,对现有的管制理论和企业政治行为理论进行了拓展,这对提高经济转型时期的我国政府管制政策的合理性具有积极的意义.     

Does Cohabitation Matter? French European Policy-Making in the Context of Divided Government

This article analyses French European policy-making in the context of divided government, arguing that in the area of European policy-making cohabitation increases the number of veto players, as compared with unified government. The increase of veto players, in turn, reduces France's acceptance-sets at the European table and thereby introduces a status quo bias. In order to test this theory, use is made of a comparative case study design. Process-tracing and counterfactual analyses reveal that veto player theory can, indeed, be applied to the interactions of a split-executive government.     

The political legislation cycle

The economic theory of legislation holds that laws, even when they do not involve financial resources, redistribute property rights. Politicians supply legislation to groups with the highest political return. By the same logic, politicians should supply legislation when doing so has the highest political return. The dynamics of the supply of legislation should follow the pattern suggested by the political business cycle theory. We develop a model of government’s and voters’ behavior where a legislation cycle is the strategy to hold the government (coalition) together. Under certain assumptions, the model predicts that the approbation of laws should be concentrated at the end of the legislature and be positively related to the fragmentation of the government coalition. We test these restrictions on data about the supply of legislation by the Italian Parliament during legislatures from I to XIII (1948 to 2001). The empirical analysis provides strong support to the theory: a legislation cycle occurs when the conditioning phenomena that the model indicates are satisfied.     

Divided we vote

Divided government is known to correlate with limited government, but less is understood about the empirical conditions that lead to divided government. This paper estimates the determinants of continuous and categorical measures of divided government in an empirical macro political economy model using 30 years of data from the American states. Voters support more divided government after increased government spending per dollar of tax revenues, but more unified government after worsening incomes and unemployment rates. Only conditional support is found for the strategic-moderating theory (Alesina and Rosenthal in Econometrica 64(6):1311–1341, 1996) that focuses purely on midterm cycles and split-ticket voting absent economic conditions.