The Realism of Universals in Plato and Nyāya

It has become commonplace in introductions to Indian philosophy to construe Plato’s discussion of forms (εἶδος/ἰδέα) and the treatment in Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika of universals (sāmānya/jāti) as addressing the same philosophical issue, albeit in somewhat different ways. While such a comparison of the similarities and differences has interest and value as an initial reconnaissance of what each says about common properties, an examination of the roles that universals play in the rest of their philosophical enquiries vitiates this commonplace. This paper draws upon the primary texts to identify the following metaphysical, epistemological, semantic and soteriological roles that universals play in the philosophy of Plato and of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika:

Metaphysical: causal of the existence of x Metaphysical: constitutive of the identity/essence of x Epistemological: cognitively causal (i.e. of the cognition of one over many) Epistemological: epistemically causal (i.e. of knowledge of x) Semantic: necessary condition of speech and reason Epistemological: vindicatory of induction (Nyāya only) Metaphysical: explanatory of causation (Nyāya only) Soteriological: cathartic contemplation (Plato only)

These roles provide us with motivations or reasons to believe that universals exist. As we examine these motivations, we find pressures mounting against our assimilating Platonic forms and the universals of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika in the discourse about common properties. It is especially when we appreciate the utterly different contribution that universals make in securing our highest welfare that we realize how Plato and the two sister schools are not so much talking somewhat differently about the same thing, but talking somewhat similarly about different things. This better understanding of this difference in these philosophies opens a route for our better understanding of their unique contributions in the ongoing dialogue of philosophy.     

Paśyantī, Pratibhā, Sphoţa and Jāti: Ontology and Epistemology in the Vākyapadīya

Eli Franco has recently suggested to distinguish the two main periods in the history of Indian philosophy, i.e. the older ontological and the new epistemological. In the Vākyapadīya, however, ontology and epistemology are evidently intertwined and interrelated. In this paper ontological and epistemological features of the concepts of pa?yantī, pratibhā, spho?a and jāti are analyzed in order to demonstrate that all these concepts, while being ontologically different, are engaged in similar epistemological processes, i.e. the cognition of a verbal utterance. Thus the identification of spho?a and jāti as well as of pa?yantī and pratibhā met with in some passages of VP and the commentaries implies not the absolute identity of these concepts, but only their overlapping in the sphere of epistemology. Considering concepts of different origin in one epistemological perspective enables to escape controversies in interpretation and provides a kind of consistency in a bit but amorphous work of Bhart?hari.     

Changing Frames in Buddhist Thought: The Concept of Ākāra in Abhidharma and in Buddhist Epistemological Analysis

It has been argued that the use of the concept of ākāra—a mental “form,” “appearance” or “aspect”—in Buddhist epistemological analysis or pramā?a exhibits continuities with earlier Buddhist thinking about mental processes, in particular in Abhidharma. A detailed inquiry into uses of the term ākāra in pertinent contexts in Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmako?abhā?ya brings to light different semantic nuances and functions of this term. The characteristic use of ākāra in Buddhist epistemological discourse turns out to be continuous with only some of the nuances it has in Abhidharma. Moreover, ākāra becomes associated with novel explanatory functions in Buddhist pramā?a. These discoveries underscore the need to pay closer attention to the reuse of terms and concepts, ideas and arguments in Buddhist philosophy, and to the often subtle adaptations and transformations that formed an integral part of its history.     

The Two Pratyabhij?ā Theories of Error

In this essay, it is argued that Abhinavagupta’s theory of error, the apūrṇakhyāti theory, synthesizes two distinguishable Pratyabhij?ā treatments of error that were developed in three phases prior to him. The first theory was developed in two stages, initially by Somānanda in the Śivadṛṣṭi (ŚD) and subsequently by Utpaladeva in his Īśvarapratyabhij?ākārikās (ĪPK) and his short autocommentary thereon, the Īśvarapratyabhij?āvṛtti (ĪPVṛ). This theory served to explain individual acts of misperception, and it was developed with the philosophy of the Buddhist epistemologists in mind. In a third phase, Utpaladeva developed in his Śivadṛṣṭivṛtti (ŚDVṛ) a second theory of error, one that involved the noncognition of non-duality (abhedākhyāti) and served to explain both the appearance and perception of multiplicity, despite the strict monism to which all Pratyabhij?ā authors subscribe. Abhinavagupta’s treatment of error, then, is significant not only because it was meant to explain all the various theories of error offered by opposing philosophical schools, as Rastogi has shown, but more importantly because it synthesized the thinking of his predecessors on the matter in a single, elegant account of error.     

Yogic Mindfulness: Hariharānanda Āraṇya’s Quasi-Buddhistic Interpretation of Smṛti in Patañjali’s Yogasūtra I.20

This paper examines Swami Hariharānanda āra?ya’s unique interpretation of sm?ti as “mindfulness” (samanaskatā) in Patañjali’s Yogasūtra I.20. Focusing on his extended commentary on Yogasūtra I.20 in his Bengali magnum opus, the Pātañjaljogdar?an (1911), I argue that his interpretation of sm?ti is quasi-Buddhistic. On the one hand, Hariharānanda’s conception of sm?ti as mindfulness resonates strongly with some of the views on sm?ti advanced in classic Buddhist texts such as the Satipa??hānasutta and Buddagho?a’s Papañcasūdanī. On the other hand, he also builds into his complex account of the practice of sm?ti certain fundamental doctrines of Sā?khyayoga—such as mindfulness of the Lord (“ī?vara”) and mental identification with the Puru?a, the transcendental “Self” that is wholly independent of nature—which are incompatible with Buddhist metaphysics. I will then bring Hariharānanda’s quasi-Buddhistic interpretation of sm?ti of Yogasūtra I.20 into dialogue with some of the interpretations of sm?ti advanced by traditional commentators. Whereas many traditional commentators such as Vācaspati Mi?ra and Vijñānabhik?u straightforwardly identify sm?ti of I.20 with “dhyāna” (“concentration”)—the seventh limb of the a??ā?gayoga outlined in Yogasūtra II.28-III.7—Hariharānanda argues that sm?ti is the mental precondition for the establishment of dhyāna of the a??ā?gayoga.     

Killing as Orthodoxy,Exegesis as Apologetics: The Animal Sacrifice in the Manubhāṣya of Medhātithi

Journal of Indian Philosophy - Deeply rooted in the Vedic tradition, animal sacrifice is a controversial issue associated with a larger discourse of violence and non-violence in South Asia. Most...     

The nyāya concept of Svābhāvika sambandha: A historical retrospect

Journal of Indian Philosophy -     

An Inquiry into the Definition of tarka in Nyāya Tradition and Its Connotation of Negative Speculation

Journal of Indian Philosophy - The technical term “tarka” in the Nyāya tradition is the object of the present investigation. Diverse texts including Buddhist ones exhibit a...     

The Feasibility of Cost of Crime Estimations in Eastern Europe – The Case of Poland

Estimates of cost of crime have gradually been introduced into the public debate on crime policy. Estimates differ in their scope and methodologies and this impedes international comparisons. This article follows the model of estimating costs of crime developed under the 6th Framework Programme and provides the comparable results of costs of crime in Poland. The total costs of crime have been estimated at 5.1% of GDP. In particular, the victimisation costs of violent crimes have been estimated at 1.94% of GDP and the costs of property crimes against individuals at 0.5% of GDP. The results are in line with estimates for other countries and provide the relevant measure for any cost-benefit analysis of a crime policy.