股权分置改革后我国公司治理模式的选择

从公司治理的视角,比较股权分置改革前后的公司治理问题,借鉴西方公司治理中机构投资者积极治理主义的抬头,我国上市公司应顺应公司治理模式发展趋势,致力于构建由机构投资者参与的多个大股东相互制衡的公司治理模式。     

股权激励惹了谁

在股市身陷重围，徘徊不前时，被誉上市公司经营者“金手铐”的股权激励全然没有金色的喜气，冷气凛冽，让人颤栗。于是，以其为舶来品而言，其为橘生于淮南而为橘，生于淮北则为枳，不为上市公司经营者所青睐。     

“新三板”股权激励思考

"新三板"新的《业务规则》出台之后,股权激励引起了普遍关注,但由于没有具体的实施细则,目前企业还是采取观望的态度。股权激励在上市公司运用较多,但非上市公众公司有自身的特点,在制定新的实施细则的时候应当在借鉴上市公司经营的基础上充分考虑非上市公众公司自身特点,笔者对于"新三板"的股权激励发展持谨慎乐观的态度。     

证监会发布上市公司股权激励管理办法

2006年1月1日，证监会发布的《上市公司股权激励管瑚办法》（试行）开始实施。该《办法》主要内容包括：（1）上市公司全部有效的股权激励计划所涉及的标的股票总数累计不得超过公司股本总额的10％。非经股东大会特别决议批准，任何一名激励对象通过全部有效的股权激励计划获授的本公司股票累计不得超过公司股本总额的1%。     

非上市企业股权激励解析

目前对股权激励制度的研究,业界关注点大多集中在上市公司层面,而对非上市企业关注度较弱,但非上市企业对股权激励制度同样存在需求.本文分析股权激励机制的原理以、实施过程中潜在问题及相应对策,以期为企业提供一定的参考价值.     

关于设立股权公司双重股权制度的思考

我国的股权公司一直奉行一股一权制度,在保障股权相统一的前提下,侧重于保护股东的利益,在这种制度下,公司为了发展而对外发行股票进行融资,但随着股票的发行,融资过程带来的却是股权的稀释,融资次数越多,股权稀释的也就越严重,最终导致管理层无法拥有公司绝对的控制权。而基于这种情况,双重股权制度在世界很多国家盛行,它将股权分为表决权和财产权两种进行管理,在流通自由的股票市场上,股东在去的股票财产权权的同时并没有取得与之原本相对应的表决权,所以不能稀释管理层的表决权,进而维护了管理层绝对的控制权。但是股份公司的双重股权制度因为违背了我们国家一直以来的一股一权但以股权制度,所以受到一些学者的质疑,本文通过对双重股权制度基础理论的介绍,并结合我国资本市场的现状,对在我国设立股权公司双重股权制度问题进行研究。     

公司治理法律制度浅析

中国公司法律制度在很大程度上产生于对国外通行规则的借鉴。在公司治理方面,也应该理性地吸取国外的先进经验,充分理解国外先进法律制度的产生原因和作用原理。本文通过对国外相关法律制度的研究,浅析了不同治理结构的特点及形成原因,并结合现代公司治理理念的转变,进而探讨了我国的公司治理法律制度改革的方向。     

论银行公司治理制度的构建

在银行中,利益冲突的范围不同于实体经济中一般的工商企业,但是,一直以来银行的公司治理制度并没有给予银行中特别的利益冲突以特别关注。美国2007-2009年的金融危机表明,有必要调整和改革银行的公司治理结构。银行功能的社会公益性以及银行中特殊的利益冲突和其它的特点使得在构建银行的公司治理结构时,不能够简单地适用普通公司的治理模式,而要在股权治理、债权治理和监管治理之中寻求平衡。     

后股权分置时代我国公司治理机制选择的探索

长期以来,我国的资本市场处于股权分置格局,学业界和实业界均认为,股权分置是中国上市公司治理诸多缺陷的症结所在。随着我国股权分置改革的逐步推进,我国资本市场将发生制度性的变革。本文对股权分置改革对我国上市公司治理结构的影响,以及股改后我国上市公司可能实现的公司治理模式进行了阐述,得出四种我国上市公司可能选择的治理模式,分别是过渡型模式、外资主导型模式、交叉持股模式、利益相关者利益协调机制。     

试论国有企业经营者股权激励

对国有企业经营者实行股权激励,可以促使其利益与企业趋同,从而降低代理成本.目前,由于现有制度的问题,我国国有企业的股权激励不足与激励不当的问题并存,激励效果也不尽理想.为此,应当进一步完善相关制度,以实现对国有企业经营者的有效激励.     

Recent developments in German corporate governance

This paper provides an overview of the German corporate governance system. We review the governance role of large shareholders, creditors, the product market and the supervisory board. We also discuss the importance of mergers and acquisitions, the market in block trades, and the lack of a hostile takeover market. Given that Germany is often referred to as a bank-based economy, we pay particular attention to the role of the universal banks (Hausbanken). We show that the German system is characterised by a market for partial corporate control, large shareholders and bank/creditor monitoring, a two-tier (management and supervisory) board with co-determination between shareholders and employees on the supervisory board, a disciplinary product–market, and corporate governance regulation largely based on EU directives but with deep roots in the German codes and legal doctrine. Another important feature of the German system is its corporate governance efficiency criterion which is focused on the maximisation of stakeholder value rather than shareholder value. However, the German corporate governance system has experienced many important changes over the last decade. First, the relationship between ownership or control concentration and profitability has changed over time. Second, the pay-for-performance relation is influenced by large shareholder control: in firms with controlling blockholders and when a universal bank is simultaneously an equity- and debtholder, the pay-for-performance relation is lower than in widely held firms or blockholder-controlled firms. Third, since 1995 several major regulatory initiatives (including voluntary codes) have increased transparency and accountability.     

Co-evolution of politics and corporate governance

In the OECD countries, there exists a negative cross-country correlation between an economy's degree of employment protection and its degree of corporate ownership dispersion. One explanation is that employees’ political rights influence corporate governance: systems characterized by strong employees’ rights tend to be balanced by strong and concentrated owners. In this approach, the separation between ownership and control is only possible when unions and social democratic parties are sufficiently weak. In this paper we argue that causation runs also in the opposite direction (from strong concentrated ownership to strong employees’ protection) and leads to multiple equilibria characterized by alternative co-evolution paths of politics and corporate governance. To empirically assess our theoretical arguments we estimate a simultaneous equation model for workers rights’ protection and corporate ownership structure determination by three-stage least squares in a sample of 21 OECD countries. We conclude by arguing that the relative relevance of each flow of causation has important economic policy implications.     

Public markets, private orderings and corporate governance

In the New Property Rights approach the degree of incompleteness of markets is taken independently of the cost of the public ordering and of their efficiency relatively to private orderings. In this approach “public markets,” similarly to a Swiss cheese, are either assumed to be nonexistent empty holes (because of infinite third party verification costs) or assumed to be smooth and efficient (because of zero third party verification costs). When we allow for positive but not infinite third party verification costs we are necessarily pushed back to the insights of Commons, Coase, Fuller and Williamson. The degree of (in)completeness of public markets becomes an endogenous economic problem and managers can be seen as agents that make “second order” specific investments to run specific relations that cannot be efficiently handled by public markets. Managers and the public authorities build respectively private and public “legal equilibria” that set the working rules within which transactions can take place. Private and public legal equilibria are not only substitutes but also complements. This complementarity is an important source of the path dependency that characterizes the development of different legal systems. The framework is applied to GM’s acquisition of Fisher Body. We suggest that, contrary to the claims of the New property Rights approach, the advantages of the acquisition were not due to the superior incentives of the new private owners but should be rather related to the replacement of public markets by the new private ordering set up by Alfred Sloan.     

The relationship between corporate governance characteristics and credit risk exposure in banks: implications for financial regulation

This article analyses board structures in listed Danish banks in the years prior to the financial crisis by exploring the relationship between corporate governance characteristics and credit risk exposure. The article presents a novel approach as it relies on a newly developed risk metric entitled the “Supervision Diamond” introduced by the Danish FSA, which “external” board directors must address. It contains five thresholds for measuring a bank’s exposure to credit risks i.e. the proportion of large customers, lending growth, the ratio of lending/deposits, liquidity buffer and the proportion of real estate loans. By employing quantitative governance variables the article finds that increased executive director remuneration is associated with increased credit risk posed by the bank’s borrowers. On the other hand, increasing the number of executive/“inside” directors is associated with a lower credit risk exposure. It is argued that more “inside” directors on the executive board constitutes a stronger “checks and balance” system. The article also documents that the probability of obtaining state capital from the Danish credit bailout package is negatively related to larger boards as well as higher executive director remuneration. The policy implication is that financial authorities should be increasingly aware of insufficient corporate governance characteristics in order to prevent excessive credit risk exposure. Moreover, the article provides important insights on which corporate governance variables have a significant impact on a bank’s credit risk exposure. This knowledge is valuable for financial authorities/policy makers considering future regulatory initiatives and how they should administer bank monitoring.     

Promoting a more efficient corporate governance in Nigeria through the law

Corporate governance reforms have been viewed as one of the formal means of improving the economic and social welfare of emerging economies. There have been efforts by the Nigerian government, through its agencies, to promulgate codes of best practices for companies in the country. These reforms appear to be ineffective and the codes do not compliment and are not complimented by corporate law. The aim of this paper is to identify the problems that hinder effective corporate governance reforms in Nigeria within corporate law. Using the doctrinal approach, the paper analyses features of the Nigerian corporate governance framework and identifies the problems bedeviling this regime. It argues that the problems stem from (amongst others), state ownership and control, board independence, poor minority shareholder protection, ineffective judicial system and Incomplete disclosure. The paper, by linking the apparent weakness of the extant framework to the attempt to reform outside corporate law, suggests a hybrid of legislation including hard laws, soft laws and other policy proposals to promote an effective corporate governance regime in Nigeria.     

Board composition and corporate governance–A multivariate analysis of listed Danish firms

The article conducts a multivariate analysis using a sample of listed Danish firms in order to examine what describes board composition. This issue also relates to corporate law that stipulates the legal boundaries of board composition. In recent years, several European countries, including Denmark, have issued various codes for good corporate governance, in the form of soft law. Such initiatives have been launched, even though the questions of what describes board composition, as well as, the legal profession's influence on board structure, have not been fully uncovered. This study shows that four factors explain Danish board structure. These factors can be interpreted by the following dimensions; the lawyer oriented, the business person oriented, the internationally oriented and finally the traditionally oriented board. Thus, the paper shows that a higher proportion of insider ownership increases the first dimension, whereas a higher remuneration increases the business person orientation of the board. If firm size increases, the international dimension of the board increases and if a firm experiences less growth board structure becomes more traditional. classification G32 . K22