Reducing the Adversarial Burden on Presidential Appointees: Feasible Strategies for Fixing the Presidential Appointments Process

Can the current presidential appointments process be improved? This essay highlights three kinds of problems: inexperienced appointees, a lengthening process, and tedious and adversarial inquiry. While the essay side‐steps trying to affect the prerogatives of institutions involved in the tussle over appointments, it concentrates on improving the support of presidential personnel operations and the process of inquiry that nominees face, and it identifies patterns of repetitiveness among the roughly 2,800 details that a nominee must provide in responding to some 295 individual questions in nine categories. The most adversarial and tedious categories of inquiry include identifying personal background, reporting on criminal entanglements, and assaying potential conflicts of interest. Five strategies are identified for better matching the needed experience in the White House to the demands of presidential personnel. These changes would indirectly shorten the nomination and confirmation process, and the author makes three important recommendations for structuring inquiry that could reduce the adversarial burden on nominees by nearly a third.     

The American Presidential Election in Perspective

In 2004 President Bush was elected more decisively than in 2000, but he would have lost if Ohio had voted for John Kerry. Turnout in a polarised electorate was the highest since the 1960s. Bush saw his party increase its existing majorities in both houses of Congress - the first Republican candidate to do so since 1924. The Republicans benefited from political trends in the South, international developments and the impact of social issues. Gains by Bush at the time of the national conventions were reduced by Kerry's strong showing in the televised debates. In the end, Americans were unwilling to eject their commander-in-chief during the wars on terror and in Iraq. While the Republicans have been advancing in national politics since the 1960s, it is unclear whether 2004 was a realigning election. There was not a realignment in the classic way that it occurred in 1932.     

Regulation in Comparative Perspective

Structural changes in the world economy pose challenging new problems for comparative policy analysis. One such problem is the harmonization of domestic policies and institutions, which the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations has identified as a key principle of international economic relations. Harmonization may mean the creation of a single policy space out of a number of distinct jurisdictions. It can also mean the adoption of common policy goals or general principles that national governments can pursue by different strategies. Comparative analysis can help in choosing the type of harmonization most appropriate in a given context. This article analyzes the development of harmonization strategies in the European Community/European Union. The European experience shows that far-reaching economic integration can be achieved without suppressing cultural diversity and legitimate differences in national preferences.     

Punctuated Equilibrium in Comparative Perspective

We explore the impact of institutional design on the distribution of changes in outputs of governmental processes in the United States, Belgium, and Denmark. Using comprehensive indicators of governmental actions over several decades, we show that in each country the level of institutional friction increases as we look at processes further along the policy cycle. Assessing multiple policymaking institutions in each country allows us to control for the nature of the policy inputs, as all the institutions we consider cover the full range of social and political issues in the country. We find that all distributions exhibit high kurtosis values, significantly higher than the Normal distribution which would be expected if changes in government attention and activities were proportionate to changes in social inputs. Further, in each country, those institutions that impose higher decision-making costs show progressively higher kurtosis values. The results suggest general patterns that we hypothesize to be related to boundedly rational behavior in a complex social environment.     

Torture Approval in Comparative Perspective

Torture is (almost) universally condemned as barbaric and ineffective, yet it persists in the modern world. What factors influence levels of support for torture? Public opinion data from 31 countries in 2006 and 2008 (a total of 44 country-years) are used to test three hypotheses related to the acceptability of torture. The findings, first, show that outright majorities in 31 country-years reject the use of torture. Multiple regression results show that countries with high per capita income and low domestic repression are less likely to support torture. Constraints on the executive have no significant effect on public opinion on torture.     

The Independence Case in Comparative Perspective

Scotland is not the only sub‐state unit in Europe where relevant political actors make claims for independence. To generate insights on these independence demands, we compare the drivers, arguments and popular support for secession in Scotland, the Basque Country, Catalonia and Flanders. We argue that national identity, party politics and the economy are behind the independence requests, and the exact articulation of these elements varies from case to case. Currently, the most salient of these demands are the ones from Catalonia; Basque demands for self‐determination are less prominent than in the past, whereas the demand for a vote on independence is much less articulated in Flanders. Although the Scottish independence referendum has set a precedent for solving independence disputes, we argue that the possibilities of exporting the Scottish referendum experience to other realities are limited.     

Presidential coattails and electoral coordination in multilevel elections: Comparative lessons from Brazil

This article seeks to understand how concurrent presidential and gubernatorial elections in strong federal systems affect electoral coordination and coattails voting between national and subnational levels of government. We seek to determine whether the nationalizing effect of presidential elections can overcome the strong incentives for regionalization that can arise in federal systems. We use individual-level survey data and time-series cross-sectional electoral data from Brazil, a federal country with decentralized electoral institutions that has recently adopted concurrent presidential and gubernatorial elections. We find that the congruence between national and subnational elections increases when elections are temporally proximate and the effective number of presidential candidates is low. In short, the coattails effect can not only operate “horizontally,” by shaping national legislative elections, but also “vertically,” by shaping subnational elections.     

Scandinavian Corporatism in a Trans-Atlantic Comparative Perspective

Although the concept of 'neo-corporatism' has been around for 30 years, it has many different meanings. Nonetheless, evaluations of the level of corporatism in different countries turn out to be remarkably similar despite differences in the theoretical meaning of 'corporatism'. That the Scandinavian countries are among the most corporatist countries and the United States the least is thus shared conventional wisdom among different corporatist schools. The conventional wisdom and its underlying conceptual pragmatism are challenged in this research. Empirically, it is demonstrated that the level of corporatism in the United States comes close to the level in Denmark if the Scandinavian 'boards and commissions' variant of the concept of 'corporatism' is applied. It can even be argued that the pattern of interest groups' participation in boards and commissions in the United States is more in line with the corporatist idea that interest group involvement varies with the saliency of issues of the boards and commissions to interest group than it is the case in Denmark. The empirical findings of the study conflict with deeply rooted perceptions of the presence of corporatism in the United States and Scandinavia. How to make sense of similar levels of 'Scandinavian' corporatism in the United States and Denmark is discussed in the conclusion of the article.     

Southern European Public Bureaucracies in Comparative Perspective

The public bureaucracies of Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain may be set apart from the rest of West European bureaucracies. Until the mid-1990s, the former were distinguished from the latter by certain interrelated structural characteristics. These characteristics were extended politicisation of the top administrative ranks; enduring patronage patterns in recruitment to the public sector; uneven distribution of human resources; formalism and legalism; and, with the exception of Spain, absence of a typical European administrative elite. The characteristics were related to the type of capitalism and political development in Southern Europe. South European bureaucracies have started evolving towards decentralisation and privatisation. However, convergence with the bureaucracies of other EU member-states is an open question.     

The Determinants of Political Knowledge in Comparative Perspective

Political knowledge is a powerful predictor of political participation. Moreover, what citizens know about the political system and its actors is a central aspect of informed voting. This article investigates how and why political knowledge varies between citizens. The analysis is comparative and based on data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. At the micro level, the results confirm results from national surveys – specifically that education explains what citizens know about politics. It is found in a contextualized analysis, however, that the effect of education varies with the country's degree of economic redistribution. In more egalitarian countries, political knowledge is less contingent on education attained than in more inegalitarian countries. Similarly, education seems to have a stronger effect in countries with majoritarian electoral systems compared to countries with proportional systems.     

Economic Perceptions and Executive Approval in Comparative Perspective

Controversy exists over whether people use retrospective or prospective economic perceptions when evaluating their political leadership. In this article, I argue that the structure of the political-economic system affects which type of economic perception people employ. Specifically, in established democracies with developed economies, people will employ prospective assessments. In contrast, in nations with less well-established democratic systems and less developed economies, people will employ retrospective reasoning. They do so because under such conditions uncertainty about the future is too high for them to make reliable prospective assessments. I test this hypothesis on aggregate survey data taken from 41 nations in 2002. Support for the hypothesis is found. The conclusion puts the findings into perspective and discusses directions for future research.