Property Offences as Crimes of Injustice

The article provides an outline of the basic principles and conditions of criminalisation of interferences with others’ property rights in the context of a specific context: a liberal, social democratic state, the legitimacy of which depends primarily on its impartiality between moral doctrines and the fair distribution of liberties and resources. I begin by giving a brief outline of the conditions of political legitimacy, the place of property and the conditions of criminalisation in such a state. With that framework in place, I argue that interferences with others’ property rights should be viewed as violations of political duties stemming from institutions of distribution. I then discuss three implications of this view: the bearing of social injustice on the criminal law treatment of acts of distributive injustice; the expansion of criminalisation over the violation of distribution-related duties, which are considered criminally irrelevant under moral conceptions of criminalisation; and, finally, the normative significance of the modus operandi.     

Protecting the Internet with international law

The Internet remains the odd child of international law. While forever more universal law venues such as conferences, edited volumes or research projects consider “the Internet” a peculiar, interesting aspect of its well-recognized disciplines, international scholarship fails to address the global network as a whole, stalling the application of the fully developed and well-suited international law apparatus to the global community's biggest contemporary challenge. “Internet governance” is still perceived by legal scholars as construed to international relations and, at best, a potential ground for soft law in a distant future. That is not the case: Internet governance, with all its challenges, has been shaping international law for almost two decades. The latest unveilings of the ways in which the Internet impacts global policies and laws caught the public eye with the 2018 Cambridge Analytica scandal and, previously, with the 2013 Snowden revelations, yet as surprising as they might have been to the average user, they are direct results of network's architecture and its governance model. This paper looks at the evolving concept of “Internet's public core” as an opportunity to bridge this dogmatic gap. We identify the scope and meaning of “Internet's core” and assess its legitimacy within existing international normative frameworks. We argue that the technical components crucial to the flawless operation of the global network, such as the Domain Name System and Internet's backbone networks, can be effectively protected with international law.     

After Government? On Representing Law Without the State

For the greater part of the 20th century, representations of law as state law were dominant in the legal scholarship of the West. But over the last thirty years sustained attempts have been made, notably under the self-conscious banner of legal pluralism, to loosen the conceptual bonds between law and government. Early on, acephalous societies in formerly colonial territories and local groupings within the metropolis were represented as legal orders. Latterly, as attention shifted to orderings at regional and global level beyond the nation state, attempts have been made to delineate a general jurisprudence. It is argued here that these conceptual revisions have for the most part been problematic, made in the face of strong evidence linking the cultural assemblage we have come to call law with projects of government. The lecture concludes with a plea that we should be very cautious in representing what are essentially negotiated orders, whether at local or global level, as legal orders; these remain significantly different from those at the level of the state. Today, under an onslaught of jural discourse and institutional design, the distinctive rationalities and values of negotiated order, while arguably deserving to be celebrated, are effectively effaced.     

A European Legal Method? On European Private Law and Scientific Method

This article examines the relationship between European private law and scientific method. It argues that a European legal method is a good idea. Not primarily because it will make European private law scholarship look more scientific, but because a debate on the method of a normative science necessarily has to be a debate on its normative assumptions. In other words, a debate on a European legal method will have much in common with the much desired debate on social justice in European law. Moreover, it submits that, at least after the adoption of the Common Frame of Reference by the European institutions, European contract law can be regarded as a developing multi-level system that can be studied from the inside. Finally, it concludes that the Europeanisation of private law is gradually blurring the dividing line between the internal and external perspectives, with their respective appropriate methods, in two mutually reinforcing ways. First, in the developing multi-level system it is unclear where the external borders of the system lie, in particular the borders between Community law and national law. Second, because of the less formal legal culture the (formerly) external perspectives, such as the economic perspective, have easier access and play an increasing role as policy considerations.     

Reconstructing Embedded Liberalism: John Gerard Ruggie and Constructivist Approaches to the Study of the International Trade Regime

In 1982, John Gerard Ruggie published a study of the postwarinternational trade and monetary regimes in which he introducedthe concept of ‘embedded liberalism’. A large andgrowing number of international trade scholars are finding Ruggie’sconcept of embedded liberalism an appealing one, and it nowoccupies a significant place on our conceptual horizon. In thisarticle, the author returns to Ruggie’s original articleto excavate lessons which are peculiarly relevant for currenttrade law scholarship. He argues that Ruggie’s accountof embedded liberalism usefully serves to destabilize commonassumptions about the objectives and normative underpinningsof the trade regime and thereby to expand our conceptions ofwhat a liberal trade regime might plausibly look like. On theother hand, he explains why he does not share the enthusiasmof those who see in embedded liberalism an attractive normativevision to guide WTO reform. In addition, and most importantly,the author draws attention to the constructivist theoreticalframework of Ruggie’s piece. He suggests that Ruggie’sarticle provides a useful introduction to the central elementsof constructivist thinking about international institutionsand shows how attention to constructivist insights has the potentialto significantly enrich and expand our understanding of thetrade regime and of trade law.     

Comparing Juvenile Justice Systems: Towards a Qualitative Research Project in East Asia

This paper contrasts the assumptions and methods used by quantitative criminologists with the approach to comparison pursued by the interpretive tradition in sociology. Whereas quantitative studies tend to conceal distinctive legislative or institutional responses in particular countries, interpretive studies make it possible to address internal debates about policy issues, as well as how practitioners exercise professional judgement. The paper considers a variety of ways in which the interpretive traditions of symbolic interactionism and ethnomethodology have approached comparison. It also considers the conceptual and practical issues that might arise in conducting a qualitative comparative study about juvenile justice within East Asia focusing on Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Whereas quantitative studies tend to ask questions that interest Western researchers, interpretivism makes possible a dialogue between countries that have different institutions, philosophies and cultures.     

Business Adaptation to Regulation: What Do We Know and What Do We Need to Know?

There is, predictably, a gap between the normative model and empirical pictures of regulation drawn from many societies. We may get an approximation of the goals of much regulation, but often regulatory policy is not carried out exactly as legislated. Agencies pursue enforcement strategies in light of their priorities and resources. They engage in soft law enforcement and bargain with the targets of regulation. Regulated businesses have many tactics available to blunt or evade regulation. We can fashion plausible normative arguments both for and against these common empirical pictures. To a great extent, however, these normative positions rest on unexamined empirical assumptions. Future research might profitably focus on the roles played by those individuals who act for business associations and cope with regulation. Attention should be paid particularly to the roles played by business lawyers in such coping. James Gould Cozzens' novel , Guard of Honor, suggests how lawyers comply narrowly, evade, cover up and otherwise divert the impact of regulation, all in the service of what they see as the greater good. Cozzens' story suggests important empirical and normative questions for future consideration.     

What’s Inside and Outside the Law?

In this article I take up a conceptual question: What is the distinction between ‘the law’ and the behavior the law regulates, or, as I formulate it, the distinction between what is ‘inside’ the law and what is ‘outside’ it? That conceptual question is in play in (at least) three different doctrinal domains: the constitutional law doctrines regarding the limits on the delegation of legislative powers; the criminal law doctrines regarding mistakes of law; and the constitutional rights doctrines that turn on the distinction between state action and the acts of non-state actors. I argue that legal doctrines should turn solely on normative considerations and should not turn on answers to conceptual questions. However, the doctrines I discuss appear to turn on the conceptual question regarding what is ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ the law. I show how each of these doctrinal areas appears to raise this conceptual issue, and I explain how the doctrines might or might not escape being held hostage to conceptual controversy.     

Legal Theory for Legal Empiricists

There is a widespread view that one does either theory or empirical work, and that theory and empiricism represent distant concerns, opposing worldviews, and perhaps distinct mentalities or personalities. This prevalent view has deep roots and is also the result of pragmatic and understandable tendencies toward division of intellectual labor. Against this view, this essay suggests that the relations between theory and empirical study ought to be understood as more intimate and that making legal theory an explicit focus can improve empirical scholarship. We pursue this claim by articulating a basis for legal theory and by showing how that basis illuminates both the application and design of empirical research on law. Legal theory, we argue, follows jurisprudence in interrogating the law as a set of coercive normative institutions. The upshot of this approach is a recognition that an interdisciplinary analysis of law must rely on both a theory (explicit or implicit) of the way law's power and its normativity align and an account of the way in which this discursive cohabitation manifests itself institutionally. We thus argue that legal theory is necessary in order to draw fruitfully on empirical research and further claim that legal theory provides guidance both for setting up an empirical research agenda on law and for designing research into specific topics.     

Let's talk about trust,baby! Theorizing trust and mutual recognition in the EU's area of freedom,security and justice

If mutual recognition is to be the ‘cornerstone of judicial co‐operation’ in the area of freedom, security and justice, mutual trust, on the other hand, must take a lead role as the normative glue that grounds and facilitates legal practices of recognition. Despite its topicality and practical relevance, the theoretical underpinnings of trust have been largely left untouched by legal scholarship. This article seeks to fill that void by unpacking trust's conceptual premises to prepare a critique of the legal principle of mutual trust and its underlying ideology as it emerged in the jurisprudence of the CJEU. It presents an enriched conceptualization of recognition trust, inquires into the potential and risks of trust‐based judicial cooperation and sheds light on the interplay of trust, distrust and the law. In drawing policy conclusions from the theoretical discussion, it also points to a new normative dimension of trust asking whether trust could feature as a form of mutual recognition.     

The Morality of Compensation through Tort Law

In this paper, I will focus on the normative structure of tort law. Only by elucidating the point or rationale of holding the wrongdoer responsible to the victim can we understand the value of having tort law instead of establishing other mechanisms of redress, such as a social insurance scheme. Ultimately, I will argue that the value of interpersonal justice, which underlies tort law, might not suffice to fully justify it in a given community. It all depends on whether victims of accidents are able to vindicate their rights against wrongdoers on a regular basis. If social conditions make this unlikely, then the state might be morally required to implement other forms of compensation, either replacing tort law altogether or supplementing it with social insurance in cases where private justice mechanisms tend to fail more dramatically.     

医疗损害责任的规制逻辑与适用路径——以《民法典》与“医事法”的协调为视角

为推进对《民法典》的规范阐释,促使其与医事法的衔接、互补,应对"医疗损害责任"的规制逻辑与适用路径进行明晰。"医疗损害责任"整体延续了《侵权责任法》的概念体系和框架结构,在说明义务、责任主体以及责任构成等方面加以创新。其作为《民法典》的具体规范,对总则编之规定予以遵从,是侵权责任编一般规定的特别法;其作为医事法的基本范畴,处于上位效力层级之中,与其他规范条文形成条件关系和并列关系。鉴于此,应遵循"从民法典到医事法"的适用路径,藉由内外在规范的自足与互助,明确规范条文之间的内在关联,实现规范概念的阐明和规范内涵的拓补,以推动《民法典》相关规则的贯彻实施,促进我国医事法学的蓬勃发展。     

德国法学方法论

一般认为,对于一门学术型学科而言,一套方法的存在及由此而形成的方法论至关重要。在德国,法律一直以来都是一门学术型学科。作为被称之为"法学"(字面意思是法律"科学",更确切地说是有关法律的学问)的研究对象,法律以具有一套专门的法学方法论为其特征。在德国大学法学院中,法学方法论是一门非常重要的讲授科目,且围绕这门课程有大量的法学文献。这些文献所讨论的是德国法律人如何(或者更准确地说:应该如何)开展法律工作。德语文献相关讨论中的一个特殊之处在于,在概念上区分"法律解释"与"法的续造"。方法论的讨论涉及制定法解释的各种相关要素、先决条件、不同层级,以及法的续造的合法性等问题。除此之外,还应意识到,对于德国法方法论的讨论是在不同的政治发展历程下展开的。基于此,本文从以下五个一般性话题展开对方法论的讨论:第一,德国、瑞士以及奥地利在方法论上的共性;第二,方法论讨论的规范特征;第三,不同法律领域中所出现的方法论上的差异;第四,法教义学与法学方法论的关系;第五,德国所讨论问题的历史背景。     

Reflections on the sociology of law: A rejection of law as ‘socially marginal’

Rejecting the concept of law as subservient to social pathology, the principle aim of this article is to locate law as a critical matter of social structure – and power – which requires to be considered as a central element in the construction of society and social institutions. As such, this article contends that wider jurisprudential notions such as legal procedure and procedural justice, and juridical power and discretion are cogent, robust normative social concerns (as much as they are legal concerns) that positively require consideration and representation in the empirical study of sociological phenomena. Reflecting upon scholarship and research evidence on legal procedure and decision-making, the article attempts to elucidate the inter-relationship between power, ‘the social’, and the operation of law. It concludes that law is not ‘socially marginal’ but socially, totally central.     

Some reflections on the legitimacy of international trial justice

This paper addresses a number of interrelated conceptual difficulties that impact adversely on the ability of international criminal trials to deliver outcomes perceived as legitimate by victims and communities in post-conflict states. It begins by exploring the extent to which those moral justifications for punishment espoused by international courts are instrumental in marginalizing the aspirations for justice of victims and victim communities, and suggests how a greater appreciation of the sociological context of punishing international crimes can contribute towards an improved understanding of normative practice. The paper then examines the relationship between perceptions of international crime and punishment, and the broader issue of whether international criminal law provides an appropriate normative structure for giving effect to those universal humanitarian values concerned with punishment in an increasingly pluralistic world. Finally, the paper considers how the theory and practice of punishing international crimes can more effectively satisfy both local and global aspirations for post-conflict justice through enhancing the transformative capacity of international criminal trials.     

Enabling the IPBES conceptual framework to work across knowledge boundaries

The IPBES conceptual framework (CF) serves an instrumental value to translate usable knowledge into policy across spatial scales, alongside a normative function to engage diverse knowledge systems, promoting inclusivity and enhancing legitimacy. It has been argued that the CF operates as a boundary object, a communication and organisation tool for those working across diverse knowledge systems, designed to help them reach shared goals. The paper focuses on this claim, exploring the three core characteristics of a boundary object: interpretive flexibility, material and organisational structure, and the recognition of dissention. We suggest that too much emphasis is placed within the CF upon interpretive flexibility, whilst meeting information needs and the work requirements of all individuals, groups and communities who use the CF are overlooked. By forcing consensus, the IPBES CF ignores the critical dimensions of a boundary object. We argue that embracing the full characteristics of a boundary object will enable the IPBES to support knowledge coproduction and translation across the knowledge systems, better achieving its goal of providing policy advice.     

Hobbes on Political Authority,Practical Reason and Truth

The role of sovereign authority in Hobbes' political philosophy is to establish peace and stability by serving as a definitive and unambiguous source of law. Although these broad outlines of Hobbes' account of political authority are uncontentious, matters quickly become more complicated once one seeks its normative basis. This much is evident from recent debates on the normative status of the laws of nature and the related issue as to whether Hobbes is better categorised as an incipient legal positivist or as a heterodox natural law thinker. In this paper I argue that although the positivist and natural law commitments in Hobbes' theory of political authority can be partially reconciled, such a reconciliation points to the need for more substantive theories of practical reason and truth than are to be found in Hobbes' official statements on these topics. Section II examines the positivist and natural law dimensions in Hobbes' thought and suggests that the role of sovereign authority in providing the definitive interpretation of the laws of nature allows a partial reconciliation to be effected. In section III, I consider the tension between this reconciliation and Hobbes' instrumentalism about practical reason and equivocal separation of authority and truth.     

‘Paedophile Hunters’, Criminal Procedure,and Fundamental Human Rights

‘Paedophile hunters’ have attracted global media attention. The limited literature on paedophile hunters, which documents their emergence in contemporary liberal democracies, pays scant attention to how their use of intrusive investigative methods may threaten the procedural rights of suspects and undermine the integrity of the criminal justice system. This article fills this normative ‘gap’ in the literature. It draws upon media coverage, criminal procedure jurisprudence, and criminological scholarship to analyse the regulation of paedophile hunting in English and Welsh law. The article suggests that domestic law does not afford adequate protection to due process and the fundamental human rights of those falling under the paedophile hunter's purview. Unless paedophile hunting is constrained by a narrower and more robustly enforced regulatory regime, it should not be permitted, let alone encouraged, in contemporary liberal democracies.