Regime Change and War: Domestic Politics and the Escalation of the Ethiopia--Eritrea Conflict

The 1998-2000 war between Ethiopia and Eritrea seems to defy rationalist explanations. This paper contends that the escalation of the war, from an isolated border clash to the largest conventional war of the past decade, has its roots in the domestic politics of each of the two states. Quasi-democratisation in both countries created environments in which political elites were able to bolster their popular legitimacy by utilising nationalist and aggressive foreign policy rhetoric. The Eritrean leadership believed that a rapid escalation of the border clash to full-scale war would undermine domestic popular support and topple the Ethiopian People's Democratic Front (EPRDF) regime. War escalation had the opposite effect, strengthening the EPRDF domestically and provoking a massive Ethiopian retaliation. War thus served nation- and state-building goals in both countries. This paper provides a theory of the domestic political roots of international conflict in transitional regimes and applies this theory to explain the escalation of a localised border conflict into a highly destructive, full-scale war.     

Choosing Sides in the Horn of Africa: Wikileaks,the Ethiopia Imperative,and American Responses to Post-9/11 Regional Conflicts

The United States has faced at times the policy dilemma of seeing conflict erupt between two countries with which it maintains friendly diplomatic relations. The bureaucratic biases of relevant agencies can play an important role in determining whether to choose sides or remain neutral in these conflicts. In the early 1960s the Africa Bureau adopted a pro-Ethiopia bias that shaped American policy in the Horn of Africa. With the insights provided by the 2010 Wikileaks cables, this analysis explores how the “Ethiopia imperative” affected three inter-related American policy decisions in the Horn of Africa in the early twenty-first century: the decision to support Ethiopia despite its refusal to abide by a legally binding decision that favoured Eritrea following the 1998–2000 Eritrea–Ethiopia border war; to give Ethiopia what amounted to a “blank cheque” to invade Somalia in December 2006 and overthrow the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC); and to confront and isolate Eritrea diplomatically for waging proxy war against Ethiopia in Somalia.     

A territorial history of the international system

This article charts the evolution of the international system from the post‐Napoleonic wars to the present, with special reference to growth in the number and configuration of states as well as changes in territorial sovereignty involving those states. Growth and change in the international system was found to occur largely in the 20th century. In that time, war plays a major role in precipitating the growth of the international system, although war is less significant in changes in territorial sovereignty. Finally, it was noted that major powers were involved in one half of the territorial changes. Implications for the future of the international system are discussed.     

Group identity—a neglected asset: Determinants of social and political participation among female ex-fighters in Guatemala

Many of the armed conflicts after World War II have had female fighters, such as El Salvador, Eritrea, Guatemala, Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka. In the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process that followed the signing of the Guatemalan peace accord in 1996, altogether 766 women were demobilised. This article seeks to explain why some of these women became politically and socially active in the post-conflict peacebuilding phase, whereas others did not. Contrary to the negative experiences of female ex-fighters from Sierra Leone and West Africa, the article points out that the Guatemalan female ex-fighters preserved a positive group identity developed during the war. In particular, the war experiences represented an asset for social and political participation to those of the female ex-fighters that reintegrated collectively—together with their male ex-combatants. The article concludes that future DDR programming should take into account the importance of group identity and the needs and the own wishes of female ex-fighters from different war contexts.     

The economic community of West African states,the defence of democracy in Sierra Leone and future prospects

The wave of democratization in the 1990s has brought considerable challenges and opportunities for post‐cold war Africa. One such challenge is the democratic intervention of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) under the aegis of the multilateral intervention force, ECOMOG, to restore a democratic government and constitutional order. The ECOWAS democratic intervention in the West African state of Sierra Leone can be located in a wider debate about international dimensions of democratization. In several respects, it also reflects the changing nature of international politics in the post‐cold war period particularly with regards to certain traditional norms of international society, namely non‐intervention and state sovereignty. The ECOWAS democratic efforts in Sierra Leone demonstrate that it is increasingly becoming acceptable for regional and international organisations to ‘defend’ democracy, albeit under the auspices of forcible as well as non‐forcible humanitarian intervention. However, these kinds of external intervention on behalf of democracy have in most cases led to its retrenchment. This article therefore critically assesses how the nature of domestic politics led to the suspension of democracy in Sierra Leone, the domestic and international implications of the ECOWAS defence of democracy there and the country's post‐conflict democratic prospects.     

Battlefield Outcomes and Rebel Cohesion: Lessons From the Eritrean Independence War

This article uses data from the Eritrean war for independence to refine existing theories of rebel fragmentation. The author argues organizational performance affects the emergence of factional infighting within rebel organizations in unique and novel ways. While battlefield losses increase the likelihood of internal fragmentation, so do battlefield gains. The implication is battlefield stalemates possess unique properties that promote organizational cohesion in war, a relationship this study refers to as “cohesive stalemates.” The article extends an emerging literature on the internal politics of insurgent groups that has linked the coherence of rebel organizations to rebel losses.     

Old Allies, New Friends: Intelligence-Sharing in the War on Terror

The Bush administration's designation of its national strategy as a war on terror highlights the importance of combating terrorism on an international level. Fundamental to this effort is bilateral intelligence-sharing. Intelligence reform efforts to date have focused on improving intelligence-sharing within the U.S. intelligence community. However, critical intelligence can be gained through America's international partners. This paper assesses the state of bilateral intelligence-sharing relationships and the challenges that need to be overcome.     

The Russian case for military intervention in Georgia: international law,norms and political calculation

Abstract

The Russian military intervention in Georgia in August 2008 has raised significant questions about Russian thinking and practice on the legitimate use of military force abroad, especially in relation to neighbour states. The arguments advanced by Russia to justify this campaign show how Russian interpretations of customary international law as well as norms related to the use of force have served as an instrument of state policy, rather than being rooted in any broader international consensus. The Russian discourse in this context about sovereignty, self-determination and the legitimacy of recognising South Ossetia and Abkhazia as states appears similarly to be strongly influenced by political self-interest and Russian views about its entitlement within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) region. Among Russian claims, Moscow's commitment to support its ‘citizens’ abroad has been particularly controversial. This article examines these issues and also the possibility that, through its justifications for waging war against Georgia, Russia is more broadly contesting the interpretation of certain international norms, that it regards as essentially constructed by Western states. Some potential implications of these legal and normative arguments for future Russian policy in the CIS region, including Ukraine, are also examined.     

Deterrence by Presence to Effective Response: Japan's Shift Southward

Over the past fifteen years, a quiet strategic shift has occurred in Japan. During the cold war era, Japan's defense was oriented towards the Soviet threat north of Hokkaido. However, under the very real threat of North Korean aggression, the less tangible threat of terrorism, and the perceived need to participate more fully in international peacekeeping activities, Japan has changed the characteristics of its armed forces. Additionally, an increasingly self-confident China is testing Japan's resolve in the waters surrounding Japan, simultaneously speaking of cooperative development while laying claim to a swathe of Japanese territory and waters. An apparently ambivalent United States, in relative decline, watches these proceedings. Japan has reoriented its defense posture to face south, towards the East China Sea, trying to shape Chinese behavior and hedge against future Chinese adventurism. However, with a tangible recommitment of American attention to East Asia and a firm, public, American stand on behalf of Japan's territorial integrity, future conflict can be deterred.     

Grasping the Commercial Institutional Peace

While the commercial institutional peace research program provides empirical evidence that international institutions, especially preferential trade arrangements, help reduce the incidence of militarized inter-state conflict, it fails to delineate clearly how such institutions matter. Building from the logic that low opportunity costs for fighting, private information, and commitment problems constitute important causes of war, this article explores three interrelated causal mechanisms. First, the state leaders' increased expectations about future commerce create an incentive for these actors to consider peaceful bargains as an alternative to costly war. Second, security coordination under the umbrella of a commercial institution provides fuller information about state military capabilities, thus making inter-state bargaining for dispute resolution more efficient. Third, in bringing together high-level state leaders on a regular basis, commercial institutions may create the trust necessary to overcome commitment problems in inter-state bargaining. I explore how these mechanisms have operated within the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Economic Community of West African States.     

Capability concentration,power transition,and war

Theories of international politics and war are generally formulated at the state, dyad, or system level of analysis. Systemic theories focus on structural attributes of the international system such as the distribution of capabilities. Alternatively, state‐level theories tend to emphasize national attributes, whereas dyadic theories concentrate on relational qualities between paired sets of states. This study presents an analysis of war at these analytic levels and explores the possibilities of synergistic empirical linkage. The results of a simple statistical experiment demonstrate that the two higher levels of aggregation are not separate and independent: The interaction of system and dyad‐level power dynamics is associated with patterns of international conflict, and the integration of shifting capability distributions at these levels produces a more adequate explanation of the sources of major power war.     

阿富汗战争曙光难现

阿富汗战争进入第10个年头，这场美国历史上持续时间最长的战争，已成为奥巴马总统的“烫手山芋”，美国及其北约盟友对赢得阿战的信心和耐力逐渐减弱。奥巴马政府不断调整对阿战略，在加强军事打击塔利班的同时，加重了政治解决阿富汗问题的战略考量，希望通过军事打击、民事支持和外交努力“三管齐下”，尽快摆脱阿战。然而，阿富汗乱局依旧，美国的新战略成效有限，地区形势更趋复杂，各国对阿未来局势发展的担忧增加，阿富汗战争依然看不到尽共．     

Cycles of war: Historical speculations on future international violence

The paper offers a historical approach to the problem of future international violence. It begins by arguing that the past can be used to predict the future. The modern European state system (since the fifteenth century) is designated both as an appropriate model and as the background to the present global state system. The history of the European state system reveals periods of war which are designated as probing (low level violence), adjusting (middle level violence) and hegemonic (high level violence); these periods appear to recur in cycles. The paper offers a number of explanations for these cycles and suggests that violence may be functional in the state system as a means of accomodating changes in power. The duration of these cycles may be interpreted as the time required for such power changes to occur. War would appear necessary in a state system which combines moderate change with moderate stability; it might be avoided only if the system were to move to the extremes of non‐change or continual change, the first risking stagnation, the second chaos. A projection of these cycles into the future implies that the last quarter of the twentieth century will be characterized by adjusting wars, followed by a generation of probing wars, then a generation of hegemonic wars, etc. Although mixed and difficult to evaluate, some signs may confirm this prediction. Thus the historical record may indicate that international violence is likely to increase in the last quarter of the twentieth century.     

Why States No Longer Declare War

Why have states stopped issuing declarations of war? Declaring war was a norm of international politics for millennia, but now appears to have exited states’ behavioral repertoires. I argue that the proliferation of codified jus in bello, the law of war governing belligerent conduct, has created disincentives for states to issue formal declarations of war. The increasing number of codified international laws that govern belligerent conduct during warfare has made complying with the laws of war extremely costly. One way for states to limit these costs is to avoid admitting they are in a formal state of war by refraining from declaring war. I test this claim, as well as others, using an original data set. I also discuss several cases of nineteenth and twentieth century wars that illustrate the logic of this argument.     

International terrorism? Indian popular cinema and the politics of terror

The first decade of the twenty-first century has been marked by the decisive entry into our media landscape of the so-called global war on terror, with countless films and TV series from all over the world addressing the issue of international terrorism. Even Indian popular cinema, which has been addressing the issue of domestic terrorism since the late 1980s with films such as Roja (Ratnam, 1992), Drohkaal (Nihalani, 1994), Maachis (Gulzar, 1996), has, since the new millennium, begun to tackle the topic of international terrorism. In this article, I will analyse the shift in the construction of the terrorist discourse in Indian popular cinema from a domestic to an international perspective in order to highlight the close proximity between the two, as in fact, the “global war on terror” narrative seems to offer Indian filmmakers the possibility to simultaneously address international and domestic terrorism. In particular, I will refer to Karan Johar’s film My Name Is Khan as a text which, while discussing the consequences of the American war on terror on its minorities, problematises the official discourse on terrorism and its neo-Orientalist character. It also draws a parallel between the situation of minorities in the United States and India. In so doing, the film triggers a reflection on the state of the Indian nation and questions the state of the secularist values of newly independent India after decades of communal violence.     

Towards a more peaceful world? A critical view

Contemporary scholars do not agree on whether there is a declining prospect of war and armed conflict. A substantial number of authors of quantitative studies have concluded that the current worldwide trend is towards peace. I argue that this conclusion builds on insufficient evidence and possibly on misleading categorisations. The complacent view on the contemporary international system is based on inadequate awareness of the changing patterns of violence. The so-called new wars are not played out on the traditional battlefield. Valid conclusions about present trends would require a reconsideration of definitions, empirical evidence, and coding rules. Moreover, the current wave of democratisation and the increasing number of international interventions probably do not make the world more peaceful. Therefore, the conclusions in some of the most extensive recent analyses of war and peace, that the world is becoming more peaceful, are flawed.     

A Universal Test of an Expected Utility Theory of War

Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman's version of an expected utility theory of war has become one of the most widely cited theories of international conflict. However, the testing of the theory has lagged behind its theoretical development. In its most sophisticated formulation, the theory has been tested on only 707 dyad-years, all drawn from Europe between 1816 and 1970. We present a test of the expected utility theory of war (as developed in War and Reason ) on the international system from 1816 to 1984. Specifically, we examine the relationship between the main equilibrium variables derived under the "domestic variant" of the international interaction game and behavioral outcomes using multinomial logit. We find that the equilibria correlate with actual behavior in both the set of all dyads and a subset of politically relevant dyads, even after including a set of control variables. The relationship is somewhat less clear among the population of all interstate-directed dyads, however, with key equilibrium variables having smaller effects at increasing the odds of interstate conflict among all dyads. We also present a new software program, EUGene , which generates expected utility data and can serve as an important data management tool for international relations researchers.     

“9·11”事件与东北亚地区间的大国关系

恐怖主义在世纪交替之际成为国际政治舞台上的一个突出现象,“ 9·11”事件引发的美国反恐怖主义战争,从本质上来说带有“宗教战争”的色彩,这就注定了要铲除国际恐怖主义的根源不是一朝一夕所能完成的。“ 9·11”事件引发的东北亚地区间大国关系的调整以及对该地区政局的影响,可以被看作是全球政治舞台上大国关系调整的一个缩影。     

The Road from Dayton to Brussels? The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Politics of War Crimes in Bosnia

Abstract

The tenth anniversary of the massacre of 7–8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys at Srebrenica in July 1995 set in stark relief the continuing salience of war crimes in the political life of Bosnia and Herzegovina. With the country now firmly on a path ‘from Dayton to Brussels’, dealing with the war crimes legacy is critical to its future development. Cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) is a non-negotiable condition for further progress toward membership of the European Union and NATO's Partnership for Peace, while in the long-term, dealing with the legacy of war crimes is crucial to establishing lasting peace in Bosnia and in the region. This article examines the potential contribution of the ICTY to the restoration of peace in Bosnia in the context of debates about the role of post-conflict justice in societies in transition from war to peace and in the context of the international community's use of the war crimes issues as a political bargaining tool. It will be argued that the two are inextricably linked as short-term pragmatic advantages brought by cooperation work in tandem with longer-term goals of peace and reconciliation.     

The Taiwan Strait: A Continuing Status Quo of Deadlock?

Relations across the Taiwan Strait have demonstrated over the past 50 years a cyclical nature, revolving between states of limited tension or conflict and generally peaceful and politically acceptable stalemate. Individual policy directions followed by all of the three main actors in cross-Strait relations--China, Taiwan and the United States--continue to be pursued with a high degree of ambivalence, as countervailing political imperatives mean that any policy contains within itself the seeds for its own reversal. Any equilibrium is consequently inherently unstable, yet also drives relations back to a status quo of deadlock from which a new cycle can again commence. Given the full range of objectives on all sides, there is little likelihood of the presently existing deadlocked status quo moving towards a stable resolution. The state of neither war nor peace will continue in the Taiwan Strait, but the margin for error in probable future cycles of tension and stability remains very small.