Who benefits from minority business set-asides? The case of New Jersey

Race-based remedies often are justified by evidence of prior discrimination. They work when they benefit groups previously disadvantaged. This article examines one such remedy—minority business set-asides—and its application in the award of public procurement and construction contracts by the state of New Jersey. Analyzed are contract awards to minority and non-minority/non-women-owned business enterprises in 1990, as well as in periods before, during, and after the imposition of a state minority set-aside program. Using a conventional decomposition approach, the article reveals significant discriminatory gaps in the success of minority- versus non-minority-owned firms in obtaining contracts from the state of New Jersey. The analysis suggests that minority contracting success rates fell from the pre-set-aside era to the set-aside era and that discriminatory outcomes persisted. The particular remedy chosen—while justified based on evidence of prior discrimination—appears not to have reduced the original discrimination nor did it unambiguously benefit minority businesses.     

Who Will Pay for Better Care?

In launching its review of adult social care in May 2008, the Government acknowledged that this is one of the biggest challenges for the 21^st century. With our ageing population and the increasing expectations of baby boomers, the current system simply isn't fit for the future. But what kind of care system do we want for this and future generations and critically how are we going to pay for it? There are no easy answers but what is certain is that we will all have to pay more for better care. In this article Stephen Burke examines the care crunch     

Transparency and mistrust: Who or what should be made transparent?

It is increasingly recognized in public administration that the relationship between trust and transparency is not straightforward. Recently, right‐wing populists have risen to power, rejecting transparency requirements based on documents while claiming that they “hide nothing.” Clearly, existing scholarly conceptualizations are insufficient for understanding how transparency operates as a value in real‐world political contestation. An analysis of state‐ and national‐level politics in Nigeria reveals that, while always retaining a core informational component, there are multiple competing conceptions of transparency. Popular demands for transparency express a belief that not only should data be made transparent, but also the social networks in which politicians are embedded. “Transparency in people” can clash with more traditional, technocratic transparency practices centered on data. By rethinking who or what should be made transparent—data, things, or people—this article offers fresh theoretical insights on the complex politics of transparency and trust.     

Who Cares? Explaining Perceptions of Compassion in Candidates for Office

Although prior research establishes the important effect perceptions of compassion have on vote choice, no systematic research examines why some candidates are perceived as more caring than others. In an era where television and social media put candidates’ personalities front and center, the lack of research on this topic is problematic. In this article, I explain why voters view some candidates as more caring than others. I argue that voters view politicians as compassionate when there is a commonality to link them. A commonality demonstrates an empathetic connection, or the ability to understand another’s feelings. This, in turn, convinces voters that the politician is sympathetic, or willing to do something to help. Without an empathetic connection, claims of sympathy by politicians will be viewed with greater levels of skepticism. I generate a classification system for the sources of commonality that link voters with politicians, including shared experiences, shared emotions, and shared identities. Using three survey experiments, I show how candidates can build empathic bonds with voters and better their chances of election.

     

Who does better for the economy? Presidents versus parliamentary democracies

Are certain forms of government associated with superior economic outcomes? This paper attempts to answer that question by examining how government systems influence macroeconomic performance. We find that presidential regimes consistently are associated with less favorable outcomes than parliamentary regimes: slower output growth, higher and more volatile inflation and greater income inequality. Moreover, the magnitude of the effect is sizable. For example, annual output growth is between 0.6 and 1.2 percentage points lower and inflation is estimated to be at least four percentage points higher under presidential regimes relative to those under parliamentary ones. The difference in distributional outcomes is even starker; income inequality is 12 to 24% worse under presidential systems.     

Who should be chef? The dynamics of valence evaluations across income groups during economic crises

In this paper, we investigate partisan rationalization in valence politics by trying to better specify the direct and indirect effects of the economy on government support. To do so, we examine how income levels moderate the influence of objective economic conditions on perceptions of which party is the best manager of the economy during a period of economic crisis, 2004–2010, in the United Kingdom. We find that low-income voters are more responsive in their assessments of the incumbent Labour government based on unemployment, as are high-income voters in terms of inflation. In addition, high-income voters tend to behave in a manner consistent with partisan rationalization, while low-income voters do not. These conclusions offer important implications for the effectiveness of electoral control of government policy, as well as the quality of representation.     

Mental health and substance abuse insurance parity for federal employees: How did health plans respond?

A fundamental concern with competitive health insurance markets is that they will not supply efficient levels of coverage for treatment of costly, chronic, and predictable illnesses, such as mental illness. Since the inception of employer-based health insurance, coverage for mental health services has been offered on a more limited basis than coverage for general medical services. While mental health advocates view insurance limits as evidence of discrimination, adverse selection and moral hazard can also explain these differences in coverage. The intent of parity regulation is to equalize private insurance coverage for mental and physical illness (an equity concern) and to eliminate wasteful forms of competition due to adverse selection (an efficiency concern). In 2001, a presidential directive requiring comprehensive parity was implemented in the Federal Employees Health Benefits (FEHB) Program. In this study, we examine how health plans responded to the parity directive. Results show that in comparison with a set of unaffected health plans, federal employee plans were significantly more likely to augment managed care through contracts with managed behavioral health "carve-out" firms after parity. This finding helps to explain the absence of an effect of the FEHB Program directive on total spending, and is relevant to the policy debate in Congress over federal parity.     

Who Pays the Piper?

Abstract

This paper, using research from the UK and comparable US studies, looks at the growth in party fundraising, ethics of the process, impact on electoral systems, candidates, parties, campaigning and methods of obtaining funds (one donor in the UK has recently agreed to give £5 million to the Conservative Party because they are anti EU whilst Labour gained £1 million from the smoking lobby in 1997). It then links this to a growth in strategic public affairs and outlines the direct causal link between political lobbying and party fundraising.     

Who Benefits from KIPP?

The nation's largest charter management organization is the Knowledge is Power Program (KIPP). KIPP schools are emblematic of the No Excuses approach to public education, a highly standardized and widely replicated charter model that features a long school day, an extended school year, selective teacher hiring, strict behavior norms, and emphasizes traditional reading and math skills. No Excuses charter schools are sometimes said to target relatively motivated high achievers at the expense of students who are more difficult to teach, including limited English proficiency (LEP) and special education (SPED) students, as well as students with low baseline achievement levels. We use applicant lotteries to evaluate the impact of KIPP Academy Lynn, a KIPP school in Lynn, Massachusetts that typifies the KIPP approach. Our analysis focuses on special needs students that may be underserved. The results show average achievement gains of 0.36 standard deviations in math and 0.12 standard deviations in reading for each year spent at KIPP Lynn, with the largest gains coming from the LEP, SPED, and low‐achievement groups. Average reading gains are driven almost entirely by SPED and LEP students, whose reading scores rise by roughly 0.35 standard deviations for each year spent at KIPP Lynn.