THE CENTRE STRIKES BACK: META‐GOVERNANCE,DELEGATION, AND THE CORE EXECUTIVE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, 2010–14

A growing literature on ‘agencification’, ‘quangocratization’, and the ‘autonomization’ of the state has highlighted a coordination dilemma in contemporary public governance whereby governments rely on delegated governance but are frustrated by the lack of control that arises from such structures. In the run‐up to the 2010 General Election in the United Kingdom this coordination dilemma was prominent as the capacity of the Cabinet Office to exert control over arm's‐length bodies, either directly or indirectly, received intense criticism. This article presents the findings of the first detailed research project to examine the subsequent Coalition Government's approach to this dilemma. It argues that in relation to the governance of public bodies, the role and capacity of the Cabinet Office has been transformed. In mapping this development the article explores the implications of the centre striking back in the context of ‘post‐New Public Management’ reforms.     

CENTRAL REGULATION OF ENGLISH LOCAL AUTHORITIES: AN EXAMPLE OF META‐GOVERNANCE?

This paper discusses how the UK government has reconfigured its regulation of English local authorities by moving from direct oversight to using an indirect independent agency as a vehicle of meta‐governance. This theme is discussed through two strands: first, by examining how several factors eroded central government’s capacity to directly regulate councils. The second strand examines the strategies used by the Audit Commission, an independent agency, to assert its authority over councils and how its hegemony is sustained by facilitating and participating in horizontal and vertical networks across government, specialist policy and stakeholders’ communities.     

THE NEW GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS FOR NHS FOUNDATION TRUST HOSPITALS: REFRAMING GOVERNORS AS META‐REGULATORS

New governance arrangements for NHS Foundation Trusts (FTs) aimed to replace centralized state ownership of acute English hospitals with a new form of social ownership. Under this, trusts would exist as independent public interest organizations on the model of mutuals and co‐operative societies. Assessing the impact of the new arrangements on the management structure of four acute hospitals, we demonstrate that FTs have failed to deliver social ownership and local accountability on this model. We suggest that policy‐makers should re‐frame the governance apparatus associated with mutualism and social ownership in terms of the concept of meta‐regulation. By re‐framing governors as meta‐regulators, regulatory institutions would acquire new powers to steer FTs towards sustainable forms of compliance via non‐coercive, non‐intrusive means.     

THE HISTORY OF GOVERNANCE IN THE NETHERLANDS: CONTINUITY AND EXCEPTIONS

THE HISTORY OF GOVERNANCE IN THE NETHERLANDS: CONTINUITY AND EXCEPTIONS
W.J.M. Kickert
Reed Elsevier, 2004, 121 pp., €17.85 (pb) ISBN: 9059014359     

SELF‐SERVICE SOCIETY: PARTICIPATIVE POLITICS AND NEW FORMS OF GOVERNANCE

The purpose of this paper is to identify ‘participative politics' and what is here called ‘self‐service politics' as distinct political themes in many advanced democracies, in order to investigate their main elements and chart their interrelationships. These two themes are examined from the viewpoint of politicization and depoliticization tendencies. Participative politics consists of three main forms, defined as active citizenship, citizen networks and co‐production. Self‐service politics, in turn, connects each of these forms to a larger political transformation by pitting themes of activating politics, social governance and accountability against them. The paper investigates what bearing participative politics, and self‐service politics as its inevitable attendant, have on the sphere of democratic deliberation.     

THE ROLE OF STATE‐REINFORCED SELF‐GOVERNANCE IN AVERTING THE TRAGEDY OF THE IRRIGATION COMMONS IN JAPAN

The scholarly works on governance alternatives are peppered with arguments suggesting that, to avert the tragedy of the commons, the state should coerce resource users to manage the commons; take authoritarian ownership of it; privatize it; co‐manage it with users, or, since the state may also destroy self‐governing institutions of users, stay away so that users can develop self‐governing institutions for management. This article examines the management of the irrigation commons in post‐war Japan and explores a unique policy alternative termed ‘state‐reinforced self‐governance’. It allows a financially, technologically, statutorily, and politically strong state to assist strategically, rather than coerce, users to self‐govern and avert the tragedy of the commons.     

RHODES' CONTRIBUTION TO GOVERNANCE THEORY: PRAISE,CRITICISM AND THE FUTURE GOVERNANCE DEBATE

This article discusses Rod Rhodes' contribution to governance theory. Rod Rhodes' work on governance has been much quoted. He has contributed to setting a new governance agenda and to an ongoing governance debate. This debate has also had an impact on political practice. However, as this paper argues, Rhodes' definition of governance is problematic in that it is narrowly identified with networks, and it is not consistently applied. Rhodes' concept of governance remains too narrow for it to be able to include a comparative analysis of a variation of governance forms. In addition, the governance concept needs to be equipped with tools from political economy in order be able to incorporate important aspects of interests, power and conflict. The way forward for governance theory would seem to involve the inclusion of political economy analysis of context as it affects beliefs and dilemmas.     

SUPRANATIONAL GOVERNANCE OR NATIONAL BUSINESS‐AS‐USUAL? THE NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION OF EU STRUCTURAL FUNDS IN THE NETHERLANDS AND DENMARK

The partnership principle in EU cohesion policy was introduced in order to involve subnational authorities and interest organizations in policy formulation and implementation. In this article we examine how the member states have reacted to this call for a new way of making public policy. We argue that the multi‐level governance literature and the critics of the multi‐level governance framework have not examined implementation structures properly, but have focused on regional influence. We conduct a comparative analysis of the Dutch and Danish implementations of the European Social Fund and the European Regional Development Fund. Our findings show that when examining implementation structures it becomes clear that member states are in full control of the re‐allocation of EU funds. They show that Denmark and The Netherlands have been able to absorb EU cohesion policy within already existing national implementation structures of labour market policies and regional development. One central theoretical implication of our study is that the focus of studies of any fundamental re‐allocation of power resources in cohesion studies should comprise the entire network of implementation rather than the strategies of its individual component actors.     

NEW MODES OF GOVERNANCE IN ITALY AND THE NETHERLANDS: THE CASE OF ACTIVATION POLICIES

This article discusses the growing importance of operational reforms in the context of welfare state transformation processes, and the role that principles of new governance play in shaping these reforms. It focuses specifically on one social policy area considered crucial in reforming welfare states: the provision of activation services that aim at increasing the employability and labour‐market participation of people dependent on benefits or social assistance. The article argues that besides the reforms of the programmatic aspects of social policies and social services (formal policy reforms), reforms of the way in which policies and services are organized, administered and delivered (operational policy reforms) have received increasing attention as a ’second strand’ of welfare state reforms. It illustrates this by analysing and comparing reforms of the provision of activation services in two European countries: Italy and The Netherlands. The article not only reveals the growing emphasis in both countries on operational policy reforms which are to an important degree inspired by principles of new governance, but also shows significant similarities and differences in their concrete manifestations, which could be interpreted as pointing out processes of ‘path‐dependent convergence’.     

COMPETING TRADITIONS OF GOVERNANCE AND DILEMMAS OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACCOUNTABILITY: THE CASE OF DENMARK

This article offers a study of the changing role of the state in Denmark under the condition of the overall transformation from government to governance with particular emphasis on the corresponding transition from process accountability to performance accountability. It is argued that although new modes of governance have been introduced, and new interpretations of accountability have been proliferated, neither conventional modes of governance nor older interpretations of accountability disappear. Thus, what we see is a co-existence of competing traditions of governance and different and sometimes contradictory interpretations of administrative accountability, which create potential dilemmas and contradictions for the individual civil servant. Employing an interpretative approach to governance and public administration, the article analyses the constitution of competing traditions of governance and interpretations of accountability, and the way in which these competing traditions and interpretations lead to accountability dilemmas for the individual civil servant.     

VIOLENCE AND THE COSTS OF HONESTY: RETHINKING BUREAUCRATS' CHOICES TO TAKE BRIBES

Explanations of bureaucrats' decisions to take bribes include accounts of incentives as well as expectations. However, there are further considerations in violent contexts, where refusal of bribes may have dire consequences. Yet, insight into this topic is limited. This article investigates how violence upholds bribery, through interviews with South African officials who enforce regulations in communities where gangs operate. The investigation shows that when citizens offer bribes to enable rule violations, this is a process of both temptation and threats: officials who refuse bribes face intimidation by both citizens and colluding colleagues. This illustrates how violence may function as a mechanism to enforce corrupt contracts between bureaucrats and criminal citizens. Through reducing costs in such settings, bribe‐taking is partly a strategy of social protection. This has implications for policy and suggests that, besides incentives and expectations, administrative reforms may benefit from ‘fixing the security’ of bureaucrats in violent contexts.