Gaining confidence in the law of confidence

Legal context. The recent case of EPI v Symphony has left theUK law of confidentiality in an uncertain state: the extentto which recipients of confidential information may be permittedto ‘use’ mixtures of such information with publiclyavailable material remains unclear. The Court of Appeal in EPIfelt that it was hard to reconcile the principle that any claimin confidence must fail if the material in question is in thepublic domain with the ‘springboard’ doctrine; butis the distinction illusory? Key points. Issues raised in this case include considerationof what precisely is ‘use’ of confidential information,when mixed with public information, and whether a confider shoulddo more than rely on confidentiality obligations to protectthe fruits of his/her disclosures. This article asks how confidentialityobligations may be aligned with the control of statutory intellectualproperty rights. It considers whether the Court of Appeal inMarkem v Zipher has confused the issue and speculates as tohow far the general law of contract can assist the confider. Practical significance. Finally, this article discusses whichlegal tools will best assist the confider seeking to protectits intellectual property.     

Overcoming the challenges posted by technology to traditional copyright law: from Betamax to Grokster

Legal context: Dual use technology, or technology which can be used for bothinfringing and non-infringing uses, raises interesting issuesin the area of copyright law. This note analyses inter aliathe two US Supreme Court decisions on dual use technology, separatedby a gap of over 20 years—Sony v Universal Studios (1984)and MGM v Grokster (2005). Key points: Sony lays down the famous ‘Betamax’ defence—ifthe technology is ‘capable of substantial non-infringinguses’, then it cannot be challenged as infringing. Thistest had stood the test of time, and it is only recently inGrokster that there arose an occasion to reconsider its application.The Court in Grokster, borrowing from the jurisprudence developedin Patent law, recognized a novel test of liability—basedon the active ‘inducement’ to infringe. The flawin Grokster is that despite its attempt to develop new standardsfor a digital age, the ruling leaves areas of uncertainty. Practical significance: Dual use technology has become ubiquitous in this age—fromthe iPod to YouTube to P2P software, all are capable of beingused in lawful as well as unlawful ways. Legal pronouncementshave the potential to impact not just the development of law,but also innovation in technology. Some believe that the ‘brightline’ of Sony has been muddled thereby threatening technologicalinnovation. Others, me included, believe that Sony is inapplicablein the face of new technology, and hail the decision in Groksteras a positive step forward in what it actually decides. However,in what it does not decide, Grokster still represents a lostopportunity by the Court to clear up the muddled waters.     

Genocide, Complicity in Genocide and International v. Domestic Jurisdiction: Reflections on the van Anraat Case

When adjudicating international crimes, domestic courts arefaced with a choice between the application of internationallaw or national law. In the recent van Anraat judgment, a DutchDistrict Court explicitly opted for the former alternative.This approach led to the accused's acquittal of complicity ingenocide. In the Court's opinion, there was no proof beyonda reasonable doubt that van Anraat had actual knowledge of SaddamHussein's special intent to destroy part of the Kurdish population.According to the Court, such proof is required under internationallaw. This article argues that the Court's preference for internationallaw was not prescribed, either by international law or by domesticlaw, although in principle such preference may prove advisable,whenever international rules are clear and exhaustive. Aftertracing the intricate legal discussions on mens rea requirementsfor genocide and complicity in genocide, the author concludesthat the issue has not yet been completely elucidated in internationalcase law and legal literature. In situations of ambiguity whereinternational case law offers insufficient guidance, domesticcourts would better resort to their own criminal law. As Dutchcriminal law extends the mens rea of the accomplice beyond ‘knowledge’so as to cover dolus eventualis as well, application of domesticlaw might have affected the outcome of the case.     

Spanish court rules in 'Accessorize' trade marks case

The Barcelona Court of First Instance No. 1 found in favourof the claimants, owners of the famous registered trade mark‘Accessorize’ in their action for trade mark infringement,trade mark cancellation, unfair competition, and damages inrespect of the use by the defendants of the Accessori, Mr Accessoriand Accessori trade marks.     

'Trade mark use' in Europe: revisiting Arsenal in the light of Opel and Picasso

Legal context: The European Court of Justice (ECJ) decision in the case ofArsenal Football Club v. Reed led to uncertainty regarding thepractical scope of a trade mark proprietor's property rights. Key points: The uncertainty resulted from a failure of the ECJ to addressclearly the issue of what constitutes infringing trade markuse. The ECJ ignored the question of the High Court as to whetheruse of a trade mark as an indication of origin is necessaryfor establishing infringement. They instead established an ambiguousstandard for what constitutes infringing trade mark use, suggestingthat only use that jeopardises the essential function of a trademark is an infringing use. This ambiguity has had problematicimplications for subsequent interpretations of trade mark law,particularly in the Court of Appeal in Arsenal and the Houseof Lords in R v Johnstone. Two relatively new ECJ cases may help clarify the issue. InOPEL, the ECJ suggested that infringing use of a trade markmust be use that is perceived by the relevant public as a designationof origin. The Picasso decision limits the effect of the Arsenaldecision on the relevance of confusion in non-sale situationsto the facts of Arsenal. In particular, it stresses the pointthat when assessing likelihood of confusion in the context ofan opposition to an application for registration the court shouldfocus on the perception of the relevant public at the pointof sale. Practical significance: The benefit of these two cases is that they create some clarityfor legal practitioners and the Courts when addressing the questionof what constitutes infringing trade mark use.     

Community trade mark case law round-up 2006

Legal Context: This article looks at the important decisions of 2006 on theCommunity Trade Mark made by the Court of First Instance, theEuropean Court of Justice and the OHIM. These cases concernthe application of Council Regulation 40/94 on the CommunityTrade Mark, and also preliminary rulings from the European Courtof Justice on the interpretation of Council Directive 89/104(the Trade Mark Directive). Key Points: The volume of case law relating to Community trade marks, notto mention the variety of official languages in which the lawis interpreted, makes it almost impossible for even the conscientiouspractitioner to keep abreast with developments as they occur. This article provides an overview of the shifts in Communitytrade mark practice, in terms of not only the relatively accessiblesubstantive law but also the far more diffuse areas of procedurallaw and Office practice. In seeking to review and explain these shifts, the authors haveadopted a view of the case law that is functional rather thanphilosophical. In doing so, they lay bare the manner in whichthe institutions that administer and adjudicate Community trademark issues interrelate to one another. Practical Significance: Practitioners can quickly find the important decisions from2006 relating to particular articles of the Council Regulation40/94 on the Community Trade Mark. This article provides an overview of the most significant trademark cases decided in 2006 by the European Courts of Justiceand the OHIM Boards of Appeal. The article enables practitionersto access rapidly the key decisions of 2006. The cases discussed concern the application of Council Regulation40/94 on the Community trade mark (‘CTMR’), CommissionRegulation 2868/95 implementing the CTMR (‘CTMIR’),and Council Directive 89/104 (the ‘Trade Mark Directive’).     

Evidentiary Issues in the ICJ's Genocide Judgment

Despite the commitment by the International Court of Justice(ICJ or the Court) in clarifying underlying methods and guidelinesof its approach to fact-finding and evidence, it can be doubtedwhether the judgment delivered in the Bosnia and Herzegovinav. Serbia case genuinely marked a decisive step towards a moretransparent and reliable methodology for evidentiary matters.Behind the formula of ‘fully conclusive evidence’,when dealing with Articles II and III of the Genocide Conventionthe Court adopted for all practical purposes a typical criminallaw ‘beyond any reasonable doubt’ standard of proof.By this choice the Court upheld in substance the argument putforward by Serbia that even if the questions of state responsibilityfor acts of genocide are not excluded by the scope of the Convention,they must nevertheless be judged by the same parameters of individualcriminal responsibility. In reaching its conclusions the Courtrelied heavily on the jurisprudence of the ICTY, both as regardsthe ascertainment of facts and their legal qualification. Itremains to be seen whether in future cases the Court will beable to adopt a similar criminal court posture, and whetherit will be similarly prepared to rely on the findings of otherinternational tribunals such as the International Criminal Court,which is not established by the Security Council.     

Copyright Infringement in a Borderless World - Does Territoriality Matter? Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v Canadian Association of Internet Providers [2004] 2 SCR 427

The recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Societyof Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v CanadianAssociation of Internet Providers [2004] 2 SCR 427 is significantfor two reasons: (a) the Canadian Supreme Court held that InternetService Providers should be exempted from copyright liabilityas long as they provide only a conduit service in transmittingcopyright materials between Internet users (a point which isconsistent with many national copyright laws); (b) the majorityof the Canadian Supreme Court arrived at the conclusion thatthe appropriate test to determine whether an infringement forthe unauthorized transmission of online copyright material hasoccurred within the Canadian jurisdiction is the ‘realand substantial connection’ test (LeBel J, however, dissentedand was of the view that the correct test to apply is the ‘hostserver’ test). This paper studies these two tests as propoundedby the Canadian Supreme Court and assesses their strengths andweaknesses, especially in light of the territoriality principlein copyright law.     

Trustees beware: submit with care

The Royal Court of Jersey has recently heard an interestingapplication reported in Jersey as In the Matter of CI Law TrusteesLimited and Folio Trust Company Limited as Trustees of the FountainTrust [2005 JRC099]. The case concerned an application for directions by CI Law TrusteesLimited (the ‘Trustee’) seeking directions as tohow to respond to a judgement of the Family Division of theHigh Court of Justice in England and Wales setting aside a Jerseylaw trust (the ‘Trust’) as a sham, and orderingthe Trustee to transfer the Trust assets to the petitioner inthe English matrimonial proceedings (the ‘Wife’).     

Money for nothing and your MP3s for free

The judgment of the Federal Court of Australia (‘the Court’)in Universal Music is the first judicial pronouncement in Australiaon the legality of website operators who provide hyperlinksto remote websites to allow ‘internauts’ (web users)to download MP3 music files and the liability of internet serviceproviders (ISPs) and their employees for authorizing that infringementunder Australian copyright law.     

Coexistence in Community trade mark disputes: conditions and implications

Legal context. A defence based on coexistence has no legal basisin the Trade Mark Directive or in the Community Trade Mark Regulation.Still, a practical approach to Community trade mark conflictsrequires attention to the situation in the marketplace whereconflicting marks may be shown to coexist without any currentconfusion or dilution being reported. Key points. Trade mark coexistence may sometimes be persuasive,the strict requirements being laid down by the Community courts.Through a detailed review of the case-law of the Community courtsand OHIM's Boards of Appeal, this article explains the conditionsfor and the consequences of proving the coexistence of the conflictingmarks in cases based on likelihood of confusion or dilution. Practical significance. Consideration must also be given tothe effects of third parties' neighbouring marks which may diminishan earlier mark's distinctive character. Accordingly, this articlefurther addresses the issue of whether the scope of protectionof a mark may be damaged by the use of later marks in the lightof the ECJ Judgment in the preliminary ruling Case C-145/05Levi Strauss v Casucci Spa.     

Civilized Squatting

This article seeks to trace the origins of the requirement thata squatter must have an intention to possess (animus possidendi)in order to establish title by adverse possession. The requirementhas been confirmed by the House of Lords in the recent caseof Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419. Its origins canreadily be traced back to the decision of the Court of Appealin Littledale v Liverpool College [1900] 1 Ch 19, but thereis little evidence of any need for intention before that case,and no convincing authority is cited for it. Possible explanationsfor the source of this requirement are considered by the article(for instance cases on re-entry by landlords and the so-called‘found chattel’ cases), but these are ultimatelyrejected. The article goes on to suggest that the reason forthis is that the intention requirement was ‘imported’into English law from German Pandectist writers of the nineteenthcentury. It suggests that Littledale was the case in which thishappened. It seeks to support this hypothesis by reference tobiographical details of Lindley MR, who gave the leading judgmentin Littledale, and who not only trained in part in Germany butalso took an active interest in German scholarship of the time.A brief survey of the relevant German sources is undertaken,focusing primarily on the work of Savigny, but also consideringthe rival theory of Jhering. Finally, it tracks the developmentand refinement of the content of animus possidendi, first by19th century legal scholars and then by 20th century judges,to make it ‘fit’ with English property law. It seeksto address the question of whether the animus possidendi requirementis a free-standing element (the ‘strong’ will theory),or whether it is simply implied from the acts of the squatter(the ‘weak’ will theory), and suggests a solutionby reference to the German sources and later English cases.Finally, it considers how the House of Lords decision in Pyereflects the logical culmination of the acceptance of this ‘legaltransplant’ into the common law.     

Dutch Courts' Universal Jurisdiction over Violations of Common Article 3 qua War Crimes

On 14 October 2005, The Hague District Court sentenced two Afghanasylum seekers for their role and participation in the tortureof civilians during the Afghan War of 1978–1992. The Courtheld in both cases that it had ‘universal jurisdiction’over violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventionsand that the accused were guilty of ‘torment’ (‘foltering’)and torture as a war crime (‘marteling’). The jurisdictionalbasis relied upon by the Court and the Court's legal reasoningin both cases is open to criticism.     

Whose trade mark rights? What the Microsoft case means for trade mark owners

Legal context. The article considers the influence of the commissionruling in the Microsoft case, forcing Microsoft to use its WINDOWS-trademark for an ‘unbundled’ version of the program inthe light of the trade mark owner's properties rights. The scopeof these rights is determined by the function of the trade markand the rights that the trade mark laws confer to the ownerin case of infringement. Key points. Trade marks are protected as property rights undercommunity law. They are the embodiment of past investments andtransform the reputation of the owner into a bankable asset.Consumers rely on trade mark owners' control over quality. Thisis mirrored by the rights of the trade mark owner to stop interferencewith quality and image, in particular in the context of resaleof altered products. Any interference that would be considereda trade mark infringement if committed by a private party shouldbe considered an interference with the protected property rightif caused by a government agency. This interference is not justifiedby the public interest because trade mark rights also embodyimportant public interests. Practical significance. If the analysis proposed in the articleis followed, intellectual property rights have to be given greaterweight in shaping antitrust remedies.     

Court of Appeal hears 'huge money' divorce case involving offshore trusts

On 7 March, Mr and Mrs John Charman's ‘huge money’divorce reached the Court of Appeal. Last year insurance magnateJohn Charman was ordered by the High Court to pay his formerwife £48 million in what is thought to be the biggestdivorce award in legal history. (See Trusts & Trustees,Volume 12, Issue 9, November 2006, High-value divorces and trusts,p 22, by James Freeman of Speechly Bircham LLP). James Freeman, family law solicitor at City law firm SpeechlyBircham LLP (tel. 020 7427 6584), commented on the case:

TheCourt of Appeal will rule on how parties with unusually highwealth, including offshore trust assets, should be treated ondivorce.     

Subsidiarity and 'Arguability': the European Court of Human Rights' Case Law on Judicial Review in Asylum Cases

The European Court of Human Rights’ case law on judicialreview in asylum cases is not entirely consistent. However,it can be interpreted as consistent if two presumptions areaccepted. First, that, as the Court's role should be subsidiaryto that of domestic courts, domestic judicial review shouldat least be of the same quality and substance as the EuropeanCourt of Human Rights’ review. Secondly, that the Courtdistinguishes between arguable and non-arguable cases not justin the context of Article 13 ECHR and of the admissibility ofapplications, but that this distinction is central to its entirecase law about the asylum procedure. This analysis results ina coherent doctrine on deadlines for submitting evidence, theburden of proof, the intensity of judicial review, and suspensiveeffect. If the Court understands its case law in this way, itcan prevent it from becoming, in some respects, a court of firstinstance.     

The Bosphorus Ruling of the European Court of Human Rights: Fundamental Rights and Blurred Boundaries in Europe

The recent case of Bosphorus Airlines v Ireland provided theEuropean Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) with an opportunity torefine further its relationship with the EU. In particular,the ECtHR was called upon to clarify when States could be heldresponsible for actions taken under the banner of the EU. Thisarticle examines the status quo prior to the Bosphorus judgment,and then scrutinises the judgment itself, focusing particularlyon the use and scope of the doctrine of ‘equivalent protection’to determine State responsibility. The doctrine as outlinedin Bosphorus is applied to some likely scenarios involving EUaction and its relative merits and disadvantages are discussed.The article also briefly addresses the further global implicationsof the judgment, namely for the legal accountability of theUN Security Council and the ongoing issue of responsibilityof international organisations under international law.     

Interactions between National and International Criminal Law in the Preliminary Phase of Trial at the ICC

The author discusses the interaction between international andnational law in determining whether a case is admissible fromthe viewpoint of complementarity (Article 17 of the Statuteof the International Criminal Court) and with regard to theconcept of ‘interests of justice’ (Article 53 ofthe same Statute). Complementarity does not separate nationalfrom international criminal jurisdiction; nor does it put themin conflict with each other — rather, it favours the aforementionedinteraction. In addition, the concepts of ‘ability’and ‘willingness’ tend to ensure an indirect harmonizationof national criminal systems around common international criteria.As for reliance on the notion of ‘interests of justice’when determining whether to initiate proceedings, accordingto the author, Article 53 envisages a compromise between prosecutorialdiscretion and strict legality, thereby enshrining a hybridizationbetween various national traditions. The author notes that thedecision to open investigations should be objective and foreseeable;to this end, she suggests some general criteria, which are intendedto serve as guidelines for establishing whether, in a specificcase, the interests of justice warrant the initiation of proceedings.     

Violence and Massacres -- Towards a Criminal Law of Inhumanity?

The law's responses to massacres seem to vacillate between twomodels: (i) the model of the ‘criminal law of the enemy’inspired by the national criminal law and rendered topical againby the attacks of September 11; (ii) the model of the ‘criminallaw of inhumanity’ symbolized by the paradigm of crimesagainst humanity. The latter model is better suited to takeaccount of the qualitative dimension of massacres, i.e. thefact that they, besides being mass offences (quantitative criterion),also offend against humanity. To establish a ‘criminallaw of inhumanity’ as a model with a universal, or universalizable,dimension, three conditions are necessary, which concern (i)the definition of the crimes, (ii) the assignment of responsibilityand (iii) the nature of the punishment. As for the definitionof the crime, one could implicitly deduce from the list of actsconstituting crimes against humanity (Article 7 of the InternationalCriminal Court Statute) that humanity so protected has two inseparablecomponents: the individuality of each human being, not reducibleto membership in a group, and the equal membership of each inthe human community as a whole. With regard to the second condition,it is not sufficient to hold responsible the de jure or de factoleaders; intermediaries and perpetrators, at all levels of hierarchy,must also be held accountable. As for the third condition, itis not sufficient to content oneself with the watchword of thefight against impunity without bringing up the nature and functionsof the punishment; hence the necessity not only to rethink therole ‘criminal’ law can play in a policy of punishment,but also to focus on prevention, reparation and reconciliation.Finally, the author suggests that the proposed model of a ‘criminallaw of inhumanity’ must be built through the interplaybetween municipal law and international law. On the one hand,the wealth of national legal systems — also with regardto penalties and responsibility — should be better integratedinto international criminal justice; on the other, nationalcriminal systems should be better adapted to conditions of internationallaw, through the introduction into domestic law of the definitionsof the crimes and also the rules for assigning criminal responsibility.