Grassroots International NGOs: Using Comparative Interpretive Policy Analysis to Understand Meanings in Private Development Aid

Abstract

This research comparatively examines grassroots international NGOs (GINGOs), a growing subset of international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) working in private development aid. GINGOs are small-scale, on-going development initiatives through voluntary third sector organizations. How do GINGOs’ founders and volunteers understand their role in private development aid? The article uses an interpretive framework to examine three in-depth comparative case studies of GINGOs based in the US and working in South Sudan, Nepal and Haiti. Its contribution is that it provides rich data to build further theory about the experiences, or multiple realities, in private development aid. It is found that GINGOs’ founders and volunteers attach new meanings to private development aid to distinguish themselves from larger professionalized INGOs and emphasize personal connections.     

Whither the Developmental State? The Growing Role of NGOs in Japanese Aid Policymaking

Japan is often characterized as a developmental state, i.e., a state with a strong and autonomous bureaucratic leadership that directs the economy toward achieving developmental goals. This study challenges the developmental state model, arguing that the once-powerful Japanese bureaucracy has lost much of its authority and is no longer autonomous from societal forces. By focusing on the growing role of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Japan's official development assistance (ODA) policymaking, this study shows how the nongovernmental sector has begun to challenge bureaucratic dominance and reshape state–civil society relations in Japan.     

The private stake in public goods: overcoming the illogic of collective action

Conclusion According to the Logic of Collective Action, most actions in the service of common interests are either not logical or not collective. In a large group, the argument goes, individual action counts for so little in the realization of common interests that it makes no sense for a person to consider group interests when choosing a course of personal conduct. Only private interests are decisive. Their fulfillment, at least, depends in a substantial way on one's own behavior. Individual actions designed to achieve private advantage are therefore rational. Actions aimed at collective goods are a waste of time and effort. Occasionally, of course, a person acting on the basis of private interests may inadvertently provide some collective good from which many other people derive benefit. This is what happens in the case of the Greek shipping tycoon. But it occurs only because one person's private good fortuitously coincides with the collective good of a larger group. From the tycoon's perspective, there are no collective interests at stake in the sponsorship of an opera broadcast, only his own private interests. Nor does his decision to underwrite a broadcast take account of the other people who will listen to it. His action is a solitary one designed to serve a private interest, and it is perfectly consistent with Olson's argument concerning the illogic of collective action, because it is not grounded in collective interest and is not a case of collective behavior. Olson's theory permits people to share collective interests but not to act upon them voluntarily. The only acknowledged exception occurs in the case of very small groups, where each member's contribution to the common good represents such a large share of the total that any person's default becomes noticeable to others and may lead them to reduce or cancel their own contributions. In this instance, at least, one person's actions can make a perceptible difference for the chance of realizing collective interests, and it is therefore sensible for each person to consider these collective interests (and one another's conduct) when deciding whether or not to support group efforts. Outside of small groups, however, Olson finds no circumstances in which voluntary collective action is rational. But in fact the conditions that make collective action rational are broader than this and perhaps more fundamental to Olson's theory. They are inherent in the very ‘collectiveness’ of collective goods - their status as social or group artifacts. In the absence of a group, there can be no such thing as a collective good. But in the absence of mutual awareness and interdependence, it becomes extremely difficult to conceive of a social group. The assumption that group members are uninfluenced by one another's contributions to a collective good is no mere theoretical simplification. It may be a logical impossibility. Being a member of a group, even a very large one, implies at the very least that one's own conduct takes place against a background of group behavior. Olson's assumptions do not acknowledge this minimal connection between individual and group behavior, and they inhibit recognition of the elementary social processes that explain why slovenly conduct attracts special attention on clean streets, or why the initial violations of group norms are more momentous than later violations. It may be argued, of course, that the groups of Olson's theory are not functioning social groups with a collective existence, but only categories or classes of people who happen to share a collective interest. The logic of collective action is intended precisely to show why these ‘potential’ groups are prevented from converting themselves into organized social groups whose members act in a coordinated way. In such latent groups, perhaps, members are unaware of one another, and Olson's assumption that they are uninfluenced by one another's conduct becomes a reasonable one. Another implication, however, is that Olson's theory is subject to unacknowledged restrictions. The logic of the free ride is for potential groups. It may not hold for actual ones. The distinction is exemplified, in the case of public sanitation, by the difference between what is rational on a clean street and what is rational on a dirty one. The logic of the free ride does not make sense for the members of an ongoing group that is already operating to produce collective goods such as public order or public sanitation. While this represents a notable limitation upon the scope of Olson's theory, it apparently leaves the logic of collective action undisturbed where potential or latent groups are concerned. But suppose that a member of an unmobilized group wants her colleagues to contribute to the support of a collective good that she particularly values. Her problem is to create a situation in which such contributions make sense to her fellow members. As we have already seen in the case of the neighborhood street-sweeper, one possible solution is to provide the collective good herself. If it has the appropriate characteristics, its very existence may induce other members of the latent group to contribute to its maintenance. This is not one of those cases in which one person's private interest fortuitously coincides with the collective interest of a larger group. The neighborhood street-sweeper is acting on behalf of an interest that she is conscious of sharing with her neighbors. Her aim is to arouse collective action in support of that interest. She does not expect to pay for public cleanliness all by herself, or to enjoy its benefits all by herself. Her role bears a general resemblance to the one that some analysts have defined for the political entrepreneur who seeks to profit personally by supplying a collective good to the members of a large group (Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Young 1971). Like the neighborhood street-sweeper, the entrepreneur finds it advantageous to confer a collective benefit on others. But the similarity does not extend to the nature of the advantage or the manner in which it is secured. The entrepreneur induces people to contribute toward the cost of a collective good by creating an organizational apparatus through which group members can pool their resources. The existence of this collection mechanism can also strengthen individual members' confidence that their colleagues' contributions are forthcoming. What the entrepreneur gains is private profit - the difference between the actual cost of a collective good and the total amount that group members are prepared to pay for it. By contrast, the neighborhood street-sweeper induces support for a collective good, not by facilitating contributions, but by increasing the costs that come from the failure to contribute. As a result of her efforts, she gains a clean street whose benefits (and costs) she shares with her fellow residents. She takes her profit in the form of collective betterment rather than private gain, and her conduct, along with the behavior of her neighbors, demonstrates that effective selfinterest can extend beyond private interest. Self-interest can also give rise to continuing cooperative relationships. The street-sweeper, acting in her own interest, brings into being a cooperative enterprise in which she and her fellow residents jointly contribute to the production of a collective good. Cooperation in this case does not come about through negotiation or exchange among equal parties. It can be the work of a single actor who contributes the lion's share of the resources needed to establish a collective good, in the expectation that its existence will induce others to join in maintaining it. The tactic is commonplace as a means of eliciting voluntary collective action, and it operates on a scale far larger than the street or the neighborhood. Government, paradoxically, probably relies on it more than most institutions With its superior power and resources, it may be society's most frequent originator of voluntary collective action. Its policies, imposed through coercion and financed by compulsory taxation, generate a penumbra of cooperation without which coercion might become ineffectual. By providing certain collective goods, government authorities can move citizens to make voluntary contributions to the maintenance of these goods. The stark dichotomy between private voluntary action and public coercion - one of the mainstays of American political rhetoric - may be as misleading as the identification of self-interest with selfishness. There is more at stake here than the voluntary production of collective goods. Continuing cooperative behavior can have other results as well. Once group members begin to expect cooperation from one another, norms of cooperation and fairness are likely to develop. Axelrod (1986) has suggested that modes of conduct which have favorable outcomes for the people who pursue them tend to evolve into group norms. Public-spirited action that serves self-interest could therefore engender a principled attachment to the common good, undermining the assumption of self-interestedness that gives the logic of collective action its bite. Laboratory studies of cooperative behavior have already demonstrated that experimental subjects have far less regard for narrow self-interest than rational choice theory requires (Dawes 1980). In one extended series of collective action experiments, however, Marwell and Ames (1981) found a single group of subjects who approximated the self-interested free-riders of Olson's theory. They were graduate students in economics.     

Managing business political activities in the USA: bridging between theory and practice

The political arena in the USA is portrayed as a marketplace in which businesses and other groups compete to influence public policy decisions. Managers can view this political market as an opportunity to shape the rules of the game by which they operate but must realise that it is a very competitive arena. Drawing on concepts from business strategy advocacy activities like lobbying, making campaign contributions, and organising grassroots efforts are analysed in terms of opportunities for gaining competitive advantage. Results from case studies indicate that many businesses miss opportunities to build support among employees for political advocacy because few firms use bottom up approaches for political action committees or grass‐roots efforts. Suggestions for managers interested in improving the effectiveness of their business advocacy efforts are discussed. Copyright © 2001 Henry Stewart Publications     

Legitimacy and the Rise of NGOs: the Global and Local in South Asia

We extend sociological institutionalist theory and draw on evidence from South Asia to develop a research agenda for studying how nongovernmental organization (NGO) legitimacy plays out in national and local arenas. After first presenting a sociological institutionalist approach to nongovernmental organizing, we extend it into three areas: national laws governing international and domestic NGOs, growth in domestic NGOs, and the situated interactions among international organizations, nation-states, local organizations, and other actors. (1) International and domestic NGOs are governed by national laws, and we sketch the history of such laws in South Asia to hypothesize a pattern of legal change leading to the present social concern about accountability. (2) Sociological institutionalism suggests that domestic NGO growth is related to the presence of international NGOs and can be interpreted as the diffusion of formal organization. (3) We conceptualize the situated interactions of the plethora of actors as a meso realm at the interface of the global and local. The interrelations of these actors are marked by tensions and conflict. There are many permutations of how they coalesce, not always along a global—local cleavage, and there is a need to examine the full range of interactions. We explore some of these and it seems that actors use accountability strategically in their conflicts with others. The ‘uses of accountability’ in contesting legitimacy within such situations is proposed as a fruitful research direction.     

Social inequalities and collective action in times of crisis: The case of the Lisbon Metropolitan Area

During the international financial crisis, Portugal found itself in a very difficult and vulnerable socioeconomic situation that has led to an increase in social inequalities. This article seeks to understand two things: firstly, how much the impacts of the crisis contributed to a general perception that people's social position has gone backwards, compared to their pre-crisis situations; secondly, whether it is possible to link this generalized perception that living conditions have gone downhill to an increase in and diversification of collective action practices. The authors analyse data from a 2014 survey of 1,500 residents of the Lisbon Metropolitan Area, which they use to measure how far the level of collective action practices has increased and varied in accordance with a set of social inequality indicators, such as resource and educational inequalities.     

Revisiting the role of civic organizations in Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan: Confidence,membership, and democratic practice

In many emerging and authoritarian countries, civil society organizations that focus on political or sensitive policy issues are being cracked down upon, while service-oriented ones are given a relatively greater ability to operate. What might the consequence of this be for democratic practice given the important role civic organizations play in this process? We examine this question by considering whether the absence of confidence in a country's governing institutions is related to membership in service-rather than governance-focused civic organizations, and how such membership is associated with elite-challenging, political activities in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. We find that individuals who have no confidence in state institutions are less likely to seek membership in governance-focused civic organizations, but not necessarily in service-focused ones. At the same time, membership in both types of civic organizations is associated with participation in political activities, while beliefs that a country is run democratically decreases it. This suggests that a variety of civic organizational types, even those without an explicit governance-focus, contingent on perceptions of democratic governance and other covariates held constant, enhance democratic practice.     

UNSC Resolution 1325 national action plans in Liberia and Sierra Leone: An analysis of gendered power relations in hybrid peacebuilding

This paper considers how the use of ‘hybridity’ in the peacebuilding literature overlooks the gendered dimensions of hybrid interactions. It does so by examining the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1325 national action plans (NAPs) for Liberia and Sierra Leone. By asking the gendered questions of ‘who participates?’ and ‘how do they participate?’ it draws from Mac Ginty’s conception of hybridity and traces the compliance and incentivizing power in hybridized peace, as well as the ability of local actors to resist and provide alternatives. However, Mac Ginty’s model is found to be inadequate because of its inattention to the gendered nature of power. It is found that with a gendered approach to hybridity, it is easier to trace the processes of hybridization of NAPs in post-conflict states where their implementation is limited. In asking the questions of ‘who’ and ‘how’, three conclusions about the gendered nature of hybrid peacebuilding are drawn: international intervention relies upon the ‘feminization’ of local actors; issues framed within the realm of the ‘masculine’ are more likely to get attention; and the Resolution 1325 agenda in post-conflict states can be subverted by framing it as a ‘soft’ issue.     

Agencies without borders: Explaining partner selection in the formation of transnational agreements between regulators

Transnational collaboration between regulatory agencies has proliferated rapidly within the last three decades. However, given that information regarding the motives, trustworthiness, and capabilities of potential partners is typically imperfect, decisions about with whom to collaborate are inevitably characterized by a degree of uncertainty. To better capture these dynamics, this article uses a network analytical perspective and hypothesizes that agencies are more likely to form agreements with agencies to whom they are already indirectly connected (transitivity), that are highly connected (preferential attachment), or with whom they share tie-characteristics (assortativity). To test these hypotheses, a stochastic actor-oriented model is used to analyze an original, self-coded data set in which bilateral information exchange agreements between national securities agencies (n = 143) are mapped out over a 18-year period. The results show that the formation of agreements between regulatory agencies is driven by (i) the number of shared partners (i.e. triadic closure); and (ii) similarity regarding agency characteristics (i.e. homophily).     

Policy Advocacy in Transitioning Regimes: Comparative Lessons from the Case of Harbour Protection in Hong Kong

Current research on policy advocacy relies exclusively on established regimes where instability is largely contained. Using the harbour protection advocacy in Hong Kong as an exploratory case, the article documents how conservationists exploited the unique opportunities arising from the transfer of sovereignty to advance heritage protection policy. Three new strategic choices in policy advocacy are identified. First, policy advocates strategically switched between issue frames instead of becoming strongly identified with any issue frame. Second, they avoided prolonged involvement by pursuing modest, programme-level adjustments. Third, they circumvented the restrictions on scope and focus by creating new venues outside of the policy subsystem.     

Between hearts and pockets: locating the outcomes of transnational homemaking practices among Mexican women in Canada's temporary migration programmes

Temporary migration programmes (TMPs) contain features such as reduced costs and the social legitimation of regularized entry that allow women, including the very poor, to access transnational livelihoods. For mothers, taking up opportunities for employment abroad inevitably involves ‘transnational homemaking’, the set practices involved in caring for family relationships and maintaining household economies across borders. In this article, we examine the transnational homemaking practices undertaken by rural Mexican migrant women employed in highly masculinized TMPs in Canada, tracing how they construct and maintain household economies across borders through a delicate (re)negotiation of reproductive roles and responsibilities with non-migrating kin in Mexico. We find that migration yields material and subjective benefits that enable the expansion of their citizenship across multiple dimensions ranging from the economic to the sexual. At the same time, as racialized, gendered, migrants from the global South, their labour and status in Canada are highly precarious. The advantages derived from transnational migration are thus tenuous, limited, and contradictory.     

西部高校毕业生求职难度影响因素的实证研究——基于社会资本、人力资本与物质资本的比较研究及其交互效应

本研究旨在考察社会资本、人力资本与物质资本及其交互变量对高校毕业生求职难度的影响。实证分析发现:社会资本、人力资本与物质资本对高校毕业生职业获得难度存在显著的影响。在搜寻成本模型中,社会资本同人力资本的交互项对高校毕业生在求职过程中的搜寻成本存在正向影响,即社会资本欠缺者,可以通过提升人力资本以降低搜寻成本;在求职结果模型中,社会资本同人力资本的交互项对高校毕业生的最终求职结果存在负向影响,即社会资本欠缺者,可以通过提升人力资本以提高求职成功的概率,从而降低求职难度。     

Assessing Policy Design and Interpretation: An Institutions‐Based Analysis in the Context of Aquaculture in Florida and Virginia,United States

Recently in the field of policy studies, there has been a renewed interest in research that connects policy design with broader governance outcomes. As opposed to past studies of policy design that have characterized policies along broad categories of variables, however, recent studies have sought to systematically assess the language of public policies and resultant outcomes. This paper contributes to the existing and emerging literature on policy design by coupling a content analysis of polices governing the aquaculture industry in two U.S. states and interviews with aquaculture community members to understand policy design and perceptions of policy legitimacy, coerciveness, and enforcement.