Fighting for survival: responding to state capacity and terror group end

ABSTRACT

The well-established argument in the literature suggests that the higher state capacity is associatedwith the lower chance of experiencing civil conflict or higherchance of defeating the violent non-state groups. However, theliterature does not sufficiently address how these groups respondto increasing state capacity, and how their responses to that shapethe dynamic of political violence. I investigate the impact of statecapacity on terrorist group termination by exploring the waysterrorist groups respond to increasing state capacity. I argue thatincreasing state capacity might lead to a set of responses fromthe terror group in a way that it might induce the group to producemore terrorist violence to show that the group can still persist. Itmay also encourage the group to provide positive and negativeincentives to its constituents in order to rehabilitate its physicalcapacity to operate, and to prevent a shift of popular support a wayfrom the group towards to the government. Thus, such responsesof the group will decrease the likelihood of its terror campaign. Ialso expect that these arguments are especially relevant for ethnicor religious terror groups. The results of the empirical analysessupport these theoretical expectations.     

The Homegrown Threat: State Strength,Grievance, and Domestic Terrorism

Scholars maintain that, similar to insurgency, terrorist violence is precipitated by both relative deprivation and state weakness. Yet aggrieved minority groups within a country should turn to terrorism when they are weak relative to the state rather than strong. Empirical evidence shows minority group discrimination and fragile political institutions to independently increase domestic terror attacks. But it remains unclear whether grievances drive domestic terrorism in both strong and weak states. Using data from 172 countries between 1998 and 2007, we find that for strong states the presence of minority discrimination leads to increased domestic terrorism, while for weak states the presence of minority discrimination actually leads to less domestic terrorism. Consequently, increasing state capacity may not be a panacea for antistate violence, as nonstate actors may simply change their strategy from insurgency or guerrilla warfare to terrorism. Efforts to reduce terrorist violence must focus on reducing grievance by eliminating discriminatory policies at the same time that measures to improve state capacity are enacted.     

Conjuring up the next attack: the future-orientedness of terror and the counterterrorist imagination

Although terrorism is widely understood to be the politically motivated creation of fear by means of violence in a target group, the nature of that fear is seldom explained or even considered. The present article attempts to close that gap by proposing a definition of terror as the apprehension of (more) violence to come. Because every terrorist act is perceived to be part of a potential series, terror is oriented towards the future and involves the imaginary anticipation of prospective events. On the basis of this definition, I will examine the problematical role of counterterrorist discourse. As the statements of public officials and security experts in the run-up to, and during, the “War on Terror” demonstrate, the peculiar dynamic of terror is, seemingly paradoxically, reinforced by counterterrorist rhetoric. With its insistence on the escalatory nature of terrorist violence and its repeated prediction of even worse attacks, counterterrorism contributes to the evocation of terror in the sense proposed here.     

A history of drones: moral(e) bombing and state terrorism

This article argues that an historical investigation of air power makes possible the critique of current regimes of drone surveillance and bombing as a practice of state terrorism. By identifying certain key themes regularly used in terrorism studies for the classification of violence as “terrorism”, this article shows that early air power theorists understood military aircraft as essentially instruments of terrorism. A central argument permeating these theorists’ conception of air power was that the military value of aviation lay in its capacity to target the enemy’s population and, by means of bombing, generate a significant “moral effect” – that is, a psychological effect against the morale of civilians. This strategic formula constituted a central component of British air control schemes during the interwar period, where terror bombing was deployed systematically in order to control and pacify colonial populations. In arguing that widespread and long-lasting terror remains an inalienable feature of air power, this article concludes with a call for a critique that accounts for the fact that current deployments of armed drones – for instance, the US “targeted killings” programme – effectively reproduce these historical and material conditions of terrorist violence.     

The Malaysian “Islamic” State versus the Islamic State (IS): evolving definitions of “terror” in an “Islamising” nation-state

ABSTRACT

This article provides a study of how the Malaysian state defines and redefines “terror” as the nature of militancy changes from the Communist insurgency to present day’s Islamist jihadism. Tracing such definitional changes, the article demonstrates how the portrait of a terrorist not only is inherently political (and at certain junctures, politicised), but also reflects the changing nature of the state. While able to ethnicise and externalise the Communist Terrorists (CTs), the rise of Islamist militancy forced the Malaysian state to shelve the term “terrorist” in favour of religious “deviancy” until the advent of the “war on terror”. Advancing along a state-driven Islamisation project, the discursive ideal that is the “Islamic state”, was securitised (1980–2001), normalised (2001–2013), and resecuritised (2014–2016) as a balancing act not only to neutralise the security threat but also to augment the state’s “Islamic” credentials for domestic political gains. Following the emergence of the Islamic State (IS), I argue that the Malaysian state is now embroiled in an “Islamic state versus Islamic State” dilemma, where in the face of a far enemy it cannot decisively eliminate, the state has no choice but to defend itself as a sovereign nation-state as well as an “Islamic” one, further problematising Islam in discourses of security and violence.     

All for brownie points!: reappraising the new commercial media and media–terrorism nexus in the context of the Mumbai attacks of 26/11

The emergence of a global new media model aided by the technological revolution of the twenty-first century, economic globalization and political neo-liberalism, has transformed the traditional old model of media as a democratic pillar of public service into a new profit-oriented model of media as a corporate business enterprise primarily dependent on advertisement revenues. This change in the media ownership has had significant negative implications for media coverage and content. In this changed scenario of eclipse of investigative and critical journalism and triumph of infotainment journalism, this new corporate media, especially in the post-9/11 era, has nonetheless made itself particularly vulnerable to the terrorist manipulation of mass media as an advertisement agent for terror. Through the specific case study of the media coverage of Mumbai terror attacks on November 26, 2008, this study attempts to reveal how the commercial agenda of the new media ends up furthering the terrorist agenda, albeit in immediate short run, of inculcating mass hysteria, irrational mob fury directed against the state thereby eroding, however temporarily, popular sovereignty of the state.     

Marching Down the Garvaghy Road: Republican Tactics and State Response to the Orangemen's Claim to March their Traditional Route Home after the Drumcree Church Service

This study outlines the background and circumstances of the dispute over the Orange Order's claim to the right to parade down the Garvaghy Road after their annual Drumcree church service. This dispute has soured community relations in Northern Ireland and caused deep embarrassment to the British government, Unionists and many other groups for over five years now. However, it is the analysis of this article that such embarrassment and bad community relations was the desired outcome for one of the major participants in the dispute, the Republicans. It is argued that they deliberately set about conducting protests against Orange parades in the most confrontational manner possible. Their aim was to create a substitute for bombs and guns, an ongoing form of violence which they could use for political advantage during the talks known as the peace process. Whilst there is undoubtedly a long-established degree of nationalist resentment against the Orange Order on which Republicans were able to play, the open confrontations on the Garvaghy Road in recent years took much deliberate manipulation to become the violent clashes of today. The dispute is thus an example of terrorist tactics in which conventional terrorist violence is replaced by street violence. It is also an example of a case in which a weak and uncomprehending state made matters worse by trying to bargain with the perpetrators of violence.     

Strong State,Smothered Society: Explaining Terrorist Violence in Thailand's Deep South

Why have militants in southern Thailand utilized anonymous and at times indiscriminate terrorist violence against civilians? This article gauges three explanations: resource wealth, weak states, and strong states. I argue that terrorist violence against civilians in southern Thailand is partially sustained and largely structured by the considerable institutional strength of the Thai state. This helps sustain the conflict by providing an additional grievance and it structures the form of violence by forcing militants underground and severing their links to civilians. A potential response would be to trim state agencies and scale back the presence of the state in Patani.     

Preemption, Unilateralism, and Hegemony: The American Tradition?

Historian John Lewis Gaddis has found precedent for the current war on terror in early American history, arguing that the British burning of the capitol in 1814 had an impact on defense policy similar to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, leading to an emphasis on preemption. In basic respects, Gaddis restates the consensus among diplomatic historians that the early republic's foreign policy focused on preemption, unilateralism, and hegemony. But these depictions of early American diplomacy conflate separate eras and ignore an opposing tradition that was more moderate and principled. They are not without some truth, but their imperious sway in histories of our country needs to be checked and balanced.     

Terrorist Assassination and Institutional Change in Repressive Regimes

ABSTRACT

Missing from the political violence literature is an in-depth and systematic examination of the effects of terrorist assassination on state political institutions in repressive regimes. By broadening the scope and depth of empirical research into terrorist assassinations, the potential exists to enhance our understanding of the outcomes of assassination by terrorist actors as well as our overall understanding of political violence in repressive regimes. Utilizing survival analysis and data from the Global Terrorism Database, the Polity IV Project, and the Political Terror Scale, this project focuses on the post-terrorist assassination institutional outcomes in repressive regimes. While the effects are long-term, the most repressive regimes are the most likely to experience political institutional shifts in the wake of terrorist assassinations. The direction of the institutional shifts is mixed, but results indicate that the level of state repression in existence prior to a terrorist assassination matters to post-terrorist assassination outcomes.     

Immigrants and undesirables: “terrorism” and the “terrorist” in 1930s France

This article investigates French understandings of the terms “terrorism” and “terrorist” in the period of the late Third Republic when a series of assassinations, murders and bombings suggested that France was dangerously exposed to the threat of terror. The article deconstructs contemporary understandings of the phenomenon, showing that, if a variety of actions were labelled “terrorist”, the term was deployed in particular in relation to matters of foreignness. It was believed that immigrants, refugees and foreign secret agents imported terrorist violence to France. French citizens did not – could not even – perpetrate terrorism. Parallels may be drawn between discussions of citizenship in the wake of twenty-first century acts of terrorism and manifestations of such violence during the 1930s when notions of terrorism, Frenchness and foreignness were intimately connected.     

Bermuda triangle: comparing official definitions of terrorist activity

Terror has been officially defined by many states and international actors. Although these definitions differ from each other to a certain extent, the basic divergence appears in the definition of the terrorist, since it reveals who is considered an ‘enemy’ by those actors. The difference between the definitions and lists elaborated by the United States and by the European Union on ‘terrorism, terrorist, and terror organization’ indicates their respective perceptions of the enemy as well as their differing global policies on terrorism. In Turkey, a country marked by a 20 year long struggle against terrorism, the definition of these concepts is mostly limited to domestic politics. The objective of this paper is to compare and contrast the official definitions of terror, terrorist, and terrorist organization by these three actors, including their respective international positions on terrorism.     

Terrorists,scholars and ordinary people: confronting terrorism studies with field experiences

Fieldwork in the study of terrorism remains the exception, allowing for scores of publications to be produced each year with little or no contact with the perpetrators of terrorist violence and scarce direct observation of the social realities in which it occurs. While examining some of the serious drawbacks and pitfalls such research can entail, this article makes a case for more fieldwork in terrorism studies, arguing that it can bring greater depth to our understanding of terrorist violence. The discussion focuses on a common assumption – the existence of the ‘terrorist’ as subject – and a common practice of terrorism studies – the concentration on extraordinary events at the expense of ‘ordinary life’ and ‘ordinary people’ – and how they are called into question by the material gathered during field research conducted in the Southern Philippine region of Mindanao. The article concludes with a reflection on some of the challenges facing researchers in danger zones, from their dependence on local knowledge for security to the need for methodological flexibility when faced with the complexity of research in conflict areas.     

Do Terrorist Attacks Increase Closer to Elections?

The shadow of violence that elections cast remains poorly understood. A key obstacle impeding cross-national empirical analysis of electoral violence has been the varied nature of such violence. To address this challenge, I examine terrorist attacks as one particular form of electoral violence. By tracking the incidence of terrorist violence relative to election dates over time and across countries using an original dataset for the period from 2000–2005, I find strong support for the hypothesis that terrorist violence increases as we move closer to an election date. In fact, terrorist violence approximates a normal distribution centered on the election date.     

Islamic terrorist activities in turkey in the 1990s

This article focuses on Islamic terrorism in the framework of overall Islamic activity in Turkey. It argues that Islamic terrorist organizations active in Turkey during the 1990s strived to establish an Islamic shari ’a‐based state on the Iranian example, profited from deeper social and political trends in Turkish society and, at the same time, strengthened those trends by their violence. These groups enjoyed wide Iranian support and often acted on behalf of Iranian local and regional, political and strategic interests. The reaction of Turkish authorities in the past to Islamic terrorist activity was limited, and thus encouraged leaders of these groups and their sponsors to continue escalating violence, hoping it would bring down the secular democratic regime in Turkey.     

International terrorism? Indian popular cinema and the politics of terror

The first decade of the twenty-first century has been marked by the decisive entry into our media landscape of the so-called global war on terror, with countless films and TV series from all over the world addressing the issue of international terrorism. Even Indian popular cinema, which has been addressing the issue of domestic terrorism since the late 1980s with films such as Roja (Ratnam, 1992), Drohkaal (Nihalani, 1994), Maachis (Gulzar, 1996), has, since the new millennium, begun to tackle the topic of international terrorism. In this article, I will analyse the shift in the construction of the terrorist discourse in Indian popular cinema from a domestic to an international perspective in order to highlight the close proximity between the two, as in fact, the “global war on terror” narrative seems to offer Indian filmmakers the possibility to simultaneously address international and domestic terrorism. In particular, I will refer to Karan Johar’s film My Name Is Khan as a text which, while discussing the consequences of the American war on terror on its minorities, problematises the official discourse on terrorism and its neo-Orientalist character. It also draws a parallel between the situation of minorities in the United States and India. In so doing, the film triggers a reflection on the state of the Indian nation and questions the state of the secularist values of newly independent India after decades of communal violence.     

American and foreign terrorists: an analysis of divergent portrayals in US newspaper coverage

American news coverage of terrorist activity consistently portrays the attacker as abnormal, but the mechanics of this othering process are entirely dependent on the nationality of the attacker in question. Coverage of domestic terrorism stresses the attacker’s personal instability and contrasts the perpetrator with his or her victims, painting the terrorist as an anomaly in American society. Foreign attackers, with whom journalists more frequently apply the terrorist label, are othered in US news media through heavy emphasis on their association with distant groups and conflicts. To explore how framing techniques differ throughout coverage of domestic and foreign terrorists, two separate corpora of articles from popular American newspapers were systematically compiled. One corpus contained articles about American attackers, while the other contained articles about foreign terrorists. The corpora were processed using both corpus linguistics software and a comparative analysis of texts. Exploring the American media’s framing choices illuminates how popular biases and perceptions of terrorist violence came to be; framing theory asserts that communicating entities inevitably shape the story they relay, influencing the reactions of those who experience the event second-hand. Not only does news coverage use distinct framing patterns for American and foreign perpetrators, but those patterns foster a populace that conceptualises American and foreign terrorists differently.     

Violence in Lenin's thought and practice: The spark and the conflagration

Drawing on Lenin's writings, the commentary of Soviet specialists, and the work of those who focus on the special character of violence, this article discusses Lenin's views on violence over his lifetime, his distinction among different types of violence, his policies and their results, and finally the doubts about his practices that he ultimately expressed near the end of his life. Beginning in the tsarist era with Lenin's campaign among his fellow revolutionaries to reject individual terror in favor of mass violence, it follows him into power as he put his tenets into practice and finally into his introspective retirement. It discusses how, oblivious to developing danger he unleashed mass violence and prodded it to action in the service of the revolutionary state; why he refused to incorporate safeguards against runaway violence; and how, as its deleterious effects became manifest, he continued to employ violence as both instrument of choice and substitute for legitimate authority. It shows that Lenin evinced an addiction to violence that caused him to overlook or foreclose other, less radical, political methods for accomplishing his goals. We see that Lenin's evident belief in the efficacy and controllability of violence blinded him to its potentially counterproductive and even disastrous effects. The state that resulted from Lenin's policies was not what he had envisaged, and not the result of a preconceived plan. But equally it did not emerge as the simple product of ineluctable circumstances defeating a hapless Lenin. Lenin made a series of policy choices ‐ none foreordained by circumstance ‐ which yielded an authoritarian state grounded in violence. These choices were explicitly contested by prominent contemporaries within and outside of the Bolshevik government, who correctly and vocally predicted the results which were becoming clearly visible during Lenin's tenure. Lenin chose to ignore the results, reject the alternatives and silence the critics, decisions he himself came to regret.     

Representative Democracy and Fighting Domestic Terrorism

Does more representative government improve states' ability to fight domestic terrorism? In prior work, democracies are seen as more susceptible to terrorism because their respect for human rights prevents them from fully eliminating terrorist groups. However, such extrajudicial aggression could also alienate large portions of the population and create the ideal conditions for an insurgency. I argue that since terrorism is the lowest-capacity form of political violence, it is natural that states that do best at deterring political violence experience the most terrorism. While representative democracies should see terrorist groups initiate spells of attacks at a greater frequency, full political representation should also galvanize major political actors to unite and eliminate terrorist threats. I test this assertion through statistical models that treat the process of terrorist group initiation and its duration and intensity separately. Results not only show that less consolidated democracies and autocracies experience longer and more intense terrorist campaigns, but that, in support of the theory's mechanisms, groups are more likely to shift to terrorism from insurgency when their political base gains more political representation. The results call the division among research programs of various political violence types into question.