The Human Price of Reparations

Post-1918 Germany was gripped by severe foof shortages that devastated the health of urban children in particular. German politicans and officials became increasingly convinced that a state of near famine and the accompanying scourges of social and political disorder could not be adequately addressed given the demands placed on public finances and the wider economy by the reparations regime. While the British reacted by counselling a moderation of the reparations regime, the French accused Germany of instrumentalizing domestic crisis to undermine reparations and thereby compromise the Versailles Settlement. French sanctions culminated in an invasion of the Ruhr District in January 1923, which served to create a devastating famine in the region and to intensify popular antipathy in Germany to the reparations regime. The article concludes by considering briefly links between the perceived perfidy of reparations and the subsequent resonance of Nazi ideology and policy.     

Lord Cunliffe, Lloyd George, reparations and reputations at the Paris peace conference, 1919

This paper reexamines the role of Lord Cunliffe, traditionally cast (by Lloyd George, among others) as one of the villains of the Paris Peace Conference for his extremism on reparations. It argues that Lloyd George used Cunliffe as a stalking-horse to conceal his own intention of exacting maximum reparations in the face of American opposition. Lloyd George's refusal to agree a final sum, despite the pleas of almost all his senior colleagues, reflected both Cunliffe's advice and his own fears of underestimating Germany's capacity by setting too low a figure, which would be largely consumed by French claims.     

Maynard Keynes and the 'Bamboozlement' of Woodrow Wilson: What Really Happened at Paris? (Wilson, Lloyd George, pensions and pre-armistice agreement)

Woodrow Wilson's acceptance of Lloyd George's demand for the inclusion of military pensions among the reparations payable to the Allies under the Treaty of Versailles was stigmatized by J.M. Keynes in The Economic Consequences of the Peace as the most notorious of the President's alleged breaches of faith with Germany. Keynes's damning verdict remains virtually unquestioned. This paper reconsiders the case for pensions, suggests that the question was less clear-cut than Keynes insisted, and queries his influential account of Wilson's supposed gullibility and culpability. The paper then considers Lloyd George's intentions in the Pre-armistice agreement, from which the Allied right to reparations and pensions were derived.     

Maynard Keynes and the ‘Bamboozlement’ of Woodrow Wilson: What Really Happened at Paris? (Wilson,Lloyd George,pensions and pre-armistice agreement)

Woodrow Wilson’s acceptance of Lloyd George’s demand for the inclusion of military pensions among the reparations payable to the Allies under the Treaty of Versailles was stigmatized by J.M. Keynes in The Economic Consequences of the Peace as the most notorious of the President’s alleged breaches of faith with Germany. Keynes’s damning verdict remains virtually unquestioned. This paper reconsiders the case for pensions, suggests that the question was less clear-cut than Keynes insisted, and queries his influential account of Wilson’s supposed gullibility and culpability. The paper then considers Lloyd George’s intentions in the Pre-armistice agreement, from which the Allied right to reparations and pensions were derived.     

J.M. Keynes and the Personal Politics of Reparations: Part 2

The second part of this article shows that John Maynard Keynes worked closely with the German Finance and Foreign ministries as a supposed neutral expert in October 1922. He supported passive resistance to the French in the Ruhr without regard to its effects on the currency, secretly collaborated in writing the German reparations note of June 1923, and then praised his own work in a weekly that he controlled. Keynes opposed the 1929 Young Plan that re-scheduled the German debt and declined to accept modern thinking on overcoming the transfer problem.     

The Reparations Debate

This paper examines the reparations question from the perspective of its role in the post-1924 period. Particular attention is paid to the work of Albert Ritschl on the reparations regimes between 1924 and 1934. He stresses the competition between Germany's public and private debts and the importance of Germany's role as a sovereign debtor that could not commit national suicide by fulfilling its obligations at any social and political price but that sought to maintain its credit by giving primacy to its private obligations at the expense of reparations. There was some learning from the past after 1945. The London Debt Agreement of 1953 precluded a conflict between private and public debts by an exclusive concentration on private debts and the restoration of German credit.     

The Reparations Debate

This paper examines the reparations question from the perspective of its role in the post-1924 period. Particular attention is paid to the work of Albert Ritschl on the reparations regimes between 1924 and 1934. He stresses the competition between Germany's public and private debts and the importance of Germany's role as a sovereign debtor that could not commit national suicide by fulfilling its obligations at any social and political price but that sought to maintain its credit by giving primacy to its private obligations at the expense of reparations. There was some learning from the past after 1945. The London Debt Agreement of 1953 precluded a conflict between private and public debts by an exclusive concentration on private debts and the restoration of German credit.     

Consoling Display of Strength or Emotional Overstrain? The Gendered Framing of the Early “War on Terrorism” in Transatlantic Comparison

This contribution addresses the diverging discourses of the United States, France and Germany in reaction to the terrorist attacks of 2001 in New York and Washington, with a focus on gender. As a discourse analysis, it explores the ways in which the different narratives instantiate dichotomous conceptions of gender. It is argued that owing to the centrality of gendered constructions for identity, and owing to the mutually constitutive nature of the relation between identity and foreign policy, the comparative perspective adopted adds to the understanding of the disparities in enacting foreign policy between these three close transatlantic allies. Not only does this paper expose the contingency of the gendered underpinnings of the US, French and German high-level policy discourses that were constitutive of the early “war on terrorism” but it also shows how these stories matter. The three countries' foreign policy formulations in response to “9/11”, particularly their respective choices between identifying the attacks as acts of war or crime, pursuit or rejection of regime change, and unilateralism and multilateralism, make explicit that the varying degrees of dichotomously gendered framings of identity are constitutively significant for foreign policy formulations.     

The Versailles Settlement and Identity in French Flanders

This article examines the local reactions to the Versailles negotiations and final settlement along the north-eastern frontier of France, discussing both immediate reactions to the post-war conditions, as well as longer-term trends in identity formation within the region. It shows that the practical considerations of rebuilding after the war outweighed desire for revenge upon Germany, and that on average they were less interested in forcing Germany to pay more, than ensuring the short term costs were met whoever paid them. It also shows that the peace settlement did have a concrete effect in solidifying the border as a marker of identity, with increasing distinction made between the French Flemish and the neighbouring Belgian population.     

The Versailles Settlement and Identity in French Flanders

This article examines the local reactions to the Versailles negotiations and final settlement along the north-eastern frontier of France, discussing both immediate reactions to the post-war conditions, as well as longer-term trends in identity formation within the region. It shows that the practical considerations of rebuilding after the war outweighed desire for revenge upon Germany, and that on average they were less interested in forcing Germany to pay more, than ensuring the short term costs were met whoever paid them. It also shows that the peace settlement did have a concrete effect in solidifying the border as a marker of identity, with increasing distinction made between the French Flemish and the neighbouring Belgian population.     

Famine and human rights

Famine is clearly and undeniably a terrible wrong, and famine is preventable. The occurrence of famine is an indictment of the ethics of the country in which it has occurred. Despite this, those claiming to represent ethical concerns in general and human rights in particular have had little impact on either understanding famine or dealing with it. This paper is an attempt to develop an agenda whereby human rights concerns can be brought to bear on the problem of famine.     

“We Can't be more Russian than the Russians”: British Policy During the Liman von Sanders Crisis, 1913–1914

This article examines British policy in the Liman von Sanders crisis, which arose between Germany and Russia in late 1913. It takes issue with recent arguments that Britain was too closely bound to the Dual Alliance of France and Russia, that concern for her Indian empire determined her foreign policy, and that the Anglo-German cooperation in 1912 and 1913 was a hollow détente. Britain played an important role in resolving the crisis, by restraining an erratic Russian policy and appealing to Germany to make concessions. Moreover, Britain was the dominant power in the entente and influenced French restraint in this crisis. This served Britain's interests in Turkey, which aimed at the strengthening of that state. Finally, the resolution of the crisis demonstrated a functioning international system, based on alliances and the Concert of Europe, not a system on the verge of collapse into war.     

Domestic politics,news media and humanitarian intervention: why France and Germany diverged over Libya

The European Union member states split over the military intervention in Libya with France, Germany and the UK voting differently in the United Nations Security Council. This article compares news media in France and Germany to better understand the foreign policy decisions of these key actors. Using a newspaper analysis of 334 articles, it shows that the German domestic debate started very late and was much less stable than the French debate. This supports arguments that Germany's decision-making was erratic. The analysis, however, also shows that the German debate was comprehensive and included an extensive discussion of the legitimacy of intervention. This fits in well with the traditional reluctance of German foreign policy elites to support military action.     

The Preventive War that Never Happened: Britain,France, and the Rise of Germany in the 1930s

The theory of “preventive war” states that, under certain conditions, states respond to rising adversaries with military force in an attempt to forestall an adverse shift in the balance of power. British and French passivity in response to the rapid rise of Germany in the 1930s would appear to constitute one of the leading empirical anomalies in the theory, one the theory's proponents must explain. After clarifying the meaning of the preventive motivation for war and specifying the conditions under which it should be the strongest, we examine French and British behavior in the crises over the Rhineland in 1936 and Sudeten Czechoslovakia in 1938 through an intensive study of government documents and private papers. We argue that French political leaders, anticipating a continuing adverse shift in relative power, wanted to confront Hitler, but only with British support, which was not forthcoming. British leaders believed, even by 1936, that the balance of power had already shifted in Germany's favor, but that German ascendancy was only temporary and that British rearmament would redress the balance of power in a few years. We contrast our argument with alternative interpretations based on domestic political pressures and ideologically driven beliefs and interests.     

Reparations in the Long Run

This paper explores how policy-makers during the Second World War attempted to “learn the lessons” of history from the reparations settlement imposed after the First World War. It shows how these lessons were developed and articulated in the formulation of, in particular, American foreign policy, and also their consequences for foreign policy during and after the Second World War. The paper demonstrates the important role of European advisors in shaping American policy, thereby illustrating that not all American lessons of history were born in the USA. It also draws out how many of these lessons have found an echo in the historiography of German reparations that has emerged over the past fifty years. In both periods the issues of enforcement and compliance, the issues that concern us generally in this volume, dominated the debate between advisors and policy-makers.     

Major-General Sir Douglas Gracey: Peacekeeper or Peace Enforcer?

Current events in Afghanistan have once again placed the political context of British forces acting in difficult circumstances under the global microscope. This article focuses upon the high policy difficulties of administering peacekeeping duties by examining the controversial role of Major-General Gracey in South Vietnam and Cambodia in 1945. Gracey's British and Indian troops were deployed in French Indo-China to oversee the surrender of Japanese forces and the liberation of the Axis occupied territory. But they quickly became entangled in peacekeeping duties between the returning French colonial regime and the emergence of various Vietnamese groups determined to take advantage of the power vacuum. By examining both primary and secondary sources and scrutinising Gracey's private papers this article attempts to reappraise a difficult period in British history.     

Reparations in the Long Run

This paper explores how policy-makers during the Second World War attempted to “learn the lessons” of history from the reparations settlement imposed after the First World War. It shows how these lessons were developed and articulated in the formulation of, in particular, American foreign policy, and also their consequences for foreign policy during and after the Second World War. The paper demonstrates the important role of European advisors in shaping American policy, thereby illustrating that not all American lessons of history were born in the USA. It also draws out how many of these lessons have found an echo in the historiography of German reparations that has emerged over the past fifty years. In both periods the issues of enforcement and compliance, the issues that concern us generally in this volume, dominated the debate between advisors and policy-makers.     

Franco‐American relations: a historical–structural analysis

This article sketches a historical‐structural picture of Franco‐American relations from a French point of view. The historical approach is chosen because it allows understanding of how mutual visions and images develop. Franco‐American mutual images are traced from the time of French involvement in the birth of the US, through the period when France and the US were the first two grand republics with universalist claims. The difficult relationship between these two states with remarkably similar universalist self‐images is seen against a background of a rising US and declining France, with the fall of France in 1940 seen as a turning point. The Gaullist project of removing this humiliation marks the Franco‐American relationship, as compared with that of Britain (declined but undefeated), and a Germany reborn within the Euro‐Atlantic institutions after the cataclysm of 1945.     

Early American Views Regarding European Unification

This article examines the origins of US foreign economic policy in the post-1945 period and the major challenges posed to US policy by European economic integration and the establishment of a multilateral trade regime. US post-war economic planning began in the early stages of World War II. The US promoted bilateral trade agreements based on reciprocity and most-favoured-nation principles. During the war, US policy makers debated the merits of various plans to provide economic and financial assistance to Europe based on the assumption that Nazi Germany would be defeated. The plans for economic reconstruction of Europe were made under the premise that US economy would benefit from the creation of export markets in Europe. However, US policy makers were also concerned that the creation of a unified European market could potentially constitute a challenge to US economic hegemony and perhaps a political threat should Europe fall under another tyrannical regime. US policy therefore pursued twin tracks: it promoted economic reconstruction and integration in Europe; at the same time, it facilitated the establishment of an international trading regime that would promote principles of liberalised trade, support US economic growth and contribute to the development of a free enterprise capitalist trading system. This article illustrates that US economic planners in the 1940s were aware of the benefits and risks of European economic integration, seeking to balance European economic reconstruction with the establishment of a robust multilateral trading system.     

Critique of Schuker “J.M. Keynes and the Personal Politics of Reparations”

In “J.M. Keynes and the Personal Politics of Reparations,” Parts I and II, published in Diplomacy and Statecraft (2014), the American historian Stephen Schuker claims that Keynes’ scientific arguments against the policy of reparations were distorted by both political passion and his emotional attachment to the German banker, Dr. Carl Melchior. He provides no evidence for this argument, and Keynes’ analytic positions emerges without reference to either.