A CONSUMER-WELFARE APPROACH TO NETWORK NEUTRALITY REGULATION OF THE INTERNET

"Network neutrality" is the shorthand for a proposed regimeof economic regulation for the Internet. Because of the trendto deliver traditional telecommunications services, as wellas new forms of content and applications, by Internet protocol(IP), a regime of network neutrality regulation would displaceor subordinate a substantial portion of existing telecommunicationsregulation. If the United States adopts network neutrality regulation,other industrialized nations probably will soon follow. As aresult of their investment to create next-generation broadbandnetworks, network operators have the ability to innovate insidethe network by offering both senders and receivers of informationgreater bandwidth and prioritization of delivery. Network neutralityregulation would, among other things, prevent providers of broadbandInternet access service (such as digital subscriber line (DSL)or cable modem service) from offering a guaranteed, expediteddelivery speed in return for the payment of a fee. The practicaleffect of banning such differential pricing (called "accesstiering" by its critics) would be to prevent the pricing ofaccess to content or applications providers according to priorityof delivery. To the extent that an advertiser of a good or servicewould be willing to contract with a network operator for advertisingspace on the network operator's affiliated content, anotherpractical effect of network neutrality regulation would be toerect a barrier to vertical integration of network operatorsinto advertising-based business models that could supplementor replace revenues earned from their existing usage-based businessmodels. Moreover, by making end-users pay for the full costof broadband access, network neutrality regulation would denybroadband access to the large number of consumers who wouldnot be able to afford, or who would not have a willingness topay for, what would otherwise be less expensive access. Forexample, Google is planning to offer broadband access to end-usersfor free in San Francisco by charging other content providersfor advertising. This product offering is evidently predicatedon the belief that many end-users demand discounted or freebroadband access that is paid for by parties other than themselves.Proponents of network neutrality regulation argue that suchrestrictions on the pricing policies of network operators arenecessary to preserve innovation on the edges of the network,as opposed to innovation within the network. However, recognizingthat network congestion and real-time applications demand somedifferential pricing according to bandwidth or priority, proponentsof network neutrality regulation would allow broadband Internetaccess providers to charge higher prices to end-users (but notcontent or applications providers) who consume more bandwidthor who seek priority delivery of certain traffic. Thus, thedebate over network neutrality is essentially a debate overhow best to finance the construction and maintenance of a broadbandnetwork in a two-sided market in which senders and receivershave additive demand for the delivery of a given piece of information—andhence additive willingness to pay. Well-established tools ofRamsey pricing from regulatory economics can shed light on whethernetwork congestion and recovery of sunk investment in infrastructureare best addressed by charging providers of content and applications,broadband users, or both for expedited delivery. Apart fromthis pricing problem, an analytically simpler component of proposednetwork neutrality regulation would prohibit a network operatorfrom denying its users access to certain websites and Internetapplications, such as voice over Internet protocol (VoIP). Althoughsome instances of blocking of VoIP have been reported, suchconduct is not a serious risk to competition. To address thisconcern, I analyze whether market forces (that is, competitionamong access providers) and existing regulatory structures aresufficient to protect broadband users. I conclude that economicwelfare would be maximized by allowing access providers to differentiateservices vis-à-vis providers of content and applicationsin value-enhancing ways and by relying on existing legal regimesto protect consumers against the exercise of market power, shouldit exist.     

评《物权法草案》第十七章

<正>新中国的抵押权制度肇始于1986年施行的《民法通则》,此后,因应经济发展和司法实务的要求,立法机关和准立法机关陆续颁布了一系列相关的法律法规和司法解释。目前,我国的抵押权制度已初具规模,抵押也日益成为社会经济中最主要的融资担保方式之一。在这个背景下,此次物权法的制定,是一个极好的总结司法实践,整合现行立法的机会。法典的制定,一方面要确定制度内容,另一方面要安排体例结构。以下本文分别从这两方面进行评论。     

业主的建筑物区分所有权 评《物权法草案》第六章

<正>一、引言建筑物区分所有权本质上属于一种重要的物权类型,但并非新生的物权概念,远在古代的埃及、巴比伦、希腊的法律中即已有其踪迹。近现代大陆法系、英美法系各国家和地区,如法国、德国、日本、瑞士、美国、我国台湾及香港地区等,都制定了有关区分所有权的法律。导致各国家和地区纷纷制定区分所有权法的原因,是在近现代社会里,钢筋高层建筑物激增,公寓大厦盛行。     

地役权与居住权问题 评《物权法草案》第十四、十五章

<正>一、关于地役权的规定(一)关于地役权的类型的问题《物权法草案》(以下简称《草案》)只规定了当事人通过契约设立的地役权,这种地役权在学理上被称为意定地役权。在大陆法系国家,除意定地役权之外,还承认有法定地役权的存在。之所以有法定地役权,主要是考虑到在许多情况下,需役地对供役地的利用有绝对的必要(比如说汲取生活用水),出于利益衡量的考虑,法律规定需役地的所有人直接依法取得对供役地的地役权,不需要取得供役地所有人的同意。法定地役权,由于依法而存在,完全排除了     

占有的基本问题 评《物权法草案》第二十章

<正>一、序论《中华人民共和国物权法(草案)》(以下简称《草案》)之末编末章,为关于"占有"之规定,共7个条文,加上"附则"第266条第7项占有概念之立法定义,条文数至多7个半。所规定者,为占有的概念(第266条第7项)、占有的种类(第259条)、有关占有的推定(第260- 261条)、对无权占有人请求回复占有物时所生的损害、孳息以及费用问题(第262-264条)、占有的保护(第265条)。除此之外,理论上涉及占有的问题,尚有占有在物权法编制中的地     

物权立法与法律理论 评《物权法草案》第一章

<正>一、引言法律的制定,在任何一个国家都会是重大的政治事件。但这丝毫不意味着,法律的制定仅仅是政治事件。萨维尼早已指出,法律由政治因素与技术因素共同构成,其中,技术因素所表现的是法律"独特的科学性的存在",它仰赖法学而得形成。就此而言,如果脱离了法学的支持,所谓法律,它表述的不过是制定者的专断意志。此时,无论立法的政治意义如何重大,皆