洛克对政治权力内涵的分析

洛克在《政府论两篇》中分析了政治权力的内涵。他的学说对英美自由主义理论的发展产生了深远的影响。尽管如此,学界却一直忽视了洛克的政治权力理论,仅仅强调了他的权利理论。本文试图弥补这一缺陷。洛克分析政治权力的起点是享有财产权和自由的个体,这些个体构成了一个前政治的自由秩序。以此为基础,洛克通过社会契约解释了政治权力的生成逻辑,并在这一论证过程中赋予政治权力以特定的道德属性。他阐释政治权力内涵的另一个特点是他赋予了政治权力以一种特殊的存在形态,即"立法权力"。洛克阐述的这一政治权力有效地在理论上对抗了当时的父权理论和绝对主权理论,为他设计一个宪政国家奠定了基础。     

Locke, Sincerity and the Rationality of Persecution

According to the most influential contemporary reading of John Locke's Letter Concerning Toleration (1689), his main argument against religious persecution is unsuccessful. That argument holds that coercion is ineffective as a means of instilling religious beliefs in its victims. I propose a different reading of the Letter . Locke's main consideration against persecution is not the unsuccessful belief-based argument just outlined, but what I call the sincerity argument . He believes that religious coercion is irrational because it is ineffective as a means of inculcating the right intentions in people. Once this alternative argument is placed at its centre, the Letter is seen to be a more fertile source of political argument than is suggested by alternative readings. In particular, the sincerity argument gives us a powerful reason for rejecting state moral paternalism, the doctrine that the state may use coercion to make people morally virtuous. If moral virtue depends upon people having the right intentions, and if coercion is ineffective as a means of instilling the right intentions in people, then state moral paternalism is ineffective and hence irrational.     

Locke and the Politics and Theology of Toleration

Locke's theory of toleration has been understood to rest on the claim that persecution was insufficient to instil either (i) true or (ii) sincere belief in people. Although Locke did indeed make both these claims, neither was fundamental to his theory. Locke was principally concerned to deny that persecution was necessary to instil true or sincere belief; its insufficiency to those ends he, and his contemporaries, took for granted. His denial of the necessity of persecution presupposed that human beings were, in principle, naturally adequate to the discovery of God's wants for them. The same presupposition, which derives from natural theology, underwrote the views in politics and revealed theology that complete his theory and supplied its moral content. Contemporary theories of toleration purposing to proceed on Lockean assumptions are morally and philosophically impoverished by their failure to see the requirements laid on an adequate theory of toleration by genuinely Lockean terms.     

Thomas Jefferson's Liberal Anticapitalism

This article reassesses Thomas Jefferson's political economy in light of debates about the influence of liberal and republican ideas on his thought. I argue that Jefferson embraced liberal premises, but used them to reach anticapitalist conclusions. He opposed neither commerce nor the prosperity it promised; he opposed working for a wage, and he did so on liberal grounds. The first section of this article shows that John Locke's theory of property turns on the justification of capitalist labor relations. The second section establishes, first, that Locke's argument played a decisive role in the development of Jefferson's own and, second, that Jefferson redefined its terms to fashion a forceful critique of wage labor. An examination of Jefferson's writings elucidates a neglected variant of the liberal tradition, prevalent in the United States until the Populist agitation. Its core is the stigma attached to working for hire as a diminished form of liberty, tantamount to wage slavery.     

Tradition and Prudence in Locke's Exceptions to Toleration

Why did Locke exclude Catholics and atheists from toleration? Not, I contend, because he was trapped by his context, but because his prudential approach and practical judgments led him to traditional texts. I make this argument first by outlining the connections among prudential exceptionality, practical judgments, and traditional texts. I then describe important continuities between conventional English understandings of the relationship between state and religion and Locke's writings on toleration, discuss Locke's conception of rights, and illustrate his use of prudential exceptions and distinctions. I conclude by arguing that Locke's problems are relevant to assessing contemporary liberal discussions of toleration and the separation of state and religion that lean heavily on practical justifications.     

Locke on the Moral Basis of International Relations

This article aims to focus analysis of Locke's theory of international relations away from the familiar discourse of sovereignty and natural law and toward a different discourse involving self-government and international society. It argues that Locke's conception of international society balanced interrelated, overlapping, and even competing claims about sovereignty and natural law in a normative framework in which the right of self-government replaced the principle of sovereignty as the moral basis of international relations. Thus, for Locke the norms deduced from the law of nature govern the international state of nature even as independent societies remain the primary executors of the law of nature in international society. The article concludes by considering how Locke's reflections on international relations may contribute to our understanding of contemporary debates about sovereignty, the use of force, and the ethics of intervention.     

The Lockean Case for Religious Tolerance: The Social Contract and the Irrationality of Persecution

John Locke's non-religious arguments for tolerance are often seen as inadequate. He is criticized for: (1) failing to give reasons in support of a strict separation between the roles of church and state; and (2) wrongly insisting that the coercion of belief is irrational. I argue that once we understand Locke's arguments for tolerance within the context of his social contract framework, his non-sectarian arguments can circumvent such criticisms. Lockean arguments for tolerance are thus stronger than typically supposed.     

Cohen vs. Rawls on justice and equality

G.A. Cohen criticizes Rawls’s account of justice because his difference principle permits inequalities that reflect the relative scarcity of different skills and natural abilities. Instead of viewing the ‘basic structure’ as the primary subject of justice, Cohen argues that individual citizens should cultivate an egalitarian ethos, which would enable a just society to dispense with the use of incentive payments to induce individuals to use their talents in socially ideal ways. This study examines Cohen’s critique, including his rejection of ‘incentives,’ and vindicates Rawls’s approach. Ultimately, Cohen’s argument fails to grapple with the moral pluralism that characterizes modern, democratic societies, whereas Rawls’s theory is constructed to accommodate such pluralism.     

Steven Lukes on the Concept of Power

Steven Lukes has recently reissued his famous book on power, Power: A Radical View . He now admits that the concept of power that he used in his original (1974) book is flawed, but he still wants to defend the position that he advanced there. I argue that he is right to regard his concept of power as flawed, but that admitting this undermines his argument. I conclude that he can rescue his argument by realising that he is not, in fact, using a concept of power at all.     

Preserving fairness: Williams against Cohen on just inequality

The view that the choices people make affect what it is fair for them to receive has widespread appeal. This very general thought has found particular and acute expression in the context of distributive justice in the form of the influential view that has become known as luck egalitarianism. In a surprising development, one of luck egalitarianism’s foremost advocates – G.A. Cohen – appeared, in one of his final papers, to reject the commitment to the fairness of chosen inequalities that defines luck egalitarianism. In opposition to the luck egalitarian view, Cohen suggests that choice merely deprives the disadvantaged of a complaint against being worse off, rather than rendering such inequality fair. Against Cohen’s revised view, Andrew Williams has argued that Cohen’s move underestimates an account of equality under which what individuals choose to do with their equal allocation affects what it is to treat them fairly. Here, I seek to show how the Williams response fails to undermine Cohen’s claims about the relation between fairness and choice. I draw on this analysis to show how the disagreement between Williams and Cohen on this issue illuminates a broader methodological divergence over how to approach questions of justice and fairness.     

Max Weber, Socialism, and the Space for Time

In Economy and Society Weber provides a detailed criticism of socialism emphasizing the dynamic nature of the formal rationality of economic action, thus indicating the limits of bureaucratic rationality. Unfortunately, Weber's critique has received scant attention, commentators concentrating instead on remarks in his political essays. Weber's main argument against socialism is that it would lead to a decrease in formal rationality. Drawing upon Austrian political economy, Weber attempts to secure a 'realm of freedom' within anarchical capitalist production through emphasizing the dynamic nature of economic decision making which necessarily precludes the possibility of a rational socialist planned economy.     

Cultural Pluralism: A Response to Seglow's Critique

I examine Seglow's critique (Politics 17(3) 1997) of my assessment of Parekh's theory of operative public values (Politics 16(3) 1996). This examination has four main stages: (a) the rejection of crucial aspects of Seglow's interpretation of my argument, (b) the rejection of his claim that my argument is logically committed to certain other specific positions which I do not support, (c) the rejection of his claim that I my argumentative strategies are misleading, (d) the consideration of possible similarities and disagreements between our respective positive positions on cultural pluralism.     

走向服务政府:洛克有限政府理论及其启示

随着国家治理现代化建设的推进,我国政府治理模式经历了管理型政府向服务型政府的转变.洛克有限政府理论在保护公民权利、实现政治国家与市民社会互动等方面具有积极的现实意义,但有限政府不一定等同于服务政府,在面对不同时期、不同国情下的市场失灵问题以及权衡德治与法治、自由与平等、作为与不作为等现实问题时,有限政府理论具有自身的局限性.而服务型政府必然是一个有限政府,洛克所提出的自然权利、社会契约以及权利让渡所构成的有限政府理论,对于新时代构建服务政府仍然有很强的借鉴意义.     

Anti-perfectionism and Rawlsian Liberalism

This article examines the justifications of anti-perfectionism given by John Rawls in his recent work Political Liberalism. Rawls, I argue, gives one major argument in defence of anti-perfectionism (what I shall call the 'reasonableness among free and equal persons' argument) and two subsidiary arguments (what I shall call the 'social unity' argument and the 'stability' argument). None of these arguments, I claim, are persuasive. Rawls's most recent justification of anti-perfectionism is therefore unsuccessful.     

范畴框架的改变:柯亨对历史唯物主义的重建

为了解决历史唯物主义的"合法性问题",柯亨开始着手对历史唯物主义进行重建。他的重建任务之所以能够实现,凭借的是功能解释的方法,而柯亨的功能解释方法能够奏效的原因在于他对生产力、生产关系(经济基础)等基本概念的重新界定。经过柯亨"重建"的历史唯物主义实质上意味着范畴框架的改变,以满足马克思理论体系的逻辑前提,从而使历史唯物主义理论看起来更加明确。     

Express Consent and Full Membership in Locke

It seems mysterious why Locke requird express consent as a condition of full membership of civil society. It is suggested this requirement be interpreted as a political programme. In a draft of a pamphlet of 1690 Locke criticizes the oath of allegiance required after the Glorious Revolution for not demanding the recognition of William and Mary de jure. So Perhaps he does not want to exclude the greater part of the natives from citizenship; he wants to establish William's throne on a full and universal recognition of his legitimacy.     

Toleration,neutrality, and exemption

ABSTRACT

I focus on some controversial features of Peter Balint’s stimulating and provocative reassessment of the place of toleration in contemporary diverse societies. First, I question his argument that we must enlarge the concept of toleration to include indifference and approval if toleration is to be compatible with state neutrality. Secondly, I suggest that his idea of active neutrality of intent risks encountering the same difficulties as neutrality of outcome, although these will be mitigated the more the state’s neutrality takes a ‘hands-off’ form. Thirdly, while accepting his claim that exemptions depart from neutrality insofar as they attribute a significance to religious and conscientious convictions that they deny to mere preferences, I argue that that departure is not arbitrary and remains within the spirit of neutrality of intent.     

Liberty, Nobility, Philanthropy, and Power in Alexander Hamilton's Conception of Human Nature

Alexander Hamilton's conception of human nature grounds his political thought. His predominately and radically liberal conception of human nature is based on Locke's concept of liberty, Hobbes's concept of power, and Machiavelli's concept of the "effectual truth." It thus stresses the necessary relation between self-interest and republican government and entails the repudiation of classical republican and Christian political ideals. But Hamilton's love of liberty is nonetheless rooted in a sense of classical nobility and Christian philanthropy that elevates even while contradicting his liberalism. The complex relation between liberty, nobility, philanthropy, and power in Hamilton's conception of human nature, in effect, defines his thought, reveals its assumptions, constitutes its strengths, and poses urgent problems. That complexity forms the spirit of his liberal republicanism.