Consultation, Constraints and Norms: The Case of Nuclear Waste

The objectives of public consultation can clash with other policy objectives, partly because the norms underpinning public consultation clash with other institutional norms within the policy process. This phenomenon is evident in the case of selecting a site for a low-level nuclear waste disposal facility in Australia. This case shows how the results of consultation processes are moulded by the process design, which in turn is constrained by a range of policy process norms to which governments adhere. The case confirms some recent critiques of participatory practices. It also suggests that reconciling potentially competing policy process norms will be an important exercise in institutional design if elected representatives wish to mitigate citizens' alienation from their governments.     

Cutback Management in the Netherlands

In this article cutback management is defined as the effort of cabinet ministers to facilitate budgetary cutback decisions through institutional change. Institutions are conceived as formal and informal rules for budgetary decision making. The article presents a sketch of the ways in which successive Dutch cabinets over the 1975–98 period attempted to cut back the expenditures of central government by institutional change and outlines the results that were achieved. The article focuses on three institutions: (1) macrobudgetary norms, (2) rules of budgetary discipline, and (3) procedures for the preparation of cutback decisions. The article identifies two kinds of effective resistance against cutbacks: (1) political resistance emanating from cabinet ministers and (2) bureaucratic resistance emanating from the administrators of executive agencies. It analyzes how the various forms of institutional change affect these forms of resistance and evaluates the results of the cutback effort.     

Policy Networks, Federal Arrangements, and the Development of Environmental Regulations: A Comparison of the Canadian and American Agricultural Sectors

Both studies of federations and studies of policy networks have sought to produce explanations for observed patterns of policy divergence and designs. However, both have evolved in parallel, insights rarely transferring from one to the other. This article reconciles the two types of studies. More specifically, it provides an understanding of the divergent efforts of the United States and Canada with regard to the adoption of environmental regulations for the agricultural sector, which emphasizes the establishment of policy networks through interactions between past policy decisions and federal arrangements. The American federal structure, when combined with unrelated agricultural policy decisions, shaped policy networks in such a way as to enable the adoption of stringent environmental regulations for agriculture. In contrast, the Canadian federal structure, also in conjunction with past policy decisions, prevented the creation of policy networks capable enough to design similarly stringent agro-environmental regulations.     

Varieties of Participation in Complex Governance

The multifaceted challenges of contemporary governance demand a complex account of the ways in which those who are subject to laws and policies should participate in making them. This article develops a framework for understanding the range of institutional possibilities for public participation. Mechanisms of participation vary along three important dimensions: who participates, how participants communicate with one another and make decisions together, and how discussions are linked with policy or public action. These three dimensions constitute a space in which any particular mechanism of participation can be located. Different regions of this institutional design space are more and less suited to addressing important problems of democratic governance such as legitimacy, justice, and effective administration.     

Exploring How Institutional Arrangements Shape Stakeholder Influence on Policy Decisions: A Comparative Analysis in the Energy Sector

In recent years, there has been an expansion of efforts to include stakeholders in administrative policy making. Despite significant potential to improve policy decisions, empirical evidence suggests that not all participatory processes provide meaningful opportunities for stakeholders to shape policy and may even give the most powerful stakeholder groups disproportionate influence over policy decisions. This article argues that the institutional arrangements for stakeholder engagement—the rules and norms that determine which stakeholders can participate and how—affect stakeholders’ influence on policy decisions. This article uses state energy efficiency policy making as a context in which to compare how different institutional arrangements shape the ways in which stakeholders engage in and influence the policy process across two states, Connecticut and Maryland. Findings highlight that institutional arrangements can be used to increase participation, mitigate undue influence of industrial stakeholders, and increase the influence of public interest stakeholder organizations.     

The Craft of Policy Design: Can It Be More Than Art?

The craft for predicting and evaluating the impacts of policy alternatives has received much of the attention of students of public policy analysis. Relatively little attention has been given to understanding and improving the craft for designing alternative policies. Beyond catalogs of generic policy instruments, two sources provide useful insights into policy design. First, the study of institutional choice as policy design draws attention to the selection of procedures and incentive systems to achieve substantive policy outcomes. Second, the study of the manipulation of the dimensions of policy choice (heresethetics), which provides insight into strategy in political arenas, may help with the broader problem of packaging and presenting policies so that they remain viable during implementation.     

Arend Lijphart's Dimensions of Democracy: Logical Connections and Institutional Design

Lijphart's (1999 ) analysis maps countries along two dimensions of democratic institutions: 'executives-parties' or 'joint-power', and 'federal-unitary' or 'divided-power'. My 'meta-study' maps the methodology of Lijphart's mapping: the nature of indices (inputs or outputs), their logical interconnections, their susceptibility to institutional design ('constitutional engineering'), and their suitability for expressing the intended underlying concepts. Strikingly, the joint-power indicators are highly correlated and mostly logically connected output measures, which are not susceptible to institutional design, while the opposite is true for the divided-power dimension. For this dimension most indices are expert estimates of inputs, marginally correlated, yet subject to institutional design, limited by size dependence. Surprisingly, the parliamentary-presidential aspect of institutional design does not affect the picture. The connection between cabinet life and the number of parties is even stronger than found by Lijphart. Interest groups and central bank independence fit his dimensions empirically but less so logically. In sum, institutional design may be more difficult than sometimes assumed, but offers hope.     

State Wildlife Policy and Management: The Scope and Bias of Political Conflict

State wildlife policy and management are often characterized by divisive political conflict among competing stakeholders. This conflict is increasingly being resolved through the ballot-initiative process. One important reason the process is being used so often is the way state wildlife policy and management decisions are often made by state wildlife commissions, boards, or councils (the dominant way these decisions are made in the United States). These bodies are often perceived by important stakeholders as biased, exclusive, or unrepresentative of nonconsumptive stakeholder values. As a result, unsatisfied interest groups often try to take decision-making authority away from these institutions and give it to the public through the ballot initiative. Cases and examples from Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, and Idaho are examined in this context. The article finishes by outlining four broad alternatives that may be debated in the future: the no change alternative, the authoritative expert alternative, the structural change alternative, and the stakeholder-based collaborative conservation alternative(s).     

The Negotiated Economy: Ideal and History*

In the negotiated economy an essential part of the allocation of resources is by definition conducted through institutionalized negotiations between independent decisionmaking centres in state, organizations and corporations. Institutionalized creation of consensus via campaign institutions and forced compromise via negotiating procedures and decisions are central characteristics of the negotiated economy. The article includes evidence to the fact that the present Danish economy is a negotiated economy. During a long historical process, a multi-centred and pluralist political structure has been formed and simultaneously the discursive and institutional basis for co-ordination of decisions made in autonomous organizations has been created. It is shown how today's wages policy, labour market policy, public expenditures policy and industrial policy are characterized by negotiation-based economic processes. It is argued that this historical development has far-reaching theoretical consequences. The institutional conditions presupposed in traditional economic theory for the ideal of optimal allocation of resources is enshrined in the constitutional interpretation of the distinction between the authority of the sovereign state and civil society. As a result of the evolvement of the negotiated economy these institutional conditions no longer exist. This development has made a myth of the ideal of optimal allocation of resources and challenges the interpretation of rationality in traditional economic theory.     

国家间公共政策的转移——概念、研究态势和理论

公共政策的制定者在决策过程中往往通过某种方式来参考其它国家的决策者在相似情况下的做法,包括正面经验和负面教训。这种政策转移(Policy Transfer)现象是公共政策制定和制度创新在现实中的一种主要途径和方式。论述分三个部分:首先,简述了政策转移的概念化过程,辨别了和其它相近概念的异同;其次,勾勒了本课题研究的多学科、多方法和多层次的态势,列举和介绍了一些代表性的研究实例;最后,探讨了相关的理论生成的问题。通过对有关政策转移问题研究的回顾、分析和总结,强调了我国政策转移中大量转移实践和理论研究缺失之间的矛盾现象;提出了开展我国政策转移研究的必要性和关注点;旨在引起我国公共政策的制定者和学者对这一课题的重视,为公共政策有关的决策实践和理论研究提供一个观察、分析和决策的角度。     

Predictions, Patterns, and Policymaking: A Regional Study of Devolution

This article examines state welfare policy choices since thepassage of the Personal Responsibility and Work OpportunityReconciliation Act(PRWORA) of 1996. IT argues that neither priorpredictions nor existing explanations of welfare policymakingfully capture the realities of reform. Using data from nationalstudies and comparisons of policymaking in six states, thisstudy demonstrates that diversity, not uniformity, characterizesstate responses to devolution. Accounting for these choicesrequires an understanding of the context of policymaking. Conventionalanalyses of welfare reform have ignored the institutional structuresthrough which policy is formulated and thus miss an importantdeterminant of choices: the actions of administrative officials.Analyses that ignore institutional settings, and the actionsof administrators within such settings, will continue to missmuch that is crucial to our efforts to understand policy decisions.     

Deleuze and the liberal tradition: normativity,freedom and judgement

This paper is a critical review article of Paul Patton's book, Deleuze and the Political , and analyzes the relationship between Deleuze and the 'liberal' tradition of political philosophy. It focuses on three concepts drawn from the liberal tradition - normativity, freedom and judgment - and in each case shows how these concepts are capable of being transformed in light of Deleuze's philosophy. For Deleuze, a truly 'normative' principle must be a principle of creation as well as critique: it must not only provide norms for condemning abuses of power, but also a means for transforming norms that have themselves become abuses of power. From a Deleuzian perspective, the normative is thus seen as the condition for the production of the new. The liberal notion of 'negative freedom' in turn finds itself transformed into the stronger notion of 'critical freedom' (Tully), which entails the freedom to critique and create, to transform (and not merely pursue) one's own interest and desires. This entails, finally, an exercise of a kind of judgement outside pre-existing rules or norms that would be truly creative of the new (e.g. the production of new rights). A concluding section of the concept of the 'social imaginary’ shows how Deleuze's work might contribute to a transformation and rejuvenation of the liberal tradition itself.     

Ideas, Interests, and Institutions: Challenging the Property Rights Paradigm in Botswana

Recent work in international studies and comparative politics scrutinizes the relative importance of ideas, interests, and institutions as sources of policy change. A growing body of scholarship identifies ideas as the main causal factors, influencing perceived interests as well as perceived policy options. Others contend that policies can best be understood as products of institutions. Neither explanation can account for both policy choice by politicians and the implementation strategies of administrators. In Botswana, the use of professional criteria for hiring and advancement encourages adherence to international professional norms within the bureaucracy, but electoral competition gives politicians more reason to be attentive to local political concerns. The institutions that define relations of authority among actors with different motivations shape the outcomes of policy choice and implementation. Institutions influence the attentiveness of policy-makers to ideas when making decisions, the degree of attention particular policy-makers give to ideas from particular sources, and the degree of acceptance that ideas must achieve to affect policy. Better evaluations of political development can be achieved through attentiveness to the mix of actors involved in policy decisions, the diversity of institutions and ideas that affect their policy preferences, and the relations of authority that shape their relative influence over policy choice and implementation.     

Legitimacy, trust and procedural fairness: Remarks on Marcia Grimes' study

Abstract.  This article is a reply to Marcia Grimes's 2006 contribution to the European Journal of Political Research entitled 'Organizing consent: The role of procedural fairness in political trust and compliance'. The remarks focus on two main points. First, the author discusses the conceptual basis of the study, to argue that trust and legitimacy are quite different concepts that should not be used synonymously. In particular, the author challenges the conceptualization of (subjective) legitimacy in that institutional legitimacy is partly defined as institutional trust. Additionally, the author justifies why (institutional) trust should not be treated as a 'component' of (institutional) legitimacy. Second, the author deals with a methodological problem in Grimes' article. This problem refers to the operationalization of norms of fairness in order to examine the influence of perceived fairness in decision processes on citizens' beliefs of legitimacy. Summing up the author's conceptual and methodological objections, this article offers a somewhat different interpretation of Grimes' main findings.     

Policy Community, Policy Network and Comparative Industrial Policies

This article explores ways in which the relationships between 'government' and 'industry' in the making and carrying out of policy can be compared cross-sectorally and cross-nationally. It draws attention to the accumulating empirical evidence which suggests a disjuncture between conventional characterizations of national economic and industrial policies and processes, with what actually happens in practice. It argues that more systematic attention needs to be given to the analysis of the norms of policy and behaviour at different policy levels. Using the concepts of policy community and policy network, it shows how policy networks can be identified, characterized and compared, and how relationships within networks are regulated by 'rules of the game'.     

The Democratic Quality of Institutional Regimes: a Conceptual Framework

Lijphart's spectrum of democracies – recently expanded by Jack Nagel to a sub-majoritarian sphere of pluralitarian systems which use disproportional electoral systems in order to manufacture majority governments from minorities in the electorate – is based on only one dimension: inclusion of preferences. Political scientists in the Lijphartian tradition wrongly assume that inclusion of preferences, which is an input characteristic, automatically leads to responsiveness, which refers to actual policy decisions and hence is an output characteristic. We therefore add 'responsibility' as a second input characteristic and employ it alongside the inclusiveness of institutional regimes. We argue that in representative democracies there exists a trade-off between inclusiveness and responsibility. This trade-off helps us to measure the democratic quality of institutional regimes. The now expanded spectrum of democracies based on these two dimensions shows that majoritarian democracy proper – in which governments represent a majority of individual preferences but not more than necessary – is the best possible combination of the two democratic values.     

Policy advice as policy work: a conceptual framework for multi-level analysis

This article argues that policy advice can be understood as a special kind of “policy work” that depends upon a diverse set of factors operating at different levels. The basic aim of the article is to disentangle this multi-level and multifaceted phenomenon into a conceptual framework that can be used for empirical analysis and theory building. In that framework, policy advice is conceptualized as a never-ending interaction among various actors in a specific institutional context, through which routines and norms are both reproduced and abolished. First, it is explained why policy advice is most fruitfully understood as a special kind of policy work, and then how it relates to other policy work activities. Second, problems with single-level approaches are discussed and the need for a multi-level approach is explained. Third, a multi-level conceptual framework is formulated and described. Fourth, some possible applications of the framework are illustrated with examples from current empirical research. The article concludes with implications for research and theory building.     

Supplying Trade Reform: Political Institutions and Liberalization in Middle-Income Presidential Democracies

Correcting the relative lack of attention to the supply side of trade policy, this article addresses how political institutions channel societal demands for protection. I hypothesize that strong presidents with significant legislative powers and strong party leaders—empowered through electoral rules that rein in the personal vote—can help overcome protectionist biases. These arguments compare with two institutional alternatives: first, that protectionism should decrease as electoral district size grows because elections become more proportional; and second, that the collective-action problems in fragmented party systems thwart trade reform. I evaluate these hypotheses empirically using pooled time-series–cross-sectional data involving 18 developing countries from 1971 to 1997. I find that delegation to presidents and party leaders is significantly related to trade liberalization, and some evidence suggests that the effective number of parties and the size of electoral districts may also influence levels of protectionism.     

Taking It to the Next Level: The Elevation of District Court Judges to the U.S. Courts of Appeals

We address an important aspect of judicial careers: the elevation of judges from the U.S. District Courts to the Courts of Appeals. We argue that the likelihood of a judge being elevated is a function of informational cues and signals regarding the nature of the judge and the judge's compatibility with presidential preferences. We also expect norms involving the intersection between geography and Senate politics to affect a judge's elevation chances. Using data on district court judges appointed between 1946 and 1995, we find that the likelihood of a judge being elevated is a function of the judge's ideological compatibility with the president, the judge's previous ABA rating, and Senate norms involving state "ownership" of appeals court seats. Blunt indicators of policy preferences trump direct signals when presidents decide whom to elevate, leaving judges little control over their career prospects and thus less incentive to slant their decisions in the direction of the president's preferences.