Psychological Barriers to Resolving Intergroup Conflict: An Extensive Review and Consolidation of the Literature

This article reviews over sixty years of research on psychological barriers to intergroup conflict resolution and finds that scholars have identified eighty nominally different barriers that create or exacerbate intergroup conflict. In order to create a tractable list that would be more helpful to future scholars and practitioners, we consolidate this vast literature (e.g., by eliminating substantive and conceptual redundancies) to produce a list of twenty‐six “unique” psychological barriers. We further organize this inventory of barriers with a framework that distinguishes between “cognitive,” “affective,” and “motivated” psychological barriers. To better understand the literature ecosystem of research on psychological barriers, we employ a data visualization tool to illustrate the extent to which each of the twenty‐six unique barriers has been studied conjointly with every other barrier in the articles we reviewed. We then shift our attention to the work of scholars who have attempted, experimentally, to attenuate psychological barriers in negotiation and conflict settings, and identify five primary methods for doing so. Finally, we discuss the implications of our review for future work in this field.     

Creating Stable Agreements in Marine Policy: Learning from the California South Coast Marine Life Protection Act Initiative

In this article, we examine the California South Coast Marine Life Protection Act Initiative stakeholder process, evaluate its shortcomings, and consider what could have been done differently. Our objective is to make recommendations to improve future multi‐stakeholder marine policy processes. In our view, while the South Coast stakeholder process had many positive outcomes, it failed to reach what we call here a “stable agreement.” Our analysis is based on two of the authors’ involvement (one as a facilitator and the other as a stakeholder representative) in the process and a post‐hoc survey of participants. We find that several ill‐advised process design and management choices significantly destabilized the negotiations, leading to an ultimately unstable agreement. We highlight four major problematic process design and management decisions, including the following: representation on the multi‐stakeholder group was imbalanced, the pre‐meeting caucuses were not paired with training in interest‐based negotiation, adequate incentives to negotiate toward a consensus agreement were not provided, and the use of straw voting at one point in the process was unclear and inconsistent. As a result of these and other process design and management flaws, many stakeholders believed that the process was biased and that their ends would be better achieved by anchoring negotiations and engaging in positional bargaining. Ultimately, this meant that near‐consensus on a single cross‐interest marine protected area proposal was not reached, the scientific guidelines put forth were not fully met, the process was not and is not viewed as fair by the stakeholders directly or indirectly involved, and the marine protected area regulations lack broad‐scale support. These pitfalls of the South Coast stakeholder process could have been avoided had the management and facilitation team consistently followed best practices in dispute resolution. We recommend that future marine planning processes learn from this example, particularly those occurring in highly complex, urban ocean environments.     

Climate Change and Environmental Security: For Whom the Discourse Shifts

This article explores the implications of the April 2007 United Nations Security debate on the security dimensions of a changing climate for international climate change politics. Specifically, our analysis focuses on whether and how security concerns have been addressed in past international political debates on climate change and considers whether the Security Council debate, which emphasized the threat of climate-related conflict, reflects a discursive shift. We elaborate on two general discourses on the relationship between environment and security, which we call environmental conflict and environmental security . Using content and discourse analysis, we demonstrate that both the historical climate change debate and the more recent Security Council debate have been informed by the environmental security discourse, meaning that a discursive shift has not taken place. We conclude by considering the possibility of a future discursive shift to the environmental conflict perspective and argue that such a shift would be counterproductive to the search for an effective global response to climate change.     

From discourse to policy: US policy communities’ perceptions of and approaches to climate change and security

ABSTRACT

Increasingly, a diverse set of policy communities, including those with defence, development and environmental mandates, frame climate change as a security threat. Most often this discursive formation labels climate change as a ‘threat multiplier’. This framing, however, is vague, linear and leaves many questions unanswered regarding how institutions can develop and implement policy that addresses the joint challenges of climate change, conflict and security. Utilising a mixed-methods approach, and grounding data collection in US policy communities, this article examines how policy actors and institutions integrate climate-security discourses into policy processes. The objective of this research is to provide direct insight into how the discourses and technical understandings of climate-security transition into policy priorities and implementation realities. This research identified three common approaches to climate-security: (1) A challenge of adaptation and resilience; (2) A potent political argument; and (3) An issue of limited importance and feasibility. These approaches, however, are inconsistent across sectors and within organisations, suggesting a lack of cohesion and considerable challenges in identifying and responding to climate change as a ‘threat multiplier’.     

A California Effect for International Environmental Externalities?

An influential conventional wisdom holds that globalization could induce upward convergence in environmental regulations. Wealthy countries impose environmental regulations that prompt exporters in other countries to adopt sustainable production techniques, so the cost of environmental regulation in these countries decreases. However, previous research has only examined this California Effect for environmental regulations to address domestic externalities. I formally investigate the case of international externalities, such as global warming or ozone depletion. I find that a country can exercise leadership by enacting environmental regulations to strategically induce other countries to regulate in the future, but only if the incentive to free ride is not too strong. Surprisingly, under deep economic integration, environmental regulations are strategic complements with positive spillovers, so that international coordination is necessary to capitalize on the California Effect. In addition to showing that the California Effect is a powerful instrument of environmental statecraft, the results suggest new reasons why liberal trade and investment policies might improve environmental protection. They can also inform a strategy to promote efforts to mitigate global warming.     

Optimal transfers and participation decisions in international environmental agreements

The literature on international environmental agreements has recognized the role transfers play in encouraging participation in international environmental agreements. However, the results achieved so far are overly specific. Therefore, we develop a more general framework that enables us to study the role of transfers in a systematic way. We propose transfers using both internal and external financial resources for making “welfare optimal agreements” self-enforcing. To illustrate the relevance of our transfer scheme, we use a stylized integrated assessment simulation model of climate change to show how appropriate transfers may induce almost all countries into signing a self-enforcing climate treaty.      

Democratic inclusiveness,climate policy outputs,and climate policy outcomes

In an ideal inclusive political system, all citizens are equally able to influence and challenge policies. We focus on how inclusiveness affects climate policies and outcomes. We argue that more inclusive systems should produce more policies in response to environmental threats and should have better outcomes. We test these hypotheses using panel and cross-sectional data relating to climate policy outputs and outcomes. The results suggest that inclusiveness is positively associated with policy outputs, but probably not with lower emissions of greenhouse gases. This pattern may relate to a lack of deliberation in systems, which are relatively inclusive in the narrower sense of pluralist democratic theory.     

Presidential Leadership on Foreign Policy,Opinion Polling,and the Possible Limits of “Crafted Talk”

The strategy of “crafted talk” (or framing) suggests that a politician uses public opinion to anticipate the most alluring, language to convince the public to follow a politician's own preferred policy (Jacobs & Shapiro, 2000 Jacobs, L. R. and Shaprio, R. Y. 2000. Politicians don't pander: Political manipulation and the loss of democratic responsiveness, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  [Google Scholar]). This manipulatory behavior by presidents has important consequences in the realm of constructing foreign policy, especially if the policy involves military service personnel, international prestige, or foreign conflict. However, no scholar has investigated White House archival data to examine the theoretical nuances of presidential “crafting” talk when constructing arguments for foreign policy. This article examines three case studies using internal polling memoranda and focus group results concerning the Vietnam War under President Johnson, the signing of the INF Treaty with the Soviet Union under President Reagan, and the Gulf War under President Bush. In each of the three cases, public opinion places serious constraints on presidential framing of foreign policy. Implications for the effectiveness of political framing and the limits of presidential persuasion are discussed.