Precedents in Negotiated Decisions: Korea–Australia Free Trade Agreement Negotiations

Initial random acts can be replicated and evolve into precedents, but precedents can also be built with strategic intent. Regardless of their origin, strategically applying a particular precedent or effectively refuting the relevance of a precedent can help a negotiator control decisions and achieve interdependent goals. The purposeful use of precedents has received little attention in the negotiation literature, even though using precedents can be a powerful negotiating tactic. In this study, we examine how past decisions became precedents that helped establish the Korea–Australia Free Trade Agreement of 2014 (KAFTA). We further consider how precedents established through KAFTA later influenced trade negotiations with Canada, China, India, and Japan. Following an extensive literature review and field research, we developed a two‐dimensional matrix (precedent ownership and negotiator goals) to help guide negotiators both offensively (what I want from you) and defensively (what I don't want to give you). We conclude by proposing research to enhance our understanding of temporal issues in negotiation. No previous study within the negotiation literature has examined precedents empirically.     

Diplomatic Interactions and Negotiations

This article examines the role of state actors, organization agencies, and individual agents in diplomatic interactions and negotiations. States as diplomatic actors, organizations as diplomatic agencies, and individuals as diplomatic agents enter into complex and interdependent relationships. Proposing a three‐level analysis of interstate interactions and diplomatic negotiations, I argue that no diplomatic negotiation happens without interactions between parties at the state, organizational, and individual levels. The agency–structure paradigm provides a conceptual framework for understanding behavioral and structural properties of international interactions and their influence on diplomatic negotiations. Diplomatic negotiation employs specific forms of interaction, using a distinct language, protocol norms, symbols, ceremonies, and rituals. The state's “self” (as a social conception of its identity, values, and interests) affects the process of diplomatic negotiation. By managing, organizing, and improving international interactions at the actor, agency, and agent levels, negotiating parties can advance the process and effectiveness of diplomatic negotiation.     

Analyzing Complex Negotiations

Complex negotiations have been conducted for a long time, although until somewhat recently analysts had yet to conceptualize their fundamental nature, their essential elements, and the relationship between these elements. Over the past forty years, however, scholars have gained increasing understanding of the forces that shape negotiation complexity. In this article, I first review literature that has explored complex negotiations, which is found primarily in negotiation studies, and studies of international negotiation. I then develop a five‐part theoretical framework for analyzing complex negotiations: (1) identification of negotiation architecture, (2) context analysis, (3) process analysis, (4) structural and relational analysis, and (5) decisional analysis. I then demonstrate the utility of this five‐part framework by examining the U.S.–Australia Free Trade negotiations that produced the Australia–U.S. Free Trade Agreement of 2005. Finally, the article closes with some observations on complex negotiations and their analysis.     

Strategic Moral Diplomacy: Mandela, Qaddafi, and the Lockerbie Negotiations

Understanding and mitigating the consequences of clashing moral perceptions should be a primary goal of diplomacy and foreign policy analysis. Personal interviews and primary documents about the Lockerbie negotiations are used to illustrate the dangerous collision of different moral claims in the international arena, the mistakes made by the United States and United Kingdom in handling this aspect of the negotiations, and South African President Nelson Mandela's use of strategic moral diplomacy to resolve the stalemate between Libya, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Mandela's strategy in these negotiations is an example of how an intelligent and pragmatic moral position, rather than the conventional image of an enemy as evil, can produce the desired strategic results—in this case, Colonel Qaddafi's handover of the two Libyan citizens accused of the Lockerbie bombing.     

Sharks, Saints, and Samurai: The Power of Ethics in Negotiations

In this article, I explore the notion that ethics, far from being a check or drag on negotiator power, can actually help to enhance it. As the example of Nelson Mandela negotiating with the South African government showed, ethics (or at least the perception of being ethical) can be a major source of power, diminishing or even neutralizing many other weaknesses. I explore some of the principal ethical dilemmas facing negotiators and illustrate the sometimes surprising ways that "right" ethical choices can actually increase negotiator power. This occurs not only in the more superficial case of instrumental or even prudential ethics, (the province of "saints" and "sharks"), where "right" behavior is employed to gain short-term advantage or to improve long-term negotiator reputation, but even more so in the case of intrinsic "principled" negotiation, where the "right" thing is done for its own sake. As in the case of the medieval Japanese samurai, ethics can be a major source of power. This thesis is then illustrated anecdotally in three practical examples, leading to a proposal for how to deepen and apply this lesson to negotiation analysis and practice.     

Transformations and Critical Moments in Negotiations

Transformation is not a new concept in the conflict literature. It forms the foundation for a particular school of thought in mediation and plays a major role in the analysis of international conflicts. More-over, it shapes the goals and processes for managing public conflicts through dialogue and democracy. Although transformation surfaces in a variety of conflict management arenas, this concept has received only a modicum of attention in the negotiation literature. This article centers on the definition and features of critical moments in negotiation that might foster conflict transformation. It draws from the literature on conflict transformation and applies this work to negotiations. First, the author explores the definitions, characteristics, and types of shifts that set up transformations. Then she examines internal and external factors that contribute to transformative moments. Finally, the essay concludes with a discussion of distinctions between transformation and related constructs, suggestions for conducting research, and implications of this work for negotiation research.     

Sources of Power in Public Negotiations: A Framework Applied to Public-Public and Public-Private Negotiations

The negotiation literature has extensively examined the topic of power and how it can be wielded. Numerous frameworks have been created and utilized in the various treatises on negotiations; analyzing the power differential in any given situation is a common teaching technique. However, despite this focus on the topic, discussions of power have been mainly focused on negotiations in the private sector. As a result, many of the most common frameworks are oriented toward this type of situation, resulting in a clumsy application to a public-sector negotiation. Given the growing importance of negotiations to public-sector leaders, we provide a new structure for analyzing power that can be utilized in such situations. For a municipal leader confronted with a complex public-private partnership, it is important to have the right tools to use when examining the power dynamics at play. After examining several current models of power, as well as other writings on the topic in negotiation and strategy literature, we present a new model. This model divides power into different categories based on whether it stems from formal or informal mechanisms, and then offers several specific forms relevant to the public sector. We then use this new model to examine a case study involving the new mayor of Manchester, New Hampshire and her efforts to negotiate a better response to the opioid and homelessness crisis. This case study illustrates the unique nature of public sector negotiations and provides a roadmap for negotiators looking to use our new framework.     

Process in Cross-Cultural Negotiations

This essay describes the four broad themes that emerged from our discussionabout the role of process in cross-cultural negotiations and considerstheir implications for future research. First, we address the nature of theconflict, in particular whether a negotiation is classified as a dispute or atransactional exchange. Second, we contrast the role of cognition and rapportin negotiations and consider when rapport replaces the centrality ofcognition. We also discuss the extent to which negotiating processes createrelationships based on trust or power, and consider how cultural valuesinfluence the development of these underlying relationships. Finally, weconsider the role of culture in defining what is perceived as an optimal outcomeand raise the possibility that suboptimal outcomes may holdsymbolic value in cross-cultural negotiations.     

Breaking Deadlocks in International Institutional Negotiations: The WTO, Seattle, and Doha

Negotiations among members of international institutions often stalemate yet the outcomes vary. Sometimes talks end in impasse and other times in agreement. Several familiar theories are unable to explain the contrast between two prominent outcomes in the World Trade Organization—its 1999 deadlock in Seattle and its 2001 agreement in Doha, Qatar, on an agenda for a new round. Extensive original evidence from these cases documents mechanisms that can tip the negotiation process between impasse and agreement in any institution, not only economic ones. The study illustrates benefits for international relations research of building on the relatively neglected tradition of negotiation analysis, a substantial part of which is outside political science.     

From Lab Experiments to Real Negotiations: An Investigation of International Iron Ore Negotiations

Negotiation researchers have conducted a large number of experimental lab studies to identify the factors that affect negotiation outcomes, but it remains unclear whether those results can be generalized to real‐world negotiations. To explore this question, we analyzed the dynamic international iron ore annual negotiations that took place from 2005 to 2009. We found evidence that supports two important findings from previous experiments. Specifically, we focused on the impact of negotiators’ best alternatives and first offers on negotiation prices using multiple case study analysis. We found that iron ore prices increased more when the gap between the previous year's negotiated price and the price on the alternative spot market, a public market in which commodities are traded for immediate delivery, was larger, which suggested that buyers were sensitive to the strength of this alternative, supporting the literature on the role of alternatives. We also found that the first offer price significantly influenced the final price. Our findings extend two important experimental findings from the negotiation literature to large‐scale business negotiations in the real world.     

导弹试射、六方会谈与多边谈判中的"安全困境"

2006年7月5日朝鲜的导弹试射加剧了朝核问题所引起的安全紧张关系,沉重打击了六方会谈进程。为什么多边会谈启动三年之后朝核问题上的“安全困境”始终得不到实质性缓解?本文认为,在有关国家的安全认同无法得到实质性变更与发展的情况下,单纯依靠对话机制难以消除安全冲突。朝鲜导弹试射所提供的经验是,必须在行为体形成开放系统的前提下发展可以规范的安全认同。     

The Illusion of Transparency in Negotiations

The authors examined whether negotiators are prone to an illusion of transparency, or the belief that their private thoughts and feelings are more discernible to their negotiation partners than they actually are. In Study One, negotiators who were trying to conceal their preferences thought that their preferences had leaked out more than they actually did. In Study Two, experienced negotiators who were trying to convey information about some of their preferences overestimated their partners' ability to discern them. The results of Study Three rule out the possibility that the findings are simply the result of the curse of knowledge, or the projection of one's own knowledge onto others. Discussion explores how the illusion of transparency might impede negotiators' success.     

建立美洲自由贸易区的构想和最新发展

20世纪90年代,在世界经济全球化日益加强的同时区域经济集团化的趋势也进一步发展。除了欧洲和亚太地区的区域经济合作取得较大进展之外,西半球的美洲自由贸易区谈判也空前活跃。但是,由于以美国为首的和以巴西为首的南共市国家在市场准入、农业和知识产权等方面存在较大分歧,错过了建立FTAA的最终期限。而在刚刚结束的第四届美洲国家首脑会议上,针对重新启动FTAA谈判问题,与会各方仍未达成一致意见。     

Seal the Deal: Bargaining Positions,Institutional Design,and the Duration of Preferential Trade Negotiations

Multilateral negotiations at the World Trade Organization have stalled. This has contributed to a steep rise in preferential trade agreements (PTAs). At the same time, negotiations for PTAs have not always proven quick and painless: While some treaties are sealed within a few months or days only, other agreements are preceded by protracted bargaining processes in trade and trade-related issue areas. In this article, we provide a theoretical explanation for this empirical variation. More specifically, we argue that PTA negotiations take longer the greater the distance between the prospective partners’ initial bargaining positions. Moreover, we contend that negotiation processes become more protracted the higher the relative ambition of the prospective PTA. Due to the limited links to the domestic political arena in autocracies, we expect this latter effect to play out for groups of democratic bargaining partners only. We test these two hypotheses for 198 preferential trade negotiations using novel measures for bargaining templates and the ambition of PTA clauses. In our two-stage survival models, we find support for our argument. In line with qualitative evidence from recent preferential trade initiatives, our models indicate that services, investment and intellectual property rights are particularly sticky agenda items for democratic leaders at the international bargaining table.