Electoral promises and minority governments: An empirical study

Abstract.  This article studies the relationship between electoral policy proposals and subsequent government actions in the case of minority governments. Content analysis of electoral pledges of Spanish parties is utilised to study the gains that a relatively small party obtains when it helps to sustain the governing party in office without entering a coalition government. According to the authors' results, cooperating in parliament to maintain the minority government in office can be a rational choice for a party because it allows it to obtain significant gains in terms of programme fulfillment.     

Portfolio allocation patterns and policy-making effectiveness in minority coalition governments

Although minority coalition has become a relatively frequent form of governance, it is often considered politically ineffective in policy making. To obtain sufficient support in parliament, government bills must go through the scrutiny activities initiated by coalition partners and overcome the concerns of external support parties in opposition. By examining parliamentary scrutiny on government bills, this paper explains the surprising policy-making effectiveness in minority coalition governments. Specifically, we argue and show that different patterns of portfolio allocation with the specific ideological locations of the ministerial office-holder, the coalition partner and the external supporter, structure the extent to which government bills are scrutinized in parliament, and therefore, the effectiveness of the minority coalition on managing and implementing policies. We empirically examine bills initiated by 256 ministries in 13 Danish minority coalitions between 1985 and 2015, and we reveal robust evidence that corroborates our argument.     

Voters and coalition governments

Coalition governments are the norm in parliamentary democracies. Yet, despite the predominance of this type of government, political scientists have only recently started to investigate how voters approach elections when a coalition government is the likely outcome. Such elections present additional uncertainty and complexity for voters compared with elections in plurality systems, where party choice translates more directly into a choice of government. These factors have lead to the assumption that strategic voting is unlikely to occur in systems that produce coalition governments. In this introductory article to the special issue on Voters and Coalition Governments, we consider whether voters have the capacity to anticipate specific coalition outcomes and propose a framework for understanding the conditions that lead to strategic voting in both plurality and proportional systems.     

Political competitition and multiparty coalition governments

Abstract. Many previous theoretical analyses of multiparty coalition behaviour have been based either on a one-dimensional policy model or on a constant-sum game interpretation. For theoretical and empirical reasons this paper focusses on a competitive two-dimensional model. In this model parties are concerned with policy outcomes but choose party positions both with a view to electoral consequences and as a basis for coalition bargaining. The political heart is proposed as the set of possible coalition outcomes. The heart is either the core of the political game or is determined by a small number of party positions. Under certain conditions an equilibrium in the choice of party positions can be shown to exist. The model suggests that parties can be categorized as either strong or weak core parties, anti-core parties or peripheral parties. This categorization of parties implies a typology of party systems, which gives some theoretical foundation for the occurrence of minority, minimal winning and surplus coalitions in many of the European countries in the postwar period.     

The cartelization of local governments

Intergovernmental competition can enhance efficiency. Centralization of government expenditures inhibits intergovernmental competition because it makes governments more homogeneous, and so cartelizes local governments. Cartelization reduces Tiebout competition, and limits benchmark competition in which one government??s performance can be compared with neighboring governments. Measuring fiscal centralization as the ratio of local to state and local government expenditures within the state, the evidence shows that more fiscal decentralization is associated with higher levels of state per capita income. Cartelization of local governments negatively impacts income.     

Redistribution tax under non-benevolent governments

I analyze redistribution policies of majority governments in one kind of representative voting system. I employ these assumptions: members gain special benefits in the majority; parties act strategically by using redistribution transfers; the member's utility function is given in a quasi-linear function; the government's objective functions are the weighted summation of utilities and I classify governments according to the weight. The four main results are: a stable majority dose not support myopic government; the stable redistribution policy of benevolent government is expressed by a scope of transfers; the stable transfer of non-benevolent governments depends on private utilities of the majority and opportunity costs of the minority; and the altruistic government is not displayed by any other majority, because it offers the total welfare of the majority to the minority as a subsidy.     

Fairness and qualitative portfolio allocation in multiparty governments

How do political parties divide coalition payoffs in multiparty governments? Perhaps the most striking answer to this question is Gamson’s Law, which suggests a strong fairness norm in the allocation of office payoffs among coalition partners. Building upon recent advancements in portfolio allocation research, we extend this approach in three important ways. First, we study fairness with regard to the allocation of policy (rather than office) payoffs. Second, we introduce measures to assess the fairness of the division of policy payoffs following two norms: envy-freeness and equitability. Third, we explore why some allocations of ministerial portfolios deviate from fairness norms. Based on an original data set of party preferences for individual portfolios in Western and Central Eastern Europe, we find substantial variation in the fairness of policy payoffs across cabinets. Moreover, coalitions are more likely to arrive at envy-free and equitable bargaining outcomes if (1) these fair allocations are based on an allocation of cabinet positions that is proportional to party size and if (2) the bargaining power is distributed evenly among government parties. The results suggest that fairness is not a universal norm for portfolio allocation in multiparty governments, but in fact depends on the cabinet parties’ bargaining positions.

     

浅论协调地方政府间横向关系

随着中央与地方关系改革的发展 ,地方政府间横向关系逐步得到发展 ;而在地方政府间横向关系发展中 ,由于种种原因导致的摩擦与矛盾产生了诸多负面影响 ;因此 ,必须采取措施对地方政府间横向关系加以协调     

Dispositional neutrality and minority rights

Alan Patten defends a novel principle of neutrality according to which the state must accommodate all conceptions of the good equally. This principle rests on the claim that the state must be equally responsive to the interests of all citizens. I introduce a competing principle – neutrality of disposition – according to which the state must be disposed to treat citizens with different conceptions of the good alike in relevantly similar situations. The requirement of the equal responsiveness of the state is neutral between these two conceptions of neutrality. Moreover, neutrality of disposition, unlike neutrality of treatment, is compatible with a plausible luck egalitarian view of cultural justice according to which justice requires the state to be more accommodating of some conceptions of the good than of others in situations where not being so will result in members of minority cultures being worse off than others through no responsibility of their own.     

Defining and classifying technocrat‐led and technocratic governments

Governments led by technocrats remain a nebulous category in political science literature, with little clarity about how they differ from party governments, how many have existed and how we can differentiate between them. This article aims to provide that conceptual and empirical clarity. Having proposed an ideal type definition of ‘technocratic government’, it sets out three conditions for an operational definition of a ‘technocrat’ and, on that basis, lists the 24 technocrat‐led governments that have existed in 27 European Union (EU) democracies from the end of the Second World War until June 2013. It then classifies these according to their partisan/technocrat composition and remit. This allows for the presentation of a typology of four different types of technocrat‐led governments and the definition of ‘full technocratic governments’ as those which contain a majority of technocrats and – unlike caretaker governments – have the capacity to change the status quo. The article concludes that full technocratic governments remain extremely rare in EU democracies since there have been only six cases – of which three have occurred in the last decade.     

The university and approaches to problems of state and local governments

There is a growing interest within universities in the operation of state and local governments, and in the services they provide. An example of this interest is the Program for Urban and Policy Sciences (UPS) at the State University of New York at Stony Brook.Since its inception two years ago, it has been the operating policy of the Program to direct its principal research activities to real and immediate problems facing state and local governments in the New York area. In each of the collaborative efforts undertaken with an outside agency, we have seen our role as that of both problem analysts and catalytic agents for bringing about change. This means our faculty and students actively participate in the policy formulation and policy implementation processes. A case study of a cooperative effort undertaken with the Environmental Protection Administration of New York City illustrates these ideas.We believe that a successful university program should combine research with real world experience; the university should encourage the faculty to broaden the scope of their activities; and students, particularly those from minorities, should be trained for professional careers as planning and program analysts.Work reported in this paper has been supported by the National Science Foundation under grant GI-5. A similar version of the paper was presented at the American Political Science Association Conference, September 6–11, 1971, Chicago, Illinois and at the ORSA Conference, October 28, 1971, Anaheim, California.     

Federal tax reform and the financing of state and local governments

Although the Reagan Administration tax reform proposals would reduce federal income tax liabilities for most taxpayers, federal tax reform would also create strong pressures on state and local governments to cut taxes and public services. These pressures would arise primarily because itemizers would no longer be able to deduct state and local taxes in determining their federal income tax liabilities. In New York City and Boston, it is likely that the Administration's tax reform would induce cuts in spending that range from 2.5 to 7.5 percent. While the elimination of state and local tax deductibility may promote allocative efficiency in the provision of local public goods, the cost would be a decline in the degree of redistribution through the state and local public sector, and a reduction in local public services for the poor.     

Endogenous elections,electoral budget cycles and Canadian provincial governments

The existence of manipulative electoral budget cycles and opportunistic election setting is examined in the framework of a parliamentary democracy. Empirical tests are conducted using a pooled time series cross section data set derived from Canadian provincial governments over the 1962–1992 period. Evidence in support of the electoral budget cycle hypothesis but not the opportunistic election timing hypothesis is obtained.