Autocracy, Elections, and Fiscal Policy: Evidence from Malaysia

Authoritarian regimes often use fiscal policy to reward political supporters and to punish political opponents. In many authoritarian regimes with political institutions like parties, legislatures, and elections, elections become a focal point for budget expenditures and the distribution of government patronage. A time-series analysis of Malaysian fiscal expenditures from 1967 to 1997 shows that the ruling coalition systematically increases federal government spending before elections. In addition to marshalling private resources to distribute patronage, the Malaysian government manipulates the government’s official position. These findings have important implications for the growing literature on political institutions under autocratic regimes and the politics of patronage and redistribution in the developing world. They also suggest a new empirical domain for existing theories of political business cycles.     

The failure of democratisation by elections in Cambodia

This article questions the explanatory power of the theory of democratisation by elections. This approach to democratisation argues that elections in authoritarian regimes constitute part of a metagame between ruling elites and opponents, which involves a competition for votes inside a larger competition over the nature of political power. The cumulative effect is that even flawed elections raise the costs of repression and lower the costs of toleration in ways that eventually bring about democracy. When applied to the most likely case of Cambodia, however, electoral democratisation has resoundingly failed to occur. Instead, this article argues that neopatrimonial inhibits the transformative power of elections by preventing the emergence of resolute democratic ideals, reform-minded elites and pro-democratic institutions. In this way, the distribution of party-state patronage constitutes a method of co-optation; and flawed elections represent a mechanism to renew and reinforce the historical roots and structural basis of state authority. Using the case of Cambodia, this article develops an account of neopatrimonialism in authoritarian elections and explores implications of the Cambodian experience for the democratisation by elections theory more broadly.     

Can Leviathan be Democratic? Competitive Elections, Robust Mass Politics, and State Infrastructural Power

Reconciling effective government with accountable government remains an enormous political challenge, especially in the postcolonial world. Can postcolonial states only gain infrastructural power when their rulers enjoy unencumbered despotic power? With their contradictory findings about the influence of democratic parliaments on state autonomy and capacity, the literatures on constitutional states in Western Europe and developmental states in Northeast Asia provide limited guidance on this normatively critical question. As an alternative approach, this essay proposes three causal mechanisms through which competitive national elections can incite the territorial extension of state institutions: (1) catalyzing the construction of mass ruling parties; (2) energizing state registration of marginal populations; and (3) fostering centralized intervention in local authoritarian enclaves. Evidence from Southeast Asia suggests that competitive elections will only have these infrastructural effects when accompanied by robust mass political mobilization. This has intriguing implications for how scholars understand historical patterns of state-building in the West, as well as how policymakers try to build more effective states in the most ungoverned corners of the contemporary world.     

Multi-party elections in the Arab world: Institutional engineering and oppositional strategies

Recent moves toward multi-party competition for elected legislatures in numerous Arab countries constitute a significant departure from earlier practices there, and create the basis for democratic activists to gradually chip away at persistent authoritarian rule. This article explores the institutional mechanisms by which incumbent authoritarian executives seek to engineer these elections. It documents examples of rulers changing electoral systems to ensure compliant legislatures, and demonstrates the prevalent use of winner-takes-all electoral systems, which generally work to the regimes’ advantage. I then review various strategies of opposition forces—boycotts, non-competition agreements, election monitoring, and struggles over election rules—and the dilemmas that these entail. Surmounting differences in terms of ideologies, as well as short-term political goals and prospects, is a central challenge. The future should see greater electoral participation among opposition activists, along with cleaner elections. As vote coercion and ballot box stuffing is restricted by opposition pressures, electoral institutions will take on greater importance, and struggles for proportional representation are likely to increase. Marsha Pripstein Posusney is associate professor of Political Science at Bryant College and an adjunct associate professor of International Relations (Research) at the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University. Her first book,Labor and the State in Egypt: Workers, Unions, and Economic Restructuring (Co-lumbia University Press, 1997) was co-winner of the 1998 Albert Hourani prize, awarded annually by the Middle East Studies Association for outstanding original scholarly work on the Middle East. She is currently completing work on a co-edited volume,Privatization and Labor: Responses and Consequences in Global Perspective (Edward Elgar Publishing, Forthcoming). Earlier versions of this article were presented at Middle East Studies seminars at Harvard and columbia Universities in April, 1998, and at a Brown University Political Science Dept. seminar in April, 1999. In addition to the feedback at these events, I would like to acknowledge helpful comments on earlier versions from Miguel Glatzer, Iliya Harik, John Kerr, Ann Lesch, Vickie Langohr, Rob Richie, Wendy Schiller, Jillian Schwedler, Joe Stork, Greg White, and especially Ellen Lust-Okar and four anonymous reviewers. I am also grateful for the research assistance of Myrna Atalla, Daria Viviano, Laurent Fauque, and Colleen Anderson. The article draws on presentations and discussion at the conference on “Controlled Contestation and Opposition Strategies: Multi-Party Elections in the Arab World”, Brown University, October 2–3, 1998. Sponsored by the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown in cooperation with the Center for Middle Eastern Studies as Harvard, it brought together ten democratic activists from seven different Arab countries. It is referenced here (to save space) as the “Brown elections conference.”     

Beyond Boom and Bust: External Rents,Durable Authoritarianism,and Institutional Adaptation in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

Drawing on recent critiques and advances in theories of the rentier state, this paper uses an in-depth case study of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to posit a new “supply and demand” approach to the study of external rents and authoritarian durability. The Jordanian rentier state is not exclusively a product of external rents, particularly foreign aid, but also of the demands of a coalition encompassing groups with highly disparate economic policy preferences. The breadth of the Hashemite coalition requires that the regime dispense rent-fueled side payments to coalition members through constructing distributive institutions. Yet neither rent supply nor coalition demands are static. Assisted by geopolitically motivated donors, the Hashemites have adapted institutions over time to tap a diverse supply of rents that range from economic and military aid to protocol trade, allowing them to retain power through periods of late development, domestic political crisis, and neoliberal conditionality.

Political transition and civil society: The cases of Kenya and Zambia

Studies of regime change that focus on the “high politics” of transition tend to overlook the importance of civil society in democratization and liberalization. This article explores the role that organizations and institutions in society play as agents of political change. Elements of civil society influence both the processes and outcomes of political transitions. Case studies of Kenya and Zambia indicate that associational arenas representing civil society made important contributions in liberalizing and democratizing authoritarian regimes. Beyond this, contrasting the two cases highlights the factors that influenced their efficacy as agents of political transition. Differences are found in the character of the civil societies in the two countries. These differences help to account for the extent of Zambia’s transition when compared to Kenya. Peter VonDoepp is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of Florida. From 1992 to 1995 he held a Foreign Language/Area Studies Fellowship at Florida’s African Studies Center. He is currently conducting research in Malawi on the role of religious institutions in political change. Until 1997     

Which Dictators Produce Quality of Government?

This study deals with the effects of authoritarian regimes on state capacity or the quality of government (QoG): do some types of dictatorship (military, monarchy, and civilian) perform better than others? More importantly, which are the mechanisms through which different authoritarian rulers produce better government? The article argues theoretically, first, that single-party regimes are more responsive to citizens’ demands than other types of authoritarian rule because they have a structured mechanism to channel citizens’ “voices” (the single party). As a consequence, they will provide QoG following societal demands, which are low in low-income countries and high in high-income ones. Second, the effect of the other relevant authoritarian types—monarchies and military regimes—is exclusively conditional on rulers’ self-interests. We predict that with short-sighted rulers, monarchies and military regimes will tend to under-provide QoG. In contrast, when monarchs and military rulers have long-term horizons, these types of authoritarian regimes will have a positive effect on QoG. Employing a sample of over 70 authoritarian countries from 1983 to 2003, we find empirical support for these interactive effects. In single-party autocracies, the higher (lower) the average income, the higher (the lower) the QoG; while albeit weaker support than the first finding, in monarchies in particular, the longer (shorter) the government’s time horizon, the higher (the lower) the QoG.     

Dominance and change in the global computer industry: Military, bureaucratic, and network state developmentalisms

This article examines the conditions under which firms in different economies were able to emerge as significant actors in the global computer industry during different time periods. To achieve this, the article divides into three periods the history of the industry in terms of the three major policy regimes that have supported the dominant firms and regions. It argues that these policy regimes can be thought of as state developmentalisms that take significantly different forms across the history of the industry. U.S. firms’ dominance over their European counterparts in the 1950s and 1960s was underpinned by a system of “military developmentalism” where military agencies funded research, provided a market and developed infrastructure, but also demanded high quality products. The “Asian Tigers”—Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and South Korea—in the 1970s and 1980s were able to eclipse their Latin American and Indian rivals due in large part to the significant advantages offered by a highly effective system of “bureaucratic developmentalism,” where bureaucratic elites in key state agencies and leading business groups negotiated supports for export performance. The 1990s saw the emergence of a system of “network developmentalism” where countries such as Ireland and Israel were able to emerge as new nodes in the computer industry by careful economic and political negotiation of relations to the United States, reestablished at the center of the industry, and by more decentralized forms of provision of state support for high-tech development. Finally, the conditions under which new regimes can emerge are a consequence of the unanticipated global consequences of previous regimes. While state developmentalisms have been shaped by existing global regimes, they have promoted further and different rounds of industry globalization. Seán ó Riain is professor of sociology at the National University of Ireland, Maynooth. His research has been primarily on the political economy of high-tech growth in Ireland and elsewhere, and on work and class politics among software developers. He is the author ofThe Politics of High Tech Growth: Developmental Network, States in the Global Economy (Cambridge, 2004).     

Hegemonic political parties in post-Soviet Eurasia: Towards party-based authoritarianism?

Hegemonic parties in authoritarian regimes can fulfill important purposes for those regimes and thereby contribute to their survival. Along with the consolidation of authoritarian regimes, hegemonic political parties have emerged in some post-Soviet states, raising questions about the role that these parties play in the survival of the regimes. This article asks which of the purposes that are frequently ascribed to ruling authoritarian parties are fulfilled by United Russia, the Yeni Azerbaijan Party, and Nur Otan of Kazakhstan, the hegemonic parties of the three strongest consolidated authoritarian regimes with a hegemonic party in the former Soviet Union. It is argued that despite the increasing prominence of the hegemonic parties, full-fledged party-based authoritarianism has not yet been established in Russia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan.     

Identity,procedures and performance: how authoritarian regimes legitimize their rule

ABSTRACT

Constructing convincing legitimacy claims is important for securing the stability of authoritarian regimes. However, extant research has struggled to systematically analyse how authoritarians substantiate their right to rule. We analyse a novel data set on authoritarian regimes’ claims to legitimacy that is based on leading country experts’ assessments of 98 states for the period 1991–2010. This analysis provides key new insights into the inner workings and legitimation strategies of current non-democratic regimes. Closed authoritarian regimes predominately rely on identity-based legitimacy claims (foundational myth, ideology and personalism). In contrast, elections fundamentally change how authoritarian rulers relate to society. In their legitimacy claims, electoral authoritarian regimes focus on their ‘adequate’ procedures, thereby mimicking democracies. All regimes also stress their purported success in proving material welfare and security to their citizens.     

Women in Contemporary Democratization

Over the past two decades authoritarian regimes in many parts of the developing world, as well as in East/Central Europe, have been replaced by democracies. This paper looks at the issue of democratization from a gender perspective. While many of the problems afflicting the new democracies, such as the elitist character of political parties, and the failure of the state to guarantee civil and political rights or make a significant dent in poverty affect all citizens, they are manifested and experienced in gender-specific ways. Women's persistent exclusion from formal politics, in particular, raises a number of specific questions about how to reform democratic institutions since these institutions are not automatically gender-equitable.     

Authoritarian ‘geopolitics’ of survival in the Arab Spring

The Arab Spring has shaken not only the state and society dimension in the countries of the MENA region but also the power of authoritarian leaders that had been ensured for a long period of time. This paper takes a critical look at the issue of how authoritarian regimes reacted to the new political atmosphere produced by the Arab Spring. More specifically it attempts to identify how geopolitical reasoning influenced the formulation of new strategies designed to promote the survival of authoritarian regimes. It focuses upon the geopolitical reasoning relied upon by Iran and Saudi Arabia, which included creating threat-enemy chains in domestic politics, shifting alliances in regional policy and taking advantage of relations with external actors to gain support for authoritarian rule at home.     

Debt arrears in Latin America: Do political variables matter?

Political instability and debt problems characterise Latin America in the last two decades. This article estimated a logit model of debt arrears including economic as well as political variables. Our results suggested that both economic and political indicators affected debt repayment in Latin America during 1971–86. We also cast a shadow on the viewpoint that authoritarian and military regimes have an advantage over democratically elected governments with regard to debt related issues.     

Dissecting the Attitudes of Political Science Students Towards Democracy and the 2004 Elections in Indonesia

Students’ attitudes towards Indonesia's transition from an authoritarian era to democracy varied from strong support for the democratic transition to nostalgia for the authoritarian era's strong leadership and economic prosperity. A sample of 317 students from three Indonesian universities was asked to rate the importance of political, economic, legal and social democratic principles. In addition to concerns about corruption, economic decline and security, students differed significantly centring on the importance of legitimate elections, representation, tolerance, accountability, human rights and gender equality. The majority of students were pessimistic about the elections; paradoxically some students optimistic about the general elections rated democratic principles the least important. After discussing the implications, political attitudes about democracy and elections were related to cognitive consistency and dissonance theory.     

The Tanzanian Villagisation Programme: Its Impract on Household Production in Dodoma

The survival of authoritarian regimes has for a long time been associated with the availability of rents derived from oil and gas. In particular, military oil regimes have been able to withstand the challenge of domestic opposition even at difficult times because these regimes could ultimately count on oil and gas revenues. As this article demonstrates, the Qadhafi regime had been particularly adept at surviving by using oil and gas rents. But there is a limit to what these rents can explain: in 2011 however the regime fell after a brief civil war, in which external forces played a central role. The role played by the European and NATO interventions points to the limits of the oil and gas rents. The changed distribution of international resources amongst domestic Libyan actors contributed to the rebels' victory, indicating that international factors should be better incorporated into studies of both authoritarian survival and democratisation.     

Electoral theocracy and hybrid sovereignty in Iran

Post-revolution Iran is uniquely based upon the contradictory principles of divine and popular sovereignty but with ultimate authority delegated to jurists. At the same time, the theocratic basis of clerical dominance is rooted within a pluralistic and decentralised theological tradition peculiar to the Shiite establishment. Despite the tutelary institutional arrangements engineered by the ruling clergy, elections have generated unexpected outcomes and unleashed power and policy shifts. Emphasising the political dynamic generated by elections, this paper examines the uncertainties stemming from electoral processes that have been constructed by conflicting electoral and theocratic principles. In developing the concept of electoral theocracy, the paper highlights the paradoxes underpinning the hybridity of Iran’s clerical and electoral authoritarian system of governance. These hybrid features have remained largely neglected in the literature on electoral authoritarian regimes.     

Politics of exclusion and institutional transformation in Ethiopia

Ethiopia experienced a critical juncture in 1991 with the defeat of the military dictatorship, opening up the possibilities of a new political order. Since then the country underwent social engineering and institutional transformation emerging as a leading reformist state under hegemonic-party rule with high institutional state capacity but also a concentration, and even personalisation, of decision-making power. This approximates to a path of ‘authoritarian institutionalisation’. This article argues that Ethiopia’s institutional trajectory can be explained by the nature of coalition politics in the formative years of transition, specifically the extent to which credible challengers were excluded from transitional processes. The strategy of excluding Pan-Ethiopian parties and sideling the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) set the country on the path of establishing a hegemonic rule by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). Sustaining hegemonic rule entailed fending off threats from excluded groups in the 1990s but which coalesced into a strong electoral performance in the 2005 elections in whose aftermath the ruling party embarked on aggressive pursuit of state-directed development for political legitimation.     

Armed Groups as Political Parties and Their Role in Electoral Politics: The Case of Hizballah

In recent decades, armed groups have shown an increased interest in creating political parties to take part in institutional politics. By using these political wings to participate in elections and win public office, some of them have gained enormous political power. However, despite the important real-world implications of this trend, the existing literature on the topic is still underdeveloped. This article contributes to a better understanding of this subject by examining the factors that motivate armed groups to set up a political wing and compete in elections and by assessing how political participation affects an armed group's strategic outlook. The hypotheses on political wing formation and development are tested by analyzing the decision-making patterns of Hizballah. The findings suggest that the political involvement of armed groups does not follow a linear development process from armed to political organization, but instead assumes cyclical patterns: political accommodation and armed struggle are chosen in turn in response to shifts in the relation and the internal balance of power between a given group's political and armed wings.     

The developmental state: Israel, South Korea, and Taiwan compared

The growth performances of the Israeli economy during the years 1948–1973 were excellent by any criteria, and are comparable to the “miraculous” performances of South Korea and Taiwan. Excellent economic performances in the three countries were accompanied by the presence of an autonomous and an interventionist state as well as by strategies of governed development (in the spheres of finance, investment, and international trade). The comparison is used, to shed new light on the Israeli political economy as well as on the replicability of the developmental state model across regions, cultures, and political regimes. First, by comparing the three countries and pointing to the similarities in the role and autonomy of the state, the article offers a different interpretation of the Israeli economy from that offered by both neoclassical and neomarxist interpretations of the Israeli political economy. Second, successful cases of develoment are rare in our world; this should make the study of the Israeli political economy a valuable case-study for the proponents of the developmental state model. By pointing out the similarities in the growth performances and the developmental strategies of Israel, Taiwan, and South Korea, as well as the dissimilarities in their political regimes, their cultural traditions, and their regional settings, this article further strengthens the arguments in favor of state-guided economic development in developing countries. David Levi-Faur is a lecturer of comparative public policy and business and politics at the University of Haifa. He was a visiting scholar at the L.S.E., University of California, Berkeley, the University of Utrecht, and the University of Amsterdam.