The Day‐to‐Day Life of a Dean: Engaging in Negotiations and negotiations

This article analyzes the negotiating strategies and tactics that proved useful during my eight‐year stint as dean of the New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations during the 1970s. David Lax and James Sebenius have paved the way with their pioneering work on The Manager as Negotiator. By taking this perspective to the academic setting, I have identified a portfolio of tactics that are helpful in understanding how an administrator operates in a complex environment. The examples presented in this article help flesh out the standard categories of distributive and integrative bargaining as well as forcing and fostering strategies for implementing change.     

The domestic politics of international negotiations: The effects of state structures and policy making processes

Putnam's metaphor of a two‐level game that state representatives play when they face the dual constraints of international bargaining and domestic pressures has been applied across different political systems. This paper argues that it is important to take into account differences in state structures and political processes in the study of international negotiations. That state structures and processes are important has become a common theme in current research on foreign policy, decision making, and international conflict. Building on this literature, this study involves a meta‐analysis of existing case studies of two‐level games. The previously completed cases provide evidence of variation in the characteristics of two‐level games. Independent measures of the institutional structures of the states involved in the set of case studies are collected from the POLITY III dataset. Hypotheses on how differences in state structures might influence the characteristics of two‐level bargaining are then examined. The study finds that differences in state structures do influence the dynamics of two‐level games. Some of the results support the conventional wisdom on this relationship, while other results suggest counter‐intuitive insights. A framework conceptualizing state characteristics at three levels is proposed for future research.     

The effects of anger on negotiations over mergers and acquisitions

Conclusion The practical implications that have been drawn from this analysis of anger in mergers and acquisitions negotiations are just a few of the many that could be identified and further developed from future research. Future studies of conflict behavior can profitably go beyond the narrow focus on anger used here to consider other emotions and related states, such as fear, resentment, gratitude, guilt, or stress. Scholars and negotiators should be mindful not to ignore emotional factors in negotiation simply because emotions and their causes are complex. As I pointed out earlier, emotions are an integral part of the way human beings approach many conflict situations. Those of us who are interested in resolving disputes can only benefit by gaining a better understanding of emotions, the factors that trigger them, and their consequences. Joseph P. Daly is Assistant Professor in the Department of Management, Walker College of Business, Appalachian State University, Boone, N.C. 28608. He is nearing completion of his doctoral studies in organizational behavior at the Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University.This study was supported by a grant from the Dispute Resolution Research Center (DRRC) at North-western University. An earlier version of the paper appeared in the DRRC's working paper series as Working Paper Number 43.The author is indebted to the following for their suggestions on the research and writing of this paper: Bob Bies, Denise Rousseau, Jerry Fox, Tom Tripp, and Max Bazerman.     

Openness, Uncertainty, and Social Spending: Implications for the Globalization— Welfare State Debate

We extend the literature on openness and spending in developing countries arguing that the effect of increasing openness depends on both regime type and the level of openness. Democracies respond to increases in openness by increasing spending while dictatorships respond by decreasing spending. However, the degree to which countries pursue the strategy of choice depends on the level of openness. In autarkic countries, an increase in import competition has more severe consequences for perceptions of job insecurity and dislocation. In response, government management of openness will be more vigorous under these conditions regardless of whether the leader increases or decreases spending. Economic selection mechanisms at work will produce an outcome wherein, at higher levels of openness, further import liberalization has smaller effects on perceptions of job insecurity and dislocation. Hence, both the demand and the supply of government management of openness will be lower.     

EU FTA negotiations with India: The question of liberalisation of public procurement

The proposed bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) between India and the European Union has thrown up many contentious issues among which public procurement is an important one. While India is reluctant to include public procurement in FTA, the European Union (EU) has been insisting that FTA without liberalisation of public procurement is not on the negotiating table. What makes India particularly attractive to the EU is not only the size of its public procurement market but also its rapidly growing economy and demand for infrastructure which presents EU firms with an opportunity to gain market access into this sector under the FTA setting. The EU is insisting on national treatment and non-discrimination as also transparency in Indian procurement system. Indian companies aspire to crack open public procurement market in the EU by entering it through the services sector. However, they are finding EU procedures for ‘data adequacy’ and policies relating to work visa difficult. India’s reluctance to negotiate government procurement under the FTA framework is also attributed partly to administrative costs required for making changes to existing framework and for establishing institutions to implement bilateral obligations. Though several deadlines have been missed, an agreement that could bring mutual benefit for both the EU and India is not out of reach.     

Affecting trust: Terrorism,internet and offensive information warfare

The national security consequences of the potential use of the Internet by terrorist organizations have attracted the interest of many academics and government and intelligence officials. The goal of this article is to provide a new explanatory angle concerning the possible targets of terrorists’ offensive information warfare (OIW) operations. It argues that these organizations may prove more valuable and effective to undermine on‐line activities of leading electronic commerce sites than to target elements of the critical national information infrastructure. These offensive actions, in fact, would directly impact one of the explanatory elements for the Internet's success: users’ perception of its trustworthiness. Before tackling its arguments, the article provides a definition of offensive information warfare. Then, it investigates how terrorist organizations would formulate their operational style concerning offensive information warfare. The stage is then set to define the central argument of the article by drawing from studies carried out in the areas of information security, international management and electronic commerce. The article concludes with a set of policy recommendations to counter these potential threats and thus make the Internet a safer communication instrument for economic, commercial and social development.     

Assessing State Preferences and Explaining Institutional Choice: The Case of Intra–German Trade

A solid knowledge about states' interests in the case under investigation is required to reinforce the neoinstitutionalist hypothesis that international institutions are built to reap joint gains in issue areas in which uncoordinated activities may lead to a suboptimal outcome. However, most neoinstitutionalists who apply game theory to international politics seem to assume that, regardless of the outcome to be explained, no case–specific empirical assessment of actors' interests is needed to understand regime formation. This article aims to empirically assess the constellation of state interests on the basis of which the intra–German trade regime came into existence. Furthermore, solution concepts are used merely as indicators for describing a situation, they are not taken as unqualified predictions of what will happen. This application of game theory still proves useful. By demonstrating that the intra–German trade regime emerged from a constellation of interests resembling a prisoner's dilemma, the neorealist argument that international institutions are unable to regulate important issues in a really competitive relationship is challenged. At the same time, the article points to at least one necessary addition to the neoinstitutionalist argument, as the explanation of given international institutions requires a two–step procedure: first, the explanation of state interests, and second, the explanation of behavior brought to light on the basis of these interests.     

The negotiation burden of institutional interactions: non-state organizations and the international negotiations on forests

The participation of non-state actors in international politics has been investigated since the creation of international institutions. Yet, the rules, principles and norms of global governance are no longer discussed in single isolated institutions. Rather, with the proliferation of international regimes and organizations, international issues are now negotiated in a context of institutional interactions known as ‘regime complexes’. This poses new questions, in particular on the negotiation burden that these new processes place on international actors. To answer this question, this contribution compares non-state participation in both contexts (single regimes and regime complexes), using the international forest negotiations as a case study. It uses quantitative methods to measure the negotiation burden of single regimes and compare it with the negotiation burden of regime complexes. The negotiation burden of single regimes is found to be insignificant, political interest being the major motivation for participation, while the negotiation burden of regime complexes is found to be real, demanding a certain type of material and organizational resources in order for non-state actors to participate. Yet a certain diversity of non-state representation is maintained within regime complexes, non-governmental organizations being dominant with respect to business groups.     

EU FTA negotiations with India, ASEAN and Korea: the question of fair labour standards

The EU sets considerable store by the need for its Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) now under negotiation with Asian countries to contain a sustainable development chapter with clear references to respect for the core ILO labour standards. While they reject the sanctions-based approach demanded by the European trade unions, they accept that some real enforcement mechanisms will be needed. Among Asian countries, Korea is most likely to accept some form of a social clause, while India and certainly some ASEAN countries strongly oppose it. This article explores the prospects for mutual agreement on this thorny issue at the bilateral level which, to date, has failed at the multilateral level.

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The irrelevance of negative campaigns to political trust: Experimental and survey results

This article examines how media and partisan mechanisms of accountability influence presidential agendas in Latin America. The authors argue that responsiveness increases in powerful presidential systems when opposition parties and free media help citizens hold presidents accountable between elections. Where presidents must contend with a cohesive, ideological opposition and effective constraints to their power, they turn to valence issues with broad appeal and over which they have greater control. A free media—one without significant economic, legal, or political constraints—pressures the president to respond to the electorate's concerns, which include crime and corruption due to the incentives that motivate news content and the media's agenda-setting powers. Analyzing more than 50 presidential terms across 18 countries, the authors show that when Latin American presidents face either free and competitive media or strong legislative oppositions, homicide rates and the level of perceived corruption tend to be lower. Thus, this study proposes that efforts to improve media or partisan environments, or both, would help address Latin America's accountability deficit and promote good governance in the region.     

The impact of international conflict and detente on bargaining in arms control negotiations: An experimental analysis

This paper reports on a laboratory experiment which investigated the impact of conflict and cooperation in a hypothetical international environment on the bargaining processes and outcomes of a simulated arms control negotiation. A method called Bargaining Process Analysis was employed for measuring the content of bargaining behaviors in this experiment where free verbal interactions were permitted.

The results suggested that a heightening of international tensions tended to increase the perceptions of mutual hostility among negotiators, to increase the employment of “hard‐line” bargaining strategies such as threats and retractions, to increase the proportion of negative relative to positive affect and disagreements relative to agreements. These changes in bargaining behavior, in turn, detracted from the ability of negotiators to identify a solution to the bargaining problem and from the level of agreement attained. Conversely, increased cooperation in the international environment had no consistent, strong effects on either the bargaining process or outcomes of negotiations.     

The High Representative and directoires in European foreign policy: the case of the nuclear negotiations with Iran

ABSTRACT

The negotiations with Iran about its nuclear programme have seen the most protracted involvement of the High Representatives of the European Union in a high-profile policy case. This article traces the evolution of the High Representatives’ participation in the negotiations, from the first contacts with the E3 (Germany, France and the United Kingdom) in 2003 to the adoption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2015. It focuses on the institutional role the High Representatives played in relation with the directoires leading the talks with Iran – first the E3 and, since 2006, E3/EU. In this context, it examines the personal and organisational factors that affected the influence each of the three High Representatives (Javier Solana, Catherine Ashton and Federica Mogherini) had in regard to the directoires. The analysis distinguishes specifically between the phases before and after the 2009 Lisbon Treaty. The article shows how similar personal qualities of the three High Representatives in terms of problem-solving and trust-building gave them political capital that enabled them to adopt a fairly constant role as bridge-builders within the directoires and between the directoires and other actors. The reforms of the Lisbon Treaty had only a minor impact.     

俄罗斯的欧洲战略——俄罗斯与德、法、英三国关系的几点分析

俄罗斯总统普京上台伊始,就提出了俄罗斯的定位问题,明确制定了融入欧洲的战略目标.如今,6年过去了,俄罗斯与欧洲的关系有了明显的改善,普京朝着既定的目标靠近了一大步.但这并不意味着俄罗斯已经融入欧洲.俄罗斯与欧洲的经济关系日愈密切,但政治关系却是止步不前,并没有多大进展.不过,应当肯定的是,普京的欧洲外交在这6年中取得了历史上最好的成绩,尤其表现在发展与德国、英国、法国之间的战略合作等一些重大的问题上.     

The World in 2014:Peace and Development

The year 2014 was the centennial of World War I,and it was marked by chaos.Wild predictions that a new Cold War was coming,or even World War III were proved to be wholly wrong.The Cold War was a period marked by two military powers armed with nuclear and conventional weapons and engaged in an arms race.Their antagonistic ideologies were crossed swords.Today,the U.S.and Europe,are maybe on the same chorus,but they are singing different tunes,while Russia is a lonely soloist.More importantly,the U.S.,the only country that could really reignite汪Cold War,has shown no signs that it intends to do so.Ironically,U.S.President Barack Obama described Russia as a regional power,a thinly-veiled sarcasm,seeming to imply that Moscow is no longer