The other hidden hand: Soviet and Cuban intelligence in Allende’s Chile

The role of Soviet and Cuban covert activities in Allende’s Chile has not been given sufficient consideration. This paper outlines the significant actions that the KGB and the Cuban DGI undertook there, showing that both organizations played important roles in both operating directly against the CIA and by supporting local actors. The results of their efforts, however, may have been negative to Allende’s coalition by focusing on factional or ideological interests. A broad array of sources is brought together to shed light on this historical gap. The result is a new paradigm in which we can consider this dramatic period.     

‘A reach greater than the grasp’: Israeli intelligence and the conflict in south Lebanon 1990–2000

This article examines the way in which intelligence was used by Israel in its war against Hizb'allah in south Lebanon. By using ideas drawn from the literature on strategic culture, it argues that in trying to replicate methods used in countering Palestinian insurgents, Israel's intelligence agencies failed to appreciate fully the finite political aims of Hizb'allah's guerrilla struggle. As such, the paucity in Israel's collective intelligence effort allowed operatives of Hizb'allah's military wing, al-Muqawama, to score notable intelligence triumphs over Israel, triumphs that did much force the IDF into a unilateral withdrawal from south Lebanon in May 2000.     

Filling in the ‘unknowns’: Hypothesis-based intelligence and the Rumsfeld commission

In 2003 the Pentagon's Office of Special Plans employed a hypothesis-based methodology to deliver the now discredited intelligence that justified the Iraq war. The 1976 ‘Team B’, which was also heavily influenced by neoconservatives and used the same methodology, has been recognized as a precedent. There is, however, another precedent, the 1998 Rumsfeld Commission, which challenged CIA predictions on the ballistic missile threat to the US. Lobbied for by many of the same conservatives and neoconservatives, the Commission used the same analytical style as Team B and the OSP. The now discredited intelligence on Iraq was not a ‘failure’ or ‘mistake’, but a method, tried and tested by the right, of challenging the CIA on political grounds.     

The perils of multinational intelligence coalitions: Britain,America and the origins of Pakistan’s ISI

This article examines how Great Britain helped create Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) with two goals: (1) establishing a Pakistani branch of a Commonwealth intelligence network; (2) ensuring information security within that network. Ultimately, this endeavor failed because of perceived deficiencies in Pakistan’s security institutions and Britain’s inability to address Pakistan’s security needs. By the mid-1950s ISI forged close ties with the United States which offered more and with fewer political strings attached. This article offers new insights on intelligence alliance formation during the cold war. It also provides a useful case study in the weaknesses of multilateral intelligence coalitions.     

‘New politics’ in Finland: The greens and the left wing in the 1990s

This article examines the development of two Finnish political parties (the Green Association and the Left‐Wing Alliance) from a ‘New Politics’ perspective, focusing on changes in their electoral, programmatic and organisational profiles, with emphasis on the composition and value‐related features of their electorates in 1991, 1995 and 1999. The results confirm the position of the Greens as the prime representative of New Politics; but the party has moved away from its anti‐establishment role and its supporters increasingly share the social and attitudinal characteristics of the average electorate. The UNA, on the other hand, has moved towards a New Politics profile and a gradual dealignment of its old male‐dominated working class electorate; but its central characteristics and its supporters are still firmly entrenched in an old leftist format.     

The road to Bletchley Park: the British experience with signals intelligence, 1892–1945

This essay examines the evidence and the literature on British signals intelligence between 1892 and 1945. It assesses the relative significance of the documents on signals intelligence released since the Waldegrave Initiative. It criticizes many conventional assumptions in the literature and argues that signals intelligence has been a normal practice of the British government throughout the twentieth century. The text sketches an alternative history of British signals intelligence during 1892–1945 and analyses its value for the British state in various aspects of the two world wars and diplomacy during the inter-war period.     

When Casey’s blood pressure rose: a case study of intelligence politicization in the United States

This article contributes to the debate on the politicization of intelligence with a case study of a major attempt of politicization that so far largely escaped academic attention: the Special National Intelligence Estimate on the Soviet Union’s role in international terrorism produced by the US Intelligence Community in spring 1981. Despite direct and indirect manipulation by members of President Reagan’s Cabinet, this case differs from those usually discussed in a decisive way – politicization failed. Based on the empirical analysis, a theoretical model of intelligence politicization is introduced that extends Joshua Rovner’s oversell model, which can explain why policymakers demand intelligence support but is insufficient due to its exclusive focus on the consumers of intelligence, by integrating the incentives of intelligence producers and specifying the determinants of whether politicization succeeds or fails.     

The CIA’s mole in the Viet Cong: learning from a rare success

ABSTRACT

What does it take to cultivate spies inside an adversary’s forces? I assess efforts by the United States and South Vietnam to penetrate the Viet Cong during the Vietnam War. I offer the first extended account of the United States’ most successful intelligence penetration of the conflict. After initial recruitment by South Vietnam, a mid-level Viet Cong cadre spied for the CIA from 1969 until the end of the war. U.S. experience in this episode and others in Vietnam points up a challenge. Local allies offer expertise in identifying potential informants. But prospective spies view U.S. intelligence as more trustworthy and legitimate than local agencies with dubious operational security.     

Myanmar’s intelligence apparatus and the fall of General Khin Nyunt

As Myanmar’s Chief of Intelligence from 1983 until 2004, General Khin Nyunt presided over the development of a large and powerful security apparatus that underpinned military rule and played a major role in the country’s international relations. So influential did the key military intelligence organisation become, however, that it was seen as a threat by other parts of the armed forces, including the ruling State Peace and Development Council. In 2004, Khin Nyunt was arrested and his intelligence empire largely dismantled. The purge seriously weakened the regime’s capabilities, but was considered necessary to maintain its position as the supreme arbiter of power in Myanmar.     

The German intelligence estimates in the west, 1885–1914

Little has been known of German intelligence estimates prior to the First World War. The recent discovery of several German intelligence documents, including a classified history of German pre-war intelligence operations which was written during the inter-war period, in addition to some important German pre-war intelligence analysis, now gives considerable insight into the German intelligence estimates as well as their relationship to German war planning from 1885 to 1914.     

The quest for regional legitimation: Analyzing the Arab League’s legitimizing role in the Arab spring

The topic of international legitimacy has returned to centre stage during the Arab Spring, in which the Arab League has apparently assumed a prominent legitimation role. Although some scholarship has studied how international organizations are decisive in legitimizing actors and their actions during conflicts, relatively scant attention has been focused at constructing a comprehensive analytical framework for this kind of assessment that could be also applied to regional organizations (ROs). This paper proposes that when actors are involved in battles over international legitimation, analysing their access to the socially identified brokers of three legitimation functions (appropriateness, consensus, and empathy) is key to assess their success. Particularly, we argue that relevant identity-based ROs may have a crucial legitimizing role by operating as brokers of regional consensus. For this purpose, two case studies – Bahrain and Libya – illustrate how the Arab League’s brokerage influenced the legitimation of the actors involved and their outcomes. The findings suggest novel implications about the decisive legitimizing impact of regionalism on conflict resolution.     

The Administration’s Retreat and the Party’s Advance in the New Era of Xi Jinping: the Politics of the Ruling Party,the Government,and Associations in China

Journal of Chinese Political Science - In the new era of Xi Jinping, the Party has become more assertive, reclaiming the function of managing social organizations that the government agencies had...     

Fusing algorithms and analysts: open-source intelligence in the age of ‘Big Data’

In the age of ‘Big Data’, the potential value of open-source information for intelligence-related purposes is widely recognised. Of late, progress in this space has increasingly become associated with software that can expand our ability to gather, filter, interrelate and manipulate data through automated processes. The trend towards automation is both innovative and necessary. However, techno-centric efforts to replace human analysts with finely crafted algorithms across the board, from collection to synthesis and analysis of information, risk limiting the potential of OSINT rather than increasing its scope and impact. Effective OSINT systems must be carefully designed to facilitate complementarity, exploit the strengths, and mitigate the weaknesses of both human analysts and software solutions, obtaining the best contribution from both. Drawing on insights from the field of cognitive engineering, this article considers at a conceptual level how this might be achieved.