The political policy cycle: Presidential effort vs. presidential control

After disentangling presidential budget proposals from budgetary changes attributable to fluctuations in the economy and to congressional action, we find consistent evidence for a presidential macroeconomic policy cycle attuned to the elctoral cycle. Proposed budgets are more expansionary in election years than at other times. The Congress, however, also plays a significant role in determining fiscal outcomes. Its budgets are systematically related to those of the President and in general reinforce presidential efforts to respond to the electoral cycle. Although Presidents generally propose quite conservative budgets, their proposals are more expansionary in presidential election years than in other years. The Congress, which generally adopts an expansionary fiscal policy ratifies this proposed macroeconomic policy electoral cycle by adopting even more expansionary budgets in presidential election years than they do at other times.     

Consensus,constraint, and political polarization in recent presidential elections

By reexamining the structure of political attitudes among Americans in the period 1956–72, using both the items and coding scheme as given inThe Changing American Voter (1976) by Nie and his associates and using only domestic attitude items, but including all available responses, we have found that the major type of change between the 1950s and the 1970s is not an increase in internal constraint (ideological thinking of any sort) but an increase in political attitude polarization. Further, this analysis indicates that when interitem associations are used to measure constraints present in the entire population, a major source of political attitude constraint is ignored—the constraints present within the social, political and demographic groupings within the society. The major types of attitude constraints in our society are likely to be external to the attitudes themselves. Understanding electoral outcomes will necessitate understanding the nature of electoral coalitions formed across social and political groupings.     

Chairman reappointments,presidential elections and policy actions of the federal reserve

A number of recent studies have analyzed whether there is a political influence on monetary policy, focusing primarily on whether monetary policy becomes easier just prior to elections. In addition to exploring whether there exists an election period cycle in monetary policy, this article explores the existence of another political influence on policy. Following up on some recent anecdotal evidence provided by John T. Woolley, this article explores whether incumbent FED chairmen have succeeded in influencing monetary policy in order to improve their reappointment chances. The analysis, which spans the administrations of seven U.S. presidents and four FED chairmen, finds no conclusive evidence that FED policy changes systematically either before elections or chairman reappointment dates. The analysis has implications for the issue of rules versus discretion in monetary policy.     

Forecasting presidential elections: A comparison of naive models

Our primary aim is to forecast, rather than explain, presidential election results, using aggregate time series data from the post-World War II period. More particularly, we seek prediction of the presidential winner well before the election actually occurs. After comparing the performance of several naive blvariate models based on economic performance, international involvement, political experience, and presidential popularity, we go on to formulate a multivariate model. This economy-popularity regression model rather accurately forecasts the winner 6 months in advance of the election, by employing spring measures of presidential popularity and the growth rate in real GNP per capita. Furthermore, the model's performance, both ex post facto and prior to the election, compares favorably with the Gallup final preelection poll taken only a few days before the election.     

Random timing of elections and the political business cycle

In his 1975 paper, Nordhaus formally proves that governments whose aim is to be reelected, will generate ‘political’ business cycles. Empirical results do not confirm this proposition, especially in countries used to early elections. We show that if there is a non-zero probability for elections to be called before the legal term, the political business cycle will be less pronounced, even if no early election actually takes place; moreover, if the normal electoral cycle is interrupted before the legal term, one might observe an inversion of the business cycle, or no cycle at all.     

Direct presidential elections: a world summary

This paper first examines the frequency of direct presidential elections among the 170 countries of the world with a working, directly elected parliament. We find that there is a directly elected president in more than half of the countries and in about two-thirds of the republics. Former British colonies are less likely to hold direct presidential elections, which are otherwise very popular in North and South America and Africa. We then examine the kind of electoral formula that is used for the election of presidents. Most elections are held under the majority rule, most of the time under the majority runoff procedure. The majority rule is clearly predominant in Europe and Africa, and is unpopular in North America. Finally, no relationship is observed between the level of economic development or of democracy and the use of direct presidential elections or the choice of an electoral formula.     

Late-deciding voters in presidential elections

This article examines the behavior of voters who decide on their presidential candidate preferences within the final two weeks of the presidential campaigns. Relying on data from American National Election Studies (ANES) for elections, between 1972 and 1988, we demonstrate that late deciders are different from other voters in a variety of respects. They are less involved politically and far less predictable in their behavior than other voters. More significantly, we find that the candidate preferences of late deciders are not determined by the conventional political forces that motivate other voters. Rather, the choices that late deciders make appear to be nearly random in character. The implications of these findings for the analysis of electorates are discussed.     

Turnout and presidential coattails in congressional elections

Estimating the impact of turnout on House election results is problematic because of endogeneity and omitted variable bias. The following study proposes an instrumental approach to correct for these problems by using a series of fixed effects two-stage least squares panel-data regression models covering three congressional apportionment cycles (1972–1980; 1982–1990; 1992–2000). The analysis tests whether voter participation decreases the House incumbent’s electoral support, regardless of the level of competition in the district. The study also aims to determine if an increase in participation benefits Democratic candidates and whether this effect is constant across apportionment cycles. The results show that the influence of turnout on incumbency vote share is conditional on the level of presidential support in the district. This finding is explained by the surge and decline thesis of Campbell (1960).     

Turnout in recent American presidential elections

The well-noted decline in the participation of Americans in presidential elections since the early sixties reversed in the 1984 election, although only slightly. An improved national mood appears to have contributed little to increasing turnout. However, the gap in participation between the wealthier and poorer widened, while that between men and women narrowed and reversed direction, and belonging to a group associated with an identity affected participation more powerfully. Taken together, these findings indicate shifts in patterns of turnout corresponding to shifts in the lines of politicized interests. Analysis of the participation of blacks finds little evidence for electoral mobilization by the Rainbow Coalition in 1984.     

Economic determinants of presidential elections: The fair model

Ray Fair has constructed a model explaining the incumbent share of the two-party presidential popular vote for the elections of 1916-1984. The economic measures of the growth rate of real per capita GNP and the absolute value of the rate of inflation are singled out as important. In addition, a time trend favoring Democrats and whether an incumbent is seeking reelection are included.I argue that the Fair model is misspecified. Including the rate of growth in the Dow Jones Industrial Averages significantly improves the fit of the model, eliminates the trend as significant, reduces the income parameter, and strengthens the inflation parameter. In addition, the model remains stable when including the 1908 and 1912 elections, and up-dating to include the 1988 election strengthens the results.The explanatory power of the model is impressive with only one missed election outcome (1976) between 1908 and 1988, and this miss is easily explained by the impact of Watergate on the Republican candidate, President Ford.     

The 2011 general and presidential elections in Singapore

For the first time in Singapore's history, two elections were held in a year. In 2011, Singaporeans voted in a general election on 7 May and in another competitive presidential election on 27 August. Faced with a stronger opposition force and an emboldened electorate, the ruling People's Action Party won the elections but achieved the worst results since the country's independence.