Linking strategy and performance: Developments in the New Zealand public sector

In recent decades, many governments have sought to improve their systems of strategic management and priority setting. Few of these attempts have met with unequivocal success. In particular, the systems for “whole-of-government strategizing” have not been well integrated into the ongoing budgetary processes and departmental performance management systems. In 1993—1994, as part of its comprehensive reforms of the public sector, the New Zealand government instituted a new system of strategic management. The new approach—which in part grew out of the National government's attempt to outline its long-term vision in a document titled Path to 2010—involves the ministers specifying a series of medium-term policy goals, referred to as “strategic result areas” (SRAs), and then translating these into more detailed departmental objectives, known as “key result areas” (KRAs). More specific “milestones” are subsequently identified to serve as benchmarks against which the achievement of departmental KRAs can be assessed. This article describes and evaluates this new approach and considers its possible application in other countries.     

New public management and the reform of French public hospitals

New public management (NPM) is not only an Anglo‐Saxon debate but also a French one, with some of its elements constituting structural components of the French state apparatus. How did it make its way into French hospitals? What core mechanism was at the center of NPM implementation in hospitals? We discuss the redisorganization of the health system under NPM, as it attempted to reassert the central government's power over regions and how it alienated the medical profession. The paper highlights inherent contradictions and other false promises within NPM. It was unable to contained cost, could no enhance accountability or increase civil participation. We then investigate post‐NPM reforms in French healthcare. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Public management reform and lessons from experience in New Zealand

This article is edited from a speech delivered to the University of Victoria, Wellington—IPMN Workshop on the theme lessons from experience in New Zealand. The author articulates a number of lessons that have been learned, and identifies some lessons that should have been learned. Scott writes from the perspective of having been directly and centrally involved in the development and implementation of what has been characterized as “the New Zealand model” of public management for more than twenty years, a record of service that continues to date. The views expressed also benefit from extensive consulting by the author for governments around the world. Among the lessons learned are (a) the need for clarity of roles, responsibilities and accountability in the implementation of management reform, (b) the importance of matching decision capacity to responsibility, (c) the significance of ministerial commitment and clarity on expectations, (d) the advantages gained from structural innovations within the New Zealand cabinet, (e) the need to analyze disasters carefully for what they teach, (f) approaches to embrace and foibles to avoid in implementing performance specification, (g) problems caused by confusion over ownership and improper assessment of organizational capability, (h) the fact that actually doing strategic management in the public sector is hugely complicated, (i) that it is time to put an end to the notion that there is an “extreme model” of public management in application in New Zealand, and (j) that public management, government and governance innovations in New Zealand are no longer novel compared to those advanced in other nations. With respect to lessons not learned satisfactorily, many are simply the dark shadow of positive lessons, i.e., having not understood or implemented the successes achieved in some parts of New Zealand government into others. The author concludes with an admonition to avoid jumping too quickly, in response to post-electoral rhetoric, to the conclusion that past reforms in have to be modified quickly and radically, and that the New Zealand Model has failed.     

Citizen perceptions of public management: Hybridisation and post‐new public management in Japan and New Zealand

An older body of research claims variously: a world‐wide transformation from new public management (NPM) to new public governance or post new public management (post‐NPM); a ‘layering’, where new management rhetoric and techniques are layered upon existing ones; or a ‘hybridisation’ synthesised from competing systems. More recent studies, particularly in central and Eastern Europe, suggest a nuanced and context‐specific degree of transformation. Influenced by a growing research interest in citizen perceptions of public management, this study expands this more nuanced approach by surveying local government public management perceptions of 1,140 New Zealand and 3,100 Japanese citizen online survey respondents. Using principal component analysis, we show both New Zealand and Japan exhibit degrees of hybridisation of public management paradigms, with Japan exhibiting a higher degree of eclecticism.     

Symposium on public management teform in New Zealand:: Reflections on the international public management network/victoria university workshop

The genesis of the workshop on public management reform in New Zealand, held in Wellington on March 10, 2000, was an invitation from the International Public Management Network to the Graduate School of Business and Government Management at Victoria University to organize and co-host a one-day event in Wellington following the Network’s Sydney 2000 Conference. Approximately sixty people attended the workshop. The majority of attendees were senior public servants in the New Zealand government. In addition, there was a representation of academics from New Zealand and Network members who came on from the IPMN conference in Sydney at Macquarie Graduate School of Management March 4–6.The mix of speakers was strongly weighted towards practitioners, as is reflected in the articles in this symposium. The three central agency contributions are all from officials who have a reputation for thinking creatively and critically about the future of New Zealand public management, Derek Gill, Andrew Kibblewhite and Anne Neale. Graham Scott kindly agreed to provide the keynote address. Robert Gregory, a well-known critic of the New Zealand reforms, was the sole academic voice in this small chorus of practitioners. Gregory would be the last to claim that he is “representative” of anyone’s opinion other than his own.     

New Zealand's public sector management reform: Implications for the United States

This article describes the reforms to the functions of central government in New Zealand that have been introduced since 1985. It sketches the political and economic situation which motivated the changes to the systems of public management. Some of the theoretical influences that provided insights to the advice given to the government by its officials are noted. The essential elements of the system are described briefly. The results are summarized in terms of how the ideas were implemented, the extent of their acceptance, the impact on managerial behavior, and the effects on government in terms of the objectives that were originally set out. Some tentative suggestions are made regarding the messages that might be drawn from the New Zealand experience that are relevant to the reforms of the government of the United States.     

Electoral reform in New Zealand: The report of the Royal Commission

In late 1986 the Royal Commission on the Electoral System in New Zealand published its report. The Commission's recommendations were both radical and comprehensive. Amongst other things it proposed the introduction of a mixed member proportional (MMP) electoral system, the abolition of the four Maori seats, a substantial increase in the number of MPs, the state funding of political parties, and various changes to the system of boundary redistribution and the administration of elections. This paper outlines the background to the establishment of the Royal Commission, briefly examines the Commission's principal findings, and considers the prospects for reform.     

The challenge of evaluating systemic change: the case of public management reform

At what stage of reform in the public sector does it become possible to conduct a thorough appraisal of results and how does one know when this stage has been reached? How should such an assessment be undertaken? By what methods can comprehensive and far-reaching systemic reforms be evaluated in the arena of public management during recent decades, particularly in countries like Australia, Britain and New Zealand? Most assessments have focused upon specific changes in management practice including the introduction of performance pay, the move to accrual accounting, the growth of contracting-out, the separation of policy and operations or the devolution of human resource management responsibilities. Alternatively, they have dealt with management changes in particular policy domains –such as health care, education, community services or criminal justice –or within a particular organization (department, agency or private provider). By contrast, there have been relatively few macro evaluations –comprehensive assessments of the impact of root-and-branch changes to the system. The problems of evaluation in the arena of public management are inherently complex and the way ahead is by no means clear. This article offers some broad reflections on the limitations to policy evaluation in the field of public management, and more particularly explores the obstacles confronted when assessing the consequences of systemic management reforms. It focuses on recent changes in the New Zealand public sector to illustrate the general themes because these reforms constitute one of best examples of systemic change anywhere in the world.     

新公共管理:质疑与反思

新公共管理是公共行政发展过程中的一个新阶段.然而,新公共管理的所有教义是否就是正确的和值得提倡的,则是一个值得令人深思的问题,本文从它的理论体系、人性假设、价值导向和实践操作效果对新公共管理进行了质疑与反思.     

New directions for public service reform in developing countries

This paper argues that recent developments in practice and theory provide a more promising basis for public service reform in developing countries than we have had since at least the turn of the century. There have been significant instances of large‐scale reform success, such as Nepal's Public Service Commission and Malaysia's delivery unit, Pemandu, and also “pockets of effectiveness” in individual agencies in many countries. They contribute to a more fruitful and diverse repertoire of reform approaches than generally realized. Policymakers can draw on all those instances and types of reform, together with relevant rich country experiences, as they improvise and tailor responses to their always unique reform problems. Proceeding in this way helps reformers to expand the “reform space” available within the political economy. Donors can help reformers if they facilitate reform in the spirit of the Busan Partnership rather than impose their preferred models. In short, the new direction which this paper identifies can be stated as creative problem solving by local actors facilitated by sympathetic donors, building on examples of reform success and drawing on a repertoire of poor and rich country reform approaches.     

Reforming the public sector for leaner government and improved performance: The New Zealand experience

Over the 10 year period from 1984 to 1994 New Zealand has gone through an intense period of restructuring, both of the public sector and of the wider economy. In the process New Zealand has been transformed from a highly protected and regulated economy with a range of intrusive and expensive interventions, to an open and deregulated economy with an efficient and leaned down public sector. The article presents the “New Zealand experience” in restructuring, not necessarily as an example to be copied but as a benchmark to be used in examining the most appropriate restructuring to apply in other circumstances. The stages in the reform are described and the three key success factors set out. One of the key factors is the establishment of a set of clear principles which are then applied with determination. The principles developed in the New Zealand context are set out. The article examines the restructuring of the science sector in New Zealand as one case study; in part because of the author's personal involvement but also because it is a particularly complete example. Areas where work remains to be done are identified including the reforms in education and health and the need for collective action across government. Finally lessons to emerge from the New Zealand experience are discussed. These include especially putting time into fully understanding market characteristics before a market oriented reform is started, carrying reforms through to their conclusion rather than stopping partway, and establishing clear principles to guide the reform process.     

Evaluating public expenditure management systems: An experimental methodology with an application to the Australia and New Zealand reforms

This article examines how institutional arrangements affect the size, allocation, and use of public expenditures. It identifies a set of arrangements that can address underlying problems and affect three levels of expenditure outcomes - aggregate fiscal discipline, strategic prioritization, and technical efficiency in the use of resources. A diagnostic questionnaire is constructed which produces index values for each arrangement. This methodology is used to analyze the radical reforms introduced by New Zealand and Australia. The results show that New Zealand sought to achieve aggregate fiscal discipline and enhance technical efficiency through formal mechanisms for transparency and accountability. The Australian reforms sought to improve strategic prioritization through transparency of the medium-term costs of competing policies, and the devolution of detailed program decisions to line ministries within hard budgets.     

Public management reform and organizational performance: An empirical assessment of the U.K. Labour government's public service improvement strategy

We present the first empirical assessment of the U.K. Labour government's program of public management reform. This reform program is based on rational planning, devolution and delegation, flexibility and incentives, and enhanced choice. Measures of these variables are tested against external and internal indicators of organizational performance. The setting for the study is upper tier English local governments, and data are drawn from a multiple informant survey of 117 authorities. The statistical results indicate that planning, organizational flexibility, and user choice are associated with higher performance. Conclusions are drawn for the theory and practice of public management reform. © 2006 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management     

The private stake in public goods: overcoming the illogic of collective action

Conclusion According to the Logic of Collective Action, most actions in the service of common interests are either not logical or not collective. In a large group, the argument goes, individual action counts for so little in the realization of common interests that it makes no sense for a person to consider group interests when choosing a course of personal conduct. Only private interests are decisive. Their fulfillment, at least, depends in a substantial way on one's own behavior. Individual actions designed to achieve private advantage are therefore rational. Actions aimed at collective goods are a waste of time and effort. Occasionally, of course, a person acting on the basis of private interests may inadvertently provide some collective good from which many other people derive benefit. This is what happens in the case of the Greek shipping tycoon. But it occurs only because one person's private good fortuitously coincides with the collective good of a larger group. From the tycoon's perspective, there are no collective interests at stake in the sponsorship of an opera broadcast, only his own private interests. Nor does his decision to underwrite a broadcast take account of the other people who will listen to it. His action is a solitary one designed to serve a private interest, and it is perfectly consistent with Olson's argument concerning the illogic of collective action, because it is not grounded in collective interest and is not a case of collective behavior. Olson's theory permits people to share collective interests but not to act upon them voluntarily. The only acknowledged exception occurs in the case of very small groups, where each member's contribution to the common good represents such a large share of the total that any person's default becomes noticeable to others and may lead them to reduce or cancel their own contributions. In this instance, at least, one person's actions can make a perceptible difference for the chance of realizing collective interests, and it is therefore sensible for each person to consider these collective interests (and one another's conduct) when deciding whether or not to support group efforts. Outside of small groups, however, Olson finds no circumstances in which voluntary collective action is rational. But in fact the conditions that make collective action rational are broader than this and perhaps more fundamental to Olson's theory. They are inherent in the very ‘collectiveness’ of collective goods - their status as social or group artifacts. In the absence of a group, there can be no such thing as a collective good. But in the absence of mutual awareness and interdependence, it becomes extremely difficult to conceive of a social group. The assumption that group members are uninfluenced by one another's contributions to a collective good is no mere theoretical simplification. It may be a logical impossibility. Being a member of a group, even a very large one, implies at the very least that one's own conduct takes place against a background of group behavior. Olson's assumptions do not acknowledge this minimal connection between individual and group behavior, and they inhibit recognition of the elementary social processes that explain why slovenly conduct attracts special attention on clean streets, or why the initial violations of group norms are more momentous than later violations. It may be argued, of course, that the groups of Olson's theory are not functioning social groups with a collective existence, but only categories or classes of people who happen to share a collective interest. The logic of collective action is intended precisely to show why these ‘potential’ groups are prevented from converting themselves into organized social groups whose members act in a coordinated way. In such latent groups, perhaps, members are unaware of one another, and Olson's assumption that they are uninfluenced by one another's conduct becomes a reasonable one. Another implication, however, is that Olson's theory is subject to unacknowledged restrictions. The logic of the free ride is for potential groups. It may not hold for actual ones. The distinction is exemplified, in the case of public sanitation, by the difference between what is rational on a clean street and what is rational on a dirty one. The logic of the free ride does not make sense for the members of an ongoing group that is already operating to produce collective goods such as public order or public sanitation. While this represents a notable limitation upon the scope of Olson's theory, it apparently leaves the logic of collective action undisturbed where potential or latent groups are concerned. But suppose that a member of an unmobilized group wants her colleagues to contribute to the support of a collective good that she particularly values. Her problem is to create a situation in which such contributions make sense to her fellow members. As we have already seen in the case of the neighborhood street-sweeper, one possible solution is to provide the collective good herself. If it has the appropriate characteristics, its very existence may induce other members of the latent group to contribute to its maintenance. This is not one of those cases in which one person's private interest fortuitously coincides with the collective interest of a larger group. The neighborhood street-sweeper is acting on behalf of an interest that she is conscious of sharing with her neighbors. Her aim is to arouse collective action in support of that interest. She does not expect to pay for public cleanliness all by herself, or to enjoy its benefits all by herself. Her role bears a general resemblance to the one that some analysts have defined for the political entrepreneur who seeks to profit personally by supplying a collective good to the members of a large group (Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Young 1971). Like the neighborhood street-sweeper, the entrepreneur finds it advantageous to confer a collective benefit on others. But the similarity does not extend to the nature of the advantage or the manner in which it is secured. The entrepreneur induces people to contribute toward the cost of a collective good by creating an organizational apparatus through which group members can pool their resources. The existence of this collection mechanism can also strengthen individual members' confidence that their colleagues' contributions are forthcoming. What the entrepreneur gains is private profit - the difference between the actual cost of a collective good and the total amount that group members are prepared to pay for it. By contrast, the neighborhood street-sweeper induces support for a collective good, not by facilitating contributions, but by increasing the costs that come from the failure to contribute. As a result of her efforts, she gains a clean street whose benefits (and costs) she shares with her fellow residents. She takes her profit in the form of collective betterment rather than private gain, and her conduct, along with the behavior of her neighbors, demonstrates that effective selfinterest can extend beyond private interest. Self-interest can also give rise to continuing cooperative relationships. The street-sweeper, acting in her own interest, brings into being a cooperative enterprise in which she and her fellow residents jointly contribute to the production of a collective good. Cooperation in this case does not come about through negotiation or exchange among equal parties. It can be the work of a single actor who contributes the lion's share of the resources needed to establish a collective good, in the expectation that its existence will induce others to join in maintaining it. The tactic is commonplace as a means of eliciting voluntary collective action, and it operates on a scale far larger than the street or the neighborhood. Government, paradoxically, probably relies on it more than most institutions With its superior power and resources, it may be society's most frequent originator of voluntary collective action. Its policies, imposed through coercion and financed by compulsory taxation, generate a penumbra of cooperation without which coercion might become ineffectual. By providing certain collective goods, government authorities can move citizens to make voluntary contributions to the maintenance of these goods. The stark dichotomy between private voluntary action and public coercion - one of the mainstays of American political rhetoric - may be as misleading as the identification of self-interest with selfishness. There is more at stake here than the voluntary production of collective goods. Continuing cooperative behavior can have other results as well. Once group members begin to expect cooperation from one another, norms of cooperation and fairness are likely to develop. Axelrod (1986) has suggested that modes of conduct which have favorable outcomes for the people who pursue them tend to evolve into group norms. Public-spirited action that serves self-interest could therefore engender a principled attachment to the common good, undermining the assumption of self-interestedness that gives the logic of collective action its bite. Laboratory studies of cooperative behavior have already demonstrated that experimental subjects have far less regard for narrow self-interest than rational choice theory requires (Dawes 1980). In one extended series of collective action experiments, however, Marwell and Ames (1981) found a single group of subjects who approximated the self-interested free-riders of Olson's theory. They were graduate students in economics.     

The specificity of public service reform

Despite universal recognition of the decline of public services and the need for reforms, considerable divergence of views exists on the strategy and sequencing of reform for individual countries according to their capacities and level of development. This article reflects on the general contours of public service reform, emphasising past experience, the need to be pragmatic rather than idealistic, the mudding of the waters by the New Public Management movement, the complications of structural adjustment programmes of international financial institutions and the damage resulting from the imposition of universal solutions unfitted and unsuitable to local circumstances. Reform needs political and bureaucratic champions, careful preparation, patience and necessary investment, and capacity to neutralise opposition. Ultimately, one has to allow for a shifting combination of history, culture, politics, economics, sociology, ideology and values in each country. This analysis is applied to the possibility of reforming the public service of India, the second most populous country in the world, and the lessons to be gleaned for developing and implementing the strategy. The article then concludes with an outline of some universal problems facing public service reformers all around the globe such as corruption, the future role of government, shape of the civil service, reversing its erosion and addressing issues of fragmentation, compensation and diversity. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When industrial policy shapes public sector reform: Total quality management in Britain and France

Approaches seeking to explain the development of TQM ideas in government are very much ‘business‐centric’. The goal of this article is to show that in reforming the public sector, policy‐makers did not simply follow the lead of the private sector because ‐ in the case of TQM ‐ the private sector was itself, to some extent at least, led by government. In the mid‐1980s, Britain and France launched nationwide ‘quality initiatives’ which provided money for businesses to buy management consulting expertise. Through the implementation of these policies, consultants built channels of communication with the state, and this subsequently opened possibilities for consultants to help transfer TQM ideas from the industrial policy area to the field of public sector reform.     

Strategies and path arrangement for public budget management reform of China

Through analyzing the development of public budget management of developed country, the reform strategies to probe budget management of China should be on the basis of Chinese situations. The reform process should be carried out gradually.