Determinants of Business Response to Government Tax Incentives for Privately Financed Termination Benefit Programs

This study examines the industry and organizational factors that determine the likelihood of business response to government tax incentives for privately financed termination benefit programs and the substitution problems confronting government programs that use tax incentives to encourage businesses to provide these benefits to their employees. It concludes that government tax incentives will likely have marginal effects on the private provision of termination benefits, especially in large firms in industries with a strong market presence from government. These programs most likely will get high participation from large firms which already provide these benefits to salaried and hourly workers resulting in high substitution effects. They also are likely to extend benefits to hourly employees in firms that already provide similar benefits to salaried workers. However, these tax incentives are likely to have very limited inducement effects on small and medium-sized firms resulting in low overall target efficiency for these programs.     

Globalization,government spending and taxation in the OECD

Abstract. This article assesses the impact of globalization on welfare state effort in the OECD countries. Globalization is defined in terms of total trade, imports from low wage economies, foreign direct investment, and financial market integration. Welfare effort is analyzed in terms both of public spending (and separately on social service provision and income transfer programs) and taxation (effective rates of capital taxation and the ratio of capital to labor and consumption taxes). Year–to–year increases in total trade and international financial openness in the past three decades have been associated with less government spending. In contrast, integration into global markets has not been associated either with reductions in capital tax rates, or with shifts in the burden of taxation from capital to consumption and labor income. Moreover, countries with greater inflows and outflows of foreign direct investment tend to tax capital more heavily.     

Reducing Government Involvement in a Market: Lessons from the Privatization of Sallie Mae

Government intervention shapes institutions and markets; even when government seeks to reduce its involvement, it must protect against resulting market distortions. Government provided substantial benefits to Sallie Mae as a government‐sponsored enterprise (GSE). Giving up GSE status allowed Sallie Mae to expand the scope of its financial services beyond restrictions of its GSE charter. Benefits of GSE status led to scale economies and low cost structure that now propel the company's dominance and growth as a non‐GSE. Lessons from Sallie Mae apply to removal of GSE status from other GSEs and to restructuring and deregulation in other economic sectors.     

Government growth in the twenty-first century

Public choice explanations of government growth fall into three main categories: budget-maximization theories, rational-choice models, and path-dependent models like the “ratchet hypothesis”. The strengths and weaknesses of these theories as explanations for government growth are considered along with some facts about the actual growth of government to conjecture about its trajectory in the twenty-first century. Government size seems to have been constrained in the past primarily by its ability to raise revenue. Growth rates in the new century thus appear to depend on factors constraining government’s ability to continue to expand the tax base.     

The bigger the better? Evidence of the effect of government size on life satisfaction around the world

This paper empirically analyzes whether government size is conducive or detrimental to life satisfaction in a cross-section of 74 countries. We thus provide a test of the longstanding dispute between standard neoclassical economic theory and public choice theory. According to the neoclassical view, governments play unambiguously positive roles for individuals' quality of life, while the theory of public choice has been developed to understand why governments often choose excessive involvement in – and regulation of – the economy, thereby harming their citizens' quality of life. Our results show that life satisfaction decreases with higher government consumption. For low, middle income, and male people, this result is stronger when the government is leftwing, while government consumption appears to be less harmful for women when the government is perceived to be effective. Government capital formation and social spending have no significant impact on life satisfaction.     

Government size and growth: Accounting for economic freedom and globalization

We examine the relationship between government size and economic growth, controlling for economic freedom and globalization, and using Bayesian Averaging over Classical Estimates in a panel of rich countries. Countries with big government have experienced above average increases in the KOF globalization index and in the Fraser institute’s Economic freedom index. To maintain comparability with earlier studies, we use two sample periods: 1970–1995 and 1970–2005. Government size robustly correlates negatively with growth. We also find some evidence that countries with big government can use economic openness and sound economic policies to mitigate negative effects of big government.     

Worldwide trends and developments in social security, 1983-85

This article highlights the major developments and trends in social insurance programs that are presented in detail in the 1985 edition of Social Security Programs Throughout the World. The data in that reference book reflect the fact that as countries have adapted to the slow economic growth in recent years, increased emphasis has been placed on the cost effective use of social security funds. Some industrialized countries have restructured benefit provisions and reallocated resources among programs and beneficiaries to target benefits for specific groups. In the developing nations, the introduction of additional programs and expanded benefits continued on a limited scale amidst widespread concern about maintaining the real value of benefits after years of high inflation.     

全球经济进入"低增长陷阱"背景下的中国财税改革研究

随着全球经济进入低增长阶段,政府宏观政策的多样化和有效性在经济周期中的调控作用不断提高.政府进行的新一轮财税制度改革既是应对全球经济低增长、国内经济换挡、中美贸易战等的重要举措,也是延续分税制改革、缓解土地财政压力和降低地方债务风险的必然结果.新一轮财税制度改革通过维持增值税"五五分享"比例以稳定和调整增值税留抵退税分担机制,后移消费税征收环节并稳步下划地方以保障地方财政收入和提高地方财政支出能力,减税降费以刺激企业创新,合理化收入分配制度以扩大内需,最终实现经济的稳定增长.新一轮财税制度改革取得预期效果,还需要完善转移支付制度、预算管理制度、债务管理制度、信息披露制度等,保障政策落到实处.     

The Impacts of State Capital Management Programs on State Economic Performance

Although the normative literature advocates systematic capital management practices, empirical studies investigating the tangible benefits of these practices are rare. Based on previous findings that public investment affects economic growth, this study extends the model of government spending and economic growth to investigate the effect of systematic capital management programs on state economic performance. Using panel data from 1997 to 2004 and the Government Performance Project's data on state capital management practices, the empirical results indicate that highly systematic capital management programs positively alter the relationship between the state's capital spending levels and the state's economic growth rate.     

A distributional theory of government growth

This article presents a closed form solution for time-consistent taxation and public spending in a dynamic game between government and median voter. Extending Meltzer and Richard’s static analysis of government size the article offers a theory of growth of government. At low stages of economic development the median voter, identified as a relatively poor worker, prefers to have no or only small redistributive taxation in order to foster savings. Through this channel he expects improvements of his labor productivity and wage. At higher stages of development, however, when capital is relatively abundant and prospects of further labor productivity gains through capital accumulation are smaller, the incentive to tax and redistribute income rises. Yet, in line with previous work on growth and infrastructure spending the median voter prefers a constant share of productive public spending at all times. Hence, government growth is solely driven by an expanding welfare state.     

The effect of government size on the unemployment rate

Recent empirical studies have revealed that the size of government is inversely related to economic growth and technical efficiency. Evidence is presented linking the size of government to reported unemployment rates for the industrial countries during recent years. This finding helps to explain the empirical link between government size and poor macroeconomic performance.     

Tax decentralization and local government size

This paper investigates the relationship between fiscal federalism and the sizes of local governments. While many empirical studies emphasized that grants encourage the growth of local public spending and local taxes constrain it, they are more silent regarding the effects of different types of tax autonomy. The paper addresses this issue by arguing that tax decentralization as organized on tax bases used only by local governments (tax-separation), rather than on tax-base sharing, would restrain local public expenditures. Using an unbalanced panel of OECD countries, the key finding is that only property taxes—mostly based on a “tax-separation” scheme—seem to favor smaller local governments. Thus, while tax decentralization is a necessary condition for limiting the growth of local governments, it does not appear sufficient, as tax-separation schemes among government levels would in fact be required.     

Asymmetric Effects of Intergovernmental Grants: Analysis and Implications for U.S. Welfare Policy

Theories of federal grants to states and localities suggestthat these grants have a stimulative effect on spending, causingrecipient governments to expand and contract programs alongwith changes in the grants. However, policymakers may responddifferently to grant decreases than to grant increases becausethey face political and bureaucratic pressures to expand programs.These asymmetric reactions may depend on specific politicalstructures. Pooled time-series regressions of data from theAid to Families with Dependent Children program across 46 statesfrom 1965 to 1994 demonstrate state government responses togrant changes. Bureaucratic pressures and proposals lead statesto expand their welfare benefits upon increases in federal grants,but not to contract them upon decreases in federal grants. Withregard to the 1996 welfare reforms, this study indicates thatthe switch to block grants will lead to little or no state reductionin welfare payments.     

Understanding Informal Payments in the Public Sector: Theory and Evidence from Nineteenth‐century Sweden

Informal payments for public services such as health care are a major problem in many countries around the world. Explanations for their prevalence include cultural factors, lack of enforcement as well as insufficient funds and low wages for public employees. This paper analyzes the phenomenon from an economic perspective, arguing that they are a logical consequence of low wages in the public sector. However, informal payments from citizens to public employees for services may be preferable to a situation in which no services are delivered. Given that the informal payments thus can be seen to have a functional element, and that reforms aimed at eliminating them largely have been unsuccessful, formalization and legalization rather than increased enforcement may be a way forward. Many government employees in nineteenth‐century Sweden received their salary through semi‐informal payments (‘sportler’) from citizens. A case study reveals that politicians at the time reasoned along the lines of what could be expected from economic theory: although undesirable and problematic, sportler were necessary to finance the wages of the government employees, given the lack of tax revenue and monitoring capabilities. In contrast to previous research, this article argues that reform efforts were aimed at pragmatically improving the existing system through formalization and regulation rather than simply prohibiting the informal payments.     

Economic Reforms and Their Impacts on Informal Payments for Government Services in Transition Countries

This article examines whether economic reforms in transition countries reduce the incidence of informal payments to government officials. Using the 2009 EBRD-World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) data, empirical models of the likelihood and frequency that firms are asked to make informal payments are estimated. Eight measures of economic reform developed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) are also included in the analysis, both individually and as a combined index of overall reform, to test whether reforms reduce informal payments. Firm, country, and economic reform factors are all found to have an impact. In particular, the overall reform index and all but one of the eight EBRD reform indices are found to significantly reduce informal payments. The marginal effect of a one-standard-deviation increase in the overall reform index is to reduce the probability of a firm reporting that it gives a gift by 2.5% and reduce the probability that the firm reports that gift giving is a usual practice in its industry by 4%. Enterprise reforms, markets and trade reforms, financial sector reforms, and infrastructure reforms all have the effect of reducing the likelihood and frequency of informal payments.     

The Politics and economics of revenue growth: A cross–national analysis

Despite considerable interest in comparative fiscal policy in general, and the high salience of tax policy and tax reform in the industrialized democracies, there are relatively few cross–national studies of the economic and political correlates of revenues over time. We undertake a cross–national time series study of revenue growth in fourteen OECD countries between 1958 and 1990.We test a number of political and economic hypotheses about revenue change, including political business cycle, 'fiscal illusion', elasticity, and ideological theories. For the 1958—1990 period, we find that all countries, regardless of revenue structure, experience higher real revenue growth as a result of inflation, but that revenue growth is more responsive to unemployment in countries that rely more on direct taxes compared to countries with less direct–tax reliance. We find that this effect is most pronounced in the post–1972 period. We also find that revenue tends to increase in the years following elections, consistent with the idea that governments try to minimize the political fallout from tax increases by separating them as much as possible from election campaign periods; this effect, too, is most pronounced in the post–1972 period. We find no support for 'fiscal illusion' and ideological theories of revenue growth.     

Expenditure effects of metropolitan tax base sharing: A public choice analysis

This research explores probable budgetary consequences from the introduction of an institutional change which requires communities in metropolitan areas to pool any growth in the commercial-industrial tax base so that all cities benefit from new development irrespective of where the development occurs. Sharing of the tax base has been suggested as a means to overcome fiscal disparities among local governments in metropolitan areas and to reduce competition for new industrial development, thus, promoting ‘orderly development’ of the urban area. An alternative view of the institutional change focuses on the consequences of removing the tax base from the control of the local unit of government and suggests that based upon existing studies of government size and the cost of public services, government managers will be less responsive to the wishes of the citizen/taxpayer after the introduction of tax base sharing. The efficiency aspects of local government finance are examined and based upon data for the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area, the expenditure effects are estimated. The empirical evidence suggests that while revenue flows are altered in the metropolitan areas, the primary impact of tax base sharing has been to expand the level of government expenditures, not equalize interjurisdictional tax rates.     

The politics and economics of revenue growth: A cross-national analysis

Abstract Despite considerable interest in comparative fiscal policy in general, and the high salience of tax policy and tax reform in the industrialized democracies, there are relatively few cross–national studies of the economic and political correlates of revenues over time. We undertake a cross–national time series study of revenue growth in fourteen OECD countries between 1958 and 1990.We test a number of political and economic hypotheses about revenue change, including political business cycle, 'fiscal illusion', elasticity, and ideological theories. For the 1958—1990 period, we find that all countries, regardless of revenue structure, experience higher real revenue growth as a result of inflation, but that revenue growth is more responsive to unemployment in countries that rely more on direct taxes compared to countries with less direct–tax reliance. We find that this effect is most pronounced in the post–1972 period. We also find that revenue tends to increase in the years following elections, consistent with the idea that governments try to minimize the political fallout from tax increases by separating them as much as possible from election campaign periods; this effect, too, is most pronounced in the post–1972 period. We find no support for 'fiscal illusion' and ideological theories of revenue growth.     

The impossibility of a desirable minimal state

The amount of control the general public exerts over government depends on accepted government procedures as determined by the political constitution and prevailing public opinion. It has not been the purpose of this paper to suggest ways of providing the public more control over government but to consider some implications of changes in that control. It is obvious that it would be desirable for the general public to have more control over political decisions; i.e., for the political process to be more responsive to the broad based benefits and costs that result from government action. The question is; what does more public control over government imply about the desirable size of government? For the natural rights advocate the answer is nothing. Government should be only large enough to protect citizens against force and fraud. The purpose of the present paper, however, has been to argue that the desirable size of government can be either positively or negatively related to the control exerted over it by the public. If this argument is accepted, it casts doubt on the possibility of a desirable minimum state.When there is little public control over government, organized special interest will have disproportionate political influence and will use this influence to expand government into activities that are detrimental to the public interest. Obviously, given this situation, it will be desirable to use additional public control over government to reduce the size of government by restricting its activities. But just as obvious is that this situation is one in which control over government is inadequate to the task of achieving a minimal state.     

Incentivizing self‐regulation: Federal vs. state‐level voluntary programs in US climate change policies

How does program sponsorship influence the design of voluntary programs? Why and how do voluntary programs on climate change sponsored by the state and federal governments in the United States vary in their institutional design? Scholars emphasize the signaling role of voluntary programs to outside stakeholders, and the excludable benefits that induce firms to take on non‐trivial costs of joining voluntary programs. Scholars have noted several types of benefits, particularly reputational benefits programs provide, but have not systematically studied why different programs emphasize different types of benefits. We suggest that excludable benefits are likely to take different forms depending on the institutional context in which program sponsors function. We hypothesize that federal programs are likely to emphasize less tangible reputational benefits while state programs are likely to emphasize more tangible benefits, such as access to technical knowledge and capital. Statistical analyses show the odds of a voluntary program emphasizing tangible benefits increases by several folds when the program is sponsored by the state as opposed to federal government.