John Locke and the Limits of Religious Liberty: Marriage License Refusal,Religious Freedom Laws,Vaccine Refusal,Contraception Mandate Exemptions,and Ultrasound Requirements

Nearly two hundred fifty years into its existence, the American polity faces a conundrum over a core founding principle: religious liberty. Multiple debates have emerged over the extent and limits of religious liberty, including arguments over how far any one person’s religious liberty extends into the public sphere as well as into the private lives of other citizens. Highly influential on James Madison’s crafting of the First Amendment, John Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration outlines a strong conception of both religious toleration and of religious liberty. In the “Letter,” Locke’s reasoning is sympathetic to the concerns and convictions of believers while remaining cognizant of the calamities to which religious differences can give rise. Further, he provides a robust explication of the mutually exclusive domains of ecclesiastical and civil authorities, now known more colloquially as the division of church and state. In the following article, I illustrate how the principles put forth by Locke offer guidance in adjudicating religious liberty claims in the cases of Kim Davis, religious freedom laws, vaccine refusal, contraception mandate exemptions, and ultrasound requirements.     

Cohen on Locke, Land and Labour

G. A. Cohen has argued that Locke's remarks on the value-creatingcapacity oflabour contain a premise which is both implausible and incoherently defended by Locke. I contest Cohen's attribution oferror to Locke. and offer an alternative interpretation of his remarks, integrating them within his more widely discussed labour-mixture argument. However, I agree with Cohen, although for distinct reasons, that Locke's remarks do not constitute a plausible anti-egalitarian argument.     

Locke, Hegel, and the Economy

Peter Lawler’s insightful critique of American individualism offers many important lessons, but his diagnosis of our economic situation is overly optimistic. Indeed, “big government” is more of a problem than Lawler suggests. This essay draws on two central figures of Lawler’s analysis—Locke and Hegel—to explore the problems that individualism poses for modern political economy. Although individualism is unlikely to make the regulatory state or welfare state wither away, the psychology of individualism confirms the importance of cultivating forms of recognition beyond economic life.     

Locke and the Politics and Theology of Toleration

Locke's theory of toleration has been understood to rest on the claim that persecution was insufficient to instil either (i) true or (ii) sincere belief in people. Although Locke did indeed make both these claims, neither was fundamental to his theory. Locke was principally concerned to deny that persecution was necessary to instil true or sincere belief; its insufficiency to those ends he, and his contemporaries, took for granted. His denial of the necessity of persecution presupposed that human beings were, in principle, naturally adequate to the discovery of God's wants for them. The same presupposition, which derives from natural theology, underwrote the views in politics and revealed theology that complete his theory and supplied its moral content. Contemporary theories of toleration purposing to proceed on Lockean assumptions are morally and philosophically impoverished by their failure to see the requirements laid on an adequate theory of toleration by genuinely Lockean terms.     

Recognition as Redistribution

Abstract

This paper aims to explore and examine the implied commitment to the premises of recognition in Rawls’s account of redistributive justice. It attempts to find out whether or not recognition relations that produce humiliation and cultural injustice can be followed to their logical conclusion in his theory of redistribution. This paper makes two claims. Firstly, although Rawls does not disregard the harms of misrecognition as demonstrated in his notion of self-respect being the most important primary good, he cannot liberally accommodate the idea of humiliation as a case of injustice without compromising the basic premises of his theory. Secondly, while resource distribution produces indirect side effects that can impact upon cultural injustice, addressing recognition issues through the prism of redistribution can inadvertently result in further misrecognition. The paper concludes that in the final analysis Rawls wrongly takes redistribution as the overarching principle of justice to which recognition is but a subservient principle.     

洛克对政治权力内涵的分析

洛克在《政府论两篇》中分析了政治权力的内涵。他的学说对英美自由主义理论的发展产生了深远的影响。尽管如此,学界却一直忽视了洛克的政治权力理论,仅仅强调了他的权利理论。本文试图弥补这一缺陷。洛克分析政治权力的起点是享有财产权和自由的个体,这些个体构成了一个前政治的自由秩序。以此为基础,洛克通过社会契约解释了政治权力的生成逻辑,并在这一论证过程中赋予政治权力以特定的道德属性。他阐释政治权力内涵的另一个特点是他赋予了政治权力以一种特殊的存在形态,即"立法权力"。洛克阐述的这一政治权力有效地在理论上对抗了当时的父权理论和绝对主权理论,为他设计一个宪政国家奠定了基础。     

LOCKE AND NOZICK ON PROPERTY

Abstract: In this paper I hope to show that the differences between the Lockian and Nozickian ideas regarding the foundation of private property are far greater than is generally assumed. My purpose is not to criticize Nozick, but to show that the accepted interpretation of Locke on which he relies is mistaken. In particular, I hope to show (1) that the theory of appropriation by labor is not applicable after the invention of money; and is meant to show that the right to property is based on the right to life and self-preservation, and (2) that property arrangements after the introduction of money are justified primarily by utility rather than natural right, and (3) that the conditions created by the invention of money make the'regulation'of private property necessary for the preservation of mankind which is required by the law of nature.     

Innocents and Oracles: The Child as a Figure of Knowledge and Critique in the Middle-Class Philosophical Imagination

Abstract

This paper argues that the figure of the child performs a critical function for the middle-class social imaginary, representing both an essential "innocence" of the liberal individual, and an excluded, unconscious remainder of its project of control through the management of knowledge. While childhood is invested with affect and value, children's agency and opportunities for social participation are restricted insofar as they are seen both to represent an elementary humanity and to fall short of full rationality, citizenship and identity. The diverse permutations of this figure, as it develops in the middle-class imagination, are traced from the writings of John Locke to the films of Michael Haneke (via Charles Dickens and Henry James), to interrogate what this ambivalence regarding childhood reflects about middle-class, adult identity.     

On the political and democratic preconditions of equal recognition

Alan Patten’s Equal Recognition is a compelling justification of a liberal, procedural conception of recognition. This conception is built upon a convincing conception of moral equality, but it does not offer a full theoretical discussion of recognition. I argue that the liberal recognition provided by Patten is too formal and narrow to address all relevant issues regarding conflicts of recognition in democratic societies. In particular, it does not consider the political and democratic preconditions that should be granted to minority groups or immigrants in order to provide them fair opportunities to effectively (and not only formally) reach equal recognition.     

Strauss and 'Straussianism': From the Ancients to the Moderns?

Do scholars inspired by Leo Strauss adhere to, or diverge from, his teachings as they contribute to turn of the twenty-first-century American conservative thought and new conceptions of the American political executive and constitutional order? Analyzing Strauss' view of the twofold task of political philosophy, as well as his position that modern political philosophy inexorably leads to philosophic and moral crises, the scaffolding of Strauss' political outlook – and the dimensions of its contemporary relevance – will begin to take shape. Turning to the writings on America by many of Strauss' most notable students, we discover that most of them point back to the admittedly liberal theories of John Locke and the American founders as the starting point for defining a new conservative outlook that will address the problems of modernity. We are thus confronted by a quandary. How can an important current of Strauss-inspired scholarship put forth that the theories of Locke and the American founders provide the foundation for addressing a crisis that Strauss states is rooted in that very modernity? We will discover that the thought of Strauss and an important strand of Straussianism are not the same, because Strauss-inspired scholarship on America adheres to only a facet of Strauss' two-pronged political philosophy. Strauss, however, cannot disavow responsibility for these students and followers, who embrace an important current of his thinking.     

Locke, Darwin, and the American Science of Modern Virtue

American “progress” has typically been reconstructed in terms of the Lockean understanding of who we are. That “progress” is only ambiguously progress. It highlights the truth about our personal freedom, but at the expense of the truth about who we are as free and relational beings. So our Lockeanism receives and deserves Darwinian criticism—criticism from the point of view of the social animals evolutionary theory says we are. This article is a scientific prelude to our openness to a theory that incorporates what’s true about Locke, what’s true about Darwin, and more.     

Faces of Federalism: From Bullinger to Jefferson

This study argues that the eighteenth-century political philosophyof federalism found its roots in covenant theology of earlyReformed Protestantism in Zurich. It contends that there wasa progression covenant or federal thought from the first publishedarticulation of the theological covenant by Bullinger in 1534,through the use of the covenant notion in defense of tyrannicideby Philippe Mornay, to Johannes Althusius's political philosophyof federalism, as well as the political theories Thomas Hobbesand John Locke, to the Declaration of Independence and the Constitutionof the United States. These different faces or variations offederalism shared several common elements over the 250-yearspan.     

Tradition and Prudence in Locke's Exceptions to Toleration

Why did Locke exclude Catholics and atheists from toleration? Not, I contend, because he was trapped by his context, but because his prudential approach and practical judgments led him to traditional texts. I make this argument first by outlining the connections among prudential exceptionality, practical judgments, and traditional texts. I then describe important continuities between conventional English understandings of the relationship between state and religion and Locke's writings on toleration, discuss Locke's conception of rights, and illustrate his use of prudential exceptions and distinctions. I conclude by arguing that Locke's problems are relevant to assessing contemporary liberal discussions of toleration and the separation of state and religion that lean heavily on practical justifications.     

John Locke’s America

This essay argues that John Locke’s thought has been a significant influence on how Americans understand public life and that this remains true despite contemporary conservative arguments that Progressivism is ascendant while our Lockean founding is in retreat. Many of the things conservatives bemoan—same-sex marriage, for example—can be understood in Lockean terms. Moreover, Lockean individualism can be consistent with a robust sense of community. Yet it is striking that a most Lockean virtue—responsibility—is altogether missing from critical accounts of Locke’s influence on American politics and culture.     

Normative political theory,democratic politics and minority rights

In Equal Recognition, Alan Patten argues that in a proper relationship between normative political theory and democratic politics, we must make a clear distinction between two questions related to cultural rights: (a) authority (who should decide?) and (b) the substance of deliberation. The question he wants to explore, however, is not the authority question but the substantive question. The aim of this article is to show that an account of equal recognition cannot bracket out the democratic element. It argues, first, that Equal Recognition does not live up to its initial promise, as it contains a number of reflections and recommendations (on language rights, on secession, on the rights of migrants’ cultures) that either explicitly or implicitly include the democratic element. Second, it points at other important areas of political decision-making – such as electoral system design, districting, referendums, quotas – in which it is quite clear that in order to extend equal recognition to minority cultures, we are obliged to take decisions related to the design of democratic institutions.     

Lockean Self-Ownership: Towards a Demolition

Self-ownership is the moral principle that one ought to be left free to do whatever one chooses so long as non-consenting other persons are not thereby harmed, in specified ways. The principle is foundational for one tradition of political liberalism running from Locke to Nozick. This paper aims first to clarify this principle, in part by contrasting it with a kindred principle of 'self-benefit', and secondly to develop its implications for justified private property ownership. These implications are more meagre than is usually supposed. The principle is indeterminate in ways that undermine its claim to adequacy. Finally, further reasons for rejecting the self- ownership principle are suggested.     

Locke on the Moral Basis of International Relations

This article aims to focus analysis of Locke's theory of international relations away from the familiar discourse of sovereignty and natural law and toward a different discourse involving self-government and international society. It argues that Locke's conception of international society balanced interrelated, overlapping, and even competing claims about sovereignty and natural law in a normative framework in which the right of self-government replaced the principle of sovereignty as the moral basis of international relations. Thus, for Locke the norms deduced from the law of nature govern the international state of nature even as independent societies remain the primary executors of the law of nature in international society. The article concludes by considering how Locke's reflections on international relations may contribute to our understanding of contemporary debates about sovereignty, the use of force, and the ethics of intervention.     

Brandom on Norms and Objectivity

The aim of this paper is to investigate Brandom’s conception of the objectivity of norms. In Making It Explicit Brandom supports a weak notion of objectivity based on his understanding of the perspectival structure of linguistic practices. In his following works, he resorts to the Hegelian notion of recognition, adding a historical dimension to his account. I contend that this notion of objectivity can be successfully defended against the objections raised by the commentators. In particular, it does not jeopardise the same possibility of communication, as claimed by Habermas and others, unless a strongly objective notion of communication is assumed. However, the paradigm shift from a strong to a weak understanding of objectivity entails a consequent revision of the conception of social criticism.     

A Liberal Republican "Cato"

In recent years the polarized debate surrounding the relative influence of the liberal and classical republican traditions on the political thought of the Founding Fathers has abated somewhat. Trenchard and Gordon's Cato's Letters , however, seen predominantly as a classical republican text, continues to be misread, resulting in a misinterpretation of the way in which it may have been read by the Revolutionary era generation. This article presents, evaluates, and subsequently rejects the arguments in favor of viewing the work of Trenchard and Gordon within the framework of either a classical republican or a neo-roman tradition. It argues instead that the authors fall squarely within a liberal republican tradition, embracing Locke, Mandeville, Hume, and Smith and suggests that it was in this vein that they were read by the Founding Fathers .     

Michael Leifer and the balance of power

Abstract

In the work of the late Professor Michael Leifer few concepts are invoked more often than the balance of power. It was due to his reliance on this concept that Michael Leifer came to be widely regarded as an exponent of realism and an advocate of countervailing balance of power practices. By reviewing Leifer's own writings, this article not only re-examines the now almost standard interpretation of his work, but also investigates the significance of the balance of power in his scholarship in new ways. The first section identifies the two key meanings Leifer explicitly imputed to the balance of power. It also examines Leifer's arguments relative to what he perceived as changes in the balance of power. This will be done with reference to his analyses of the international politics of Southeast and East Asia in the Cold War and post-Cold War period. The second section extends the discussion on the particularities of Leifer's writings on the balance of power, but relates it specifically to the question of what Leifer's writings suggest about his theoretical home. His ability to demonstrate the significance of the balance of power as a political factor in the foreign policies of individual Southeast Asian states is the focus of the third section. Finally, the article builds on Leifer's empirical writings on the importance of psychological factors in relation to the balance of power as policy to take up theoretically important questions that he himself did not pursue, particularly about the extent to which the balance of power is the product of struggles for security and recognition. The article draws three conclusions. First, Leifer should be thought of not as a diehard advocate of conventional balance of power practices, but rather as a scholar broadly working within English School parameters who was deeply wedded to the idea that the balance of power is necessary to uphold regional order in international society in the context of the rise of a potentially hegemonic power. Second, one of the finest aspects of Leifer's scholarly legacy is to be found in his discussion of the balance of power factor in the foreign policies of Southeast Asian states. Third, Leifer should also be an inspiration to those interested in empirical work underlining the importance of struggles for recognition in the formation and practice of the balance of power.