Learning to Rise Peacefully? China and the security dilemma

The People's Republic of China's turbulent experience during the Cold War (1949–1991) has been followed by a remarkably tranquil period. Although conflict and crisis have certainly not been completely absent in the post-Cold War era, the PRC has managed to undertake three decades of ‘peaceful rise’ or ‘peaceful development’. What explains this remarkably peaceful great power ascent? Prominent scholars, such as Thomas Christensen and Iain Johnston, stress the utility of the security dilemma in understanding the PRC's security behavior since the end of the Cold War. Can the PRC's peaceful rise in recent decades be attributed to a realization of the centrality of the security dilemma in great power politics acquired during the Cold War? This paper concludes that the security dilemma does not seem central to China's thinking about its relations with other powers, including the United States.     

China and Major Power Relations in East Asia

Tremendous changes have taken place in East Asia in the post-Cold War era, which have a great impact on Chinese foreign policy and its relations with major powers in East Asia. This new power configuration is related to as 'two ups' and 'two downs', which have become apparent since the early 1990s. The 'two ups' concern the rise of the United States and China. The United States' rise to sole superpower status has given Washington a dominant role in all four dimensions of world affairs: political, strategic, economic, and technological/cultural. Meanwhile, China has achieved a spectacular economic performance for the past two decades, sustaining high growth rates, and escaping, so far, the Asian economic crisis of 1997‐98. This expansion has greatly increased China's influence in regional and global affairs. The 'two downs' refer to the downturns of Russia and Japan. This article provides a detailed analysis of China's international environment in the context of the changing dynamics of major-power relations in East Asia. Special attention is paid to the crucial Beijing‐Tokyo‐Washington triangle. The examination focuses upon political, economic, and strategic dimensions.     

The US Global Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era and Its Implications for China‐United States Relations: A Chinese perspective

At the early stage of the post-Cold War era, Chinese scholars put more attention into the study of US international standing than to the study of US global strategy. Around the middle of the 1990s, it became obvious for Chinese scholars that the power structure in the post-Cold War era was 'yi-chao-duo-qiang' (one super-power and several big powers). People realized that the leading position of the US would be unshakable and its comprehensive national power would be unparalleled by any single country in the foreseeable future. Since then, Chinese scholars have paid more attention to the study of US global strategy. Chinese scholars tend to agree that the Bush Administration's strategy was a transitional one, and that the US global strategy in the post-Cold War era came into being in the middle of President Clinton's first term. It is symbolized by the appearance of so-called 'engagement and enlargement strategy'. At the very beginning of his Administration (January 1993), President Clinton set forth that 'economy, security and democracy' would be the three pillars of US foreign policy. This greatly changed the traditional 'security first' strategy. The new strategy reflects some new features in the international and domestic contexts of the post-Cold War era. It has very important influences on Sino‐US relations.     

Four Contradictions Constraining China's Foreign Policy Behavior

Beijing's foreign policy behavior is constantly tested by a set of conflicting variables. China views itself as a major power and wants to play a role accordingly in the world arena, while it always lacks an adequate material basis to do so. The open-door policy requires China to be fully integrated into international society, while strong concern over sovereignty makes it difficult for Beijing to embrace some of the mainstream values. China believes in a set of principles in international affairs, while consideration of its national interests causes Beijing to make a pragmatic compromise from time to time. Beijing has long been accustomed to dealing with others in bilateral settings while the post-Cold War era is witnessing a rise of mulilateralism in international politics, which is bringing more and more pressure on China's traditional diplomacy. These variables will continue to constrain China's foreign policy behavior while their influence will decline as a result of rapid change with China both materially and conceptually.     

Limited Defensive Strategic Partnership: Sino–Russian rapprochement and the driving forces

The deepening rapprochement between China and Russia, those two formidable continental powers, constitutes one of the most noteworthy phenomena in post-Cold War world affairs. Through detailed investigation of this vital bilateral relationship over a variety of issue areas, we characterize the current Sino–Russian relations as a limited defensive strategic partnership, with strategicness constituting the core of the Sino–Russian relationship. More than that, we further argue that the Sino–Russian rapprochement is externally-driven rather than internally-driven. More specifically, realism's balance of power theory, or its variety balance of threat theory, provides a relatively convincing explanation regarding the increasingly strengthened Sino–Russian strategic partnership. In a roughly chronological way, this paper will demonstrate how America's increasing unilateralism in its foreign policy approaches was correlated with, and thus contributed to, the deepening rapprochement between China and Russia.     

Learning to Live with the Hegemon: evolution of China's policy toward the US since the end of the Cold War

This paper is designed to review China's efforts to adapt to the post-Cold War world dominated by the United States and to analyze the underlying factors that have shaped such efforts. It attempts to make three points: (1) the adaptation process has been an eventful and difficult one; (2) China's gradual appreciation of the new international reality, the daunting domestic challenges China faces, and China's growing awareness of the implications of its rise for its developmental prospects have helped shape its efforts of adaptation; and (3) in the foreseeable future, if the US does not treat China as an enemy and if the two countries can effectively manage the Taiwan problem, China is likely to continue its efforts to accommodate and cooperate with the US.     

How Do Americans Evaluate China's International Responsibility? An Empirical Assessment

China in recent years has been asked by other major powers to take a greater share in international responsibility in response to the rise in China's national capability. Negative perceptions about how China is dodging its international responsibility exist not only among policy makers around the world, but have spread to worldwide mass publics, especially across the American people. In this article, we apply the dataset from the ‘Americans’ Attitudes toward China Survey' (AACS) to investigate what the American public think of China's international responsibility and which factors explain the varying evaluations from different theoretical perspectives. The results indicate that Americans' negative evaluations of China's international responsibility are associated with poor ratings regarding China's fulfillment of its domestic obligations and apprehension regarding China's potential threat, but has little to do with China's international behavior. To reduce these negative evaluations, China needs to improve its human rights conditions, give people more political rights, and convince the American public of the benevolence of its ascending power. In addition, persistent efforts toward soft-power construction are also very important since Americans who are interested in Chinese culture or knowledge tend not to think that China is dodging its international responsibility.     

China's Move to Preferential Trading: a new direction in China's diplomacy

China was a latecomer to the preferential trading bandwagon that has swept East Asia in the years since the financial crises. The Chinese government was unwilling to go down the path of negotiating bilateral and minilateral agreements until the terms of its accession to the World Trade Organization were finalized. Since then, it has become one of the most active participants in the negotiation of preferential trading arrangements, currently being engaged in negotiations with more than 20 countries. The paper will address the following questions about China's move to preferential trade: (a) What forces are driving China's approach to the negotiation of preferential trade agreements? (b) To what extent is it possible to untangle economic and political motivations in China's choice of partners for PTA negotiations? And, which economic interests are being pursued most aggressively? (c) How are conflicting domestic interests reconciled in the policy-making process? (d) To what extent will the new PTAs facilitate Chinese-dominated production networks in the regions? (e) What overall impact will the PTAs have on the Chinese economy?     

A New Model of Big Power Relations? China–US strategic rivalry and balance of power in the Asia–Pacific

Exploring the causes of the China–US strategic rivalry and its possible mitigation, this article argues that President Xi's new model of big power relations represents a challenge to the US primacy in the Asia–Pacific based on China's rising power and deeply rooted suspicion of the US containment. But neither the US nor China can be the single dominant power in the region. The new model can be built only if China and the US demonstrate a strategic restraint and maintain a delicate balance of power to prevent their rivalry from boiling over into a new Cold War.     

Leading change through collaborative partnerships: a profile of leadership and capacity among local public health leaders

Collaborative partnerships have grown in prominence as vehicles for systems change and organizational development among a network of organizations, particularly in the complex field of public health. Likewise, supporting the functioning and effectiveness of collaborative partnerships has become a key interest among organizational development scholars and community psychologists alike. In the question of capacity-building, no aspect of collaborative capacity has received greater attention than that of leadership. Research on collaborative partnerships has highlighted the importance of shared leadership while at the same time acknowledging that specific individuals do and often must emerge and assume more prominent roles in the partnership in order for the work of the partnership to move forward. However, we have limited knowledge of these key individuals and the roles that they play in non-hierarchical, voluntary partnerships. The present study is a comparative case study of prominent leaders in three regional public health partnerships. The aim of this investigation is to explore the questions: (1) What does it mean to be a leader in a context where no one is "in charge?" (2) What roles do those individuals identified as leaders play?, and (3) What are the specific capacities that enable the enactment of these roles? We find that those viewed as leaders by their partnerships shared a similar profile both in the range and types of roles they play and the capacities that enable them to carry out these roles. Further, we find that while individual attributes such as passion, knowledge, and leadership skills are important, some of the most prominent capacities are rooted in the organizational and institutional contexts within which the leader is nested.     

Locating Transition: the prospect for a US–China transition in Asia

In charting the water of the post-Cold War world, one of the most prominent questions touches upon the likely effects of China's rise. Echoing more or less explicitly power transition theory's assumptions, the rapid and multifaceted ascent of China has popularized the idea of a likely overtaking of the American dominant power by the rising challenger. Sceptics have, however, pointed out that by most standards China remains far from being on a par with the United States. This paper argues that though a global power transition lies far beyond the horizon, the relevant level at which the transition should be considered is the East Asian region, or the Asian ‘super-region’.     

China Goes to Africa: a strategic move?

Entering the twenty-first century, particularly under the reign of Hu Jintao, China began to pursue an increasingly pro-active diplomacy in Africa. Most analysis on China's offensive diplomacy in Africa focuses on Beijing's thirst for energy and raw materials, and for economic profits and benefits. That is why it is often called ‘energy diplomacy’ or ‘economic diplomacy’ as if China, just like Japan in the 1980s, became another ‘economic animal’. But if one looks at the history of the PRC's foreign policy, Beijing has seldom pursued its diplomacy from purely economic considerations. Is this time any different? This article exams China's diplomacy in Africa from a strategic and political perspective such as its geo-strategic calculations, political and security ties with African countries, peacekeeping and anti-piracy efforts in the region, support for African regionalism, etc. It argues that China's diplomatic expansion in Africa, while partially driven by its need for economic growth, cannot be fully understood without taking into consideration its strategic impulse accompanying its accelerating emergence as a global power. Africa is one of China's diplomatic ‘new frontiers’ as exemplified by new Chinese leader Xi Jinping's maiden foreign trip to Africa in 2013.     

A tragedy of history: The Chinese search for democracy in the twentieth century∗

Lloyd E. Eastman suggested that, “Because of the nature of Chinese society and of its political traditions, it is perhaps one of China's tragedies during the twentieth century that, in the quest for a viable political system, attempts had been made to erect democratic institutions.” Is Eastman's statement too pessimistic? And why has the tragedy recurred? This paper tries to answer these questions by examining some major events in the Chinese search for democracy.     

China's Evolving Views of the Korean–American Alliance, 1953–2012

This article reconstructs an ideational trajectory in which China's views of the Korean–American alliance evolved during the last 60 years. The article first surveys China's general policy toward alliance and alliance-making. The article then traces the evolutionary path of Chinese views in the following four periods: (1) the Cold War era (1950s–1960s); (2) transformative years (early 1970s–mid-1990s); (3) the period of a strained alliance (late 1990s–late 2000s); and (4) an era of great reversal (late 2000s–present). Principally, the article suggests that China's view of the Korean–American alliance was intense antagonism during the Cold War era, although it was significantly watered down during the transformative years of Sino–South Korean rapprochement. With the normalization of relations between Beijing and Seoul in 1992 and a decade of progressive rule (1998–2007) in South Korea, China's view encompassed some wishful thinking about a gradually diluted alliance. The strong comeback of the conservatives in South Korean politics since 2008, however, shattered such optimism and re-awoke Beijing to some cold realities. China's view of the Korea–American alliance may grow more negative in tandem with US–China relations, irrespective of the official rhetoric of sovereignty regarding alliance and alliance-making.     

Soldiers,statesmen, strategic culture and China's 1950 intervention in Korea

Is China a rational, peaceful, and defensive‐minded power or an irrational, bellicose, and expansionist state? Are Chinese soldiers more hawkish than Chinese statesmen? Many analysts remark on the growing influence in foreign affairs of the PLA in the post‐Deng era. There is no consensus, however, on what this increasing influence will mean in practice. This article analyzes the attitudes of civilian and military figures toward Beijing's 1950 intervention in Korea and concludes that soldiers are no more hawkish than statesmen and, in many instances, less so. The findings suggest that China's strategic culture does not embody a single tradition and that civil‐military relations exert considerable influence on decisions to initiate war. All this indicates that the growing influence of the military does not necessarily mean a more bellicose China.     

Hong Kong in United States‐China relations: The international politics of Hong Kong's reversion to Chinese sovereignty

This article examines the implications of the political transition of Hong Kong on US‐China relations in strategic, political and economic dimensions. It evaluates the impact of Hong Kong's changing status in the context of the engagement‐containment debate on China policy in the US. It suggests that US concerns over questions such as democracy and human rights and China's rejection of foreign interference’ in Hong Kong would turn the territory into a source of political conflict between the US and China. Finally it points out that any major trade confrontation between the two countries would have serious implications for the territory. The article concludes by arguing that if Hong Kong could continue to be a prosperous and free society with a global outlook, it would facilitate China's integration with the global community, but if a reversion to authoritarian rule occurred in Hong Kong, US‐China relations will be aversely affected.     

The Lion and the Dragon: A view on Singapore‐China relations

This paper starts with some observations about developments of the post-Cold War era and their impact on Sino‐ASEAN and Sino‐Singaporean relations. It then surveys the relations between Singapore and China in the 1990s. The focus is on the establishment of official ties in 1990 and the economic interactions between the two sides in the last decade. Having surveyed the relations, the paper examines some of the problems for the promotion of closer cooperation. It notes the difference in the working style of both sides. In this regard, it deals specifically with the Suzhou Industrial Park and highlights the lessons that could be drawn from such a joint venture. The paper concludes by noting that Sino‐Singaporean cooperation has been broadened to include defence, cultural and educational exchanges and the relationship will be more realistic and mature in the twenty-first century.     

China's Defense White Papers: a critical appraisal

China's defense white papers have long been dismissed as lacking substance and offering little useful information on China's real strategic intentions and military capabilities. Nevertheless, since 1998 Beijing has continued to issue defense white papers on a regular two-year frequency. Indeed, in recent years it has accorded greater importance to these documents. This paper argues that China's defense white papers warrant more attention than they have received so far. An examination of the making of the white papers, the functions designated for these documents and their evolving content and structure reveals not only the different nature and purpose of the Chinese white papers compared with their counterparts in Western countries, but also important changes and continuities in China's strategic outlook and its evolving perceptions of the role of the use of force in the context of the country's re-emergence as a major player in international affairs.     

Chinese Employee Class: an analysis using a three-dichotomy segmentation approach

As the ‘World's Factory’, China now has the biggest worker/employee class in the world. Though this newly emerging social group has captured much attention, relatively few scholars have paid attention to such sociological questions as raised by this paper: rather than referring to such a huge group of almost 500 million people simply as ‘Chinese workers’ or ‘Chinese employees’, can this social class be stratified and in what way? What is the current situation of the employee class in China's contemporary industrial relations? This paper attempts to concisely answer the above questions by proposing a three dichotomy segmentation approach and a review of the existing literature on the matter, providing a broader picture to the readers with regards to the current situations of different employee groups in the context of China's unprecedented transitional economy.