Comparing Jiang Zemin's Impatience with Hu Jintao's Patience Regarding the Taiwan Issue, 1989–2012

Although the essence of China's Taiwan policy has not changed from the era of Jiang Zemin to the present, the era of Hu Jintao, Jiang's and Hu's attitudes are different. Jiang was impatient with the delay in the unification of China and Taiwan, talking about timetables for unification; however, Hu has so far been patient, saying that he is not afraid of delaying unification. The purpose of this paper is to explain why their attitudes are different. I argue that two factors combine to result in Jiang's impatience and Hu's patience: conflicting ‘perceptions of Taiwan's domestic politics and Taiwan's China policy’ and differing ‘perceptions of the US behavior and attitude regarding Taiwan’.     

China's Foreign Military Relations with Asia‐Pacific

The People's Liberation Army has always had a significant role in shaping and implementing the People's Republic of China's foreign policies. Over the past two decades, the PLA's role has increased considerably, and is likely to become even more important in the future as China develops its military capabilities and casts a broader shadow in the Asia‐Pacific region. The PLA's foreign relations program has several goals: to shape the international security environment in support of key Chinese national security objectives; to improve political and military relations with foreign countries; to enhance China's military and defense industry modernization; to provide military assistance to countries in the developing world; and, to acquire knowledge in modern military doctrine, operations, training, military medicine, administration, and a host of non-combat related areas. The PLA seeks to accomplish these goals through its military attache´ offices abroad and the use of an elaborate system of bilateral exchanges. Of these programs, the most visible relations involve high-level visits, functional exchanges, arms purchases, and ship visits.     

The Role of the Military in the PRC Taiwan Policymaking: A case study of the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-1996

This article examines the role of the military in the structure and process of PRC policy formulation on Taiwan through a case study of the military's involvement in, and influence on, Beijing's policymaking in the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-1996. The military has its own vital interests in Taiwan policy, which are embodied in three aspects: preservation of the military's political privilege, military build-up for modernisation drives, and more budgetary resources for defence. This article proposes that the PRC leadership succession problem together with the military's leverage accounted for the outbreak of the crisis. Under pressure, Jiang Zemin had to accept the plan of physically intimidating Taiwan to gain the military's support in consolidating his position as Deng Xiaoping's successor.     

Soldiers,statesmen, strategic culture and China's 1950 intervention in Korea

Is China a rational, peaceful, and defensive‐minded power or an irrational, bellicose, and expansionist state? Are Chinese soldiers more hawkish than Chinese statesmen? Many analysts remark on the growing influence in foreign affairs of the PLA in the post‐Deng era. There is no consensus, however, on what this increasing influence will mean in practice. This article analyzes the attitudes of civilian and military figures toward Beijing's 1950 intervention in Korea and concludes that soldiers are no more hawkish than statesmen and, in many instances, less so. The findings suggest that China's strategic culture does not embody a single tradition and that civil‐military relations exert considerable influence on decisions to initiate war. All this indicates that the growing influence of the military does not necessarily mean a more bellicose China.     

An Emerging Consensus on the US Threat: the United States according to PLA officers

Though the PLA elite perceptions of the United States have fluctuated over time, there has been some regularity in the evolution of their perceptions. Comparing the dominant perceptions of the United States among different generations of Chinese military elites in the PRC, we find that the PLA elite perceptions of US intentions have been foremost influenced by China's strategic interest in a certain period, rather than the level and intensity of bilateral exchanges at the time. Using the case of US arms sales to Taiwan and the case of the South China Sea and the Diaoyu Islands, we try to assess how consistent and persistent PLA elite perceptions of the US have been in recent years. While we agree that these outspoken military men cannot be taken on the surface as indicative of China's national policies, we will also point out several important dimensions that are likely to allow the PLA to play a more influential role in setting the agenda for China's strategic interest in the era of Xi Jinping.     

Sino‐Japanese Relations

China's relations with Japan over the past several decades have been cyclical, with periods of relative cordiality interspersed with episodes of contention. Since 1995, however, the Beijing leadership has perceived a hardening of attitudes on the Japanese side in ways that are inimical to long-term amicable relations with the People's Republic of China. This has been mirrored in Tokyo, which sees Chinese behavior as increasingly provocative. The policy directions of the two states appear more divergent as well. Periodic slight thaws in relations and numerous joint projects notwithstanding, the problems between the two defy easy solution, and may be intractable. Weak leadership in both countries may encourage extremists in each to become more assertive.     

The Tenacious Tributary System

Recently, some writers on Chinese foreign relations have argued that the tributary system is a useful concept for describing imperial China's relations with its neighbors, and that it can even serve as a model for the future of international relations in East Asia. An examination of China's historical practice of foreign relations shows that there was no systematic tributary system, but instead multiple relationships of trade, military force, diplomacy and ritual. Furthermore, China's neighbors did not accept the imperial center's definition of hierarchy and subordination, but interpreted ritual relationships in their own way. Even in the 1930s, when scholars invoked Chinese history to advocate peaceful relations, they recognized the importance of military force, colonial settlement and domination in East Asian state relationships. The current myth of the tributary system ignores historical reality and misleads us about China's true position in East Asia and the world.     

Sino–Russian Relations at the Start of the New Millennium in Central Asia and Beyond

Sino–Russian relations have swayed considerably in the second millennium. During the Yeltsin era, China–Russia relations were still strong, but this changed abruptly after Putin's accession to the presidency in 2000 and his initial pro-Western adventures. This was, in no small part, due to Russia's involvement in the war on terror, together with Russia's complicity in a US military presence in Central Asia which did not go down well in Beijing. Putin's domestic constituency found his swing into Washington's fold equally awkward, which created no small amount of criticism in Russia. Convinced that things could not get much worse, Putin's acceptance of NATO's expansion into the Baltics, his approval of US withdrawal from the ABM-treaty, and his quiet consent for an American military presence in Georgia raised additional fears in the Duma, within Russian public opinion, and to some extent among the Chinese. This was perceived as a direct surrender to American superiority and aggression, and it would not last for long.     

The PLA and Diplomacy: unraveling myths about the military role in foreign policy making

The PLA's role in Beijing's foreign policy-making process is a closed book but it is a key research topic in our study of Chinese diplomacy. This paper argues that generally the PLA abides by a fine division of labor with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) in managing Beijing's international pursuits. The civilians are in charge of China's generic foreign affairs and daily diplomacy. The Central Military Commission (CMC) is responsible for security/military-related foreign affairs and defines the bottom-line for employing force in conflicts. Institutionally the PLA's role is more directional than detailed and is often behind the scenes. This complicates our research of the subject matter, as the line between this division of labor is thin over many diplomatic issues. Often times it is hard to demarcate where Beijing's normal diplomacy ends and where security/military dynamics begin. This paper adopts a two-layered analysis on civil–military interaction on foreign and security affairs: the broad consensus of CCP–PLA leaders on CCP regime stability at a time of drastic domestic change and world pressure; and the PLA's directional role in China's security/military-related foreign affairs under a generic civilian guidance.     

A dangerous game: Deng and the intellectuals

This article examines one aspect of China's “second revolution” led by Deng Xiaoping: the relationship between the post‐Mao leadership and the intellectuals, who were the most persecuted during the “Cultural Revolution.” When Deng took power in 1978, one tough challenge was to mobilize China's well‐educated men and women for the nation's modernization. New policies toward them were introduced to rekindle their enthusiasm in creative and critical academic activities. The anticipation of a new period of cooperation between the authorities and the intellectuals was, however, dashed by the bloodshed in Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989. Why did Deng, who sought the support of Chinese intellectuals for his modernization program, side with the Party's hard‐liners to order the military crackdown on pro‐democracy demonstrations? Will China's post‐Mao leadership no longer need the intellectuals’ help? This article argues that the Communist Party of China has been playing “a dangerous game of cooperation” with the intellectuals. Despite the tragic events, the game is likely to continue as long as the CCP proceeds with its modernization program and the intellectuals maintain their sense of mission. What remains uncertain is how the next round of game will be played out and who will emerge as the winner.     

Sino‐US security relations: The PLA factor

Sino‐US security relations have evolved into a very complex and often precarious military relationship. The influence of the People's Liberation Army in China's national security strategy and foreign policy formulation is on the rise. The United States has begun to prepare for a strong and vociferous Chinese military by addressing this trend especially within the areas of China's nuclear programme, Asian disputes over territorial claims, and the Chinese military's modernization programme.     

Patron–Client Politics in Hong Kong: a case study of the 2002 and 2005 Chief Executive elections

The Chief Executive's (CE's) relationship with Beijing is bound to entail a patron-client network, for Beijing has to confirm, endorse and announce the CE's official appointment after a local electoral process where the CE is elected by the 800-man Election Committee, a ‘small circle’ electoral method that is favourable to maintain patron-client relations. In other words, a skilful manipulation of patron-client relations can help to secure electoral success. Still, the candidate has to build up a stable reciprocal relationship with the voters to consolidate their sense of client list recognition to maintain loyalties by means of offering material or non-material benefits the clients need, or even seeking assistance from the patron Beijing. Nevertheless, such exchange of benefits sometimes may not be so successful as to earn the loyalties of all, especially the pro-democracy and voters with different political ideology. Further, the dyadic relations and loyalties of a patron's clients can shift between patrons so that one's patron can also become another's client, like the incumbent CE Donald Tsang who is the client of Beijing but also the patron of all his political appointees, and the former CE Tung Chee-hwa, who was the client of Beijing especially the former President Jiang Zemin, but Tung himself was the patron of many Hong Kong elites coopted to the various institutions and positions. Finally, Beijing's obsession with maintaining effective of indirect control over the HKSAR polity by ordaining the actual choice of a CE and hence the resulting non-contested CE elections of 2002 and 2005 in which open nominations of CE candidates were conducted but the secret balloting for the qualified candidates was not held at all. In short, while voters may become the clients of Beijing, candidates may also seek to become the client list supporter of the central government. Patron-client relation is arguably the hallmark of the insider politics in CE elections.     

简论三代领导集体的人才战略

以毛泽东、邓小平、江泽民同志为核心的三代中央领导集体一贯高度重视人才问题 ,他们始终把人才问题纳入政治经济、社会发展、强国富民的总体发展战略 ,他们就人才的地位、标准、选拔、使用、培养、激励等方面都提出了一系列具有战略意义的精辟论述 ,他们的人才思想既立足于中国革命和建设的实际情况 ,又高瞻远瞩 ,与时俱进 ,不断地丰富和发展。形成了一整套指导中国革命和建设的行之有效的人才思想体系     

Making sense of war games in the Taiwan Strait

China's missile tests in March 1996 reflected a changing leadership consensus on the Taiwan issue. Although the goal to achieve reunification through peaceful means remains the basis for the consensus, there has emerged a new mainstream opinion that peaceful overture alone has become inadequate to reach the goal. This is especially true when Taiwan is believed to have acquired military technological edge over the PLA. The new policy direction is mainly a response to the evolving political situation in Taiwan. Yet it has also been driven by the dynamics of China's domestic politics which has entered the last stage of power transfer. Under the circumstances different party leaders and political institutions may have different stakes in such a risk endeavor but at the end of the day they have accorded their support to the policy change. As a result, their judgment on the missile tests in March has been one of success. This paper shows the reasons why they believe so.     

Chapter 12

Abstract

This study examined the perspectives and definition of leadership by women and mothers with children (n= 40) affiliated with Oxford Houses, a communal mutual-help recovery setting. Participants were asked questions relating to their experiences living in an Oxford House including the strengths and challenges encountered and how leadership impacted the stability in their house. Results illustrated the value of female leadership and highlighted the characteristics deemed important for women leaders in Oxford House, as well as some differences between these women's perception of leadership and the standard definition of leadership. The implications of the findings and how they may be useful to women's and mothers' with children houses are discussed.     

Nationalism,Ideology and China's ‘Fourth Generation’ Leadership

This paper examines the extent to which China's ‘Fourth generation’ leadership might be inclined to place a greater emphasis on nationalist rhetoric both in China's international relations and in domestic policy. It explores two different views of nationalism, namely state-centred and popular. With the decline in the public impact of official ideology, the Party–state has given tacit recognition to nationalism as one potential source of regime legitimisation. However, this article argues that by placing the Party at the centre of the official discourse the state-centred view of nationalism restricts the extent to which the Party–state can mobilise nationalist symbolism in support of its leadership and makes the Party vulnerable to criticism from more popular conceptions of nationalism. The priority given to developing the economy means China's leaders must downplay popular criticism which can focus on the negative consequences of China's growing interaction with the wider world. Under China's ‘Fourth generation’ leadership this tension may deepen. China's new leadership are unlikely to resort to ‘wrapping themselves in the flag’ as some commentators have suggested.     

China's Rise in Southeast Asia: implications for the United States

During the past few decades, China's economic success has permitted it to pursue a greater role on the international stage. China is recognized both as a regional and aspiring global power. Nowhere is this more evident than within Southeast Asia, where China's more active diplomacy is reflected in growing trade relations, proposals for stronger security ties, and the signing of numerous cooperative agreements on issues as varied as environmental protection, drug trafficking, and public health. As a whole, the region has received China's activism with both enthusiasm and trepidation. China has expended significant effort to assuage the fears of its neighbors by adopting a foreign policy approach that is active, non-threatening, and generally aligned with the economic and security interests of the region. This positive diplomacy has clearly yielded some success, most notably in the trade realm, where China is rapidly emerging as an engine of regional economic growth and integration that may well challenge Japanese and American dominance in the next three to five years. In the security realm, China's diplomacy, while rhetorically appealing to regional actors, has yet to make significant inroads in a regional security structure dominated by the United States and its bilateral security relationships. Most significantly, however, if China is to emerge as a real leader within Southeast Asia, it will also need to assume more of the social and political burden that leadership entails. As China continues to advance itself as a regional leader, its policies on issues such as health, drugs, the environment and human rights will face additional scrutiny not only for their impact on the region but also for the more profound question they raise concerning the potential of China's moral leadership. For the United States, China's greater presence and activism suggest at the very least that it cannot remain complacent about the status quo that has governed political, economic and security relations for the past few decades. Shared leadership within Southeast Asia will likely include China in the near future, with all the potential benefits and challenges that such leadership will entail.     

Re-interpreting China's Non-intervention Policy towards Myanmar: leverage,interest and intervention

China's non-intervention policy has long been criticized for prolonging the rule of many authoritarian regimes. Myanmar has become one of the classic examples. As China is expected to become a responsible great power, her behavioral patterns have aroused many concerns. This paper aims to re-interpret China's non-intervention policy. While explaining various constraints on China's capability to intervene in the Myanmar government, it shows how China is making efforts to seek a new intervention policy in dealing with countries like Myanmar. It argues that China's insistence on a non-intervention policy does not mean that China does not want to influence other countries such as Myanmar. To assess Chinese leverage and its non-intervention policy toward Myanmar as well as to supplement the current limited academic discussion on Sino–Myanmar relations, in this paper we first examine Chinese leverage in Myanmar through Burmese local politics, such as the power struggle between the central government and local rebel governments. Second, we disaggregate the Chinese interests in Myanmar into different levels (regional, geo-strategic and international) and discuss how these interests affect China's non-intervention policy. Third, we argue that China has indeed tried to intervene in Myanmar politics, but in a softer manner that contrasts with the traditional Western hard interventions, such as economic sanctions and military interference.     

The Sichuan Earthquake and the Heavenly Mandate: legitimizing Chinese rule through disaster discourse

In the aftermath of the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, the Chinese authorities launched a major public relations campaign to relay positive images of their relief effort and strengthen their political legitimacy. The effect has been a proliferation of symbols and political statements related to the disaster, not only in the official media, but also in cultural products such as movies or mass-media events. The earthquake has become part of the discourse of suffering, struggle, solidarity and ultimately victory. This article examines the ways in which various cultural products present the Sichuan earthquake and asks what meanings national crises have in the Chinese discourse on political legitimacy. The article analyses two cases: Chinese film, here in the form of Feng Xiaogang's blockbuster Aftershock, and performance-based discourses during the Beijing Olympics, the PRC's 60-Year Anniversary and the Shanghai Expo. By conducting a discourse analysis, we show how the earthquake has become part of a recurring discursive formation that is used by state and non-state actors alike to legitimate China's developmental model. Within this discourse, the leadership of the Party, the mastery of free markets and a revamped version of the Confucian idea of benevolent rule are marshaled as the decisive factors for winning any ‘battle’.     

Informed Nationalism: military websites in Chinese cyberspace

This article focuses on the so-called ‘military websites’ in Chinese cyberspace to examine the complexity of contemporary Chinese nationalism. By pointing out the fact that the majority of members of military websites are well educated and well informed, yet nationalistic and anti-Western, the author argues that the key factor in shaping their nationalist thinking is the formation of a new interest-driven game-playing paradigm in the past two decades which the Chinese use to interpret national policies and international relations today. Ironically, much of the new interpretative framework has been borrowed from Western concepts and ideas, including Comprehensive National Power, National Interests, and Rules of the Game. Equipped with this new paradigm to interpret the received information and look at the world, the more informed Chinese are the more nationalist they may be, as demonstrated by the responses to the plane bugging incident by Chinese net surfers.